

The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett

Release 1.17 ~ September 5, 2005

[Contents](#)

"No pessimist ever discovered the secret of the stars, or sailed to uncharted land or opened a new doorway for the human spirit."

~ Helen Keller

**From: Tom, retired in So. Ca
Subject: SYS ADMIN**

After watching TV news from New Orleans all week, I am solidly convinced of the "sequencing" you outlined. For 5 days there was chaos, death, lawlessness, and suffering until the "security" (Nat'l Guard) arrived. It seemed that the change was instantaneous with the arrival of convoys, a show of force, and apparent physical security. No more reports of widescale looting or rifle shots at rescuers. First responders could now do their work. Again, I am persuaded.

**Tom
retired in So. California**

Contents

[About this Newsletter ...](#) Pg. 3

[Feature: When disconnectedness defines danger: ...](#) Pg. 4

Three posts from Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

- [Katrina's System Perturbation may feature many long horizontal scenarios ..](#) Pg. 4
- [The storm surge begins ...](#) Pg. 7
- [The art of the long view ...](#) Pg. 12

[Ask Tom ...](#) Pg. 16

- [Alexander S. Bosika ...](#) Pg. 16
- [Maj Todd Vician ...](#) Pg. 17
- [Scott ...](#) Pg. 18

[Where's Tom? ...](#) Pg. 19

[Glossary \(Updated April 29, 2005\) ...](#) Pg. 20

[Contents >](#)

About this Newsletter

The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett comprises original material by Tom, Invited Contributors, commentary from his blog, Esquire contributions, and published books, as well as feedback received via email. It is written and published, based on your feedback.

Ask Tom

You've read *The Pentagon's New Map (PNM)*, Tom's blog, or perhaps a published article. You've seen him do the brief – in person, on CSPAN, or DVD. What happens next?

You've got questions.

Suppose, for instance, you have the following question, “Tom, should we be concerned with China as a hegemonious power in Asia?” You can submit the question to:

asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com

The questions and suggestions you submit to Ask Tom drive the publication of this newsletter. Please know that Tom reads each email. Additionally, members of The New Rule Sets Project, LLC assist Tom, per his request. One or more of us will personally respond to your email. The submissions we find most useful to the general understanding of *The Pentagon's New Map (PNM)* and *Blueprint for Action (BFA)* will be published in future issues of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett*.

As always, your feedback is appreciated.

Civil Complaints

This issue of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett* has been composed using Microsoft Word 2000. If the online or printed presentation of this document does not meet your needs, please let us know. That is, just asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com.

[Contents >](#)

Feature: When disconnectedness defines danger

Three posts from Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

Katrina's System Perturbation may feature many long horizontal scenarios

[Originally posted at Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog](#)

The sheer collapse of New Orleans is shaping up to be a significant System Perturbation all its own.

Time to pull out the six lenses we used to employ in my studies at the Naval War College:

[First, there is the social scenario](#) of seeing an American city so desperately humbled. We can say N.O. was a freak of man-made invention with the levee and the notion that you could keep a city that large below sea level, but still, this is one desperate scene. By definition, this will be a recovery of great length and with strong differentiation--meaning some will recover with reasonable speed while others with great delay or perhaps never. In general, America tends not to accept such humbling well, preferring to answer the challenge with a "never again" sort of resignation that can be expressed in a variety of explosive ways. And explosiveness is what defines the System Perturbation: a change so abrupt that incremental responses are abandoned in favor of radically new approaches.

If there are parts of N.O. that are written off as simply too hard to resurrect, then the environmental scenario may well become predominate, with a lot of finger-pointing regarding how America has overdeveloped coastal areas and run a boat-load of risks in a world featuring a warming global climate and rising sea levels. When you get a humbling of this magnitude, many will reach for biblical analogies and once you cross that line, the sense of transgressing God and Mother Nature may lead to a strong response not just in Louisiana but elsewhere across the nation.

[The economic scenario is already playing out:](#) the Big Easy was a hugely important transit point on trade, the movement of raw materials, and especially energy. The 3-dollar-plus gallon of gas is here already, and we may see a lot higher before recovery kicks in--if it does. Remember the underlying demand pressure from Asia. None of that goes away. So if this System Perturbation pushes markets to consider a rule-set reset, or a radically new discounting of risk regarding energy, new pathways may be explored that accelerate moves to new paradigms.

