



The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett

Release 1.3 ~ May 16, 2005

“A Duty to Leave Our Children a Better World”



“I am proposing a new grand strategy on a par with the Cold War strategy of containment—in effect, its historical successor. I seek to provide a new language, or a new context within which to explain strategic choices that America now faces. By design, it will be a language of promise and hope, not danger and fear. Some will interpret this as naïveté, others as unbridled ambition. I choose to see it as a moral responsibility—a duty to leave our children a better world.”

Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map*, Pg 7

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About this Newsletter

The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett comprises original material by Tom, commentary from his blog, Esquire contributions, and published books, as well as feedback received via email. It is written and published, based on your feedback.

Ask Tom

You've read *The Pentagon's New Map (PNM)*, Tom's blog, or perhaps a published article. You've seen him do the brief – in person, on CSPAN, or DVD. What happens next?

You've got questions.

Suppose, for instance, you have the following question, “Tom, should we be concerned with China as a hegemonious power in Asia?” You can submit the question to:

asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com

The questions and suggestions you submit to Ask Tom drive the publication of this newsletter. Please know that Tom reads each email. Additionally, members of The New Rule Sets Project, LLC assist Tom, per his request. One or more of us will personally respond to your email. The submissions we find most useful to the general understanding of *The Pentagon's New Map (PNM)* and *Blueprint for Action (BFA)* will be published in future issues of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett*.

As always, your feedback is appreciated.

Civil Complaints

This issue of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett* has been composed using Microsoft Word 2000. If the online or printed presentation of this document does not meet your needs, please let us know. That is, just asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com.

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Feature:

Kaplan's strategic lap dance for the U.S. Navy and Pacific Command

The piece in question is Robert Kaplan's "How We Would Fight China" in the June issue of *The Atlantic Monthly*. "Sell out" isn't too strong a term for what Kaplan does in this piece. As someone who's worked for the Navy for a decade and a half, I don't think I've ever seen analysis that whores itself more for the most over-the-top strategic fantasies of naval leaders who feel embittered and betrayed by the end of the Cold War. This is U.S. Navy and Pacific Command propaganda at its best.

Kaplan buys into everything he's told by PACOM and especially the chest-thumping submarine crowd of the U.S. Navy about the inevitability of war with China, and he doesn't seek to balance their amazingly narrow view of the world whatsoever. It is a stunningly unbalanced piece of work, something I recognize from years of reading Soviet newspapers and wondering exactly who could be so stupid to swallow this sort of stuff unthinkingly. Frankly, I'm amazed the magazine printed it, it's that bad.

I guess I realize why Kaplan writes stuff like this. I mean, if you want continued access to the U.S. military, peddle their stuff so they love you. But really, the analysis in this piece is cartoonishly bad. I mean, so bad that the vast majority of the U.S. military *outside* of PACOM would find it hyperbolic.

His first paragraph has the Chinese navy lobbing missiles from Central Asia at our ships in the Pacific. Why? Under what conditions? Who the hell cares? Let's just get this party started.

Second paragraph notes that China will have "distinct advantages over the United States," as in "sheer proximity."

Think about how goofy that sounds. China will be advantaged—somehow—by the fact that the envisioned battlefields (or waters) are really, really close to their shores and really, really distant from ours. This is the opening logic on display in this piece. What an advantage to have war in your front yard as opposed to your alleged enemy's front yard! This is why living in the ghetto is so much better than the suburbs.

Does anybody see that as slightly backward? I mean, should America seek to entice the Chinese navy to the shores of California so as to improve our "sheer proximity" advantage?

Next we're told that "while stateless terrorists fill security vacuums, the Chinese fill economic ones."

Yes, the two are basically one in the same, threat-wise. I can't believe I've been so naïve to miss this all these years. Two sides of the same coin, China and Al Qaeda, both desiring the same ends.

China's experiencing rapid growth and—can you believe it!—it's "establishing business communities and diplomatic outposts," and it's "negotiating construction and trade agreements" the world over. All of this is described by Kaplan as demonstrating China's genius at "indirect influence" that—of course—puts the U.S. at great strategic risk over time. I mean, really! "Construction and trade agreements"! Who do those Chinese think they are? Genghis Frickin' Trump?

Ah, but China's rise is fueled by a "martial energy," we are told by Kaplan. What that means, I have no idea, but screw it, the man's on a roll.

China's peasantry is "overwhelmingly literate," boasts Kaplan, and thus "China constitutes the principal conventional threat to America's liberal imperium."

