Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

ARTICLE: Process for Handling Marines' Urgent Needs Deemed Ineffective, Inside the Pentagon, October 18, 2007, Pg. 1

People always want a thumbs up or thumbs down.

Here is what I say, because I know this situation to be more complex than that easy judgment:

Mattis did a good job of changing the USMC's lessons learned (close to non-existent beforehand, according to the Marines themselves involved in setting up the system whom I personally interviewed at great length) within the existing constructs. But to the extent those new lines of feedback generated demands for the larger acquisition system to either answer or allow combatant commands to answer on their own using operations & maintenance funds, a lot of backpressure ensued.

The acquisition process was not adept at handling fast tracks, so in their frustration, the commands tried to sneak all manner of responses through on the O&M side. When found out, the acquisition crowd would go ballistic, saying they had spent years and years getting this great capability lined up just so, fighting off the other services, and now this cowboy effort in the field was f--king all that up royally.

Both sides in this equation would say they were just doing their job, and they'd be right. The acquisitions guys need to provide for the Marines-after-next engaged in the war-after-next, but the guys in the field just can't wait and no one in their right minds (meaning, outside this calcified bureaucratic drill) would expect them to just stand by and watch fellow Marines die for no apparent good reason.

Now the system as a whole wants to say, "Just give me more money overall."

And the field tends to say, "Just give me more of the acquisition money we've already got and forego this or that tech we probably don't need."

And the acquisition types say, "But we make the call on the long-term needs and we need to protect those Marines down the road too!"

So, in the end, Mattis set up a feedback loop that ultimately makes his entire command stressed out and creates a lot of bureaucratic pushback from upstairs in DC. Would it have been great if he could have fixed all that during his time at Quantico? Sure. How possible? Not very.

Can he do more good things in Norfolk as head of Joint Forces Command? Sure.

Does this IG report stick a nice red hot poker in him to incentivize him some more? Absolutely.

Is Mattis a big boy who can handle that and still do well? Are you kidding?

Does the entire system of acquisition need some reform so it's better tied into the field's near-term needs? Again, are you kidding?

My point is this: good people doing good things bump up against systems that don't want those good things screwing up their long-time good thing.

This evolution is just beginning, and guys like Mattis can be priceless in locking in the change over time.

Unhappy not to find obvious heroes and villains?

Welcome to my career.