Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

ARTCILE: "In a Volatile Region of Iraq, U.S. Military Takes Two Paths," by Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post, 15 September 2006, p. A1.

So the temptation is to say, "Let's go with the undercover badasses and send the Big Army home because we get more bang for the buck that way."

But then you delve into what is really being accomplished by the SOF guys, and you realize it's basically a strategy of limited regret that focuses primarily on getting the local badasses to police themselves ("Green Berets skilled in working closely with indigenous forces have enlisted one of the largest and most influential tribes in Iraq to launch a regional police force.") Now, this is all well and good, and the activity shows the Green Berets at their SysAdmin best, but the outcomes of a limited regret strategy don't just involve limited liability, they likewise pretty much guarantee limited connectivity on the far side.

Again, that's not a criticism of what SOF do, it's just to say that they represent a phase in any successful long-term, truly-connecting strategy of shrinking the Gap. They're best in situations where your near-term possibilities are limited, and you don't really want to put in the larger effort with more boots on the ground. So you send in the SOF to get the local tough guys to police their own, thus limiting your effort and exposure.

But, quite frankly, this is a stabilizing strategy only. That sort of stuff doesn't generate movement toward serious economic connectivity. It's more like picking your local warlords or tribes and making your peace with them, which, when you think of it, is basicaly how the Brits did it for decades in such ungovernable regions, a policy still used by Pakistan in its NW territories today: we put you in charge and you keep a lid on things for us so we don't have to come back here in force and really bust some heads.

Again, fine as a holding strategy, and yes, it plays to all the romantic images of SOF: they dress local, wear their hair longer, act like prima donnas in the chow line, etc. We love our badasses and we give them the toughest f--king jobs, but don't confuse that romantic, limited-regret approach with a long-term solution. It's a delaying action and nothing more. Do it too long and you're basically taking an "Escape from New York" approach to the region in question: containment yes, but no serious effort at integration. You're simply stabilizing in the traditional way of colonial powers throughout history.

I know that's counterintuitive. "Isn't it less colonialistic to go in with the small-footprint SOF, co-opt the local heavies, and then let them rule instead of trying to build something more 'modern' that will just generate resistance?"

Yes, that would be the case if globalization was some small, closed club and the Gap was slated forever more as an off-grid location, but the reason why we're in these regions is because that's simply not the case, and because these off-grid locations are the sanctuaries of choice for the bad actors who directly threaten us.

Frankly, I find the SOF/containment/limited regret strategy to be far more paternalistic and colonial--as in, we basically write them off as "unintegratable."

But yes, it's an approach we'll use early in many processes, just like you have special early investors for a start-up that are later replaced by more mature, corporate types that take you to the next level. So yeah, SOF for early-in, but if they're the sum total of your exposure and strategy, you're not solving anything. You're just begging off the inevitable solution set, pretending your half-solution is really more "just."

But ask yourself: if rule by the local badasses was such a great deal, then why would this area be so unruly, violent, disconnected economically, and typically subject to authoritarian rule?

Sound like a long-term solution to you?