No kidding. It's enough to make you want to slap some sense into the man.

Let me give you that sentence in full so it doesn't sound like I'm making this up: "Pulsing with consumer and martial energy, and boasting a peasantry that, unlike others in history, is overwhelmingly literate, China constitutes the principal conventional threat to America's liberal imperium."

China's peasants can read and write, so *naturally* they're a huge component of China's threat, because—as history so often shows—rural folk who can read and write tend to reject liberty and demand aggressive expansionistic wars at all cost. Crazy, but there you have it.

That covers the first two paragraphs of the piece, and all I can say is that America needs a better reason to go to war with China than Robert Kaplan's obvious desire to cover that conflict from the trenches.

But this is what America—and the U.S. military—gets when we pretend that journalists are our best sources for grand strategy and national security thinking. Me, I see *garbage in, garbage out*.

Clever as he is, Kaplan switches subjects before you think too long about all the asinine assertions he's just made. So we're told this vision of future war must all be true because of some elemental truths he's discovered about alliance systems in general and NATO in particular.

Here we go from misinformed to downright dumbass.

"The first thing to understand is that the alliance system of the latter half of the twentieth century is dead. Warfare by committee, as practiced by NATO, has simply become too

cumbersome in an age that requires light and lethal strikes." Yes, NATO was never a pawn of the U.S. during the Cold War, it was "warfare by committee." And now that beautiful dream has been crushed by the post-Cold War challenges we face today.

Somebody pass the hash. I'm almost feeling lucid again.

Then Kaplan goes on to cite Kosovo, which—as we know—proves this point in spades. I mean, NATO dithered on the Balkans for years and . . . what exactly happened to the strategic environment? Oh, nothing. So I guess that proves that alliance politics are dead. Hell, if NATO can't get its act together quickly on something as world history-changing as the Serbs and the Croats and the Bosnians going at it, then clearly we're living in a new age.

Of course, NATO might have dithered because they saw the Balkans as meaningless strategically, but that's beside the point. Bob wrote a book on this subject, and as we know from his many travels, he had found the end of the world at the ends of the world.

You know, Kaplan and Tom Friedman should get together and write about the world not only being flat, but make the case that "beyond here be dragons!" Now that would be a cool map I'd buy!

The real point here is that when—as Kaplan argues—the U.S. waltzed into Afghanistan on its own, NATO did nothing more than offer peacekeeping in those areas already pacified by the U.S. military. I guess you might argue that expecting anything else after the U.S. was attacked directly by terrorists led by an organization based in Afghanistan and then Washington decided unilaterally—but with the clear blessing of a shocked world—to subsequently invade the country and topple the regime *might be a little much* (Remember how Americans helped pacify the Falklands in the early 1980s along with our British allies? Oh well, bad example.), but let's not quibble here. *Clearly*, this proves that NATO is dead.

Now, Kaplan tells us, "Much of NATO has become a farm system for the major-league U.S. military."

Wow Bob! You've finally figured that out about 40 years after it happened. As Rip Van Winkles go, you kick Friedman's napping ass.

Then we get to the real advertisement, and here's where the lap dance gets hot and heavy. We're told we already have a NATO in the Pacific, and it's called Pacific Command. That's right. All by itself PACOM is a NATO equivalent because it's the imperial garrison that operates virtually on its own, without political oversight. You think the important meetings on global power occur in Davos? Asks Kaplan. Well, you're wrong. Honolulu's the place, and the commander of PACOM is really the man who comes closest to running the world. Five time zones from meddling Washington, this is where the real Bismarcks of the U.S. military thrive!

This is complete nonsense, but no matter. Kaplan believes the world is run by military power and he's located the biggest single concentration of standing U.S. forces in the world, so—by logical extension—Honolulu is the capital of global power. Does it matter that the \$50 billion of foreign direct investment that flows into China every year, effectively fueling its rise (along with that *martial energy*, mind you), passes into the Middle Kingdom without so much as a word from Honolulu? Hah! Only a neo-Wilsonian Marxist fool would see any importance in that!

Kaplan sounds quite rational when he notes that China might actually have a reason to safe-guard its sea-lanes of transport for energy flowing from the Middle East. I mean, the U.S. has lots of economic connectivity with the outside world and we have a big navy to protect it, and that big navy doesn't threaten anyone except terrorists and rogues, but certainly the Chinese cannot be expected to think along these lines. Clearly, this has nothing to do with protecting themselves but only with threatening us!

