|
CHAPTER
|
NO.
|
DATE
|
TYPE
|
SUBJECT
|
SLIDES?
|
|
1: New Rule
Sets
|
1
|
4 Aug (Mon); no
conflict
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subject is
first great mentor: Prof. Adam Ulam at Harvard, dean of Soviet for.
pol./Marxism experts]
|
My first
attempts at long-range futurology (Gorbachev Politburo paper at
Harvard I couldn’t publish + my “Jack Ryan” story of helping
Navy make peace with Russians in first research project in DC)
|
none
|
|
|
2
|
5 Aug (Tues);
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
My story of the
21st century as Globalization I, II and III and the
concept of rule sets (out of whack and periods of rapid onset of new
rules)
|
Possibly some
version of the one I use
[see PNM Book
1, page "2"]
|
|
|
3
|
6 Aug (Wed): no
conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
My stories
about the 20th Century as long “arcs” of rule-set
“rises” and “falls”: death of old balance of power, then
rise and fall of bipolar security order with nuke rule set, and now
rising globalization order with unclear/still unfolding terror/WMD
rule set
|
May want to
generate a new one: very simply trio of humps going left to right
with descriptors on “rise,” “peak” and “fall” of each
arc (example: we had nonsensical “duck and cover” in early nuke
rule set, then MAD, then arms control, but we are only at silly
“duct tape and plastic cover” stage of WMD/terror era
|
|
|
4
|
7 Aug (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Lay out the
four potential paths/ scenarios for Globalization III, using classic
Royal/Dutch Shell method of 2 Q’s = 4 boxes
|
Definitely use
brief slide
[see PNM Book
1, page "4"]
|
|
|
5
|
8 Aug (Fri): no
conflict
|
Myth buster
(summary/ segue)
|
The myth of
chaos and complete uncertainty in national security planning
|
None
anticipated
|
|
2: The Rise of
the ‘Lesser Includeds’
|
6
|
9 Aug (Sat): no
conflict
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subjects
are William Manthorpe, Dep Dir of Office of Naval Intell in early
1990s + Capt. (now Prof at NWC and frequent collaborator) Bradd
Hayes
|
Story of Naval
Forces Capabilities Planning Effort, or “best and brightest” of
Navy and Marines called for many-weeks-long conference to determine
future course of naval forces following end of Cold War; result
being historic White Paper “From the Sea” that I cowrote with
Bradd
|
Slide of
infamous “Manthorpe Curve” that predicted resurrection of
Russian threat; which I later use as basis of celebrated article
that deconstructs NFCPE gathering into “3 visions of the
future”: Transitioneers (managing world day-to-day as it
transitions to new era), Big Sticks (focus on regional rogues like
Saddam), and Cold Worriers (focus long-term on Cold War-like enemy
which “inevitably” arises”)
[see PNM Book
2, page "6"]
|
|
|
7
|
10 Aug (Sun):
fly to DC late
|
Regular
storyline
|
All the bad
predictions made at the end of the Cold War regarding the future of
the world (based on unpublished list I once penned: “Bad Stuff
That Didn’t Happen in the 1990s”; exception being rise of
catastrophic terrorism
|
None
anticipated (this sets
up next section that says it was the small “lesser includeds”
that dominated the 1990s and beyond—not the great power war fears
of a “rising near-peer competitor”)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Break
11 Aug to brief Chief of Naval Ops in DC + Commandant of US Coast
Guard
|
|
|
|
8
|
12 Aug (Tues):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Intro concept
of Kenneth Waltz’s 3 levels of perspective and make arguments
about fracturing of US security market in 1990s, rise of governance
gap (US mil built to fight other nations, but security dangers not
from other states in conventional but “bad actors” (either
state-free actors or criminal regimes)
|
Use some
version of classic Ken Waltz slide (that I made up, his book had no
graphics)
[see PNM Book
2, page "8"]
System vs
Nation State vs
Indivdual
levels of perspective
|
|
|
9
|
13 Aug (Wed):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The story of
the “downshifting” of US military responses over the past 25
years (used to be focused at system level on global war/Sov threat;
then in 1980/1990s shifted more to state-on-state warfare in Mideast
and “rogues” in general; then in 1990s shifted to internal
situations/ failed states/ nation-building
|
Possibly use
slide from brief
[see PNM Book
2, page "9"]
|
|
|
10
|
14 Aug (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The origins of
the concept of the asymmetrical threat (the
I’m-big-and-you’re-small school of strategy) and how it morphed
into the concept of “access denial” (meaning potential enemies
would seek to deny US access to their conflicts through asymmetrical
means) and how all this became huge excuse to demand all sorts of
new weapons and platforms from Congress
|
None
anticipated
|
|
|
11
|
15 Aug (Fri);
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The real
asymmetry displayed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks (not a question of
stopping our state-based military, but attacking our “system”
and our “individuals”; our response? Take down Afghanistan!
Why? That’s
what the Pentagon does? Takes
down states!
