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Year 2000 International Security Dimension
Project Report
| III. A Series of Y2K Onset Models |
Explaining Our X-Y Axis
Our X-Y Axis (shown below as Slide 4) begins with two simple questions:
There is a huge difference between these two questions, for the first question focuses on cause, while the latter focuses on effect.
One way we like to differentiate between the two questions is to employ a medical analogy. Think of the horizontal axis (What? question) as the nature of the trauma or illness and the vertical axis ("So What? question) as the patient's overall health. Two extreme examples show why this analogy is illuminating:
These two very different medical case histories, drawn from the author's family history, highlight the importance of juxtaposing the "What?" and "So What?" questions to create the four quadrants of the X-Y axis, for it is not enough simply to ask how bad Y2K may be. Given how bad it may be (i.e., how many computerized systems fail), Y2K's ultimate impact will depend greatly on the targeted system(s) in question.
| Slide 4: The X-Y Axis for Y2K Onset Models |
Looking at Slide 4, we then explain our X-Y Axis as follows:
Two caveats are in order:
Having defined the extremes of our axes, we break down the four quadrants in the following manner:
Y2K Onset Model #1: The Ice
Storm
The Ice Storm onset model is depicted in Slide 5 below.
In the embedded chart, the vertical axis defines a "field
of Y2K failures," meaning we're not going to offer any percentages or "hard
numbers" here, just a rough notion of overall failure saturation. Along
the vertical axis we display the years 1999 through 2001, with the months of
1999 noted in solid-line marks and the months of 2000 noted in dashed-line
marks. The difference between the two markings is meant to suggest that
while we may feel we have a firm grasp of appropriate time units for the
timeline leading up to 010100, perceptions of time's passing once we pass
through the 010100 threshold may vary greatly depending on locale. For
example, the subjective time unit of note for Wall Street at the beginning of
January may be the first day of trading--a mere several hours' time, whereas the
subjective time unit of note for a sheep herder in a less developed country may
be as long as until the first time he brings his sheep to market--possibly
several weeks.
| Slide 5: The Ice Storm Onset Model |
The Ice Storm onset model offers the classic, TEOTWAWKI view of Y2K: it hits en masse on or about 010100 and strikes virtually every aspect of society. To the extent that such a model may seem to hold true on a perceptual basis in any one locality or region (meaning, for all practical purposes, it seems as though all systems are impacted to some disabling degree), we posit that the Ice Storm's components are logically broken down into three categories:
While this model held implicit sway during much of the Y2K debate in 1998, it has receded in prominence over the course of 1999, as remediation efforts make clear that this is not a useful universal model. Having said that, however, we believe the model retains great validity for understanding pockets of significantly damaging Y2K impact that may occur around the world, meaning those areas where--for all practical purposes--the TEOTWAWKI notion may well emerge among significant portions of a population battered by widespread network failures.
Of course, even here we're still talking only about the perceived onset, and
not some sustained environmental status that would realistically drag on for
months. As such, the key question for the Ice Storm onset model is,
"How fast can the society or economy in question recover by necking down the
failure rate to some level commensurate with reasonably sub-optimal functioning
(meaning, for many around the world, the return to "life as we know it")?"
Y2K Onset Model #2: The Flood
The Flood onset model is depicted in Slide 6
below.
| Slide 6: The Flood Onset Model |
The Flood onset model depicts a slow but inexorable bulge of network failures that first rises above the usual "background noise" level on or about 010100 and then expands for something in the range of the first six months of 2000, peaking near the end of the 2nd Quarter or at some point in the 3rd Quarter. In some ways, we could suppose the same breakdown of elements (direct, cascading, iatrogenic) here as with the Ice Storm model, but because of the greatly extended timeline (thus allowing for more effective crisis management and network triage), we limit our description here to direct and cascading network failures, thus positing a peak failure rate somewhere in the range of 50 percent of all networks.
As such, the Flood model gets nowhere near the TEOTWAWKI pain range, but instead describes something more akin to a significant economic downturn, most likely corresponding to popular perceptions of a recession or financial market "correction." In that manner, the Flood model possibly describes a more profound economic impact than the Ice Storm, which, while it is a shock to the system, is probably of shorter duration. So, like the Ice Storm, the Flood model involves an interrelated sequence of network failures, albeit with a far smaller immediate impact on the overall functioning of society.
In keeping with the weather analogy, the key question for the Flood
model is, "What constitutes a 'low-lying area?'" One example of a
potential low-lying area would be manufacturing, whose network failures would
not likely be centered on the 010100 threshold, but rather build up over time as
production continued throughout 2000. Another could be medical supplies,
especially the production and distribution of key pharmaceuticals. Still
another might be the processing and distribution of clean drinking water.