[The political scenario](#) stems in large part from the economic one. This one feels off the usual scales, and that means the government is stuck with the perception of needing not just to make good with the victims (thus letting the market do the rest), but to resurrect that which was lost. And if that cannot be done in what is perceived to be a timely manner, then the Big Flood can be perceived as yet another example of the Bush Administration being unable to handle big complex problems, along with Iraq and the slow pace of reforms/change associated with 9/11 (e.g., a clumsy Department of Homeland Security and the general sense of a pointless "Osama tax" on so much of our day-to-day lives). Thus N.O. becomes a straw that breaks the camel's back--if the Bush Administration ends up looking like it screwed things up yet again.

That gets us to the [lens of security](#). The perception may balloon that America's troops are being stretched abroad and thus the homeland is left that much more bare of these assets. But whether that happens will depend much on the performance of the U.S. military. Whom do we associate with such disaster responses? Naturally, the National Guard and the Army Reserves. What happens if it is perceived that we're light-handed back home thanks to a Global War on Terrorism that feels bogged down right now in Iraq? Good question, not easily answered.

These are all the natural downsides.

The upsides, of course, tend to arise from the notion that "that which does not kill us makes us stronger"--and more clever. Here we're into the last lens of technology. In short, we innovate our way out of perceived dead-ends. Specific examples of resiliency reborn may signal new understandings of how you bring back the disconnected to the world of connectivity--not so much repairing the old but creating new forms of connectivity. And I'm not just talking in a physical, networked sense, but in a social-economic sense: how do you make sure the rural and urban poor aren't permanently disconnected from the future by this tragedy? Does the shock allow us to solve old, seemingly intractable situations such as these, or does it simply exacerbate them?

Positive lessons in this regard can give us a renewed sense of confidence that this nut is not necessarily that hard to crack--not just at home but elsewhere.

And we may become more empathetic with that elsewhere.

One thing is clear: our system has been perturbed.

When that happens, new rules tend to come in waves, just like Katrina did.

[Time to pull out the old Y2K report](#). Time to anticipate the political backlash, the rise of the "answer man" and the search for scapegoats.

The horizontal scenarios are just beginning...

The storm surge begins

[Originally posted at Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog](#)

So much blame to go around.

New Orleans is revealed, to no one's surprise, as a woefully loose-ruled environment barely managed by a corrupt, incompetent government.

Support networks in the poor, rural coastal areas are revealed as meager and painfully brittle.

State governments are revealed as low-ballers on a host of long-term investments in infrastructure and network resiliency, only to be superseded by the federal government's enduring penchant for unfunded mandates.

Federal relief agencies are revealed as surprisingly incoherent in their "coordinated response," begging the question, How many 9/11-like shocks must there be before Washington gets its lines of authority straight?

The military, which has gone to untold lengths to brag every chance it can since 9/11 that homeland security is job #1, still seems to be under the impression that it requires an engraved invitation from a Constitutional Congress to get off its collective ass and respond rapidly to a domestic emergency.

And perhaps most damaging of all, the Bush Administration is revealed—yet again—as strangely incapable of grabbing the bull by the horn when disaster strikes, as though such leadership is only to be summoned once it becomes a public relations damage-control function.

Sad to say, the best-working aspect of the emergency response to date has been the media—the MEDIA for crying out loud!

A lot of long-held biases are likewise revealed.

The Fed's tendency to wait until local and state resources are depleted or overwhelmed is revealed as hopelessly antiquated in this connected age. By then, too much damage is irreversible and a long-term recovery is locked-in. This is a national emergency, not some bureaucratic means test. The "I'm-with-stupid" approach to chain of command just doesn't cut it when disaster strikes

The military's strong bias against involving itself with civilian situations reveals itself as a weird sort of inability to take charge in situations that naturally demand it. For a culture that prizes decisiveness in challenging, austere environments, the military tends to tip-toe around whenever it's called into action domestically—talking a big game but never leading. I mean, where's the cigar-chomping general who couldn't give a rat's ass about pissing off the locals because he's got a job to do and he doesn't take no for an answer. Because wherever he is, he's missing his best chance to jump-start a presidential run in 2008.