But over time,
three-pronged war emerges reflective of “fractured security
market” (system-level financial war, state-based regime change
war, and warfare against individuals (serial assassinations and
special ops); point being, we had no plan for this multilayered
warfare prior to 9/11, or no concept of war fought globally along
otherwise peaceful unfolding of globalization
|
Slide from
brief
[see PNM Book
21, page "11"]
|
|
|
12
|
16 Aug (Sat);
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The new
security linkages revealed by the 9/11 attacks: we now fight bad
individuals who wage war across the system and receive support from
rogue regimes; while global /system war is unlikely and
state-on-state wars are disappearing and “failed states” are far
less numerous than most “experts” claim, we for now don’t
really understand how big a threat arises from these new linkages
across Waltz’s three levels
|
Possible slide
[see PNM Book
2, page "12"]
|
|
|
13
|
17 Aug (Sun):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The bifurcation
of US military after end of Cold War between those who saw a future
they could live with and those who didn’t see an enemy
“worthy” of them; upshot being we spent 90s buying one military
(high tech) and operating another (mil ops “other than war”); my
story about being “therapist” to naval resource “barons”
(every year decrying their schizophrenic behavior)
|
Use brief slide
[see PNM Book
2, page "13"]
|
|
|
14
|
18 Aug (Mon);
no conflict
|
Myth buster
(summary/ segue)
|
The myth of the
Global Cop and perpetual war: of three dozen failed state situations
in 1990s, we engaged in four; state-on-state wars disappearing;
bulge of ethnic violence in early 90s slows down dramatically by end
of decade; and rise of religious-based terrorism still minor
compared to “world wars of past”.
Plus, if you chart US crisis response activity of last 30
years, about 5% involved real combat in 1970s, ditto for 80s, 90s
and even today
|
Maybe some
chart comparing where we actually went in 1990s and are going now
compared to all those countries where we don’t intervene—where
the bulk of the global population actually live (this sets up next
section defining Core and Gap); point being, the 1990s were a
fabulous decade of growth and stability and not constant chaos and
death
|
|
3: Disconnect-edness
Defines Danger
|
15
|
19 Aug (Tues):
doc appt in
morn and brief in aft
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subject is
first great professional mentor in defense industry: Dr. Hank
Gaffney at Center for Naval Analyses]
|
Explain how I
was taught how to think about strategic surprise as a young pol-mil
analysts fresh out of grad school and working in my first defense
think tank in DC in the early post-Cold War period: the classic Cold
War-era “vertical scenario” versus the emerging post-Cold War
era “horizontal scenario.” Point being I was taught the “big war” way of thinking
about crises, even though the US has never really experienced that
form in the Cold War (except, in proxy sense, in onset of Korean
War). What’s
interesting about distinction is that military tends to think only
in terms of vertical scenarios while rest of USG and private sector
really think almost exclusively about horizontal ones (huge gap in
understanding, as mil thinks everyone else is clueless about “real
dangers” and rest of society thinks military is “paranoid”
about threats.
|
Possible
slide(s), but probably not necessary
[see PNM Book
3, page "15"]
|
|
|
16
|
20 Aug (Wed):
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
Story of the
long-term shift from original strategic foci of Cold War (Europe and
NE Asia to box in Sovs) to current (but a generation-in-the-making)
focus on SW Asia (aka the Middle East)
|
I have a slide,
but probably not needed
[see PNM Book
3, page "16"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
BREAK!
I AND DAUGHTER GO TO FINAL PACKER GAME IN 21-24 AUG!
|
|
|
|
17
|
25 Aug (Mon);
fly to Philly late
|
Regular
storyline
|
Defining the
Functioning Core (e.g., welcome connectivity, have robust enough
legal/social systems to handle content flow)
|
None
anticipated
|
|
|
|
|
|
BREAK!
TRAVEL TO GIVE INDUSTRY SPEECH FOR MONEY ON 26 AUG (signed this
contract long ago)
|
|
|
|
18
|
27 Aug (Wed):
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
Defining the
Non-Integrating Core (e.g., can’t handle content flows, endemic
conflicts, repressive regimes, leaders who refuse to leave)
|
None
anticipated
|
|
|
19
|
28 Aug (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Explaining the
pattern of US military crisis response in the 1990s and showing how
95% of it occurs within the Gap; basic argument of disconnectedness
defines danger
|
Use the sort of
map from Esquire
[see PNM Book
3, page "19"]
|
|
|
20
|
29 Aug (Fri):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Concept that
globalization has to be viewed not as binary outcome (here or not,
good or bad) but as historical unfolding or spread: show me where it
is and I’ll show you . . .and so on (stealing a lot of the Esquire
text); define the Seam States here
|
None
anticipated
|
|
|
21
|
30 Aug (Sat):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
A litany of
statistical differences that define the Core-Gap distinction: if
you’re leader is “president for life,” then you’re probably
living in the Gap! And
so on.
|
I have a huge
number of these; many maps possible (for example, where all the
civil wars are, where you’re likely to step on a land mine,
etc).
|
|
|
22
|
31 Aug (Sun):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The
different-worlds-yields-different rule sets argument and why it is
hard to be honest about that and how the Bush Admin keeps making new
policy that seems to contradict long cherished national security
ideals but really is about dealing only with the Gap (my old brief
trick: I tell audience to yell out things they don’t like about
Bush Admin foreign policy and I respond to all with the phrase “ .
