"At Nation's Ports, Cargo Backlog Raises Question of Security," by John M. Broder, New York Times, 27 July, p. A12.
Should America's big ports possess the best, most sophisticated technologies and terminal systems for transmodal operations? Certainly, we should aim for the same standards now achieved in Singapore, Hong Kong and Rotterdam, because such efficiency determines economic competitiveness to a large degree.
But how much should we focus on port security? Stephen Flynn, with his new book "America the Vulnerable," is generating a lot of sales and buzz like this article, by speaking of containers as "the poor man's missile" and saying "the question is when, not if" such containers will be used to deliver WMD into the U.S. He may well be right in his fears, but because he offers no context and thinks only of worst-case vertical scenarios, he tends to oversell his case. We've got the "bin Laden tax" already on the airline industry, and inevitably it gets place squarely on the shipping industry as well, either out of preemptive fear or in response to actual attack. But what we really have to ask ourselves is how much protection do we actually buy with such investments? There is simply no sense of balance in these arguments, or in this America-at-risk plethora of books now hitting the market.
Firewalling America off from the outside world may seem logical, but it really comes down to spending a lot of money on ourselves in order to reduce our connectivity with the global economy. Efficiency yes, but universal transparency is a chimera—a goal far more likely to reduce our connectivity than enhance or protect it. Plus, it does nothing at all in terms of reducing the sources of terrorism, or shrinking the Gap.
We are losing our sense of proportion in this global war on terrorism. Our instincts are always to pull back and look out for ourselves, instead of stepping forward and embracing the world for what it needs from us.
Port security is not about winning a GWOT, just about not losing one. When you play primarily not to lose, I guarantee you can't win.
Flynn can spread fear all he wants, and yes, he will inevitably be right, as even a broken clock is twice a day, but this is not a strategic approach to the problem set. We cannot prevent vertical scenarios like 9/11, and spending our scarce resources trying to do is misguided. We need to build robustness in terms of our ability to respond to and handle all the horizontal scenarios that result from a vertical scenario, because therein lies our true talents and strengths as the world's most horizontally networked society and economy and political system and military power.
As Peter Drucker admonishes, we need to stick with our strengths and outsource the rest. Our strength is connectivity, not firewalls. Our strength is engagement, not isolationism. This struggle is an away game, not a home game.
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