|
CHAPTER
|
NO.
|
DATE
|
TYPE
|
SUBJECT
|
SLIDES?
|
|
1: New Rule
Sets
|
1
|
4 Aug (Mon); no
conflict
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subject is
first great mentor: Prof. Adam Ulam at Harvard, dean of Soviet for.
pol./Marxism experts]
|
My first
attempts at long-range futurology (Gorbachev Politburo paper at
Harvard I couldn’t publish + my “Jack Ryan” story of helping
Navy make peace with Russians in first research project in DC)
|
none
|
|
|
2
|
5 Aug (Tues);
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
My story of the
21st century as Globalization I, II and III and the
concept of rule sets (out of whack and periods of rapid onset of new
rules)
|
Possibly some
version of the one I use
[see PNM Book
1, page "2"]
|
|
|
3
|
6 Aug (Wed): no
conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
My stories
about the 20th Century as long “arcs” of rule-set
“rises” and “falls”: death of old balance of power, then
rise and fall of bipolar security order with nuke rule set, and now
rising globalization order with unclear/still unfolding terror/WMD
rule set
|
May want to
generate a new one: very simply trio of humps going left to right
with descriptors on “rise,” “peak” and “fall” of each
arc (example: we had nonsensical “duck and cover” in early nuke
rule set, then MAD, then arms control, but we are only at silly
“duct tape and plastic cover” stage of WMD/terror era
|
|
|
4
|
7 Aug (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Lay out the
four potential paths/ scenarios for Globalization III, using classic
Royal/Dutch Shell method of 2 Q’s = 4 boxes
|
Definitely use
brief slide
[see PNM Book
1, page "4"]
|
|
|
5
|
8 Aug (Fri): no
conflict
|
Myth buster
(summary/ segue)
|
The myth of
chaos and complete uncertainty in national security planning
|
None
anticipated
|
|
2: The Rise of
the ‘Lesser Includeds’
|
6
|
9 Aug (Sat): no
conflict
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subjects
are William Manthorpe, Dep Dir of Office of Naval Intell in early
1990s + Capt. (now Prof at NWC and frequent collaborator) Bradd
Hayes
|
Story of Naval
Forces Capabilities Planning Effort, or “best and brightest” of
Navy and Marines called for many-weeks-long conference to determine
future course of naval forces following end of Cold War; result
being historic White Paper “From the Sea” that I cowrote with
Bradd
|
Slide of
infamous “Manthorpe Curve” that predicted resurrection of
Russian threat; which I later use as basis of celebrated article
that deconstructs NFCPE gathering into “3 visions of the
future”: Transitioneers (managing world day-to-day as it
transitions to new era), Big Sticks (focus on regional rogues like
Saddam), and Cold Worriers (focus long-term on Cold War-like enemy
which “inevitably” arises”)
[see PNM Book
2, page "6"]
|
|
|
7
|
10 Aug (Sun):
fly to DC late
|
Regular
storyline
|
All the bad
predictions made at the end of the Cold War regarding the future of
the world (based on unpublished list I once penned: “Bad Stuff
That Didn’t Happen in the 1990s”; exception being rise of
catastrophic terrorism
|
None
anticipated (this sets
up next section that says it was the small “lesser includeds”
that dominated the 1990s and beyond—not the great power war fears
of a “rising near-peer competitor”)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Break
11 Aug to brief Chief of Naval Ops in DC + Commandant of US Coast
Guard
|
|
|
|
8
|
12 Aug (Tues):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Intro concept
of Kenneth Waltz’s 3 levels of perspective and make arguments
about fracturing of US security market in 1990s, rise of governance
gap (US mil built to fight other nations, but security dangers not
from other states in conventional but “bad actors” (either
state-free actors or criminal regimes)
|
Use some
version of classic Ken Waltz slide (that I made up, his book had no
graphics)
[see PNM Book
2, page "8"]
System vs
Nation State vs
Indivdual
levels of perspective
|
|
|
9
|
13 Aug (Wed):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The story of
the “downshifting” of US military responses over the past 25
years (used to be focused at system level on global war/Sov threat;
then in 1980/1990s shifted more to state-on-state warfare in Mideast
and “rogues” in general; then in 1990s shifted to internal
situations/ failed states/ nation-building
|
Possibly use
slide from brief
[see PNM Book
2, page "9"]
|
|
|
10
|
14 Aug (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The origins of
the concept of the asymmetrical threat (the
I’m-big-and-you’re-small school of strategy) and how it morphed
into the concept of “access denial” (meaning potential enemies
would seek to deny US access to their conflicts through asymmetrical
means) and how all this became huge excuse to demand all sorts of
new weapons and platforms from Congress
|
None
anticipated
|
|
|
11
|
15 Aug (Fri);
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The real
asymmetry displayed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks (not a question of
stopping our state-based military, but attacking our “system”
and our “individuals”; our response? Take down Afghanistan!