. . in the Gap!” Point
of this being, it’s ain’t just George Bush’s cowboy foreign
policy that drives this seeming schizophrenic approach to world (you
can trace much of this back to Clinton—for example the opposition
to International Criminal Court).
Another point: being honest with Americans, allies, and
enemies about having two policies for two worlds is not being
hypocritical, but honest
|
Don’t need
another map for this
|
|
|
23
|
1 Sept (Mon) no
conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Drill-down on
policy bifurcation regarding deterrence and preemption; lotsa to say
here
|
Nothing needed
|
|
|
24
|
2 Sept (Tues):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Another
drill-down on policy bifurcation regarding missile defense and arms
control
|
Nothing needed
|
|
|
25
|
3 Sept (Wed):
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
Where and not
when unilateralism makes sense (regurgitation of op-ed I wrote on
that subject): reality that any military ops we pursue in Gap will
be largely unilateral in terms of combat, although we need allies
for peacekeeping + focus on bilat security assistance to Seam States
+ reality of continuity of multilateralism throughout Core (example
of FBI coop with China,
Russia, etc on catching terrorists)
|
Nothing needed
|
|
|
26
|
4 Sept (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The shift
realized: the announced intention to rearrange US military basing
structure around world (out of Old Europe and into New + lotsa new
“mini-mart” bases throughout Gap
|
Map of bases
probably good; there was great one of base gains and losses in 1990s
in Atlantic that I have copy of
|
|
|
27
|
5 Sept (Fri):
no conflict
|
Myth buster
(summary/ segue)
|
Myth of
Core-Gap really being just new expression of Arc of Instability and
isn’t that just code for Arabs and their oil!
I say Gap is about whole lot more.
|
|
|
4: The Core and
the Gap
|
28
|
6 Sept (Sat):
no conflict
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subject is
great Wall Street mentor, retired Navy Admiral Bud Flanagan and the
series of workshops we created together between War College and his
firm, Cantor Fitzgerald—all held atop WTC1 at Windows on the
World]
|
Story of what I
learned from thinking about the future of globalization from Cantor
Fitzgerald: best example being, when they saw a huge global problem
looming in distance, they saw business opportunity to marketize the
problem-set and make it go away over time (horizontal scenario)
while military would view same situation as time bomb waiting to go
off (vertical scenario). Explain whole point of NewRuleSets.Project: bringing nat
security and Wall Street communities together to discuss stuff they
never discuss before—like what if terrorists struck at Wall
Street, what if there was war in Middle East, what if …
|
None needed,
though I have nice shot of me in front of screen at workshop at
Windows on the World
|
|
|
29
|
7 Sept (Sun):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
My story of
what it will take for Globalization III to advance (key flows) and
all the good things that will ensue.
Also raise issue of possibility of screwing up Glob III
|
Lotsa stats on
how Glob III has already made the world a better place, so
maybe a table or two.
|
|
|
30
|
8 Sept (Mon):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Story of
population growth and aging of global population: two key points
being we begin to depopulate as species around 2050 and at same
point we reach historic milestone where old outnumber young for
first time in human history
|
I use some
charts on this in the brief
[see PNM Book
4, page "30"]
|
|
|
31
|
9 Sept (Tues):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Reality of
declining Potential Support Ratio (number of 15-59 for everyone over
60 years of age) in Core while Gap’s remains high through 2050, so
obvious need for flow of people from Gap to Core; some of this will
be permanent migration (hard politically for Europe and Japan), and
some will be through global commute like that pushed by Philippines
government.
|
Slides from
brief
[see PNM Book
4, page "31"]
|
|
|
32
|
10 Sept (Wed):
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
Reality of
Developing Asia replacing North America as global energy demand
center by 2020; this is huge shift in rule sets.
Rising codependency between Asia and Middle East; rising fear
of Asia about
dependency, so efforts to tap Russian oil/gas, for example, by China
and Japan.
|
Charts
detailing the change
[see PNM Book
4, page "32"]
|
|
|
33
|
11 Sept
(Thurs): no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Story of how
disconnected Middle East is except for raw materials (energy) it
trades; reflecting on the historical curse of oil and other precious
raw materials in the Gap ; danger of world moving beyond oil to nat
gas and hydrogen, so dangerous potential future scenario whereby
Middle East is lost to history much like Sub-Saharan Africa, where
nothing much of value originates in terms of global trade, other
than precious metals and some oil
|
Probably
nothing needed, although maybe a map of countries that are highly
dependent on exporting of raw materials or other commodities (this I
do not have at this time, but not too hard to put together, if
desired)
|
|
|
34
|
12 Sept (Fri):
fly to IL late in day
|
Regular
storyline
|
The story of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Glob II: the “triad” of US,
Europe and Japan (Kennan’s containment strategy realized
financially decades later). Plus
concept of “spheres of influence” created by heavy flows of FDI
from triad to Gap states that are subsequently integrated into the
Core over time
|
Slides from
brief
[[see PNM Book
4, page "34"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
BREAK!
