

the determination of the people and their leader to control their own destiny, regardless of allies and enemies. In 1967–1968, this concept brought forth from North Korea a more independent and belligerent foreign policy, resulting, among other things, in the capture of the *Pueblo*. An explanation that focuses on local rather than global actors is not original with Lerner. It has become a familiar theme in American Cold War historiography, especially in analyzing U.S. relations with Third World countries. But it is persuasively developed here, and it will be interesting to test it further when documents are finally available from North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union.

Lerner also provides an astute and generally convincing analysis of the diplomacy of the crisis. For the North Koreans, *juche* continued to prevail, and they used the incident mainly for domestic propaganda. Still thinking in conventional Cold War terms, the United States initially sought a solution through the Soviet Union. When that failed, President Lyndon Johnson found himself holding a weak hand and dealing with an intractable foe. Perhaps fortunately, because of the peculiar mood of that extraordinary year 1968 (a milieu that Lerner skillfully analyzes using popular culture as well as other sources), Johnson enjoyed relative freedom of action. After an initial outburst of anger, he was under little public pressure to act. In time, the United States crafted an apology that satisfied the North Koreans without subjecting itself to unacceptable humiliation.

In an interesting conclusion, Lerner argues that the much maligned President Johnson demonstrated in the *Pueblo* crisis considerable growth as a diplomatist, resisting foolish and possibly counterproductive advice to respond militarily. Instead, he kept a restive South Korea in line, accepted the weakness of his position, and did what was necessary to get the crew back. This positive assessment may be true of the *Pueblo* incident, but it does not carry over to issues such as Vietnam and the Soviet Union. On these issues an exhausted president clung stubbornly to unrealizable goals.

The Pueblo Incident is a model monograph that sheds much light on a largely forgotten episode of the Cold War.



Adam B. Ulam, *Understanding the Cold War: A Historian's Personal Reflections*, 2nd expanded edition. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002. 410 pp.

Reviewed by Thomas P. M. Barnett, Naval War College

There is really only one legitimate measure of an autobiography, and that is its ability to bring the author to life for the reader, giving a sense of who the person was and what it must have been like to have known him or her. On that score, Adam Ulam's "personal reflections" succeed on every level. To spend time with this book is to spend time with Adam himself, and I say that as someone who served as his research assistant for five years in the latter half of the 1980s and who wrote a Ph.D. dissertation under Adam's guidance. In the former capacity, I developed a great friendship with Adam,

spending far more leisure time with him than professional time, and on that basis I can state unequivocally that this autobiography captures both his personality and his academic brilliance in all its glory. When I finally put the book down, I found myself missing the man more than ever and appreciating his enormous skill as a historian in a way I never had before.

The book alternates between Ulam's somewhat shy but nonetheless truly *personal* reflections on his life and his deft summing up of all his magnificent research publications, which effectively span both his own life and that of the Soviet Union. Reading his book was comparable to watching a farewell concert in which the musician not only replays all his "greatest hits," but somehow reinterprets them in a way that enhances the audience's understanding of both their historical significance and their profound influence within the genre. In short, the book left me wanting to go to my shelf and reread all of Ulam's original "recordings."

The book unfolds in four parts. The first two sections ("Farewell to Poland" and "A Polish Youth in a New Land") are the most straightforward autobiographical portions, covering Adam's tumultuous and tragic early life. These sections provide due context for the observation by Mary Ulam (Adam's former wife and the volume's main editor) that "he devoted the rest of his life to seeking an understanding of how the 20th century could unleash such terrible forces" (p. x). The bulk of the book is found in Part Three ("The Professor"), in which he recounts both the Cold War and his career as a scholar of Soviet history and politics. On these pages, the reader finds not merely a rundown of Adam's shrewd judgments about the Soviet Union and its relationship with the United States, but also a host of biographical sketches of the many historical figures he encountered across the decades. However, the best material in this section showcases Adam's sly wit in his descriptions of both the strange academic field of "Kremlinology" and his own ambivalence at being one of its foremost practitioners.

Part Four offers the only disappointment, consisting of a hodgepodge of remembrances of Adam by his colleagues and family members, including a truly awful chapter entitled "Ending," which recounts Adam's last days and death. Ulam was a man of great natural dignity, which one immediately senses throughout the book, but he was also a man of great privacy, as witnessed by his brief but poignant remarks about the death of his older brother, Stanisław (a mathematician of world renown who played a pivotal role in the early development of America's nuclear arsenal), in 1984: "His many contributions to science have been acclaimed in numerous publications and places throughout the world. What he meant to me as a brother, friend, and mentor *in loco parentis* in my youth cannot be put into words" (p. 124). I cannot imagine that a man of such quiet dignity would have wanted his own death described in such banal detail as provided in this excruciatingly misguided offering. Although I realize that the editor wanted only to honor Adam's memory by including these reminiscences, they end the book on a sour note, diminishing—albeit only slightly—all the magnificence that came before.

Adam Ulam's autobiography stands on its own, giving a clear picture of both the man and his career and displaying his analytical prowess and personal charm in abun-

dance. Unfortunately, this virtuoso performance is needlessly interrupted at key points throughout the text by quoted remembrances of his life by colleagues and friends, all of which (except those excerpted from Stanisław's own autobiography) merely restate what is already obvious from Ulam's own words. For example, following a brilliant passage in which Ulam offers an example of his ability to portray Josif Stalin the man as something real and separate from Stalin "the myth" (in describing the dictator's seemingly inexplicable decision to visit the grave of his wife at the very moment that German Panzer divisions were closing in on Moscow in October 1941), the reader is suddenly told by one of Adam's former colleagues that Ulam's most important gift as a historian was "his ability to put himself in other people's shoes, to imagine how people would have acted under the particular circumstances in which they found themselves" (p. 193). The unnecessary insertion of other voices into Ulam's autobiography suggests that Mary Ulam feared that the reader would somehow fail to appreciate Adam's skill as a storyteller of his own life, when in fact no such danger exists.

But to dwell on these minor faults is to miss the great wealth that this volume provides to any reader interested in discovering Adam Ulam the person, not to mention the important historical record of both the life and the research of one of the twentieth century's most able and influential historians.



Joshua Rubenstein and Vladimir P. Naumov, eds. *Stalin's Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee*, trans. by Laura E. Wolfson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. c. 515 pp. \$35.

Reviewed by David Brandenberger, University of Richmond

The exigencies of war in the days and weeks following Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 forced Soviet ideologists to augment traditional Marxist-Leninist propaganda with more populist rallying calls. Although many of these new appeals were designed to resonate with ordinary Russians' religious and national sentiments, attempts were also made to court public opinion among the non-Russian population. Party organizations in the national republics and autonomous regions were given considerable latitude to make the case for war. At the same time, five anti-fascist committees were set up at the all-union level to mobilize support for the USSR abroad among groups ranging from scientists and women to the international Slavic community as a whole. Best known among these organizations was the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC), which not only conducted international fundraising and propaganda work but also served as something of a domestic lobby for Soviet Jews who lacked more formal representation within the Communist establishment.

Many of these party organizations and committees were reined in toward the end of the war after the wane of their mobilizational *raison d'être*. A number were even re-