This darker view, we are told by Kaplan, is the sort of clear-headed logic by which we need to guide our strategic decision-making. We can't expect that from the "raptures of liberal internationalism and neo-conservative interventionism" to be found in DC. No, we need the "cautious, mechanical, and utilitarian" approaches to power as exercised by military officers.

Ah yes, the pagan warrior ethos of Kaplan in full bloom. We can't trust the wooly-headed politicians who are duly elected in our republic, so our only hope for strategic survival is to turn over our foreign policy to the military officers of Pacific Command.

I don't think I've heard anything more stupid in my entire life.

Bud Flanagan, a former four-star admiral and good friend of mine who later went to work on Wall Street, several years ago expressed to me his amazement at how many in the military, but especially in Pacific Command, acted like they were somehow running our relationship with China—as though they were somehow in control of all the connectivity that was emerging so rapidly between our two economies. Bud would just laugh in sheer amazement at such idiocy, describing the unflinching hubris of those who'd make this claim. And I've heard that same bewildered chuckle from CEOs ever since.

But the notion persists in Honolulu. PACOM is really under the delusion that its network of military ties in the region somehow trumps all other realities, just like Washington is so persistently under the delusion that somehow it runs the region diplomatically. This is the essential curse of many who labor in the U.S. Government: they have almost no idea how the real world works. They think government accounts for about 90 percent of reality on the planet, with the U.S. government supplying the bulk of that. And what they cannot control they naturally fear. China is not controlled by America, much less PACOM, but we need a better reason to presume inevitable war than that.

Kaplan, of course, supplies no such rationales, simply swallowing—gulp after gulp—every bit of fear mongering fed to him by a series of strategic analysts whose sole

purpose in life—it would appear—is to make PACOM seem like the center of the power universe.

Wait until Kaplan visits Southern Command. Then we can hear about how South American drug lords really run America unbeknownst to the simple-minded citizenry living here.

We are told by Michael Vickers, former Green Beret and now with CSIS, that "getting into a war with China is easy." There are "many scenarios," but let's not bother with the logic of any of those, let's just jump to the real question we need to deal with: as Vickers puts it, "How do you end a war with China?"

The answer? Regime change, of course. This is the cool, mechanical logic of the unimpassioned military minds in Honolulu, so much more sane than those crazy Wilsonian neo-conservatives in DC. I mean, those guys just wanted Saddam's head, whereas these guys want to take down the entire Chinese Communist Party because . . . well . . . how else to end the war?

I know, I know. I'm skipping bits here and there in the logic, but that's the whole point of Kaplan's piece. Screw all the plausibility shit, let's get right to the good stuff!

Ah, but Kaplan does show some sense by actually running some numbers. We have a navy that's about 2.86 million tons of displacement, armed with the highest high-tech gear in the universe. China's scary navy weighs in at about 0.263 million tons, or roughly one-tenth our sheer fighting weight. We have 24 aircraft carriers (if we count both the regular ones and the Marines' big decks) whereas the Chinese have . . . none.

But I forget China's *sheer proximity* advantage, do I not? America has to send its warships to China, whereas China has only to sit there waiting for them to come!

Ah the sheer genius of the Chinese approach!

But all these stats are meaningless (and don't even get me started how much better our Army, Marines, and Air Force are than anything China has to offer, because—of course—this is PACOM's wet dream of future war), because, as Kaplan tells us, Athens once had a huge naval advantage over Sparta about a billion years ago and after they fought a war for 27 years, Sparta won!

Geez! With China's advantage in *sheer proximity* and our clear disadvantage in having a much larger and far more technologically advanced navy, we should get the hell out of Asia right now and hope the Chinese don't want Cuba any time soon! I mean, it'll be the first thing to go after Honolulu and the Panama Canal in this decades-long war that Kaplan is dreaming up.

But I am thinking too small, obviously, because China will whip our asses in clever, asymmetrical warfare. Yes, Kaplan intones ominously, "the Chinese are poised to show

us the high end of the art" of Fourth Generation Warfare. Kaplan doesn't call it 4GW here, because he's whoring so amazingly well for the navy that it would be bad form to mention a concept so near and dear to ground forces.

We are told that the Chinese are studying our military! No, really! As opposed to, say, the Argentine navy. Myopic but clever, these Chinese.