I AND SON GO TO SECOND HOME PACKER GAME IN GREEN BAY 13-15!
|
|
|
|
35
|
16 Sept (Tues):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Story of
expanding the Triad into the Quad (to include Developing Asia) and
what that means for global security and development: this is the
Marshall Plan people should be talking about—completely private
sector flows integrating half of humanity and taking state-based war
off table in Asia over
time.
|
Maybe a graphic
from brief
[see PNM Book
4, page "35"]
|
|
|
36
|
17 Sept (Wed);
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
A definition of
“exporting security” and a review of the history of this
public-sector export in relation to other public-sector exports like
foreign aid. Plus key
data showing how US “exports” have skyrocketed in post-Cold War
era (measured as crisis response days put in by various services)
|
Possible chart
[see PNM Book
4, page "36"]
|
|
|
37
|
18 Sept
(Thurs): no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Why focus of US
exporting security will be Middle East for very long time. Reality that most of world’s conflicts occur in countries
with low GDP per capita and history of Glob III shows that strong
FDI flows (in combination with other good things) leads to econ
development and end of conflicts; however you want to debate
development, it doesn’t occur where FDI does not flow and FDI
doesn’t flow into war zones. Good factoid: per capita GDP dropping in much of Middle
East, like Saudi Arabia, which had per cap GDP of about $28,000 20
years ago, and now is down to about $8,000 with well over a third of
its population under 15 years of age.
Also explore death ratio is Palestinian-Israeli conflict and
reality of “Berlin Wall” now going up between West Bank and
Israel
|
slide from
brief on conflicts and relation to GDP per capita
[see PNM Book
4, page "37"]
|
|
|
38
|
19 Sept (Fri):
I brief nat'l meeting of editorial writers in aft
|
Myth buster
(summary/ segue)
|
Myth that all
this connectivity between US and outside world due to globalization
leaves us highly fragile and vulnerable to disablement. My counter to audiences (from Y2K days) has always been:
Other than US, name a country in which you’d rather experience a
natural or unnatural disaster.
9/11 shows this in spades.
|
None
anticipated
|
|
5: The Rise of
System Perturbations
|
39
|
20 Sept (Sat):
no conflict
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subject is
Mitzi Wertheim, a “connector” (read Malcolm Gladwell’s
“Tipping Point”) of the highest order; she is—informally—my
speaking agent, promoting my material throughout DC, the business
world, and academia]
|
Story of my
pioneering study of Y2K as a way to understand the emerging nature
of international crises in the age of globalization.
Side-story of how I posted all the results of the Year 2000
International Security Dimension workshops on the Internet, only to
become a cult figure among the Y2K digerati (and the hardcores began
to describe me as the “real Agent Mulder”).
Rumors culminate in Jack Anderson’s column about me
secretly training the U.S. military to take over U.S. society during
the chaos unleashed by Y2K. Point
of all this was my huge education in understand the growing role of
the Internet and global connectivity in redefining the nature of
U.S. national security. Our worst-case scenario got us a lot of nasty press
concerning our fear-mongering, and it certainly was a bad
description of 01/02/00. But
it turned out to be a fascinatingly accurate depiction of the
fallout that ensued after 9/11.
Did we predict 9/11? Not
the trigger, but the aftermath.
What did we discover in this process?
A new model of international crisis we called the “system
perturbation.”
|
Probably use
two slides. First
details the scenarios on x-y. Second
details the phased worst-case scenario (the Scenario Dynamics Grid).
[see PNM Book
5, page "39"]
|
|
|
40
|
21 Sept (Sun):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The story of
9/11 as an existence proof of the concept of system perturbations.
Present SP as combo of Vertical Shock and resulting Horizontal
Scenarios.
|
Use slide from
brief.
[see PNM Book
5, page "40"]
|
|
|
41
|
22 Sept (Mon):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The follow-on
System Perturbation to 9/11 known as the Big Bang (Bush Admin notion
that if we take down Saddam, we trigger wave of rule-set change
throughout Middle East). Question
of what happens when US purposely tries to trigger a System
Perturbation on someone else.
|
Use slide from
brief
[see PNM Book
5, page "41"]
|
|
|
42
|
23 Sept (Tues):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
SARS as an
another example of a System Perturbation: point being, it’s not a
matter of how many die, but how many rule sets are changes
|
No slide on
this one yet
|
|
|
43
|
24 Sept (Wed):
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
A
point-by-point description of a System Perturbation (series of
characteristics) + a breakdown of SPs in terms of process (agent,
trigger, medium, transmission, barriers, consequences)
|
Have slide that
displays metaphor of stone being dropped into still pond.
