ARTICLE: Iran's Clerical Old Guard Being Pushed Aside, By Thomas Erdbrink, Washington Post, February 11, 2008; Page A01
Very good and useful analysis.
With any revolutionary state, the original leadership generation ages out, usually without grace and with plenty of regrets. They see what could have been and what it's turned out to be. They look back over past decisions, and realize they would have done things differently if given the chance again to rule. They typically split across two impulses: 1) they should have been more stringent re: the revolution; and 2) they should have moved more decisively to normalize the revolution's relationship with the outside world.
In China, for example, you saw both of these impulses with Mao: the Cultural Revolution and yet the opening to America, with his fear of the Sovs being a prime reason why Zhou and he started that process with Nixon. When, during their famous one-time F2F, the Great leader was prompted by Nixon to brag about how much he had changed the Chinese nation, Mao demurred, claiming that he had only changed bits and pieces in Beijing alone without really effectively any lasting transformation across the country. You could say he was being modest, but judging by how fast Deng resurrected the society's natural capitalist tendencies just a few years later, the harsh truth is that Maoism didn't take in China whatsoever, and in his old age Mao admitted as much to himself.
The aging cleric elite in Iran have reached similar conclusions about the Iranian revolution. They know it has failed. They see the ruination of the faith in society, primarily because of their own politicization of it (the fastest way to ruin faith). They realize that cutting the country off from globalization in general and the U.S. in particular has backfired. Iran's economy is in shambles. People are unhappy. There is a profound birth dearth and brain drain (the latter being the worst in the world, according to the World Bank). They would do things differently, if given the chance.
Unfortunately, they won't be given that chance.
The post-revolutionary generation has basically taken over, with two wings emerging (as I've noted in past posts over the last couple of years): one is associated with Ahmadinejad and the other is associated with Larijani (cited in this piece) and Ghalibef (the current mayor of Tehran, not mentioned in this piece).
Ahmadinejad's "principalists" want the revolution revived, and so they are called hardliners, but the technocrats have the same desire, so you begin to see the disutility of that term. In reality, both wings want to revitalize the revolution, albeit in different ways.
In Chavez-like, oil-fueled populism, Ahmadinejad promises much and delivers little across his presidency. As was noted a while back in a great WSJ analysis, Ahmadinejad has gone to great lengths to strengthen the power of the presidency, his aim being to create a non-mullah-based political party. By this article's analysis, he seems to be succeeding. But as we know from many analyses of the associated Revolutionary Guards mafia, they're a fairly parasitic bunch who, if given free reign, would surpass the corruption of previous ruling groups. Already, the Guards exist primarily to gain as much control of the economy as possible--a naturally self-interested and self-perpetuating nomenklatura in the best Soviet sense. Rhetorically, the Ahmadinejad crew talk a great game, but in execution, they accomplish nothing beyond intimidation accompanied by propaganda. Failing at home to maintain any real devotion, they externalize the revolution by seeking satellites and emphasizing foreign threats. "We will bury you!" we are constantly told. Oh yeah, and every so often at home we see campaigns of orthodoxy that go nowhere but serve simply to remind the masses who's in control.
The other wing is poorly covered in this article, and we have seen in recent Western press coverage two opinions of how strong it is, relative to the principalists. Many analyses suggest Ahmadinejad's crew is losing the Supreme Leader's support, suggesting that the Larijani/Ghalibef wing will attain power in 2009. This article suggests that the Ahmadinejad crowd is playing for the long haul, and doing fairly well.
A few things seem relatively clear to me:
Again, the clerics of the old guard are on their way out. Rafsanjani holds some king-making power in his position as head of the Assembly of Experts, but it's not clear how he actualizes that power, absent the Supreme Leader dropping dead. Of course, Rafsanjani, in his Andropov-like role, might re-emerge in supporting a Gorby-like technocratic revitalizer like Ghalibef to the presidency. What might happen then? Remember, Gorby did not begin, nor ever imagine himself to be, a reformer--but a revitalizer. I think the same will be true of the Larijani/Ghalibef wing. They will claim themselves to be revitalizers and updaters of the revolution, just like Ahmadinejad's crew does, but with very different tactics in mind. The technocrats tend to want to avoid unnecessary conflict, both at home and abroad (too inefficient), whereas the populists thrive on it, largely to cover up their personal greed (the Guards) and to cover up their economic incompetence (Ahmadinejad).
This duality can play out for quite some time: whenever the principalists are more powerful, they have to cover up their inefficiency with crackdowns, so they advance the revolution little. In contrast, the technocrats, whenever they have the upper hand, inevitably suffer all sorts of backstabbing activities from the ideologues, who can independently act to sour relations with the outside world. So until this or the next Supreme Leader decides to favor one group over the other for a sufficiently long time for them to gain supremacy (not good for the Supreme Leader, one thinks), a rough balancing means we watch Iran muddle through for quite some time in its Brezhnevian economic stupor.