So what can we expect? Kaplan warns of "specific demonstrations of strength," like China's 2001 downing of our navy EP-3E surveillance plane. Whoa doggy! Sounds like Bob got the inside dope on that amazing feat of technical prowess! Of course, anyone who knows anything about the actual story might be a bit less impressed with the Chinese threat on that basis, but hey, that's the whole point of fear-mongering to the uniformed: keep them stupid, keep them scared. I mean, without journalists like Kaplan, Americans might fear the world less, and if Americans feared the world less, who would read Bob Kaplan?

Don't get me wrong. I'm not saying Mr. Kaplan is biased here in a self-interested sense, I'm sticking with my original charge that he's whoring himself like few journalists ever have at the hands of the U.S. military.

But if you're not impressed with the EP-3E slap-in-the-face, then try on Bob's second example: "During one of our biennial Rim of the Pacific naval exercises the Chinese could sneak a sub under a carrier battle group and then surface it." They could also shoot missile rounds at a moving target in the Pacific to show they could do that, or . . . "they could also bump up against one of our ships during one of our ongoing Freedom of Navigation exercises off the Asian coast."

Holy shit! I'd never thought of the last one. That is like . . . I dunno . . . some amazing anti-access, area-denial asymmetrical strategy I've never heard of before. Wonder why the Sovs never tried anything that devious?

Or did they . . . ?

Did I mention that Bob mentioned that China and Russia mentioned that they are going to have a joint military exercise? CANYOUBELIEVEIT! I mean, America exercises with almost every navy in Asia *except* China's and Beijing has the gall to invite the Russians, who still have at least two or three floating ships, to a joint exercise! I mean, really!

Bob's answer to this rising Chinese naval challenge is for America to develop three navies. F--k the Army and Marines and Air Force. We need THREE NAVIES! Count 'em and weep ground-pounders and fly boys!

And they called me insane over Leviathan and SysAdmin . . .

We need a navy to work the littorals, a big one to bomb stuff ashore, and another to sneak around and keep those Chinese guessing. We're building the small craft for the first navy

and have the carriers already for the second, so we really need to concentrate on the third, and here's where Kaplan goes down with the submarine community by claiming that the only thing standing between us and total Chinese domination of the future is lots and lots of submarines—both diesel and nuclear. Bob admits they present a crappy payload and cost way too much, but we need them to protect our carriers because, Kaplan, employing some high-end 4GW logic, claims that "the effect of a single Chinese cruise missile's hitting a U.S. carrier, even if it did not sink the ship, would be politically and psychologically catastrophic, akin to al-Qaeda's attacks on the Twin Towers."

I take back my previous comment about Kaplan's flogging PACOM's genius for strategic thought. That last quote is now—officially—the stupidest f--king thing I have ever heard in my career.

The rest of the piece is grotesque PACOM propaganda thinly disguised as Kaplanesque strategic travelogue.

You know, I was going to say a word or two about Robert Kagan's vague, fear-mongering bit of an op-ed on China in Sunday's *Washington Post*, but frankly, why bother with a strategic personality tick when you have a full-blown mental disorder on display like the logic in this piece.

The saddest thing about this article is that *The Atlantic Monthly* published it. God, if I tried to shove anything this goofy past Mark Warren at *Esquire*, he'd just laugh me off and remove my name from the masthead. It's embarrassing, this piece, far more to *The Atlantic Monthly* than to Kaplan himself. He's got to write this sort of junk because that's what he's known for and once you establish the reputation as a brilliant fear-monger, baby, *just do what you gotta do!* But *The Atlantic Monthly* should know better than that.

I'm stunned, really, at how far the Mainstream Media sinks with this stuff.

Kaplan keeps writing scary stuff the military loves (and they do love it), and in return they keep treating him like the ultimate journalist-pet. It is a match made in heaven. As "strategic thinkers" go, Kaplan is the ultimate self-licking ice cream cone: the more you swallow, the better it tastes!

This piece is almost enough to make me take back every snide comment I've ever made about my former idol Tom Friedman (whom I adored until 9/11 pushed him to the Dark Side of the Force), and I would too, if his new book wasn't hyping China as an economic threat.

I guess Friedman at least offers an alternative to Kaplan's—same enemy, but different fear!

In the end, we need to be an America that's good and talented and true *not* because we fear the outside world, but because that's how good and talented and true we really are as

a nation. The future worth creating is the answer, not the war worth waging nor the collapse worth avoiding.

Social workers will tell you that every child grows up thinking the entire world is just like their family. If that's true, ask yourself what sort of American family we're raising with all this fear mongering.