[see PNM Book
5, page "43"]
|
|
|
44
|
25 Sept
(Thurs): no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The goal of
devising “rules” or observations about SPs.
I propose five types of “rules” centered around five
questions.
Also explain concept of comparing Vertical Systems (more
authoritarian) with Horizontal Systems (more democratic/federal)
|
Possible chart
detailing differences between Vertical and Horizontal Systems
[see PNM Book
5, page "44"]
|
|
|
45
|
26 Sept (Fri):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
First trio of
rules regarding “Who’s in charge?”
|
Might want to
do list of all rules on single table.
[see PNM Book
5, page "45"]
|
|
|
46
|
27 Sept (Sat):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Second trio of
rules regarding “What’s actually at risk?”
|
[see PNM Book
5, page "46"]
|
|
|
47
|
28 Sept (Sun):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Third trio of
rules regarding “Where are the boundaries?”
|
[see PNM Book
5, page "47"]
|
|
|
48
|
29 Sept (Mon):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Fourth trio of
rules regarding “How do we gain the upper hand?”
|
[see PNM Book
5, page "48"]
|
|
|
49
|
30 Sept (Tues):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Fifth trio of
rules regarding “Where are the boundaries?”
|
[see PNM Book
5, page "49"]
|
|
|
50
|
1 Oct (Wed):
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
Exploring
notion that emergence of System Perturbation forces DoD into serious
transformation. Asking
three questions: Does 9/11 serve as existence proof?
If yes, then does it signal need for new ordering principle
for DoD? If yes, then do we now recognize super-empowered
individuals like bin Laden and transnational networks like Al Qaeda
as dominant trigger agents for such crises?
|
[see PNM Book
5, page "50"]
|
|
|
51
|
2 Oct (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Myth buster
(summary/ segue)
|
The myth of the
intelligence failure surrounding 9/11.
Reality is that our focus on “big war” and China as
future “near-peer competitor” meant that our whole national
security system was biased against taking Al Qaeda as seriously as
it needed to be. No amount of “smoking guns” beforehand would have
changed that reality. Now
with 9/11, our mania for China as enemy of future is gone.
But this mania existed through most of Clinton Admin and was
elevated by Bush Admin, plus Congress and Pentagon indulged in it ad
nauseum, so plenty of blame to go around.
But, of course, Hill wants a few heads on platters so
Senators running for president can grandstand in front of cameras.
|
None needed
|
|
6: The New
Ordering Principle
|
52
|
3 Oct (Fri): no
conflict
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subject is
my family and the system perturbation that hit us when our first
born was diagnosed with advanced cancer at age 2]
|
Amazing story
of our child’s fight with cancer and our second child being born
in midst of it. This
led to extreme reordering of our lives and introduced me to concept
of “new ordering principle.”
From this experience we learned many things, to include the
notion of “how do you keep a vulnerable system alive when outside
forces seek to kill it?” This
becomes basis of analogy for thinking about keeping open US safe
from terrorist strikes, and this analogy helps. “Emily Updates” refers to lengthy emails I sent around
country to dozens of interested family, friends, and prayer circles
during her treatment period. I
later edited the mass of text into a book-length manuscript which I
posted on the web. It
is used by healthcare professionals at Georgetown U Hospital to
train medical social workers and interns to this day.
|
Slide probably
useful.
Also have great
photo of Em during treatment.
[see PNM Book
6, page "52"]
|
|
|
53
|
4 Oct (Sat): no
conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The concept of
DoD’s ordering principle as the core conflict model around which
entire defense establishment is organized and that we need a new,
broader model of crisis both to deal with security threats of Glob
III and to effect truly broad and progressive transformation of DoD
|
Slide probably
not needed
[see PNM Book
6, page "53"]
|
|
|
54
|
5 Oct (Sun): no
conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
First of
triptych explaining the evolution of the ordering principle from its
origins in Defense Act of 1947 until today’s current debate on
what it should be. This
section explains reality of Cold War ordering principle: we had
Great Power War as system-level organizing principle; that yielded
proxy wars at the level of the nation-state; that left, at the level
of the individual, the so-called “lesser included” residual
threat of terrorists, narco traffickers, et. Al
|
Should use
slide that puts these concepts all together in grid-like fashion
[see PNM Book
6, page "54"]
|
|
|
55
|
6 Oct (Mon): no
conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The second of
the triptych: this one explains how things changed in the 1990s (we
lose Sovs as system-level threat, downshift to “rogues” or
“regional hegemons” and go with Les Aspin’s concept that 2
major regional wars equal the old notion of “great power war”).
In effect, we trade in the old ten-foot-tall Sov threat for
two five-foot-tall threats (Iraq and N Korea) stacked on top of one
another in “near simultaneity.”
But this abstract force-sizing concept overtaken in mid-90s
by “near-peer competitor” and since we couldn’t dream of the
Sovs coming back, we ginned up “rising China” (in effect,
following the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995, we “fell in love”
and all our dreams of high-tech future wars against future high-tech
enemies were given new life. This
dream of a “revolution in military affairs” later morphed into
notion of “transformation” and it was key animating principle
for hawks in incoming Bush Admin right up to 9/11.
