ARTICLE: Experts Advise Bush Not to Reduce Troops: President Looking Beyond Study Group's Plan, By Michael A. Fletcher and Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post, December 12, 2006; Page A01

ARTICLE: To Stem Iraqi Violence, U.S. Aims to Create Jobs, By Josh White and Griff Witte, Washington Post, December 12, 2006; Page A01

You might think the "more bodies" argument from the military experts should hold sway, but instead read the far more stunning article that says our personnel in Iraq are finally going to prioritize job creation like crazy. Be amazed to read about the 200 factories the CPA closed, helping create a 70 percent unemployment rate that fuels the insurgency and sectarian strife today. Listen to Pete Chiarelli, who cracked this code on infrastructure and utilities during his first tour, say that more jobs beats more soldiers right now.

I wrote this so long ago I can't even tell you which book it appeared in: "Jobs are the exit strategy in Iraq."

Flabbergasting to think how little priority this goal has received up to now. Few things describe the crux of our postwar occupation better.

POST: Ahmadinejad May Be Heading for His First Major Political Defeat, by Amir Taheri, Arab News

TM has been tracking this election with a lot of concern, saying it could portend much about Iran's future. He was right, but his pessimism seems--as both of us are glad to note now--unfounded (knock on wood!).

Ahmadinejad is like Iran's Gingrich: very exciting trajectory but unlikely to last long.

TM, originator (for me at least) of the phrase soft-kill, is now feeling more optimistic.

Let that be a lesson for him and others in the same way the USSR's rapid collapse was for this (still) recovering Soviet scholar.

There are many ways to skin the cat--or the Gap, for that matter.

I think we're not anticipating success effectively enough with Iran. We may be under the delusion that our hard stance is holding sway, but it's really the Iranian people themselves delivering the change (no pretense on direct electoral power, but read between the lines and note how the mullahs do note the social signals from below), thus they remain the essential target of the soft-kill strategy (which works already far more than we realize, so cut off from Iran are we!).

Thanks to TM for sending this in.

SOURCE: Department of Energy's International Energy Outlook 2006, found online at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/oil.html

The IEO is always to be taken with a grain of salt, especially the long projections into the future. What is more interesting is how the numbers in current years and in the deep out-years change by issue. For example, until recently, both North America (basically the U.S.) and Asia took larger percentages of the Persian Gulf's oil (closer to two-thirds for Asia and closer to one-fifth for North America). Now each is down quite a bit (Asia takes just over 50% and North America a mere 11%). Who's picking up the slack?

Non-OECD ROW, which translates roughly as the oil-importing Gap (Non-Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development Rest-of-World). The oil-importing Gap accounted for a whopping 26% of Persian Gulf exports in 2003 (the year of last measure; or 5.9 of 22.5mbd), but will see that percentage drop to about 22% in 2030 (7.4 of 34.3mbd), due largely to Asia's growth.

The key numbers as I cull them:

-->North America takes 11% of PG's oil in 2003 (2.5 of 22.5mbd, or millions of barrels a day) and will take 10% in 2030 (3.5 of 34.3mbd)

-->Asia, both OECD and developing, took 50 percent of PG oil in 2003 (11.4 of 22.5mbd), and will take 58% in 2030 (20 of 34.3mbd)

-->Viewed from the perspective of the importer, the PG accounts for 19% of North America's imports in 2003 (2.5 of 13.5mbd), and in 2030 the PG will account for 18% (3.5 of 19.4mbd)

-->The PG accounts for 63% of Asian imports (and 32% of China's mere 2.8mbd) in 2003 (11.4 of 18mbd) and will account for the same percentage in 2030 (20 of 31.5). The percentage of China's imports from the PG will rise dramatically from 32% in 2003 (0.9 of 2.8mbd) to 53% in 2030 (5.8 of 10.9mbd). And yes, that means China's imports will more than triple between 2003 and 2030.

-->Africa OPEC (west and north) exports 1.7mbd to North America in 2003 and will export the same absolute number in 2030. China's total 0.3mbd in 2003 will rise to 1.6mbd in 2030, or basically our equal. In 2003 China and North America both get about 12% of their imports from Africa. In 2030, the projection says that share will drop to about 8% for North America, but rise to 15% for China.

-->The PG accounts for 43% of world trade in 2003 (22.5 of 52.8mbd), and that share is predicted to rise to just 44% in 2030 (34.3 of 77.3mbd).

-->Non-OECD (New Core + Gap) sucked down 20.4mbd in 2003, but will see that amount rise to 37.3mbd by 2030, a jump from 39% of global imports to 48%. In absolute terms, an increase of 83%. Developing Asia, viewed alone, accounts for most of that growth, jumping from 9.9mbd to 22.3 (or from 19% of the world's imports to 29%).

What does this say?

Europe and America together take about 20% of the PG's oil today, whereas Asia takes half and the ROW gets 30%. In 2030 the West proper will take about the same 20%, while Asia takes out almost 60% and the ROW makes do on about 20%.

Europe is more dependent on the PG than the U.S. is. In 2003 it accounted for 25% of Europe's imports and in 2030 that percentage will rise to 28%. North America will sit steady at just under 20% of its imports from the Middle East (with the true U.S. percent closer to about 15%, according to other sources.)

The U.S. Energy Information Administration says that for 2005, total U.S. oil supply broke down as follows: 55% from North America and 12% from South America. Another 14% from Africa and 4% from Europe/Russia. The Middle East accounted for 15%.

Looking at it this way, I would say about 70% of U.S. oil comes from pretty stable places (I know, Chavez talks, but he still sells), with only 30 percent coming from the Middle East and Africa. Judging by these projections, that percentage will stay roughly the same in the future.

Meanwhile, you could say China's imports are over 40% dependent on the Middle East and Africa today (43%), with that percentage rising to almost 70% dependent (68%) in 2030.

So to sum up, U.S. dependency on foreign oil is about 70-30 safe-to-unsafe today, and that will likely remain stable in coming years. China's, however, is about 60-40 safe-to-unsafe today, reversing to about 70-30 unsafe-to-safe in 2030.

I like a nice 70-30 split, you know, like the Chinese like to grade Mao and Stalin--as in, 70 percent good, 30 percent bad.

Here ends my data diddling. Gotta start the Fast Company piece.

ARTICLE: For Iraq's Sunnis, Conflict Closes In: Mixed Neighborhoods Unravel as Shiite Militiamen Expand Violence, By Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post, December 11, 2006; Page A01

This is a sign that the Balkans-backward scenario unfolds (dictator toppled, then sectarian strife leading to effective splits). Experts keep saying this is unacceptably bloody, but this is the default pathway earned by the Sunnis and Baathists--the same narrowing choice forced upon the Serbs.

And once Sunniland becomes the playground for the jihadists,then the Big Bang would be restarted, with "moderate" Sunni dictatorships on the chopping block.

How many map lines get redrawn then?

Problem is, Bush can't decide to fix Sunni and accept Shiia revival regionally. He wants to have his cake and barf it too.