From "The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare," published in Proceedings, 1999:
2. Sloth: NCW Slows the U.S. Military's Adaptation to a MOOTW WorldMilitary operations other than war (MOOTWs) are the closest thinly to a sure-bet future the U.S. military faces right now, and network-centric warfare does not yet answer that mail. Beyond the affordability issues, there is the larger question of what "networked" should mean for the U.S. military: Wiring-up among ourselves? Or wiring ourselves up more to the world outside?
This is not an esoteric question for naval forces, because I see a future in which the establishment of, and support to, information networks is the crucial U.S. naval product delivered overseas to internal crises, where confusion, complexity, and chaos are the norm. We are far more likely to be called on to be the deliverers of clarity and context than sowers of blindness and vertigo, and we are far more likely to be asked to settle down all sides in a conflict than to decimate one particular side. This is where NCW's "lock-out" phraseology misleads: we will be interested in opening up pathways to resolution, not closing down pathways of conflict. That reality speaks to non-lethal approaches, reversible effects, and keeping open the channels of communication.
Increasingly, naval forces will be called on to serve as a "node connector," rather than a "node destroyer." I am talking not only about bringing crisis-involved regions back on line, but also about the military acting as Network Central for the wide array of U.S. and international agencies that populate any U.S.-led response to complex humanitarian emergencies. Just as important as our ability to talk among ourselves during, the generation and coordination of large-scale violence will be our ability to generate and coordinate the conversations of many outsiders in the prevention of small-scale violence.
Correctly focused, network-centric warfare would allow the U.S. military to come into any crisis situation and establish an information umbrella to boost the transparency of everyone's actions. Incorrectly focused, it might hamstring us along the lines of the Vietnam War. In sum, NCW's quest for information dominance is self-limiting in an era that will see the U.S. military far less involved in network wars than in mucking around where the network is not.
But here's the point I'd make on Cebrowski: this article started my SysAdmin conversation with him. Two years later, after 9/11, it finally blossomed into his support for the idea within the Office of Force Transformation. He never saw that shift as a retreat from his sense of what NCW could do in war. He simply recognized that it needed to expand its thinking to include what NCW could provide in the postwar.
I don't think it's unfair to hold NCW partially responsible for the postwar failures in Iraq, but it was far more of a dependent variable than an independent one, meaning it did not beget the Powell Doctrine, but emanated from its biases.
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Comments (4)
I must say that I am a bit mystified as to how a command and control concept (C4ISR) designed for information sharing between command and combat modules (NCW) would have any relevance either the formulation or execution of U. S. Foreign Policy by either General Powell or Secretary Rice. NCW (also known as Network Centric Operations (NCO)) is a battlefield tool not a strategic decision maker tool.
Posted by Rick Wright | February 17, 2008 1:04 PM
Rick,
I am not sure I would agree, depending upon perspective, sometimes the battlefield picture is the entire map, instead of the section a specific commander is.
For example, the Capt. of a destroyer and an Admiral overseeing multiple task forces will have a very different take on what NCW means to them, although they both might have access to much of the same information.
Posted by Galrahn | February 18, 2008 8:55 AM
I have always believed that decision support tools are built from the ground up. NCW as designed for implementation seems still too top down! Am I wrong? Also how about compatibilty, interoperability, redundancy, resiliency, etc. Old terms perhaps but still meaningful. Again, does the level of sophistication of the enemy or those opposing even enter into NCW? Is off-grid still the basic defensive system for the sub-state actors?
Posted by William R. Cumming | February 18, 2008 11:43 AM
George Marshall was the person who decided to move our foreign policy development process from a bottom up orientation based on observations, perspectives of in country and staff specialists into a top down command and control approach. He believed it was needed at that time because of the Cold War. Some believe that Powell had similar concerns such centralization was still needed because things might come unglued as Russia and China transitioned to challenging post-Communist methods.
In any case the top down command and control structured military mindset had a strong influence on State Department evolution. Plug in elite presidential advisors and super spy administrators and the situation produces a Washington top down culture.
The DOD information and data world went though a similar top down oriented evolution long before the network centered warfare thing. Systems that were supposed to help the field guys became oriented towards Top down clients for Pentagon & Congress benefit even when it meant extra burdens and distractions for field guys at the expense of their real problems. I observed the process from different perspectives for decades.
The Washington world is so cultured to top down command and control thinking that it continually makes unnoticed minor decisions, including network design and operation rules that causes them to miss new problems areas, and to be unable to respond quickly when they pop. The Katrina incident was an example that exposed how wide spread and screwed up such thinking became.
It is still amazing to me that the Arpanet was able to develop and evolve to the Internet with that Washington culture still around, but then it was developed in secret.
Good signs.
#1. The DOD will have hundreds of thousands of troops that experienced the real world of current conflicts on the scene rather than years of fictional war game exercises. Many of them will have worked closely with local foreign 'clients' as on-scene JTACs so the experience the whole field reality of networked-centered warfare. Note: The ways that the field guys operate with 'clients' in first phase lays the foundation for post 'war' phase. Barnett's mentors knew that. Perhaps they did not develop elaborate documented explanations for outsiders in public and media to 'get it.'
#2. Secretary Rice is making it a criterion for State Department promotions that the individuals spend significant time serving in countries where problems exist rather than moving up from their academic or administrative experience including buddies in Congress. So the thinking and communications processes in future State Department could be more of a meaningful two way street.
#3. Some military activities are giving their people access to internet service to share concerns and ideas directly with distant peers without having to go through the structured up and down information hierarchy. Yes, there will be some misuse and pulp media 'exposes' of their thoughts, but I think it is a worthwhile risk.
Bottom line: Hang on guys it can be done 'almost' right, but it must always be subject to ideas and concerns of field workers. Fixing those problems and trying their ideas rather than seeking a technical analyst's fictional perfection should be the goal.
Posted by Louis Heberlein | February 18, 2008 4:10 PM