All serious strategic forecasting coming out of Pentagon
right up to 9/11 said
the future was all about fighting China!
This was the intell failure of 9/11, but that finger will
never be pointed.
|
Keep with slide
used in #54
|
|
|
56
|
7 Oct (Tues):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
The third of
the triptych: explains nature of debate today.
Some say, on individual level, that ordering principle of DoD
should be keeping Americans alive (aka Homeland Security, Northern
Command, etc.). Others
say let’s wage a global war (sometimes called WWIII [Friedman] or
WWIV [Cohen, Woolsely] or
“let’s-kill-their-leaders-and-Christianize-them-all”
[Coulter]) state-by-state, but this is the worst sort of open-ended
fear-mongering definition of the threat.
It scares the hell out of Americans, the Europeans, other
potential allies, and everyone in the Gap we’re trying to win
over. I argue that US is system power, and so needs a
system-level definition of both crisis and security.
I call it System Perturbations.
Do that well and the rest will follow.
|
Use same
graphics as #54
|
|
|
57
|
8 Oct (Wed):
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
Revisiting
concept that we are/have been progressively downshifting the focus
of the US military from Cold War focus on system-level war to
post-Cold War focus on nation-state-level rogues like Saddam and N
Korea to new, individual-level focus on terrorists.
I have been criticized my entire career for wanting to
“ruin” the military by turning them into a giant, global police
force and thereby letting its core warfighting capabilities decline.
Critics say, this is what killed the Roman empire and the
British empire: running the frontier while not staying sharp for the
big, long-term threats. My counter will draw on Max Boot’s Savage Wars arguments,
but will largely center on my notion that we need to view this as
problem of success, not failure.
We conquered global nuke war, we’ve come close to outlawing
state-on-state war by showing our willingness to topple bad regimes,
and now we’re ncreasingly specializing in stopping bad people from
doing bad things.
|
Slide
suggesting how we’ve been “running down the threats” over time
(Sovs, then rogues, now terrorists)
[see PNM Book
6, page "57"]
|
|
|
58
|
9 Oct (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Key concept of
“How much should our military force eventually mirror the
international security environment?”
If Cold War force had capabilities spread like diamond
(portion of system-level strategic force and portion of
individual-level counter-guerilla/nation-building capacity, but far
largest portion of state-level counter-military capacity—meaning
the bulk of our capabilities were designed around defeating other
nation-states’ militaries), then I argue that today/future
military should have
spread more like hour-glass (heavy on system-level capabilities and
heavy on subnational nation-building capabilities but lighter on
counter-state military capabilities).
In other words, we have too much capability to topple states
but not enough to manage system-level threats (like WMD and missile
proliferation in Gap) or deal with all those off-grid, failed states
where terrorists are grown
|
Use graphic
from brief
[[see PNM Book
6, page "58" for “RMA-crowd pre-9/11” refers to very
pure vision of high-tech, system-level force favored by Andy
Marshall in Office of Net Assessment, designed primarily for
long-distance, push-button war with China; “+GWOT” refers to all
that nation-building capability that Bush Admin swore off coming
into power but new embrace with complete abandon as debacle of
post-Saddam rebuilding effort emerges]
|
|
|
59
|
10 Oct (Fri):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Concept that
System Perturbations represents the new “Greater Inclusive” that
raises the old “lesser includeds” from an afterthought in
strategic military planning to the new ordering principle.
Point: in past, it took Great Power War to raze the global
village (reordering of strategic environment), but today we see that
a System Perturbation can lead to huge change in strategic
environment (Russia joins NATO, China goes from bad boy
to new friend, etc., after 9/11).
Additional arguments here about the merging of the Home Game
(Homeland Security as we now call it) and the Away Game (or how
we’ve thought about DoD for quite some time now: war as something
that occurs only “outside, over there” to quote Maurice Sendak.
|
Several
graphics possible.
[see PNM Book
6, page "59"
for examples of
potential graphics]
First slide
(Greater Inclusive) makes point that before 9/11, it was assumed
that if we built a military for great power war, it would handle (by
default) all the lesser includeds. Now we know that isn’t true.
Now I say that building for great power war doesn’t nearly encompass all the capabilities you
need for new form of international crisis I call the System
Perturbation.
Second slide
(Goal Posts Have Moved) resurrects “defense in depth” notion
from #52 and explores notion of “3-front war”
|
|
|
60
|
11 Oct (Sat):
no conflict
|
Myth buster
(summary/ segue)
|
The myth that
my material represents the second coming of Norman Angell. Angell wrote the “Great Illusion” in 1910, saying that
the European powers were so economically interconnected that
they’d never go to war, and if they did, they’d all be destroyed
in the process. He was
discredited by WWI, but in reality, his admonition was completely on
target. This charge is
leveled at me by those who say Glob III is no different from Glob I,
so we should stay focused on Great Power War.