[Then I wake up this morning (3 Sept) in my hotel room to find: a) a small, strangely cuddly Chinese female in my bed; and b) a cigarette-smoking, casually "Goddam'ing" African-American Lt. Gen with a Cajun-sounding name (Honore) doing a Patton-like tirade on a street-corner (can anyone say, "Answer Man"?), screaming at soldiers to put their weapons down and ordering trucks around like he's really pissed off, which is good, because we need a public face for "pissed off" instead of the happy-glad stuff from Laura and Bush uttering "adequate" over and over and over again. Because, you know what? Babies dying from dehydration and old women slumped dead in their wheelchairs isn't "adequate."]

The usual bias of the two political parties is revealed all too predictably: the Republicans look incapable of caring and the Democrats look incapable of leading—except in correctly pointing out their opponents' odd detachment from a sense of personal responsibility. Good God, the Bush people look almost startled that the country expects them to lead!

The Bush Administration may well be fatally wounded by this crisis. With its legacy of tax cuts, budget cuts everywhere save the military and national security (and look what that's gotten us to date in this response!), unprecedented budget deficits, and—most damaging of all right now—its tendency to alienate our allies even as it ambitiously seeks to reshape the world, the Bush White House seems dangerously out of step with history's demand that we face globalization's rising complexity with our own increasing ingenuity. Instead, we seemed plagued by leaders who have outsourced vision to God knows where. This is what "Who's next?" "Bring it on!" and "Let's roll!" takes you: absolutely nowhere you're prepared to go.

And so New Orleans looks like Port-au-Prince overnight, right down to the infantile behavior of its lowest residents, who never seem to notice the cameras rolling as they descend into acts most of us wouldn't put up with from a well-trained dog. Where have these people been living up to now to think that all bets were off once the lights went down?

I mean, I understand the caged—animal mindset of Iraqis living for decades under a brutal dictatorship, but how to excuse the criminally feral behavior of that many people at the drop of a hat? All of us have experienced shocks in our lives, but not all of us are instantly plunged into a primitiveness that seems to revel in its inhumanity to others in clear pain. Communities—real communities—aren't atomized overnight. Someone let New Orleans reach this latent state of brutality a long time ago. And in that process, virtually everyone is too blame: parents, churches, politicians, companies, schools—everyone. We are watching the Gap's searing pain revealed right here in America in a manner that should humble us all, because there's a whole lot more broken in the Big Easy than the levee. The physical disconnectedness on display here is nothing compared to the social and even spiritual disconnectedness—and that runs from the lowest looter right up to the mayor who couldn't bother to stay with his city.

Finger-pointing in all directions has already begun, with the vast majority of these heat-seeking missiles naturally coming round to President Bush himself, who remains white-hot from the emotional scorching put on him recently by Cindy Sheehan, in what can only be described as the revenge of Michael Moore (don't tell me you don't see the similarities between her quest and Moore's breakthrough documentary "Roger and Me"). You'd think his handlers would have learned from "Fahrenheit 9/11" that silence is deadly when it comes from leaders who hesitate to lead at moments of obvious crisis.

Honestly, that crew makes Jon Stewart's job such a frickin' cakewalk that the man should send his Peabody's to the White House as a thank-you.

The presidential election of 2008 began on Tuesday—for all of you who didn't pick up on that. Bush's second term ("Oh why does America ever bet on sequels!" the self-righteous blogger types furiously as his "vol. II" is being printed in vast numbers this very day) is now cast irretrievably as a two-and-a-half-year effort to live down its past mistakes: the systematic alienation of allies from day one, the tax cuts, the lack of peace in Iraq (and—sadly but not justifiably—the war in Iraq by extension), and now this. We are witnessing the earliest onset of post-presidency ever.

