ARTICLE: "Awkward bedfellows: Roh Moo-hyun goes to Washington DC; the alliance with America is under strain," The Economist, 9 September 2006, p. 41.Spoke with the same female South Korean reporter I've spoken with in the past about a story she'll file this Sunday.
My upshot? Long-term requirements of the Long War create strong pressures for the U.S. to reduce its personnel footprint in Asia, which will be counterbalanced by more naval forces (like subs), which, quite frankly, find less utility elsewhere in the world in this Long War. So we're basically watching a flip emerge here: during the Cold War we had the bodies in Europe and Asia and covered the Gap more virtually with naval forces. Now we're seeing the opposite: fewer troops in Europe and Asia and more virtual coverage there.
Why? Shrinking the Gap will take bodies.
I know, I know, inconceivable to pol-mil thinkers of a certain age ("It'll never happen!"), but it is happening already, it will continue to happen, and it will happen more profoundly in the future. This fight is centered in Central/SW Asia and Africa over the next several decades, not East Asia, whose freedom from the threat of great power war has been preordained by Deng's choice to base China's future on globalization, not isolation and autarky. Far sooner than most imagine, much less expect, you'll see our ground presence in East Asia shrink to basically nothing.
So yes, the clock is running on South Korea. Nuclear North Korea won't be our problem or fixation forever. We've got other fish to fry elsewhere, and the emerging strategic relationships that will inevitably arise due to that geographic shift--to include strategic alliance with China--mean that our strategic interests in the Korean peninsula will evaporate within a generation.
Again, I know this is "inconceivable" and "impossible" and "it'll never happen."
And it won't, until a certain generation of leadership and thinkers and policymakers leave the stage. But guess what? That's a guaranteed.
Ten years from now, after all the additional casualties we'll be unable to avoid (we can pay them there, or have them costed out over here, but we will pay), you will not see the strategic logic survive that says, "we prevent great power war in East Asia."
That clock is ticking.
Sure, South Korea will receive rhetorical assurances galore on this subject throughout this drawdown process, but it will happen nonetheless. Our defense guarantees on Taiwan and South Korea are past their historical expiration dates. The game has moved on and East Asia has grown up, whether it wants to admit its new responsibilities or not.
But America has fought it's last land war in Asia--a delaying action not unlike our current effort in Iraq. Meanwhile, globalization did the rest in the meantime, allowing us to increasingly virtualize our military requirements in the region (yes, we can still bomb at will from afar and our ships will be "present"). The shrinking of the remaining Gap in southeast Asia will be a minimal military affair (essentially, SOF on the back side of history, not on its cusp like in Africa).
And yeah, Japan and Taiwan and South Korea better get used to it and get ready.
Or they can simply continue deluding themselves with the comforting words we're sure to utter throughout the coming years.
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Comments (2)
This fits well with my reconsideration of our war in Vietnam. I was a early opponent of the war (as were many my age) and thought it was a mistake for us to be involved. But many years later as I surveyed the outcome I came to believe that by drawing the line in Vietnam we actually kept the dominoes from falling---just as Kennedy hoped. The Soviets and the Chicoms had to focus so much of their energy keeping the NVA/NLf in the field that when after 15 years they looked up they discovered that the Asian tigers had indeed grown up and were no longer targets of opportunity. So, from that perspective, the Vietnam War was actually a success. Now as you say our military is moving in the same direction. Perhaps, they should start see Vietnam as a success. The dominoes did not fall and the outcome was exactly what Kennedy wanted.
Posted by Charles Rostkowski | September 16, 2006 10:09 AM
Overview in October issue of Atlantic Monthly by Robert D. Kaplan with title "When North Kora Falls" presents interesting options for military to deal with in near future. Recent restructuring of US Forces in ROK has remade the context of my military duty there during 4 tours into a very different world. Blending this contingency with current commitements and the prospect of a possible new UN Secretary General from South Korea would seem to add some priority to patching up a working relationship with China as you have presented. The Seven Stages of Collapse discussed by Kaplan may have some merit as a template for an analysis of how other states fail or progress as in current mideast actions and provide grist for the sizing dilemma faced by national leaders. Your thoughts provide much stimulation to an old soldier and are much appreciated.
Posted by Mike Zar | September 29, 2006 6:36 PM