I say I am the second coming of Normal Angell alright, but
I’m Normal Angell armed with nukes.
Nukes changed everything
(Joe Nye’s notion of “crystal ball effect” where all
great powers know in advance what would happen in event of nuke
war). My point: no
great-power-on-great-power war since nukes invented, so Glob III is
hugely different from Glob I and my notion of connectedness defines
safety is not idealism,
but pragmatic understanding of security in age of deep globalization
|
No graphic
needed, unless you want picture of Angel or cover of his book?
|
|
7: The
Transaction Strategy
|
61
|
12 Oct (Sun):
no conflict
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subject is
Vice Admiral
Arthur K. Cebrowski, father of network-centric warfare, the Lenin to
Andy Marshall’s Marx on transformation, and my boss in Office of
Secretary of Defense (as Director of Office of Force Transformation)
for 20 months following 9/11
|
Story of my
strange but close relationship with what many consider to be the
Hyman Rickover of his age. I
met Art first by writing a hugely popular critique of his concept of
network-centric warfare, called “The Seven Deadly Sins of
Network-Centric Warfare.” He becomes president of War College just as I join staff.
It is his idea to do the Y2K study.
He also oversees the NewRuleSets.Project study with Cantor
Fitzgerald. He brings
me to OSD as his “assistant for strategic futures” and my
mega-brief of all the key strategic concepts I’ve been working on
for a decade finally comes together.
The brief, with its concepts of Core-Gap, System
Perturbations, Transaction Strategy, and System Administrator force
becomes the basis for most of Art’s key strategic concepts that he
argues for (and starts to convince)
with OSD and the Hill
|
None needed
There is story
of joke I like to tell that might use graphics of some sort. Joke
is, “What did Buddha say to the hot dog vendor?
Make me one with everything!”
When I met with
Singaporean defense officials, they asked me, how is your work
different from legendary OSD futurist Andy Marshall?
I said, Andy thinks about the future of war within the
context of war. I think
about the future of war within the context of everything else.
In effect, my material is about everything but the hot dog.
|
|
|
62
|
13 Oct (Mon):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Concept of US
transactions with the outside world:
Environmentally
speaking, we are 5% of world population but we generate 25% of
world’s garbage and pollution and extract 25% of world’s energy
(I call that “living large); economically speaking we export
sovereign debt and import beyond our means.
But real transaction, IMO, is that we export security to
world and—in return—are allowed to import a lifestyle beyond our
means, given our defense burden.
In effect, we export security to nations that prefer to
outsource the function to US and instead focus on economic
well-being (like Europeans, Singapore, Saudi Arabia and host of
others). So we spend
more on collective security in age of globalization because we enjoy
it more than anyone else.
|
Maybe some
graphics.
[see PNM Book
7, page "62"]
|
|
|
63
|
14 Oct (Tues):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Strategic goal
of Transaction Strategy explained: keeping Glob III’s key flows
(people, energy, FDI, US security exports) in balance
|
Several slides
to choose from, but one seems obvious
[see PNM Book
7, page "63"]
|
|
|
64
|
15 Oct (Wed):
teach elective in aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
The Transaction
Strategy detailed as 3 prongs: make Core resistant to System
Perturbations; firewall Core off from Gap’s worst eports; shrink
the Gap!
|
Two slides to
choose from, but neither essential in my mind
[see PNM Book
7, page "64"]
|
|
|
65
|
16 Oct (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Exploring the
notion of resources needed to both secure America and shrink the
Gap: concept of the “empty backfield” (football analogy) that we
employed prior to 9/11 (basically, no homeland security to speak
of), so need to rebalance spending on HLS versus System
Administration—which really gets to roots of terror “outside,
over there.” Questions
of wallet versus will (George H.W. Bush’s Stae-of-Union phrase at
end of Cold War) and question of burden sharing (public-private and
US versus rest of
world)
|
Several slides
to choose from, but I’m not committed to any being in book
[see PNM Book
7, page "65"]
|
|
|
66
|
17 Oct (Fri):
no conflict
|
Myth buster
(summary/ segue)
|
The myth of
American empire: my counter is that empires are about enforcing
maximum rule sets, whereas US, as befitting our type of John
Mill’s democracy, is all about enforcing merely minimum rule sets.
In others words, empires are about telling world what they
must do, whereas Sys Admin (like in IT) is just about telling
“users” what they can’t do
|
See no need
|
|
8: The System
Admini-strator
|
67
|
18 Oct (Sat):
no conflict
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subjects
are all the people who’ve supported my writings over the years,
when many see me crank with grandiose, wildly optimistic views of
world: like Robert Murray of Center for Naval Analyses; boss at
Naval War College Lawrence Modisett; Fred Rainbow, of Proceedings;
like Mark Warren and David Granger of Esquire; like Sam Huntington
and Joe Nye of Harvard
|
Reality that I
have been mentored and promoted by significant number of people over
my career.
Also the story
of article I wrote after Y2K came and went, called “Life After
DoDth or: How The Evernet Changes Everything.”