Feed your head, and the rest will follow. Dine on strategic junk food, and you won't like what you see in the mirror.

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Furthermore: from the *Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog*

Two big pessimists flip-flopping back into optimism

- "Brave, Young and Muslim," op-ed by Thomas L. Friedman, *New York Times*, 3 March 2005, pulled off web.

- "A Force for Good," op-ed by Robert D. Kaplan, *New York Times*, 3 March 2005, pulled off web.

Friedman, ditching his neo-green nonsense for the day, is back to his usual optimism, even if he won't give the Bush administration any credit for what's going on in the Middle East (Does anyone believe this all happens absent our invasion of Iraq? Ask yourself!). It is very good to see:

The last couple of years have not been easy for anyone, myself included, who hoped that the Iraq war would produce a decent, democratizing outcome. And even in the wake of the remarkable Iraqi election, the toppling of the Lebanese cabinet and the reforms brewing in Egypt, it is too soon for anyone to declare victory. We're dealing with some very unstable chemicals. But what makes me more hopeful today is precisely what made me hopeful that the Iraq war might work out, and that is the number of Arab-Muslim youth I've encountered since 9/11 who have urged me to keep writing about the need for democracy and reform in their part of the world.

Of course, many Americans are surprised by this.

Hah! No one's more surprised than Friedman himself! I mean, it's good to have a short memory if you're either an NFL quarterback or cornerback, but it's more reasonable to expect some self-awareness from an op-ed columnist of Friedman's towering stature. Notice how he never mentions the Iraq invasion, the neocons, or the Bush administration in this piece, instead giving a stirring description of this great book written by a Muslim woman calling for a reformation process within this globalized religion. Fair enough, but come on man! Give the administration its due and eat some crow.

Is it too early to declare any victory? Of course it is. But again, does any of this happen in a Middle East without our military interventions, when oil prices rise naturally thanks to a long-term confluence of diminished investment in infrastructure and exploration and production with a rising demand curve in developing Asia (the real cause of the long-term price rise)?

Kaplan's also turning a new leaf, or perhaps just beginning his PR campaign for his new book called *Imperial Grunts*. Instead of harping on how unprepared the U.S. military is

for the Global War on Terrorism, now he's recognizing the rapid pace of change. His example here is the Asian tsunamis response (a weak one, but okay), not exactly my definition of "imperial." But it's awfully nice to see some optimism from the man who's so in love with the U.S. military (you think I love them!). It means these changes are becoming apparent to journalists in the field with the pointy end of the spear. It says that Rumsfeld's moves over the past two years are starting to penetrate the furthest reaches of our operational forces.

Source: <http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/001588.html>

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Ask Tom

The questions and suggestions you submit to Ask Tom drive the publication of this newsletter. Please know that Tom reads each email. Additionally, members of The New Rule Sets Project, LLC assist Tom, per his request. One or more of us will personally respond to your email. The submissions we find most useful to the general understanding of *The Pentagon's New Map* and *Blueprint for Action* will be published in future issues of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett*.

Frank O'Grady

software engineer
York, Pennsylvania

Frank writes:

Crisis of Faith: For decades, the Republican Party has accommodated conservatives of faith and conservatives of doubt, their alliance lending the GOP ideological flexibility and longevity. But now, the theocons' fundamentalism has become markedly more strident, threatening the party's commitment to individual freedom--and its long-term viability.

<http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20050502&s=sullivan050205>

I am a huge fan of your work. Please take the time to read this provocative essay by Andrew Sullivan. He carefully untangles the two traditions at play in the modern conservative movement: The Conservatism of Faith (Theocracy), and The Conservatism of Doubt (Promotion of Freedom via Minimal Rule Sets). What he has to say has enormous resonance with your ideas about a Future Worth Creating.

Tom responds:

Thanks for sending the link. I went to school with Andrew at Harvard and remember him as a very kind and open-minded fellow with a brilliant mind.

I agree with his distinctions between Faith and Doubt, and there, if I may be so bold on behalf of my fellow Catholic Andrew, I think Catholicism does a nice job of balancing the two—despite the papal infallibility nonsense. I admire the faith of evangelicals deeply, especially their personal willingness to share that faith with others, because I think this push by individuals is crucial to shrinking the Gap over time, but this is what I have always told them when approached about their admiration for PNM and its vision: ameliorate the Gap's suffering without pushing conversion to the faith (because I don't think you convert when people are desperate), and instead use the rising economic conditions of the New Core states to tap into their innately growing desire for the articles of faith and the moral structures offered by organized religion. So shrink the Gap with resources (faith-based aid) and grow the New Core with converts.