Whether or not the Ghalibef wing takes the presidency in 2009, the Supreme Leader seems to be encouraging a sort of permanent competition between these two wings, in rough approximation of a ruling-versus-opposition-party dynamic with, of course, the Supreme Leader himself deciding when the two wings switch ruling status.
But again, it seems clear the Supreme Leader will likewise not allow the old clerics and their reformism back into the game, as evidence by this latest election, meaning we're firmly into the second-generation phase of the revolution, and we're looking at a long duel between these two successor wings: ideologues versus technocrats.
Fascinating stuff that shows, in my opinion, that Iran's revolution is hardly unique or unknowable or "irrational." Instead we see the same old, same old: corrupt ideologues versus less corrupt technocrats. Both think they can revitalize the failed revolution, and both are wrong. But with oil prices lubricating the regime's failures so nicely, the outcome of this yin-and-yang-like struggle may go on for a while, meaning we better be ready to seize our chances for soft-kill strategies when the technocrats are in power.
That, and we should pray for the Supreme Leader's imminent demise.
In the end, though, none of this changes my thinking on the mistakes of the Bush administration in rerunning the whole WMD drama with Tehran and buying the regime's intransigence on both Afghanistan and Iraq--plus Lebanon/Palestine. That strategy has cost a lot of American lives, I would wager, and to no good end. We get nothing with this strategy except a strengthening of Ahmadinejad's crowd. Iran, as I have noted for years now, gets the bomb anyway, and we get nothing in return for having destroyed their two worst enemies in the region pre-9/11, except more tail-wagging-the-dog dynamics from Saudi Arabia and Israel that push us into even more pointless confrontation with Iran. Why do I say pointless? Our disconnecting strategy cannot trump the combined connecting strategies of Russia, India and China. So the more we push, the more time (and lives) and opportunity we waste.
Instead, we need to take a page out of the Reagan-Gorby dialogue, because it was really both sides that "denied" the other its enemy. By getting all chummy in the final years, Reagan made Gorby confident enough to start pulling the thread of change that finally did in the long-fragile USSR. Can we hope to emulate that Reaganesque mix of strength and engagement (exactly what Fallon argues for)? Hard right now when we're so tied down in both Iraq and Afghanistan, so truth is, we need more FDR-like slipperiness than Reagan's square-jawed optimism. Then again, the time for any such clever diplomacy may already be gone, thanks to the Bush-Cheney legacy of sheer incompetence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that's why I worry the White House still dreams of starting a war with Iran before leaving. How else to break a strategic stalemate that deteriorates over the long haul? Having made Iran the regional kingpin, Bush-Cheney may be too tempted to try and suddenly reverse this outcome in its final months, thus locking the next president into an even more circumscribed pathway in the region, which, of course, would mean everybody there gets to abuse us further and longer, while other rising powers take advantage elsewhere around this world.
Isn't it amazing how the neocon primacy-defenders have, in their operational incompetency and strategic myopia, so radically hastened the loss of the very thing they sought so vociferously to defend? Kori Schake, Bush NSC vet, makes this basic point in the current National Journal.
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Comments (19)
Wow! What a terrific post. Glad you are writing a book. Don't know enough to refute any of your analysis but seems sound from what I know. Are we still talking one or two decades before rapproachment? The US helped to make Modern Iran and keep the Russians out? Is that likely to continue?
Posted by William R. Cumming | February 28, 2008 9:40 AM
There are four groups in the Government(ruling sector) of Iran right
now: 1) the supreme leader and his supporters. 2) the Guards and
thier expanding power. 3) the triangle of Ghalibaf,Larijani,Rezai
4) the reformist like Rafsanjani, Khatami. most of Ahmadinejad's supporters have split between group one and two. the main problem
with alot of these analysis are that we see the changes only in the
ruling govern and we miss the roll and the power of the people. we
always see top to bottom,instead of looking to bottom up.it is radical
but if you want real change and not soft-kill, thats what you have to
look.in fact,the question is what change? and for what?.if you ask the neocons, they say becuase for our imperialistic and conolial expansionist( in another ward national interest).you can't blame the
neocons for thier plans, if you understand thier goals,otherwise you
are dishonest.you can't agree with the big bang,and say lack of imagination on thier part.you are iether with them or not.if not then,
you have to say what kind of change do you want and why.if we don't agree with the Huntington's crash of civilization,then we don't
agree with neocons,or thier big bangs. then we agree and accept this earth with all its humans and thier different civilization as a strength and not weakness for all mankind.