And that's more than bad, it's tragic. Bush's instinct for action and leadership is his best quality, but he seems often to put it on the shelf in a strange sort of blind trust in the people he picks for positions of leadership around him. Frankly, other than Rummy and a few of his direct managers, I don't think I'd pick any of the rest of this administration's senior people for my team. They're just plain mediocre, despite all the past job titles. There simply isn't much imagination with this crowd: they know what to cut but not what to add. I don't anticipate any initiatives worth mentioning from this bunch absent Rummy's continued push to revamp the Pentagon. The rest, including Rice, just seem to be treading water. Rove seems lost now that he's won Bush's re-election. The ambition just isn't there any more (Remember the big push on Social Security? Won't that be a great

Trivial Pursuit question years from now?). Instead, Bush looks increasingly uncomfortable, like the dog that caught the car. He has his second term, besting the old man, but all that seems to have gotten him is the resurrection of the ambivalent, rather aimless politician he was so often accused of being in the past.

I mean, what exactly did we reelect him to do—other than not be a Democrat?

It's weird, but six months before the election I remember writing here that it was Rumsfeld that was the biggest burnout of the crew, and the one most needing jettisoning. Now, he remains the one figure in the crowd likely to enjoy a big legacy: the reshaping of the force from its Cold War mindset to the beginnings of the SysAdmin's profound emergence.

With a Bush White House on its heels, expect the midlevel bureaucrats who really run Washington to be largely in control through the remainder of the term, and here the System Perturbation that is Katrina will likely prove Chernobyl-like in its impact: spurring the system toward a profound rethinking of what security really is in this increasingly interconnected world (the loss of the node that is N.O. being the biggest horizontal scenario for the long haul, revealing as it does critical infrastructural weaknesses in our economy). Rebuilding the devastated coast will be a lot like shrinking the Gap, because to create real resiliency there we'll end up creating lots of new infrastructure where we now realize there was none—or at least not nearly enough.

This will not be a rebuilding, but a re-imagining—just like we need to do in the Gap. And here I think the country will end up regretting giving Bush four more years because—again—this crowd lacks imagination.

Still, it's not just the military's turn toward the SysAdmin function that's likely to be accelerated, we're likely to see a new empathetic resonance across previously firewalled sectors, like urban renewal and foreign aid, overseas crisis response and homeland security, and public versus private responsibilities for ensuring social resilience.

And in this process, I really believe we'll get stronger, get smarter, and move this pile. In getting a real dose of what the Gap feels like within our borders, we should start noticing the larger picture, the larger challenges, and the larger opportunities.

The art of the long view

[Originally posted at Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog](#)

Saw my childhood home yesterday. The front porch is still missing and now the owner is adding a godawful gazebo bit on the side. This is an historic home, one of the three Blaine homes in Boscobel that's easily 130 years old. Blaine was the most famous resident of Boscobel's origins in 1875, eventually going on to become governor of Wisconsin.

It's sad to see that home get progressively weirded out, although we did our own share with an addition off the back in the 1970s.

So I guess I'm not pretending to be the historical purist here, just the sentimental fool.

Vonne and I talk about the second vacation home somewhere that doubles as our think-ahead toward a retirement home--long range planners we. Yesterday, she just tossed out the notion of buying place here in Boscobel (my Mom had pushed us to buy the famous old Ruka house on Wisconsin Avenue (1872), a huge expanse of a place that ran in the 160s (houses not exactly expensive in this backwater). It was just a dream for us now to own a second house (my God, we have kids heading toward college!), but frankly, you should always be dreaming 15-20 years down the road (we'd be in our early 60s)--just like I do in *Blueprint for Action*. No dreams is the perfect recipe for inaction, I say.

Anyway, the dream would be for me to buy our old place on Superior Street so that when my Mom eventually leaves town, there is still a Barnett (we were the town's first mayor) owning property here. We'd try to fix it up to its original

grandeur, including the cupola on top, and it would become a private bed-and-breakfast for our collective family to use for mini-getaways. Sounds crazy, some distant Green Bay cousins of mine did the same thing on a farm around here not long ago for their big brood of siblings and associated families. Imagine a collective family gathering in the old house to open presents on Christmas Eve, and then the block-plus walk to Immaculate Conception Church for midnight mass!

A nice dream, yes. How likely, I have no idea, but I don't want the only place I visit years from now being the graves of my parents, my two brothers, and my paternal grandparents and Great Aunt Catty. I want some other reason for coming here than just death.

So I dream this little dream.

And it's good to have such dreams.

A lot of readers want me to get wrapped around the axle on various current events--to make them the immediate and broadband fixation of my work. But to crusade on Iraq or China or Katrina alone isn't really what I do, nor is it what I want to do. I want to stay the grand strategist, meaning most of my battlefields will remain in the future.