As to the fight within the GOP between these two definitions of conservatism, if you're not happy with that discussion, then the Dems need to join that debate on morals more effectively than they have in the past, because for now they don't offer a big enough tent for that discussion to expand beyond where it exists right now: almost exclusively within the Republican party. So my advice is always, rather than bitch about the fierce debate, replicate it within the Democratic Party if you want to impact it by attracting those voters to a better discussion. Build a better mouse trap or stop complaining.

Andrew has made that argument a lot on TV and I think he's right on target.

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Rich White writes:

I really enjoyed your speech at our Corporate Planning Conference. I had one question that I was unable to ask due to time. I was wondering how you thought the intelligence community (IC) reform under the new National Intelligence Director (NID)—Negroponte—will be influenced by the need to develop a "System Administrator" capability? Do you envision any significant restructuring in the big 5 IC agencies? What about the relationship between the NID and the SECDEF?

Tom responds:

I don't think the currently envisioned IC reorganization will move the ball that much. To me, how the Pentagon forces change in the IC is the same way it forces committee change in Congress: you change the way you wage war and peace and then the IC and Congress will be forced to change themselves to be able to serve you and communicate with you.

So waiting for such change inside the IC is a waste of time. Instead, being proactive is crucial, and I think, based on my interactions with Rumsfeld and his senior officials, that this is the way they will proceed: working their thing first and foremost and thus forcing desired change beyond their realm, encouraging it where they can, like their support of the new postconflict reconstruction office in the State Department. When we see a similar office open inside all the Big 5 IC components, we'll know change is beginning.

Nick Gazett writes:

Do you believe that anti-globalization groups and organizations like www.stoptheftaa.org (just one of many) and their ideology pose a significant threat to global connectivity and do you believe that many members of Congress are receptive to groups like this?

Tom responds:

I think they are a threat, but not that significant in the sense that they represent the "friction" that is natural with all this growing networking, and I try not to equate the friction with the momentum. What most of these groups are really saying is, Slow Down!

We need to listen to that fear and that request, not dismissing it but engaging it as much as possible while—indeed—slowing stuff down wherever it seems appropriate. This is a huge theme in *Blueprint for Action*. The political health of the Core—and thus globalization—depends on the Core's governments remembering that there are real Gaps within each Core state that need to be continually addressed.

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Charles Cameron was Senior Analyst with The Arlington Institute and Principal Researcher with the Center for Millennial Studies when he attended the first of Tom Barnett's Y2K workshops. Charles is the designer of the HipBone Games and analytic tools, www.beadgaming.com, and maintains a personal focus on religious violence and conflict resolution.

Charles writes:

Two questions:

You mention in a recent blog entry the "everything else" that business people tend to forget (pol-mil / security), and the "everything else" the military tend to forget (economics / connectivity), but as you know I tend to be concerned with the kind of blindsiding we get when we overlook religion (and specifically apocalyptic) -- as in the case of the advent of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. It appears to me that strong, volatile religious drivers are currently in play in the world, largely as "potential energies" but with the ability to go "kinetic" at any moment. My first question is how your gameplay will handle cultural / anthropological / psychological / spiritual drivers -- including both Shiite and Sunni Islam to be sure, and (for instance) the potential impact of bin Laden being acclaimed as Mahdi -- but also the possible impact of faith-based policies within the core -- and particularly the US.

My second question concerns the Y2K event I attended at the Naval War College. I will no doubt be writing on the topic of wargaming one of these days -- I have the tentative book title "Wargaming, Gaming Peace" in mind -- and have often wondered whether you

considered your Y2K series as precursors to the New RuleSets series, and thus as wargames (or peacegames) themselves?

So-called "serious gaming" is getting a lot of attention these days, and I'd be glad to know whether to refer to the NWC event as a "game" in anything I may write on the topic.

I'll be watching for what you write about Ratzinger, incidentally. I think he's in a somewhat unique position which needs to straddle both core and gap in its sympathies -- but that probably needs spelling out in more detail than I can manage in this post, and my sense of these things may well gain nuance from reading and responding to your own thoughts on the matter.

Tom responds:

Great to hear from you again.

On The New Map Game design question the short answer is yes, we seek to include such non-rational behavior in the game play.