Posted by farhad | February 28, 2008 11:23 AM
Many of the thoughts that Mr. Barnett has regarding the course of revolutions were discussed by Eric Hoffer in a series of books, the most important of which are listed below, during the 1950's and 60's. Eric Hoffer was a self educated San Francisco based longshoreman and his thoughts were very insightful regarding the nature of communism and other totalitarianisms prevalent in the 20th Century. These books are beginning to become available once again. The link for a web site Is: http://www.erichoffer.net/books.html
The True Believer, c 1951
The Passionate State of Mind, c 1955
The Ordeal of Change, c 1963
The Temper of Our Time, c 1967
Posted by Tom Merritt | February 28, 2008 11:55 AM
While China only took one revolutionary generation to move on to the next stage, it bears remembering how long the Soviet Union hung around, as you have four generations of leaders following the revolution. As I understand it, George Kennan was of the view that the containment policy became overly militarized, and he favored what amounted to the use of "soft power" in the mid-50s in the early days of the Khrushchev era. While the Suez Crisis would have provided the ideal opening for detente, I believe that anti-communists in both parties (Acheson and Dulles) opposed Kennan's views, and the invasion of Hungary shut the door. Nevertheless, Kennan felt that the failure to pursue this path substantially prolonged the lifespan of the Soviet Union. Perhaps we are now at a similar cross-roads with respect to Iran.
Posted by stuart abrams | February 28, 2008 2:03 PM
I agree with the comments on the relevance of Eric Hoffer's ideas (and his every-man writing style.) One of his comments, perhaps in another book, noted that each stage of (evolving) revolutionary change leaves debris that must be cared for in a later stage. That's life. I've forgotten whether he used parallel examples from the French terrible experience with the Enlightenment after it was dominated by intellectual extremists.
There are some fortunate aspects from the American and Iranian mistakes in dealing with each other. America's 'dumb cop' role versus the Russian, Chinese and Indian 'smart cops' role can have near term and long term benefits.
Also, the Bush and Ahmadinejad 'mistakes' on focusing rants on atomic bomb technology, destroying/protecting Israel etc. can be much more easily swept aside during future stages of our evolving rational relationships.
It would be more difficult if there was a history of public debate/conflict between America and Iran on the dangers of extreme Shiite beliefs and values in a country able to use dangerous modern technology to destabilize the area in the manner the Republican Guard and Hezbullah have done. Too many Iranians and their clients would have a strong personal emotional investment to admit it was necessary and timely to move to on to a more rational and connective stage.
I think there is at least one person with both DOD and State Dept. experience that could manage the next stage of our relationships with Iran and Pakistan.
I also think its time to be wary of the unintended negative impact of our words as the opportunity approaches to reach the next stage of Iran's cultural evolution. I would be wary of using 'soft kill' as our discussions are repeated abroad.
Anyway, we got to hang in there (and elsewhere)!
Posted by Louis Heberlein | February 28, 2008 2:05 PM
Thomas,
It just doesn't seem right to allow Iran to get nukes and then just hope that things will work out for us with Iran. Things haven't worked out for the past 25 years since the hostage taking in the late 70’s. We’ve also waited a long time for Cuba’s situation to work out and it hasn’t.
I’m not as optimistic as you about Iran. I hope that you are correct and hope my concerns are misplaced. But, hope is not a good strategy for our foreign policy.
Posted by Wiredman | February 28, 2008 3:04 PM
Wiredman: you're not listening. Tom keeps saying it's not just hope. it's history. no one has ever used a nuke, and Iran is no more crazy than Mao or Kruschev or the Israelis or the Pakistanis.
it's obvious you disagree, but don't mischaracterize his argument.
Posted by Sean Meade![[TypeKey Profile Page]](http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/nav-commenters.gif)
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February 28, 2008 4:08 PM
Sean:
The citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would take issue with your statement that "no one has ever used a nuke." But that's the point. No one has ever used a nuke since more than one power had them. Israel has roughly 200 nukes and the means to deliver them, which means that they are capable of killing every living thing in Iran, as well as the rest of the Islamic world. That's why Tom feels relatively confident that Iran is not likely to start a nuclear war.
Posted by stuart abrams | February 28, 2008 5:05 PM
Sorry, Sean, but it is just hope.
I remain puzzled by Tom's remarkable refusal to see any uniqueness to the Islamic angle here. It is maddening precisely because his position does reduce down to a hope that the presumed "same ole, same ole" is in fact an accurate assessment. Mao, to Khruschev, to the Israelis -- to the Pakistanis and the Iranians???
How can that be something other than hope?