Y2K Onset Model #3: The Hurricanes
The Hurricanes onset model is depicted in Slide 7
below.
| Slide 7: The Hurricanes Onset Model |
The Hurricanes onset model presents a series of sectorally-limited (meaning unconnected across sectors) but relatively lengthy (meaning some cascading effect) constellations of network failures. In effect, this model is a hybrid of the Ice Storm and Flood models. The Hurricanes model packs the same immediate punch as the Ice Storm model, albeit in isolated "low-lying areas" (echoing the Flood model), thus limiting the overall impact on the functioning of a society.
The Hurricanes model speaks more to the "winners and losers" approach to thinking about Y2K's ultimate impact: some sectors of society will seemingly get off scot-free, while others will seemingly suffer great damage. The key difference with the Flood model is the lack of interrelation and simultaneity, so rather than employing the economic language of "downturns," we're more likely to describe "shake-ups" in one or another industry.
The same approach to identifying vulnerable sectors that one uses with the
Flood model would apply here, although in an overall sense, the
Hurricanes model is probably best used to think about countries whose
remediation efforts have been weak, for here we run into the notion of
over-confidence possibly leading to poor crisis management preparation. If
such "poor remediators" turn out to be far more vulnerable than they realize,
then the key question becomes, "How can coordinated triage and crisis management
avert the appearance of a critical mass of substantial--yet still relatively
isolated--network failure clusters?"
Y2K Onset Model #4: The Tornados
The Tornados onset model is depicted in Slide 8
below.
| Slide 8: The Tornados Onset Model |
The Tornados onset model refers to a "season" of sectorally- and temporally-limited Y2K-induced network failures. This model is the closest to a null hypothesis of Y2K's overall impact, for, in many ways, it describes life as we know it, albeit with a higher-than-average failure rate. The Tornados model can likewise be thought of as the "key dates" model, for the two go naturally hand-in-hand when one seeks real-world evidence of significant network failures that either produce serious disruptions of service or require extraordinary efforts at repair. For if such key dates come and go without displaying any significant failures, meaning they're so big they can't be hidden by the service providers in question, then these Y2K milestones pass by without registering significant values on any sort of TEOTWAWKI scale, becoming the Y2K equivalent of a "tree crashing in the forest when no one's there to hear it."
The "key dates" approach does correspond nicely with the Gartner Group's predictions of Y2K failure rates rising and falling over the course of 1999 and through the year 2001, but the big deficiency of this model to date has been the lack of any stunning failures on key dates that have already passed. For example, no failures featuring major negative impact occurred on 1 or 3 January, the first day and business day, respectively, of 1999. The start of many fiscal year programs on 1 April also failed to reveal any serious disruptions for the governments involved. The so-called "nines" problem that was slated to appear on 9 April likewise produced no failures of great societal value in any country around the planet. Most recently, the 1 July threshold came and went with no apparent damage to the 46 U.S. states whose fiscal years began that day.
Meanwhile, Cap Gemini America, the computer consulting firm, declares on the basis of their recent survey of Fortune 500 companies and a smattering of U.S. government agencies that close to three-quarters of the respondents report experiencing a Y2K-related failure through the first quarter of 1999. But if these firms are having these failures and none are making any headlines, how is that much different from everyday life as we know it? Aren't private firms and government agencies experiencing network problems on a fairly regular basis, and just as regularly keeping such failures under wraps? The key missing data involve how much different 1999 is turning out to be compared to any previous year, meaning what is the "instability added" from Y2K? And that's the data we haven't found anywhere yet.
Having said that, the key question for the Tornados model remains,
"What constitutes good learning over time?" For example, should our
confidence grow due to the lack of Y2K headlines stemming from the key dates
already passed? Or should we ignore most if not all of that success,
especially for a pure fellow traveler such as the "nines" problem?
After all, we can get fixated on Y2K key dates all through 1999, get through
them all quite nicely, and still suffer significant tumult on 010100.
Uneventful key dates make that seem less likely, but don't rule out it out by
any means.
Onset Models Leading to Generic Y2K Outcome Scenarios
Of course, none of the four onset models are likely to hold sway for any one
region's entire Y2K experience, and in that sense, we are likely to see versions
of all four models occurring simultaneously around the planet at various points
in the Y2K Event. As ideal types, the four models are designed to help the
reader disaggregate the complexity presented by Y2K's myriad of possibilities,
rather than provide a "pick one of four" analytical choice that would invariably
prove false and pointless.
| Slide 9: The Onset Model Arrayed on the X-Y Axis |
Slide 9 above arrays the four onset models on our X-Y axis, and the placement should seem fairly intuitive given our descriptions:
Again, our rationale in presenting such onset models is not to encourage a "pick one" mentality, but rather to break down the abstract nature of the potentially universal problem set into a series of weather analogies that are far more easily understood by the average citizen--not to mention your average elite decision maker.