So instead of always bemoaning today's failures, like Katrina, I like to focus on tomorrow's victories, like Porter Goss opening up the CIA ("Opening Up the CIA," by Timothy L. Burger, *Time*, a recent one (I pulled the page out of one of my Mom's issues last night and now I can't find where she put them away and for some reason the sheet has no date!)).

Instead of crusading on today's fault-lines, I like to highlight and get behind tomorrow's new capacities, and Goss is doing just that, tossing \$100 million at an open-source unit. That's what I and others have been saying for a while: make the CIA more what it was originally supposed to be--not the puzzle palace but the

actual central repository for intell that all could contribute to and all could use (both public and private).

You know, I think Google's got 'em scared at Langley . . .

This doesn't mean the occasional broadside won't emanate from my lips, and that is exactly what we have teed up in the November issue of *Esquire* on China. But no one such rant will overwhelm the raves, because the raves are future pointers and not just finger pointing, which always has a past-oriented flavor (who didn't do what when).

In sum, this is how I maintain my optimism and it's how my influence can truly be expressed. The SysAdmin force is coming into being, in a big way and all around the dial. It will be created not by the political leaders so much as the mid-level bureaucrats who you never hear about and who never leave. And it will be created by a generational wave of military officers.

The temptation now is to crap on everything, to bundle up Katrina and Baghdad and say this'll never work and let's go back to what we know and love (big war with a big opponent to justify our big contracts and our big bases that keep so many jobs and votes and congressmen in their seats). And while some of that is completely right, and for some people, a good call as a full-time calling, it's isn't what I'm all about--nor will it ever be.

Nor will I be putting one party or leader (like Bush today) off to the side WRT to critical remarks. I have to tell you, whenever I get that email saying what a smart fellow I am virtually all the time except for that one comment about Bush, the simplest reply to self-professed vision adherents is that they have both the wrong guy and the wrong vision. I don't generate long-range strategic vision that works for only one party because that concept is so anathema to my logic as to defy everything save some useless angry sputtering in print.

In short, if that is what you need to stick around, then it's time to move on. I don't have that blind spot and I never will. I criticize all and I work with all. In my business, the Dem-Repub divide really doesn't mean a whole helluva lot--and I like it that way.

That's the price of the long view, as my friend Peter Schwartz would say.

[Contents >](#)

Ask Tom

From: Alexander S. Bosika

Subject: AMAZING BOOK

Tom,

I finally bought the Pentagon's New Map after reading your WEBLOG for so long. What an opening introduction!!! As a fellow Canadian who is probably the most pro-American in the country, I am impressed by the detail and quality of your insight!

I just purchased PetroDollar Warfare by William R. Clark and am reading PEAK OIL and I am very concerned. While the Alberta tar sands may have more oil reserves than the Saudis, US doctrine MUST SHIFT to alternative fuels and we must kill this consumption mentality" through the Big 3 and other auto-makers. I know our Prime Minister just stated we'd pump out more oil to stabilize prices but this is nonsense!!! Gas should not be cheaper than a can of Coke. This is "energy" that fuels the world.

With the New Orleans mess and the horrible FEMA response, I am really concerned how the forces of evil (Al-Qaeda) are looking at U.S. response to its own situation.

Alexander S. Bosika
Wireless technology Consultant/Marketer
:::

Alexander,

Be sure Al Qaeda is watching. So are the Saudis I am sure.

Everyone should be watching, because it teaches us all something profound about mutually-assured dependence in a globalized world. More than America will suffer with this critical node breakdown. Everyone who sells through that port will suffer too. Relationships will be permanently altered. Economics can shift.

The response is about so much more than just preventing immediate death. It's about protecting connectivity that millions upon millions will pay for if it's lost.

Great point. Thanks for the note.

BTW, in last DOE annual report, they calculated "what if we counted Canada's non-conventional supplies?" and when they did, Canada was the second biggest holder of oil in the world all of a sudden. Don't think the Chinese didn't notice.

Tom Barnett

From: Major Todd Vician
Subject: Invasion required to change rule sets?

