Dateline: SWA flight from BWI to PVD, 19 October 2004
The Washington Post promised Putnam that they would review PNM last spring, and led us to believe it would occur sometime in early summer. It is now almost November and still no review from the Post. At least the New York Times was more obvious in their anti-Bush bias: they simply refused to review the book whatsoever.
How can this Kerry voter claim an anti-Bush bias? Simple. The word "Pentagon" in the title makes me a "hawk," and working for the Office of the Secretary of Defense means I must be a "Bushie." Finally, my two articles for Esquire clearly identify me as a "neocon" because I supported the war. Some, upon reading the book, would claim all three suppositions to be valid, but plenty others would not—including me.
So Business Week and the Christian Science Monitor can issue rave reviews, and the Wall Street Journal can give me a front-page profile above the crease, but the Post and the Times don't touch the work, primarily—I would argue—because it confuses their stated position that it's Bush that's primarily the problem with America's foreign policy right now, instead of that controversial foreign policy being a logical response to the revealed (by 9/11) international security environment (even if its tone and style often unnecessarily grates many Americans and many allies around the world).
But enough bitching (and you have to admit, I haven't engaged in such whiney carping in quite some time) about those papers. Why not view the glass as half full, as in the Washington Times?
First, Mac Thornberry gave me a spectacular review last spring. Then I got a favorable-but-flawed more formal review by a National Defense U. academic over the summer. Then, a third major treatment appeared last Sunday from syndicated columnist and former Marine and Green Beret and Assistant Secretary of Defense named Jack Kelly (I have tried to find this piece online but cannot for the life of me! I just have the hard copy, so I know it's real).
So I guess I should stop my bitching and simply dance with them that brung me . . ..
Here's Kelly's piece in full. It was brought to my attention this morning by retired Vice Admiral Phil Quast, who lured me to Shepherdstown WV to brief a new class of one-star Navy admirals and senior executive service officials (roughly 75 in all). He used the op-ed to introduce me this morning in the fabulous education shrine that Robert Byrd built for his constituents in gorgeous West Virginia—probably the single most ornate (although almost all in wood) auditorium I have ever spoke in (save the for sumptuous shrine that is the Ronald Reagan building in DC).
Terror War Defenses
Jack Kelly op-ed in Washington Times
[17 October 2004, p. B4]
Two superb books put in context the global war on terror, and explain why the battle for Iraq is critical to victory.
Thomas Barnett is a professor at the Naval War College, and creator of what may be history's most famous Pentagon briefing. Col. Thomas Hammes is a Marine with considerable experience in intelligence and special operations.
In "The Pentagon's New Map," Mr. Barnett defines the security challenge of the 21st century in terms of "the Core" (prosperous democracies integrated into the world economy) and "the Gap" (failed states disconnected from globalization). The key to peace is reducing the number of states in the Gap.
In "The Sling and the Stone," Col. Hammes describes Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), and outlines steps America must take to wage it effectively.
In first-generation war, practiced from the misty depths of pre-history to just before World War I, groups of soldiers in close proximity whale away at each other with swords, spears, battle axes and, later, muskets. The object was to destroy enemy fighting forces.
Second-generation warfare was like the first, with the addition of artillery and other indirect fires. The objective—to destroy the enemy's fighting formations—was the game.
Third-generation warfare, inaugurated by the German Blitzkrieg in World War II, shifted the primary objective from the enemy's fighting forces to his logistical base and command-and-control systems.
In 4GW, inaugurated by Mao Tse-Tung and improved upon by the Vietnamese communists, the main target is the enemy's will to fight. Battlefield successes are less important than the ability to exploit them for propaganda.
Two characteristics of 4GW that differ from earlier generations of war is there are no ethical boundaries—noncombatants are often the preferred target because killing them can have a greater impact on enemy morale—and there are no quick victories. 4GW wars are measured in decades, not years.
A common theme for Mr. Barnett and Col. Hammes is the Pentagon cannot prepare for war as if it were separable from everything else. In modern war, "everything else" (the economy, public perceptions, nation-building) are often more important than winning fights on the battlefield.
Mr. Barnett's is a hopeful book. He believes globalization has all but outlawed war between states, because the costs of war to a country connected to the world economy vastly outweigh any potential benefits successful war could bring. Col. Hammes is less optimistic but agrees with Mr. Barnett that the kind of war for which the Pentagon is preparing is most unlikely.
Nation-building is a critical component for victory in 4GW conflicts. Only with nation-building can the Gap be shrunk, Mr. Barnett says. Only by providing a better idea and example can the United States defeat an ideological group like al Qaeda, Col. Hammes says.
Both think the Pentagon needs a major overhaul if we're to win the war on terror and future 4GW wars.
Mr. Barnett thinks our military needs to be divided into a (smaller) traditional military force and a (larger) "system administration" force that would do the dirty work of peacekeeping and nation-building.
Col. Hammes' goals are more modest and more practical. We need fewer of the kinds of units—heavy armor, air defense, tactical fighters, submarines—designed for fighting enemies who have largely vanished. We need more of the kinds of units—military police, intelligence, civil affairs, leg infantry—useful for peacekeeping and nation-building.
What's needed most in the Pentagon, Mr. Barnett and Col. Hammes agree, is a change in attitude. Military leaders must be able to work closely with civilian agencies to win the war on terror. Military bureaucracies must be flattened so field troops can respond quicker to rapidly developing situations.
Most important, our military and political leaders must recognize that 4GW conflicts are chiefly wars of ideas, and the best weapons we have in such conflicts are our better ideas.
"The fundamental message of the United States is the most powerful message ever crafted by mankind: We treasure the individual and provide an environment where every person can strive for his or her own dreams," Col. Hammes said. "It is up to us to harness that message and use it to win."
Jack Kelly, a syndicated columnist, is a former Marine and Green Beret and a former deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force in the Reagan administration. He is national security writer for the Pittsburgh (Pa.) Post-Gazette.
I won't complain about some short-cuts Kelly takes with my ideas, because he gets the big pieces correct. Also, he cleverly matches up my theory of war with 4GW in a way I've very comfortable with.
Here's the catch I pieced together in my return to civilization:
■How to be "catastrophically successful" by not really trying
■A close-up look at an "implicit villain"
■The great Chinese outsourcing begins . . . with cars!
■Voting with their money: How the rest of the Core puts the brake on "unilateral" America