Why? That’s
what the Pentagon does? Takes
down states!
But over time,
three-pronged war emerges reflective of “fractured security
market” (system-level financial war, state-based regime change
war, and warfare against individuals (serial assassinations and
special ops); point being, we had no plan for this multilayered
warfare prior to 9/11, or no concept of war fought globally along
otherwise peaceful unfolding of globalization
|
Slide from
brief
[see PNM Book
21, page "11"]
|
|
|
12
|
16 Aug (Sat);
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The new
security linkages revealed by the 9/11 attacks: we now fight bad
individuals who wage war across the system and receive support from
rogue regimes; while global /system war is unlikely and
state-on-state wars are disappearing and “failed states” are far
less numerous than most “experts” claim, we for now don’t
really understand how big a threat arises from these new linkages
across Waltz’s three levels
|
Possible slide
[see PNM Book
2, page "12"]
|
|
|
13
|
17 Aug (Sun):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The bifurcation
of US military after end of Cold War between those who saw a future
they could live with and those who didn’t see an enemy
“worthy” of them; upshot being we spent 90s buying one military
(high tech) and operating another (mil ops “other than war”); my
story about being “therapist” to naval resource “barons”
(every year decrying their schizophrenic behavior)
|
Use brief slide
[see PNM Book
2, page "13"]
|
|
|
14
|
18 Aug (Mon);
no conflict
|
Myth buster
(summary/ segue)
|
The myth of the
Global Cop and perpetual war: of three dozen failed state situations
in 1990s, we engaged in four; state-on-state wars disappearing;
bulge of ethnic violence in early 90s slows down dramatically by end
of decade; and rise of religious-based terrorism still minor
compared to “world wars of past”.
Plus, if you chart US crisis response activity of last 30
years, about 5% involved real combat in 1970s, ditto for 80s, 90s
and even today
|
Maybe some
chart comparing where we actually went in 1990s and are going now
compared to all those countries where we don’t intervene—where
the bulk of the global population actually live (this sets up next
section defining Core and Gap); point being, the 1990s were a
fabulous decade of growth and stability and not constant chaos and
death
|
|
3: Disconnect-edness
Defines Danger
|
15
|
19 Aug (Tues):
doc appt in
morn and brief in aft
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subject is
first great professional mentor in defense industry: Dr. Hank
Gaffney at Center for Naval Analyses]
|
Explain how I
was taught how to think about strategic surprise as a young pol-mil
analysts fresh out of grad school and working in my first defense
think tank in DC in the early post-Cold War period: the classic Cold
War-era “vertical scenario” versus the emerging post-Cold War
era “horizontal scenario.” Point being I was taught the “big war” way of thinking
about crises, even though the US has never really experienced that
form in the Cold War (except, in proxy sense, in onset of Korean
War). What’s
interesting about distinction is that military tends to think only
in terms of vertical scenarios while rest of USG and private sector
really think almost exclusively about horizontal ones (huge gap in
understanding, as mil thinks everyone else is clueless about “real
dangers” and rest of society thinks military is “paranoid”
about threats.
|
Possible
slide(s), but probably not necessary
[see PNM Book
3, page "15"]
|
|
|
16
|
20 Aug (Wed):
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
Story of the
long-term shift from original strategic foci of Cold War (Europe and
NE Asia to box in Sovs) to current (but a generation-in-the-making)
focus on SW Asia (aka the Middle East)
|
I have a slide,
but probably not needed
[see PNM Book
3, page "16"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
BREAK!