Mr Barnett,

After hearing your presentation last fall in Montgomery, AL, I purchased your book. I'm almost through it, and appreciate your perspective on how we should change the military to shrink the non-integrated gap.

I'm curious how you would respond to those, such as Fukuyama, who state, I think, that we could have changed the Middle East for the better by enforcing the rule sets (i.e. tighter sanctions and increased IAEA monitoring of Iraq) rather than exporting our security to that gap through the 2003 invasion. Could they reach the same end, with one taking longer than the other?

Also, given what you see now with the insurgents and constitution disagreements, if we had the SysAdmin force up and running before we went into Iraq, do you think we would be dramatically ahead of where we are now concerning Iraqi reconstruction and eventual coalition troop reduction? I'm trying to build up my repertoire for those inevitable cocktail parties and SLUG conversations now that I'm assigned to DC.

Thanks,

Major Todd Vician, Pentagon
:::

Yes to both questions.

Sanctions weakened Saddam, but cost too many lives (estimates of half a million Iraqis under 5 dying prematurely as a result of deprivation--according to the UN!) in the meantime.

Saddam was just too good an opportunity to pass up for the Bush Administration that wanted to lay a Big Bang on the region and desired the fastest possible route to that end. The Big Bang has had a load of positive effects in the region, ones that sanctions never would have delivered (elections in SA, Cedar Rev in Lebanon, Syrian pullout, "election" in Egypt, Israeli pull-out). Expect plenty of backsliding (like Iran vote), but clearly a sense of change is in the air that never could have otherwise been achieved with wait-and-see-sanctions.

A real big SysAdmin effort right on the heels of Saddam's fall would have made a huge difference. Ask the Civil Affairs guys who were over there: we have 5 months to feel the love and then we lost roughly 90 % of the population that we had in our pockets up to that point. Their basic sense: "You just took down most powerful force in our universe and you're telling us you can't rebuild the basics of the country?" Same basic dynamic

you see in any natural disaster or power outage: the clock is running from the get-go on the SysAdmin response. Do it well and win over the population. Do it badly and you will have chaos.

Best of luck to you in The Building,

Tom Barnett

+++++

From: Scott
Subject: Syndicating blog

Tom,

After reading your recent blogs on Iraq and Katrina (e.g. "The Storm Surge Begins") , I wonder why you are not syndicating some of your best blog entries. I have mentioned to friends that I believe your commentary on US and Global occurrences are as incisive, imaginative, and forward-looking as any of the many opinion columnists for the major newspapers.

Kudos...

Scott

:::

Scott,

In the works. Not as blog, but as regular columnist. Not sure how long it takes, and book coming out may delay it.

Thanks for the vote of confidence.

Tom

Where's Tom?

Enterprise Resilience Management™ for the Financial Sector

September 19, 2005

The St. Regis Hotel - Two East 55th Street at Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Registration Information at: <http://www.afei.org/brochure/5AF2/index.cfm#registration>

This conference explains how to approach the convergence of information management and regulatory compliance, and how effective solutions can help financial services enterprises avoid risk and realize tangible business benefits. You will learn how top companies are navigating the complex challenges facing enterprises, building flexibility into business processes and assuring confidence in information assets across the enterprise.

Resilience is the ability to uncover and adjust to continually changing risks and endure significant disruptions in business conditions. It creates significant advantages over less adaptive competitors. A resilient enterprise must align its strategy, operations, management systems, governance structure, and decision-support capabilities.

The conference consists of the following workshops:

- **Regulatory Compliance** With a growing body of legislation dictating how enterprises may create, use, share, and retain electronic records, CEOs must require data storage and management strategies that meet regulatory compliance while supporting their organizations' overall business goals.
- **Process Management and IT Integration** Today's most advanced enterprises are using technology to manage and monitor critical business processes. This allows businesses to tie third parties into their operations directly over the network. This "network effect" is spurring a shift to web services, process-oriented architecture and event-driven system dependencies, as well as transforming of existing enterprise applications.
- **Security** The focus on net-centricity, SOA/POA and web services will also see a rise in information assurance, security and identity management to address gaps in the open architectures. The ability to monitor activity and isolate anomalous behavior becomes a critical element of defense-in-depth strategies.

