Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 24 May 2004
I find myself consistently bumping up against this paradox: we call it a global war on terrorism and yet critics of this effort seem to be applying their statistical lenses to the world as though America was still classifying terrorism as crime versus warfare. Here's what I mean: all sorts of experts are claiming that terrorist acts around the world have actually increased since 9/11 and the start of the GWOT. A recently released State Department "Patterns of Global Terrorism" begs to differ, but one can easily suspect that the numbers there have been massaged to make things seem as improved as possible given the great GWOT effort.
[Good reference on dispute over State numbers: "Faulty Terror Report Card," by Alan B. Krueger and David Laitin, Washington Post, 17 May, p. A21.]
I have to admit: I find both the efforts of the Bush Administration to claim there's less terrorism since 9/11 and the efforts of their critics to highlight that the opposite is true to be odd in the extreme. An enemy declares war on the U.S. on 9/11 and makes clear that terrorism is going to be his main weapon. The U.S. declares war in return (albeit somewhat rhetorically, because—frankly—no one officially declares war anymore [the U.S. hasn't done it since 1943 versus Romania]). A couple of years passes. Should anyone now be surprised to read that there is more terrorism in the world as a result of America finally deciding to join this, up-to-now, one-sided war?
Think about that.
To decry the Bush Administration's efforts to date by saying there's more terrorism since 9/11 than before is sort of like criticizing FDR a year after Pearl Harbor for there being too many battles with the Japanese. Of course there's more terrorism now. We're in a war. To have less terrorism requires we leave the Middle East to the bin Ladens there—nothing more and nothing less. Absent accepting that very dangerous pathway, we're going to have more terrorism in the world with the GWOT's continued unfolding, not less.
Why do we expect less terrorism? We're still employing the terrorism-as-crime model in our heads. We want more "enforcement" and thereby assume we'll get less "terror crime" as a result, when instead we're engaged in a war and wars—believe it or not—lead to far more battles than the preceding peace and/or crisis build-up period.
Our enemy wages war with terrorism, so expect more of it as we wage war against his strategic rear—namely the Middle East.
Here's today's catch:
REFERENCES with commentary:
"U.S. Realigns War Assignments: Top Military Leader Will Focus on Developing Iraqi Forces," by Sewell Chan, Washington Post, 16 May, p. A26.
"U.S. Needs More Time to Train and Equip Iraqis," by Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 24 May, p. A14.
"U.S. Nearing Deal On Way To Track Foreign Visitors: 'Virtual Border' Planned: Huge Contract for System Built on Databases—Privacy Issue Rises," by Eric Lichtblau and John Markoff, NYT, 24 May, p. A1.
"Arab Leaders Adopt Agenda Endorsing Some Change," by Neil MacFarquhar, NYT, 24 May, p. A8.
"Violence Jolts the Still Fragile Democracy in Nigeria: Deep-rooted rivalries over land and political power are fueling deadly clashes," by Somini Sengupta, NYT, 24 May, p. A3.
"Taiwan Tensions: Avoiding a War With China (Beijing and Taipei like the U.S. as mediator)," by Danny Gittings, Wall Street Journal, 24 May, p. A15.
"China Takes Aim at Racy, Violent TV Shows," by Kathy Chen and Leslie Change, WSJ, 24 May, p. B1.
"Reform in Russia: Free Market, Yes; Free Politics, Maybe: Washington's Civic Dreams For Old Foe Fade as People Focus on Making a Living," by Andrew Higgins, WSJ, 24 May, p. A1.
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