I AND DAUGHTER GO TO FINAL PACKER GAME IN 21-24 AUG!
|
|
|
|
17
|
25 Aug (Mon);
fly to Philly late
|
Regular
storyline
|
Defining the
Functioning Core (e.g., welcome connectivity, have robust enough
legal/social systems to handle content flow)
|
None
anticipated
|
|
|
|
|
|
BREAK!
TRAVEL TO GIVE INDUSTRY SPEECH FOR MONEY ON 26 AUG (signed this
contract long ago)
|
|
|
|
18
|
27 Aug (Wed):
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
Defining the
Non-Integrating Core (e.g., can’t handle content flows, endemic
conflicts, repressive regimes, leaders who refuse to leave)
|
None
anticipated
|
|
|
19
|
28 Aug (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Explaining the
pattern of US military crisis response in the 1990s and showing how
95% of it occurs within the Gap; basic argument of disconnectedness
defines danger
|
Use the sort of
map from Esquire
[see PNM Book
3, page "19"]
|
|
|
20
|
29 Aug (Fri):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Concept that
globalization has to be viewed not as binary outcome (here or not,
good or bad) but as historical unfolding or spread: show me where it
is and I’ll show you . . .and so on (stealing a lot of the Esquire
text); define the Seam States here
|
None
anticipated
|
|
|
21
|
30 Aug (Sat):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
A litany of
statistical differences that define the Core-Gap distinction: if
you’re leader is “president for life,” then you’re probably
living in the Gap! And
so on.
|
I have a huge
number of these; many maps possible (for example, where all the
civil wars are, where you’re likely to step on a land mine,
etc).
|
|
|
22
|
31 Aug (Sun):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The
different-worlds-yields-different rule sets argument and why it is
hard to be honest about that and how the Bush Admin keeps making new
policy that seems to contradict long cherished national security
ideals but really is about dealing only with the Gap (my old brief
trick: I tell audience to yell out things they don’t like about
Bush Admin foreign policy and I respond to all with the phrase “ .
. . in the Gap!” Point
of this being, it’s ain’t just George Bush’s cowboy foreign
policy that drives this seeming schizophrenic approach to world (you
can trace much of this back to Clinton—for example the opposition
to International Criminal Court).
Another point: being honest with Americans, allies, and
enemies about having two policies for two worlds is not being
hypocritical, but honest
|
Don’t need
another map for this
|
|
|
23
|
1 Sept (Mon) no
conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Drill-down on
policy bifurcation regarding deterrence and preemption; lotsa to say
here
|
Nothing needed
|
|
|
24
|
2 Sept (Tues):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Another
drill-down on policy bifurcation regarding missile defense and arms
control
|
Nothing needed
|
|
|
25
|
3 Sept (Wed):
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
Where and not
when unilateralism makes sense (regurgitation of op-ed I wrote on
that subject): reality that any military ops we pursue in Gap will
be largely unilateral in terms of combat, although we need allies
for peacekeeping + focus on bilat security assistance to Seam States
+ reality of continuity of multilateralism throughout Core (example
of FBI coop with China,
Russia, etc on catching terrorists)
|
Nothing needed
|
|
|
26
|
4 Sept (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The shift
realized: the announced intention to rearrange US military basing
structure around world (out of Old Europe and into New + lotsa new
“mini-mart” bases throughout Gap
|
Map of bases
probably good; there was great one of base gains and losses in 1990s
in Atlantic that I have copy of
|
|
|
27
|
5 Sept (Fri):
no conflict
|
Myth buster
(summary/ segue)
|
Myth of
Core-Gap really being just new expression of Arc of Instability and
isn’t that just code for Arabs and their oil!