Slide 10 below presents a series of outcome-focused Y2K scenario titles
arrayed along our X-Y axis. By pairing them up with our onset models,
we--in effect--offer a "coming and going" view of the Y2K Event (leaving the
"guts" of our Y2K analysis for the section on Scenario Dynamics).
| Slide 10: Outcome Scenarios Arrayed by Y2K Onset Models |
Potential Y2K Impact by Country Groups:
Conventional Wisdom Has Changed Over Time
The conventional wisdom on which countries around the world are more vulnerable to Y2K has changed dramatically over the past year. We display our interpretation of this changing debate in the following two slides.
First, a word on how we break down the world into four IT categories:
What's most immediately noticeable about this group is that you're talking about the bulk of the world's population, not to mention several that recently experienced serious economic tumult (or at least serious buffeting) in the Global Financial Crisis of 1997-98. With this group, you're also talking about countries that have adopted IT in a huge way only in the past decade or so, so Y2K has some potential here to trigger a bit of a technology backlash if its overall impact is bad enough.
| Slide 11: Conventional Wisdom on Potential Y2K Impact (1998) |
Slide 11 above displays the conventional wisdom that we consistently bumped
into when we began our research back in the summer of 1998. In short, the
broad assumption implicit in most writings about Y2K's potential impact was that
there was a direct relationship between a country's development level and its
potential vulnerability on Y2K-induced network instability. Following this
rule, an ultra-modern IT country like the U.S. was the most vulnerable, while
Pre-Moderns like a Haiti or Somalia were least vulnerable. On the face of
it, this made perfect sense, because you can't be harmed by breakdowns in what
you don't have--or so it seemed. This thinking likewise tracked with much
military strategizing regarding Information Warfare, which also posited that the
more IT-intensive your society was, the more vulnerable it was to Information
Warfare.
| Slide 12: Conventional Wisdom on Potential Y2K Impact (1999) |
What a difference a year makes! Or so it seems if you buy into the
Gartner Group's estimates of likely Y2K network failure rates by country (see
Slide 12 above). Now everyone knows that the Gartner Group's data is
heavily based on the self reporting of the countries in question (or the private
firms within those countries), so taking this very rough estimate with a grain
of salt, you're nonetheless faced with a stunning reversal of fortune that's
apparently occurred solely on the basis of the remediation efforts each country
has or has not pursued over the last year. In short, from the perspective
of failure rates, the U.S. goes from most vulnerable to least vulnerable, along
with a host of like-minded states (e.g., Canada, United Kingdom,
Australia). On the other end of the spectrum, the countries looking at the
highest failure rates are the modernizing countries, such as China and Russia,
and the IT Pre-Moderns, such as a Vietnam and Zimbabwe.
| Slide 13: The So-What Filter Applied to Today's Conventional Wisdom on Country Vulnerability |
While failure rates (the percentage of system failures) are expected to be much higher in the pre-modern and modernizing countries than they are in the U.S. or OEDC nations, failure rates do not, by themselves, describe the whole picture. As noted earlier, IT is far more integrated into the economies and infrastructure of modern countries than those of emerging and modernizing nations. Consequentially, 25 percent system failure in the U.S. is likely to be much more significant than a 90 percent failure in a small pre-modern nation. In the most primitive of these, even 100 percent system failure is likely to be below the event horizon; while even 10 percent system failure in a modern IT-intensive economy could result in significant economic upheaval. As suggested in Slide 13, when all the factors—remediation effort, dependency on IT, network maturity, distribution and redundancy of the architecture—are integrated, the nations that seem to have the most to fear from Y2K would seem to be those in the process of modernizing. In general these tend to be increasingly dependent on IT, but have not been able to spend much money on remediation and have not developed the highly distributed and redundant networks of the U.S. and other modern nations.
So really, in the short span of about 12 months, the conventional wisdom on
which countries are most vulnerable to Y2K has been dramatically reversed.
Like the original conventional wisdom before 1999, this one also makes eminent
sense when you think about it: rich countries with a lot more to lose and a lot
more disposable income to throw at the problem have succeeded most in
remediating the Y2K threat into something more manageable. Meanwhile,
countries new to the IT scene, whose awareness of Y2K lagged significantly
behind that of more advanced IT countries, tend to possess less resources to
throw at the problem. Moreover, they tend to pirate software more and, as
such, pay less attention to system administration concerns such as Y2K or
viruses such as CIH. In that sense, the destructive path of CIH, the
so-called Chernobyl virus, may well prove to be reasonably predictive of Y2K's
ultimate impact--namely, more serious in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle
East than in Europe or North America.
Matching Country Groups With Y2K Onset Models
So, to the extent that we're willing to go out on a limb regarding which
country groups are likely to experience which Y2K onset model, our best guess
would be as portrayed in Slide 14 below.
| Slide 14: How Y2K May Go Down By Country Groupings |
By arraying the countries across our X-Y axis, we're not so much predicting how we think Y2K will unfold for each and every country belonging to each grouping as suggesting that if any one of the onset models is going to be strongly associated with a particular development or IT-intensiveness level, they are likely to correspond as follows:
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