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Deleted ScenesDeleted Scene #27Chapter Seven: The Myths We MakeSection: The Myth of American EmpireCommentary: This last and twenty-seventh "deleted scene" was to be my original truncated ending to the section. Since this section was originally developed as the last section for the last full chapter, I clearly was feeling the endgame coming on when I penned this (which makes it a fitting final deleted scene, yes?). Mark Warren rightfully forced me to write a better and longer ending to the section once we put this as tail-end Charley for Chapter 7. I include it here because I like the bit about "Where are today's 'wise men'?" Deleted Scene: Where are Today's "Wise Men"?[TEXT BEGINS] Where are these potential "wise men" of today? These men and women are, unfortunately, far more likely to be found in the national security community than in diplomatic circles, which under Truman was the source of the George Kennans of that age. But more than half a century of the Cold War's static quo seems to have left the State Department bereft of that sort of grand strategic talent, thus putting the Defense Department in the driver's seat by default. I say that with self-conscious irony, because I realize I am trying to sell both my ideas and myself in a grand strategic package. But my frustrations with the Bush Administration's inability to sell what I am certain is its underlying vision is reflected in my realization that I do not extend the administration's lack of vision much with my own. However, it is my fervent hope that my faults as a Pentagon-derived grand strategist will inspire others more qualified from the other side of the Potomac River to extend the arguments presented here. I do not say out of false modesty, but out of fear. The terminology that I prefer to describe a future worth creating employs the phrases "Globalization III" and "Globalization IV." This numbering scheme (through III) comes from the World Bank, and yet such phrases are rarely found in the strategic commentary of our day. Instead, the talk of prominent newspaper columnists and op-ed pundits is of "World War III" or "World War IV," and that imagery troubles me greatly. The mindset of the World Bank official does not see the world of security for what it truly is, and increasingly, I fear the mindset of the national security commentator does not see the world of economics for what it truly is. This inability to speak a strategic language that encompasses both the worlds of security and economics is the Achilles' heel of our current national debate, and the frequent misuse of the term "empire" only signals bad things about where this dialogue is heading. The world needs a better effort from America in coming years, but just as importantly, it needs a better explanation of what that effort seeks to achieve. To the extent that this volume facilitates that explanation, I have achieved my personal goals in writing it. [TEXT ENDS] |
Putnam, 2004 |