You will also hear from **Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett**, author, contributing editor for Esquire and strategic consultant on globalization. His work with Cantor Fitzgerald on new rule sets established the foundation of his views on the strategic world order, which were seminal in establishing transformation of our nation's defense.

Stephen DeAngelis, President and CEO of Enterra Solutions LLC, and visiting scientist at Carnegie Mellon University, will also speak on methods and tools for assuring resilience in enterprises.

[Contents >](#)

Glossary

updated 29 April 2005

Asymmetrical warfare — A conflict between two foes of vastly different capabilities. After the Red Army dissolved in the 1990s, the U.S. military knew it was basically unbeatable, especially in a straight-up fight. But that meant that much smaller opponents would seek to negate its strengths by exploiting its weaknesses, by being clever and “dirty” in combat. On, 9/11, America got a real dose of what asymmetrical warfare is going to be like in the twenty-first century.

Connectivity — The enormous changes being brought on by the Information Revolution, including the emerging financial, technological and logistical architecture of the global economy (i.e., the movement of money, services accompanied by content, and people and materials). During the boom times of the 1990s, many thought that advances in communications such as the Internet and mobile phones would trump all, erasing the business cycle, erasing national borders, erasing the very utility of the state in managing a global security order that seemed more virtual than real. 9/11 proved differently: that connectivity, while a profoundly transforming force, could not by itself maintain global security, primarily because a substantial rise in connectivity between any nation and the outside world typically leads to a host of tumultuous reactions, including heightened nationalism.

Disconnectedness — In this century, it is disconnectedness that defines danger. Disconnectedness allows bad actors to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their dictatorial control, or, in the case of failed states, it allows dangerous transnational actors to exploit the resulting chaos to their own dangerous ends. Eradicating disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a supreme moral cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will. Just as importantly, however, by expanding the connectivity of globalization, we increase peace and prosperity planet-wide.

Functioning Core — Those parts of the world that are actively integrating their national economies into a global economy, and that adhere to globalization’s emerging security rule set. The Functioning Core at present consists of North America, Europe both “old” and “new,” Russia, Japan and South Korea, China (although the interior far less so), India (in a pockmarked sense), Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, and the ABCs of South American (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). That is roughly four billion out of a global population of just over six billion. The Functioning Core can be subdivided into the Old Core, anchored by America, Europe, and Japan; and the New Core, whose leading pillars are China, India, Brazil and Russia.

Globalization — The worldwide integration and increasing flows of trade, capital, ideas, and people. Until 9/11, the U.S. government tended to identify globalization primarily as an economic rule set, but thanks to the Global War on Terrorism, we now

understand that it likewise demands the clear enunciation and enforcement of a security rule set as well.

Globalization I, II, and III — The history of globalization can be divided into three parts, each governed by its own rule set.

Globalization I, from 1870 to 1914, was ended by the start of World War I.

Globalization II, from 1945 to 1980, was initiated by the United States at the end of World War II, and continued until the effective end of the Cold War.

Globalization III (1980 -2001) has been an era of relative peace and enormous economic growth around the world that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but whose rule sets have now been challenged by rogue states and international terrorists, as exemplified by 9/11.

Greater inclusive — What we need to create as we expand our definition of national security crises in the age of globalization. After more than half a century of almost complete isolation from the rest of the world as it sought to guard against the terror of nuclear war, the Pentagon needs to reconnect to the world—to war within the context of everything else. We need to break up the old hierarchies between the “big one” and all the lesser included. We need something that covers the whole enchilada—that makes us one with everything. We need a greater inclusive.

Lesser included — Pentagon long-range planning during the Cold War had been very simple: always keep our forces ahead of the Soviets by matching the size of their forces and pursuing the latest technological advances. World War III constituted the “Big One” against which all long-range planning proceeded. Everything else the U.S. military did in terms of operations around the world was bundled together in the concept of the “lesser included.” Even though the U.S. military spent over ninety percent of the Cold War engaged in such lesser included, its force-sizing principle remained the Big One with the Soviets. The forces of globalization and 9/11 made clear that there wasn’t going to be a Big One—the lesser included were the whole ball game.