I say Gap is about whole lot more.
|
|
|
4: The Core and
the Gap
|
28
|
6 Sept (Sat):
no conflict
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subject is
great Wall Street mentor, retired Navy Admiral Bud Flanagan and the
series of workshops we created together between War College and his
firm, Cantor Fitzgerald—all held atop WTC1 at Windows on the
World]
|
Story of what I
learned from thinking about the future of globalization from Cantor
Fitzgerald: best example being, when they saw a huge global problem
looming in distance, they saw business opportunity to marketize the
problem-set and make it go away over time (horizontal scenario)
while military would view same situation as time bomb waiting to go
off (vertical scenario). Explain whole point of NewRuleSets.Project: bringing nat
security and Wall Street communities together to discuss stuff they
never discuss before—like what if terrorists struck at Wall
Street, what if there was war in Middle East, what if …
|
None needed,
though I have nice shot of me in front of screen at workshop at
Windows on the World
|
|
|
29
|
7 Sept (Sun):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
My story of
what it will take for Globalization III to advance (key flows) and
all the good things that will ensue.
Also raise issue of possibility of screwing up Glob III
|
Lotsa stats on
how Glob III has already made the world a better place, so
maybe a table or two.
|
|
|
30
|
8 Sept (Mon):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Story of
population growth and aging of global population: two key points
being we begin to depopulate as species around 2050 and at same
point we reach historic milestone where old outnumber young for
first time in human history
|
I use some
charts on this in the brief
[see PNM Book
4, page "30"]
|
|
|
31
|
9 Sept (Tues):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Reality of
declining Potential Support Ratio (number of 15-59 for everyone over
60 years of age) in Core while Gap’s remains high through 2050, so
obvious need for flow of people from Gap to Core; some of this will
be permanent migration (hard politically for Europe and Japan), and
some will be through global commute like that pushed by Philippines
government.
|
Slides from
brief
[see PNM Book
4, page "31"]
|
|
|
32
|
10 Sept (Wed):
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
Reality of
Developing Asia replacing North America as global energy demand
center by 2020; this is huge shift in rule sets.
Rising codependency between Asia and Middle East; rising fear
of Asia about
dependency, so efforts to tap Russian oil/gas, for example, by China
and Japan.
|
Charts
detailing the change
[see PNM Book
4, page "32"]
|
|
|
33
|
11 Sept
(Thurs): no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Story of how
disconnected Middle East is except for raw materials (energy) it
trades; reflecting on the historical curse of oil and other precious
raw materials in the Gap ; danger of world moving beyond oil to nat
gas and hydrogen, so dangerous potential future scenario whereby
Middle East is lost to history much like Sub-Saharan Africa, where
nothing much of value originates in terms of global trade, other
than precious metals and some oil
|
Probably
nothing needed, although maybe a map of countries that are highly
dependent on exporting of raw materials or other commodities (this I
do not have at this time, but not too hard to put together, if
desired)
|
|
|
34
|
12 Sept (Fri):
fly to IL late in day
|
Regular
storyline
|
The story of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Glob II: the “triad” of US,
Europe and Japan (Kennan’s containment strategy realized
financially decades later). Plus
concept of “spheres of influence” created by heavy flows of FDI
from triad to Gap states that are subsequently integrated into the
Core over time
|
Slides from
brief
[[see PNM Book
4, page "34"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
BREAK!
I AND SON GO TO SECOND HOME PACKER GAME IN GREEN BAY 13-15!
|
|
|
|
35
|
16 Sept (Tues):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Story of
expanding the Triad into the Quad (to include Developing Asia) and
what that means for global security and development: this is the
Marshall Plan people should be talking about—completely private
sector flows integrating half of humanity and taking state-based war
off table in Asia over
time.
|
Maybe a graphic
from brief
[see PNM Book
4, page "35"]
|
|
|
36
|
17 Sept (Wed);
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
A definition of
“exporting security” and a review of the history of this
public-sector export in relation to other public-sector exports like
foreign aid. Plus key
data showing how US “exports” have skyrocketed in post-Cold War
era (measured as crisis response days put in by various services)
|
Possible chart
[see PNM Book
4, page "36"]
|
|
|
