WEEK IN REVIEW: "Look Who Talks To The Enemy," by Helene Cooper, New York Times, 16 December 2007, p. WK1.HUNGRY FOR AMERICA: "Travel to Tehran: The mullahs in Iran have a single desire: an audience with the United States," by Dmitri Trenin, Foreign Policy, January/February 2008, p. 72.
OP-ED: "How to Defuse Iran: The N.I.E. shows that the place to wage battle is the negotiating table," by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, New York Times, 11 December 2007, p. A33.
The last phase of the Bush years does seem like we're suing for peace with everyone we can find. It's undignified but inevitable, as it seems like everyone is containing us nowadays, including our own bureaucracy (e.g., the successful revolt of the intelligence community over Iran).
What I find fascinating in this relatively rapid balancing is that no military power is being employed to achieve the effect. None is required, really. We're so integrated with the global economy on so many levels that we can be made to feel the world's displeasure relatively quickly.
Yes, you can cite this or that small Russian or Chinese military step, but in the grand scheme of power flows, these are truly meaningless. If that's your universe of grand strategy, then forget it and head back to the 19th century while you still can.
Once you get your mind around how we'll be forced to find some useful space for Iran in the Middle East, the initial steps aren't that hard. We know how to build in confidence measures with a rogue regime that threatens nukes and uses terror proxies. We've done it before quite successfully with the Soviets. If you want Iran to feel the necessity for economic reform, we need to connect them deeply enough in the global economy for that pressure to come on its own through the private sector, instead of micro-managed by governments (support this reform element, demand this change).
Trenin uses my favorite Nixon-goes-to-Tehran image, reminding us that Iran is the world's second-oldest state after China.
As he puts it (also in my favored vein): "Some Russian observers compare modern Iran to Leonid Brezhnev's Soviet Union—the beginning of the end. Visiting Americans report of ordinary Iranians' fascination with the American way of life, a familiar Soviet phenomenon."
How long have I been using these lines (Nixon, Brezhnev) in the brief? About four years now.
At first I was ridiculed. Then I was violently opposed. Now it's getting to be conventional wisdom. That's the normal journey for truth, as Schopenhauer once observed.
Trenin makes arguments I clearly endorse. The Leveretts give more of a plotline for progress, which, not surprisingly, mirrors much of what we "gave" the Sovs in Europe on detente: we recognize your interests, we codify your security, we start confidence building measures beginning with naval (recent need on display), and so on.
Then we draw them into globalization and totally screw their mullocracy in the process, just like Nixon and Kissinger did with the Sovs.
Remember, Reagan got no progress with saying no. Things changed only when he convinced Gorby that he could be trusted.
And boy, did they change fast once the Sovs' fears were assuaged.
The soft kill is staring us in the face.
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Comments (6)
Dr Barnett, I know you are writing your book,and it is essential to have a positive frame of mind,so it is only fair to agree with you in a
sence, that militery option in Iran has the adverse effects,& perhaps
that is why i was attracted to your view since 4 years ago,and believed it was the most practical policy toward Iran.I also agree with you that Iran has both resource and rich labor,to be economiclly
connected.in fact i agree the age of wars are over anywhere,and Bush (neocon) experiment at it failed,and we see the reversal trend.
Globalization and soft kill is one route that can be taken,as long as the purpose is not just a change of regime ,soley favorable to US and
Europeans(eg; fu...ked up regime like Eygpt,Gordan,Pakistan,Suadis,
and the rest of gulf countries)and against thier own people's interests.if we have Japan,Germany after wwII,or those other east
asia tiger countries, in mind, then it will be great.and maybe before
you become ambassador to China, you be the ambassador to Iran.
Posted by farhad | February 2, 2008 11:05 AM
You are the soviet expert, tom -- but hear me out:
Originally, Gorbachev was a Suslov disciple, correct? So a hardliner initially similar to Andropov... I think he changed policies primarily due to fear that an economic collapse and the subsequent chaos would have the serious potential to cause the loss of command and control of a portion of their strategic missile forces. That is something that the "rational russians" (as opposed to the mullahs) knew had to be avoided at all costs. PALS is good, but no one wants to take the chance, right?
I think uskoreniye, glasnost, perestroika, demokratizatsiya were a last ditch effort to avoid collapse and loss of command and control...when it became obvious that even these couldn't save the system, the system itself was abandoned.
By 1986 they would have known that we could see the economic cracks in their system -- Gates' contention of CIA's total surprise notwithstanding. I think trust in Reagan was a secondary -- though important -- factor. Reagan's economic warfare was more important in accelerating the decline; his embrace of talks occured after he understood that he had made the sale to the Kremlin itself that apparatus of state was in danger of losing control.
In this sense, Reagan's economic warfare was really a form of information warfare -- a sales job to the kremlin. I think Nixon saw this too: his madman strategy was aimed at provoking hot-head hardliners in the soviet hierarchy so that Brezhnev would lean more heavily on detente out of a fear of loosing control. How did he revitalize arms control talks?
How do we conduct command and control warfare against Al-qaeda? That is the $500 billion question...
Posted by Matt | February 4, 2008 1:17 AM
Let me restate:
how do you conduct command and control warfare against something as nebulous and protean and decentralized as terrorism? What must terrorists lose control of if we are to induce the desired change of policy? Or can it even be framed in these terms anymore?
Posted by Matt | February 4, 2008 1:28 AM
I am hoping it will teach the US Federal Govt. some much needed humility. I was seriously turned off the US during the eighties following some US Senators and Congresscritters engaging mouth before brain was even turned on, criticising New Zealand for having second thoughts about the sanity of continual stonewalling nuclear disarmament. I forgave the US after Reagan finally got a clue and started talking - but then I had second thoughts after Dubya got elected and went haywire.
That's what you call a love-hate relationship with a foreign nation! ;)
Posted by Wesley Parish | February 4, 2008 6:18 AM
Matt: one thing terrorists must lose control of is public opinion, like AQI did with the Sunni insurgency because of their extreme brutality.
Posted by Sean Meade![[TypeKey Profile Page]](http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/nav-commenters.gif)
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February 4, 2008 6:49 AM
Matt's information warfare insight is important as well as his comments on how it has been a US (and often foreign) military and foreign affairs tool for many decades. It often utilized (willing and unwilling) collaborators among foreign and domestic opponents of our strategic goals.
The era of global asymmetric war including terrorist methods made information warfare more critical. It must be focused on a wider variety of critical niche audiences and their information situations.
Interesting reminder on Gates. I think Bush I was good. Won't know if Bush II is better or worse until the final whistle blows.
I believe our roach traps have worked well at drawing enemies to locations of our choosing and provoking them into actions against their long term interests.
My big concern is whether information warfare will be sustained once we become more aware of it and its collateral damages.
Posted by Louis Heberlein | February 14, 2008 4:44 PM