In the article, I posit a Pearl Harbor-like disaster being
inflicted on US and the result being the bifurcation of DoD into two
forces: a warfighting force (Dept of Global Deterrence) full of
high-tech warmaking ability and a system administrator force (Dept
of Network Security) full of many of the organizations now sucked
into the new Dept of Homeland Security (border, DEA, customs, Secret
Service, FEMA) + the
nation-building/small wars portions of DoD (special ops, Marines,
surface navy, air force air lift, army regulars, National Guard
civil affairs specialists).
Well, one split
does occur with 9/11 (Department of Homeland Security), but another
one still coming: the creating of a Constabulary Force within DoD to
deal with situations like post-Saddam Iraq.
Creating this force, which is sorely needed, will take a huge
leap of faith for the worst-case strategists in PNT.
|
Don’t see
need for any
|
|
|
68
|
19 Oct (Sun):
flying to Germ. & writing en route
|
Regular
storyline
|
The New
American Way of War. I
will distill my Top 100 rules of the American Way of War article
down to a “top ten” a la Letterman.
I will briefly review the ten “wars” of the last forty
years that shaped this “way of war. Key theme will be the disaster that was the Powell Doctrine
and how that misguided notion pushed by Powell and Weinburger
handicapped the US in the post-Cold War era, only to be finally
discarded in the post-9/11 global war on terrorism
|
Some slides
considered.
[see PNM Book
7, page "68"]
|
|
|
69
|
20 Oct (Mon):
recover day in Germ.
|
Regular
storyline
|
Explore the
operational issues or ground rules of having to operate militarily
primarily in the Gap; give overview of military implications of
Core-Gap divide
|
Some slides
considered.
[see PNM Book
7, page "69"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
BREAK!
KEYNOTE AT ALL-DAY MEETING OF NATO GROUND COMMANDERS
|
|
|
|
70
|
22 Oct (Wed):
flying back to US & writing en route; teach elective (last) in
aft
|
Regular
storyline
|
Explore the
personnel issues of the coming bifurcation of US military into
smaller, high-tech warfighting force (warrior force focused on
projecting power) and personnel-intensive lower-tech systems
administrator force focused on exporting security; use post-Saddam
Iraq rebuilding difficulties to explain why this is coming about;
our forces will have to reconfigure themselves to meet this new
constabulary function. This
splitting-up will be a hallmark of the future American way of war;
make strategic argument that DoD historically focused wrongly on
feared danger of "access denial" (opponents denying us
access to battlespace with their sneaky, asymmetrical warfare) when,
in reality, it's not the battlespace where we're being denied
access, but the "transition space" or "peace
space" that necessarily follows-on to any combat situation.
In a nutshell, it was easy to take down Saddam, but it's hard
to win Iraq.
|
Some slides
considered.
[see PNM Book
7, page "70"]
|
|
|
71
|
23 Oct (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
Tour d'horizon
of potential trouble spots around the world, positing the future of
US crisis response as we seek to shrink the Gap; offer series of
possible scenarios for how we do in our efforts to remake Iraq and
set off a Big Bang effect in Middle East
|
Probably some
map like what we did with Esquire; probably updating/reusing the
country-by-country sketches.
Have 2x2
scenario matrix already on Middle East [see PNM Book 7, page
"71"]
|
|
|
72
|
24 Oct (Fri):
no conflict
|
Myth buster
(summary/ segue)
|
The myths that
America can't survive as sole military superpower and that balance
of power must reappear + US has no strong allies
|
None needed
|
|
9: A Future
Worth Creating
|
73
|
25 Oct (Sat):
no conflict
|
Autobio
narrative
[key subjects
are optimistic futurists who’ve inspired me over my life: guys
like Gene Roddenberry, Carl Sagan (who inspired from afar), and John
Peterson of The Arlington Institute (who’s promoted my career)]
|
Make basic case
that optimistic futurists are always right in the end and that
future dystopians are always wrong in the end, but bad news sells
better and optimists are considered naďve + my basic belief that US
can and should save world from itself because we are furthest along
in this multinational experience that defines globalization—which,
in the end, ends up looking an awful lot like us
|
None needed
|
|
|
74
|
26 Oct (Sun):
no conflict
|
Regular
storyline
|
What must
change in US national security establishment + signposts to look for
as Glob III gets stronger and US leads Core in shrinking the Gap
|
None
anticipated
|
|
|
75
|
27 Oct (Mon):
no conflict
|
Myth buster
(summary/ segue)
|
The
myth that Americans don't care about the outside world + have huge fear of body bags and will refuse to shoulder any
considerable burden
|
|
|
|
Ext
|
28 Oct (Tues):
no conflict
|
Write Forward?
|
|
|
|
|
Ext
|
29 Oct (Wed):
no conflict
|
Write Forward?
|
|
|
|
|
Ext
|
30 Oct (Thurs):
no conflict
|
Write Forward?
|
|
|
|
|
Ext
|
31 Oct (Fri):
no conflict
|
Write Forward?
|
|
|