As for your second question, everything I've done has been connected and sequential in my growth pattern. So the Y2K games presage and shaped the New Rule Sets games with Cantor to a huge degree, and the New Rule Sets stuff informs this game effort with Alidade and future stuff I want to do.

On Benedict, see my weekly digest of 9 May 05 at <http://www.newrulesets.com/newsletter.html>.

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Where's Tom?



Future in Review 2005
at the Hotel del Coronado in San Diego
May 23-26, 2005

<https://www.tapsns.com/fire/index.php>

Wednesday, May 25, 2005

11:00am - 11:30am "Future U.S. Military Strategy": a conversation with Thomas Barnett, author of "*The Pentagon's New Map*"; hosted by Dave Davison



The New Map Game
At the Hyatt Regency in Newport
May 31-June 2, 2005

<http://www.newmapgame.com/gameplay.htm>

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Glossary

updated 29 April 2005

Asymmetrical warfare — A conflict between two foes of vastly different capabilities. After the Red Army dissolved in the 1990s, the U.S. military knew it was basically unbeatable, especially in a straight-up fight. But that meant that much smaller opponents would seek to negate its strengths by exploiting its weaknesses, by being clever and “dirty” in combat. On, 9/11, America got a real dose of what asymmetrical warfare is going to be like in the twenty-first century.

Connectivity — The enormous changes being brought on by the Information Revolution, including the emerging financial, technological and logistical architecture of the global economy (i.e., the movement of money, services accompanied by content, and people and materials). During the boom times of the 1990s, many thought that advances in communications such as the Internet and mobile phones would trump all, erasing the business cycle, erasing national borders, erasing the very utility of the state in managing a global security order that seemed more virtual than real. 9/11 proved differently: that connectivity, while a profoundly transforming force, could not by itself maintain global security, primarily because a substantial rise in connectivity between any nation and the outside world typically leads to a host of tumultuous reactions, including heightened nationalism.

Disconnectedness — In this century, it is disconnectedness that defines danger. Disconnectedness allows bad actors to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their dictatorial control, or, in the case of failed states, it allows dangerous transnational actors to exploit the resulting chaos to their own dangerous ends. Eradicating disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a supreme moral cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will. Just as importantly, however, by expanding the connectivity of globalization, we increase peace and prosperity planet-wide.

Functioning Core — Those parts of the world that are actively integrating their national economies into a global economy, and that adhere to globalization’s emerging security rule set. The Functioning Core at present consists of North America, Europe both “old” and “new,” Russia, Japan and South Korea, China (although the interior far less so), India (in a pockmarked sense), Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, and the ABCs of South American (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). That is roughly four billion out of a global population of just over six billion. The Functioning Core can be subdivided into the Old Core, anchored by America, Europe, and Japan; and the New Core, whose leading pillars are China, India, Brazil and Russia.

Globalization — The worldwide integration and increasing flows of trade, capital, ideas, and people. Until 9/11, the U.S. government tended to identify globalization primarily as an economic rule set, but thanks to the Global War on Terrorism, we now

understand that it likewise demands the clear enunciation and enforcement of a security rule set as well.

Globalization I, II, and III — The history of globalization can be divided into three parts, each governed by its own rule set.

Globalization I, from 1870 to 1914, was ended by the start of World War I.

Globalization II, from 1945 to 1980, was initiated by the United States at the end of World War II, and continued until the effective end of the Cold War.

Globalization III (1980 -2001) has been an era of relative peace and enormous economic growth around the world that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but whose rule sets have now been challenged by rogue states and international terrorists, as exemplified by 9/11.

Greater inclusive — What we need to create as we expand our definition of national security crises in the age of globalization. After more than half a century of almost complete isolation from the rest of the world as it sought to guard against the terror of nuclear war, the Pentagon needs to reconnect to the world—to war within the context of everything else. We need to break up the old hierarchies between the “big one” and all the lesser included. We need something that covers the whole enchilada—that makes us one with everything. We need a greater inclusive.

Lesser included — Pentagon long-range planning during the Cold War had been very simple: always keep our forces ahead of the Soviets by matching the size of their forces and pursuing the latest technological advances. World War III constituted the “Big One” against which all long-range planning proceeded. Everything else the U.S. military did in terms of operations around the world was bundled together in the concept of the “lesser included.” Even though the U.S. military spent over ninety percent of the Cold War engaged in such lesser included, its force-sizing principle remained the Big One with the Soviets. The forces of globalization and 9/11 made clear that there wasn’t going to be a Big One—the lesser included were the whole ball game.