Leviathan — The U.S. military's unparalleled warfighting capacity and the high-performance combat troops, weapon systems, aircraft, armor and ships associated with all-out war against traditionally defined opponents (i.e., other militaries). This is the force America created to defend the West against the Soviet threat, now transformed from its industrial era roots to its information age capacity for high-speed, high-lethality, and high-precision combat operations. This force is without peer in the world today, and—as such—frequently finds itself fighting shorter and easier wars. However, this “overmatch” means that current and future enemies in the Global War on Terrorism will largely seek to avoid triggering the Leviathan's employment, preferring to wage asymmetrical war against the United States. The Leviathan rules the “first half” of war, but is often ill-suited, by design and temperament, to the “second half” of peace, to

include postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. It is thus counterposed to the System Administrators force.

Military-Market Nexus — Markets create connectivity, and military security is needed for markets to take root and flourish. “Where security enables the steady rise of connectivity between any national economy and the outside world, markets logically emerge to manage the marginal risks that remain, and where markets can effectively manage risk, investments invariably flow toward desired resources, such as relatively inexpensive but dependable labor. Over time, these essential transactions engender further connectivity among nations and regions, reflected in the rise of more complex and suitably entangling rule sets that moderate the behavior of not just nation-states but likewise firms and individuals. The desired security end state of this integration process is a community of states within which rule-set transgressions find certain—if not immediate—resolution through universally agreed-upon legal means. In other words, the military never has to get involved.” *The Pentagon’s New Map*, Pg 198.

Military operations other than war — How the Pentagon defines crisis response activity, nation-building, peacekeeping, and so forth—everything outside of major warfare. Abbreviated MOOTW (pronounced “moo-twah”), it held a very low priority before 9/11.

Non-Integrating Gap — Regions of the world that are largely disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability. Today, the Non-Integrating Gap is made up of the Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, virtually all of Africa, portions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of Southeast Asia. These regions constitute globalization’s “ozone hole,” where connectivity remains thin or absent in far too many cases. Of course, each region contains some countries that are very Core-like in their attributes (just like there are Gap-like pockets throughout the Gap defined primarily by poverty), but these are like mansions in an otherwise seedy neighborhood, and as such are trapped by these larger Gap-defining circumstances.

Rule Sets — A collection of rules (both formal and informal) that delineates how some activity normally unfolds. The Pentagon’s New Map explored the new rule sets concerning conflict and violence in international affairs—or under what conditions governments decide it makes sense to switch from the rule set that defines peace to that which defines war. The events of 9/11 shocked the Pentagon and the rest of the world into the realization that we needed a new rule set concerning war and peace, one that replaces the old rule set that governed America’s Cold War with the Soviet Union. The book explained how the new rule set will actually work in the years ahead, not just from America’s perspective but from an international one.

Rule set reset — When a crisis triggers your realization that your world is woefully lacking certain types of rules, you start making up those new rules with a vengeance (e.g., the Patriot Act and the doctrine of preemption following 9/11). Such a rule set reset can be a very good thing. But it can also be a very dangerous time, because in your rush to fill in all the rule set gaps, your cure may end up being worse than your disease.

Seam states — The countries that ring the Gap, such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Some are already members of the Core, and most others are serious candidates for joining the Core. These states are important with regard to international security because they provide terrorists geographic access to the Core. The U.S. security strategy regarding these states is simple: get them to increase their security practices as much as possible and to close whatever loopholes exist.

System Administrators (SysAdmin) — The "second half" force that wages the peace after the Leviathan force has waged war successfully. Therefore it is a force optimized for such categories of operations as "stability and support operations" (SASO), postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, "military operations other than war (MOOTW), "humanitarian assistance/disaster relief" (HA/DR), and any and all operations associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC), counter-insurgency operations, and small-scale crisis responses.

System perturbations — A system-level definition of crisis and instability in the age of globalization; a new ordering principle that has already begun to transform the military and U.S. security policy; also a particular event that forces us to rethink everything. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 served as the first great "existence proof" for this concept, but there have and will be others over time (some are purposeful, like the Bush Administration's "Big Bang" strategy of fomenting political change in the Middle East by toppling Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, but others will be accidents, like the SARS epidemic or the Asian Tsunamis of December 2004). 9/11, as a system perturbation, placed the world's security rule set in flux and created a demand for new rules. Preemption is the big new rule. By creating that new rule, 9/11 changed America forever and through that process altered global history.