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Service ID is not necessarily bad

ARTICLE: Marines Press to Remove Their Forces From Iraq, By THOM SHANKER, October 11, 2007

Rotations are one thing, but I will tell you this analysis is more to the point:

Military officials say the Marine proposal is also an early indication of jockeying among the four armed services for a place in combat missions in years to come. β€œAt the end of the day, this could be decided by parochialism, and making sure each service does not lose equity, as much as on how best to manage the risk of force levels for Iraq and Afghanistan,” said one Pentagon planner.

Tensions over how to divide future budgets have begun to resurface across the military because of apprehension that Congressional support for large increases in defense spending seen since the Sept. 11 attacks will diminish, leaving the services to compete for money.

Those traditional turf battles have subsided somewhat given the overwhelming demands of waging two simultaneous wars β€” and because Pentagon budgets reached new heights.

The Marines are always paranoid about losing out to the Army, and Iraq is perceived as an Army thing that speaks to Army expansion, but not necessarily anything for the Marines. Getting the Marines to have a more prominent identification with Afghanistan could curb that trend, but, of course, some toes are stepped on there as well (Air Force).

I will tell you that Air Force and Navy fought over who'd take over management of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa from the squeezed Marines, so everyone is looking for service identification everywhere in this Long War.

Natural stuff, not necessarily bad.

(Thanks: Tom Wade)

Comments (5)

Is this an initial step toward differentiation of Leviathan and SysAdmin within the DoD? It would certainly make for easier (or at least clearer) funding--Congress and the President get to decide how much the Leviathan gets, and how much the SysAdmin gets, and then it's more apparent where our own priorities lie and where the rest of the Core can contribute the most.

In Iraq, we have Marines, trigger-pullers and the toughest of the warriors, the peace-makers. We also have Army, wider scope of responsibility, more contact with government and civilians in occupied areas, security experts and more able to transition roles to peace-keepers, organizing and training new indigenous forces. The Air Force and Navy play big roles, of course, but are not the boots-on-the-ground (to borrow the cliche).

Besides that, it also suggests that the Leviathan left Afghanistan too early, and now needs to go back in and finish the work. I'm sure entering the zone twice is a whole lot more difficult than having stayed there and stuck it out from the first time, but then we would have been undermanned going into Iraq. Oh, wait...we were undermanned anyway.

Yes and no, in my mind. Marines still quintessential SysAdmin, just the more straightforward small wars fighting force, as has been their historic role, much like the Army's been far more about constabulary work than warfare for the vast majority of its history.

To me, concentrating the Marines in Afghanistan, where the fight remains, makes sense. While letting the Army stay with Iraq, where the fighting role recedes, also makes sense.

Both are SysAdmin functions, in my mind. The Leviathan, meanwhile, contemplates Iran, as it should. Whether we go or not, that's what the Leviathan is meant to do.

This article explains it a lot better than the one I sent you; it no longer looks like rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic:P

One thing I wonder about: Are the Marines drawing as heavily on Reservists as the Army is? If not, that suggests another good reason for this arrangement; Afganistan gets seasoned vets who are more ready to stick around for a while, while the Army gets to give its Reservists and Guardsman a rest as Iraq draws down.

Thanks for the further explanation of your view, Tom. However, it raises the question of who makes up the Leviathan that would go into Iran? Other than the Navy and AF providing the next version of "shock and awe" (v. 3.5 I think, unless they've been holding out on us), who should be the boots-on-the-ground there?

Or, are we going to avoid that aspect of commitment in the next war and keep it air-powered? I'm no mil expert, but I don't think it will succeed w/o some ground occupation, and I've always thought of the Marines as the best at that, alongside the Army's airborne, heavy armor and helo groups. Will we see more of the SOCOM and JSOC involvement (or, rather, its aftermath) in the early stages of establishing ground supremacy, and then bring in more "traditional forces" to fill in the gaps (no pun intended)?

Correct me if I am wrong but the Navy has already taken over the CJTF-HOA and has been doing it for over a year now.

That's on top of a pretty robust deployment schedule and continuing comittments in the Pacific-as well as supporting GWOT operations in the PI. The Navy does not need to add any more missions until it gets a lot more ships and people-neither of which is happening anytime soon.

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