Leviathan — The U.S. military's unparalleled warfighting capacity and the high-performance combat troops, weapon systems, aircraft, armor and ships associated with all-out war against traditionally defined opponents (i.e., other militaries). This is the force America created to defend the West against the Soviet threat, now transformed from its industrial era roots to its information age capacity for high-speed, high-lethality, and high-precision combat operations. This force is without peer in the world today, and—as such—frequently finds itself fighting shorter and easier wars. However, this “overmatch” means that current and future enemies in the Global War on Terrorism will largely seek to avoid triggering the Leviathan's employment, preferring to wage asymmetrical war against the United States. The Leviathan rules the “first half” of war, but is often ill-suited, by design and temperament, to the “second half” of peace, to

include postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. It is thus counterposed to the System Administrators force.

Military-Market Nexus — Markets create connectivity, and military security is needed for markets to take root and flourish. “Where security enables the steady rise of connectivity between any national economy and the outside world, markets logically emerge to manage the marginal risks that remain, and where markets can effectively manage risk, investments invariably flow toward desired resources, such as relatively inexpensive but dependable labor. Over time, these essential transactions engender further connectivity among nations and regions, reflected in the rise of more complex and suitably entangling rule sets that moderate the behavior of not just nation-states but likewise firms and individuals. The desired security end state of this integration process is a community of states within which rule-set transgressions find certain—if not immediate—resolution through universally agreed-upon legal means. In other words, the military never has to get involved.” *The Pentagon’s New Map*, Pg 198.

Military operations other than war — How the Pentagon defines crisis response activity, nation-building, peacekeeping, and so forth—everything outside of major warfare. Abbreviated MOOTW (pronounced “moo-twah”), it held a very low priority before 9/11.

Non-Integrating Gap — Regions of the world that are largely disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability. Today, the Non-Integrating Gap is made up of the Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, virtually all of Africa, portions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of Southeast Asia. These regions constitute globalization’s “ozone hole,” where connectivity remains thin or absent in far too many cases. Of course, each region contains some countries that are very Core-like in their attributes (just like there are Gap-like pockets throughout the Gap defined primarily by poverty), but these are like mansions in an otherwise seedy neighborhood, and as such are trapped by these larger Gap-defining circumstances.

Rule Sets — A collection of rules (both formal and informal) that delineates how some activity normally unfolds. The Pentagon’s New Map explored the new rule sets concerning conflict and violence in international affairs—or under what conditions governments decide it makes sense to switch from the rule set that defines peace to that which defines war. The events of 9/11 shocked the Pentagon and the rest of the world into the realization that we needed a new rule set concerning war and peace, one that replaces the old rule set that governed America’s Cold War with the Soviet Union. The book explained how the new rule set will actually work in the years ahead, not just from America’s perspective but from an international one.

Rule set reset — When a crisis triggers your realization that your world is woefully lacking certain types of rules, you start making up those new rules with a vengeance (e.g., the Patriot Act and the doctrine of preemption following 9/11). Such a rule set reset can be a very good thing. But it can also be a very dangerous time, because in your rush to fill in all the rule set gaps, your cure may end up being worse than your disease.

Seam states — The countries that ring the Gap, such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Some are already members of the Core, and most others are serious candidates for joining the Core. These states are important with regard to international security because they provide terrorists geographic access to the Core. The U.S. security strategy regarding these states is simple: get them to increase their security practices as much as possible and to close whatever loopholes exist.

System Administrators (SysAdmin) — The "second half" force that wages the peace after the Leviathan force has waged war successfully. Therefore it is a force optimized for such categories of operations as "stability and support operations" (SASO), postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, "military operations other than war (MOOTW), "humanitarian assistance/disaster relief" (HA/DR), and any and all operations associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC), counter-insurgency operations, and small-scale crisis responses.

System perturbations — A system-level definition of crisis and instability in the age of globalization; a new ordering principle that has already begun to transform the military and U.S. security policy; also a particular event that forces us to rethink everything. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 served as the first great "existence proof" for this concept, but there have and will be others over time (some are purposeful, like the Bush Administration's "Big Bang" strategy of fomenting political change in the Middle East by toppling Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, but others will be accidents, like the SARS epidemic or the Asian Tsunamis of December 2004). 9/11, as a system perturbation, placed the world's security rule set in flux and created a demand for new rules. Preemption is the big new rule. By creating that new rule, 9/11 changed America forever and through that process altered global history.