Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

OP-ED: “Peace Paradox: Could Iran’s meddling help solve the Israeli-Arab conflict?” by Sarah Kass, Wall Street Journal, 7-8 July 2007, p. A6.

I try to avoid just commenting on events until I can figure the angle that intrigues me. Sometimes that takes longer than usual, and Hamas’s takeover of Gaza is one such example.

What to say? Simplest: Hamas had its chance, screwed it royally, and Israel’s justified in continuing to build the wall and its one-state solution.

So obvious, it’s hardly worth typing.

But then I read this wonderful op-ed with its intriguing scenario (very nicely doled out).

The Iranians, in their proxy war (Hezbollah and Hamas v Israel) against the U.S. presence in Iraq, have reached too far.

But instead of just knee-jerking the region into an anti-Iranian coalition, why not utilize the situation to move the ball forward on Israel-Palestine.

I have said this for a long time now: the three fights that need to be advanced or processed are Israel v. Iran (Iran’s fearful reach for nukes is pushing that nicely), al Qaeda v. House of Saud (Sunni Iraq localizes that situation nicely versus having Saudi nationals ram jets into NY buildings), and Iran v. Saudi Arabia (the one giving us the chance on Israel v. Palestine right now).

Hamas’ raw grab for power in Gaza, in Kass’ scenario, work like this:

Up to now, autocrats in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and much of the Arab world have demonized Israel in order to consolidate their own diplomatic and domestic power. Hamas’ coup has changed the game. Suddenly, the autocrats realize that should Israel be defeated, the West Bank would fall to Hamas, helping revolutionary Iran secure its hold on the region while slicing in half the entire Middle East.

The latter bit is my continuing fear on making it Sunni versus Shiia, because I see New Core pillars Russia, India and China siding with the Shiia as much or more than with the Sunni, thus my concern of a Yalta-like divide in the region and the replication of a lot of pointless bipolar standoffs in coming years.

Anyway, unless you get some traction on Israel-Palestine, the U.S.-led Sunni coalition is unlikely to achieve much in its underlying disunity. So why not use the impetus of fear over Iran’s advances fuel something else?

First, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas pre-emptively denounces any Hezbollah or Syrian saber-rattling against Israel as a precursor to a Hamas-led Iranian assault on the Palestinian people. Second, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt reframe the casus belli from Israeli to Iranian occupation, changing the subject from a few dusty settlement trailers on hilltops near Hebron to the violent Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Palestine. Third, Tony Blair links future European financial support of Fatah to the West Bank’s negotiating an immediate and enduring peace with Israel.

On the heels of this one-two-three punch, the regional and international alliances could rapidly be redrawn. Mr. Abbas ends the state of war with Israel and declares a Palestinian state in the West Bank. Jordan and Saudi Arabia bless the terms of the peace after some proper diplomatic back and forth, with Mr. Blair taking the lead while the American president declares vigorous support. Before the year is out, Egypt and Jordan (with Israel’s acquiescence) back Mr. Abbas in a military campaign to liberate Gaza from its Iranian proxy, proclaiming for Gaza’s Palestinians (as well as for the Palestinians in all the refugee camps) their rightful citizenship in the newly established state of Palestine.

By next year Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel could be rolling back Hezbollah from southern Lebanon, and, with France’s help, rolling back Syria from the rest of Lebanon. A Palestinian peace and a Lebanese rollback would materially compromise Syria’s geopolitical situation and likely move it away from its flirtation with Iran. In the meantime, under the bright light of Palestinian statehood and some anti-terror momentum in Israel’s and Palestine’s environs, American troops could pull out of Iraq under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and a non-Iranian, Iraqi Shiite majority, with a weakened Syria no longer jamming the works on the border.

Frankly, if this was an underlying Bush strategy vis-à-vis the surge/drawdown dynamics in Iraq, I’d resume my general optimism about the Big Bang working out. To me, this sort of adaptive planning response was what I was hoping for all along from the Bushies on the Big Bang: get the board moving and then play, play, play--aggressively and imaginatively.

But this scenario, as Kass admits, requires some “visionary leaders” and I just don’t see that happening with the Bush-Cheney-Rice troika. I mean, the Bush team had a far better set of regional circumstances two years after the invasion and did nothing with that, so why stick their necks out now when things seem so much less conducive--at least on the surface?

Instead we get the unimaginative build-up toward military strikes and perhaps all-out war with Iran and the great answer to our failures in Iraq. That Lieberman plays that one-note so consistently tells us what a bad president he would have made.

And please don't pepper this post with all the "it-could-never-work's." We have the White House for that.