Forgive me, Sean/Tom, but there seems to be (amidst all of the gratuitous assumptions of neo-con arrogance) something of an even greater arrogance in refusing to acknowledge the possibility if not probability that the Ahmadinejad crew may win out -- for decades and decades.
Not to mention the very real possibility that the crazies in Pakistan may prevail as well, especially via renegades in the ISI. I generally find great value in Tom's approach and he rarely fails to be interesting but he appears far, far too sanguine on this.
Islam is absolutely, positively unique. I don't demonize that religion, I'm well aware of Indonesian model, etc. But we need to first and foremost acknowledge this uniqueness and the very real challenge it presents. On this issue especially, past performance on the world stage is no guarantee of future results with Islamic nations.
Posted by RattlerGator | February 28, 2008 8:13 PM
Stuart: i stand corrected. that's what i meant, of course.
RG: well, then, you disagree with Tom, not least of all in the fact that Ahmadinejad would not hold the keys.
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February 28, 2008 8:51 PM
“Our disconnecting strategy cannot trump the combined connecting strategies of Russia, India and China. So the more we push, the more time (and lives) and opportunity we waste.”
But couldn’t the best global strategic outcome come in time as a result of seeming “waste” activity from the US and consequent opportunistic non-waste activity from other Core nations? When does it matter and when does it not matter who in the Core gets credit and who doesn’t get credit for an ultimate favorable global outcome?
Posted by Gilbert Garza | February 28, 2008 9:36 PM
Maybe my thinking is overly conspiratorial but I wonder if the technocrats decided to put a crimp into Ahmadin nejad's populists by dropping a dime to the Israelis on Imad Mugniah? That one individual caused enormous mischief during his lifetime and he was extremely competent at what he did.
With Mugniah dead, it will be more difficult and more dangerous for Iran to stir up trouble that cannot be quickly traced directly back to Teheran.
Posted by Mark in Texas | February 28, 2008 9:46 PM
I agree this is a great post on Iran & I look forward to what emerges on this in your new book...but I do not share your concern that the Bush administration may attempt military action against Iran. Thank God we have term limits for presidents (too bad not for congress!) & they only have 10 months; plus they already have (ab)used WMD as justification. Do you really think Bush et. al. would attempt military action during this lame duck period?
Posted by Elmer Humes | February 28, 2008 10:41 PM
At some point, I'd like to hear Tom's view on the situation in Gaza, which concerns me a lot. It strikes me as having the potential of leading to the destabiization of Egypt, which I think is far more dangerous than Pakistan (Islamic radicalism in Pakistan is largely confined to the territories, while it is very mainstream in Egypt). If Israel launches a major offensive against Hamas in Gaza, which appears to be a distinct possibility, what does Iran do? Does it retaliate against Israel via the US by using its allies in Iraq to raise the level of violence against US troops? And with Turkey now in Kurdistan, does that create a picture of total chaos in Iraq? Could that be the scenario that sets in motion a series of steps that lead to US war vs. Iran?
Posted by stuart abrams | February 29, 2008 9:39 AM
I really like this analysis, and it almost seems right to me except I look at the IRGC and I'm stuck thinking they have more of a say than this analysis allows.
Posted by Galrahn | February 29, 2008 10:37 AM
Sean, I tend to agree with Tom if you look at Iran as a rational nationalistic country that has a lot to lose if it uses nukes. But what about the irrational Islamic radicals? They have proven to have their own rational that appears irrational to us.
Do we take that risk?
Three well placed nukes, one in NY, London and Tokyo could bring down the entire western capital markets and throw us into a massive Jericho type situation.
Posted by Wiredman | February 29, 2008 11:27 AM
"Three well placed nukes, one in NY, London and Tokyo could bring down the entire western capital markets and throw us into a massive Jericho type situation."
And are we more likely to face that if we continue to call for invasion, attacks on their military and forced regime change or if we move in for the soft-kill? Kinetics beget kinetics, you reap what you sow. Anyone think that Castro would have lasted this long if we had not totally disengaged from Cuba? I remain with Churchill on this - Jaw-jaw is better than war-war.
Posted by hof | February 29, 2008 3:25 PM
"Three well placed nukes, one in NY, London and Tokyo could bring down the entire western capital markets and throw us into a massive Jericho type situation."
I reject that premise.
No matter how irreplaceable the masters of the universe in the financial market places believe themselves to be, the system is really more resilient than that. Like the internet, the system will route around damage. Within weeks the financial industry will be fully restaffed with a new crew of folks moving money around the world and within a few months nobody will notice any difference except that things will probably be a bit more geographically dispersed.
Instead of a Jericho type situation, it will be more like the inconvenience of the time between Christmas and New Year, maybe with a big snowstorm on the east coast thrown in. The Core survives disturbances pretty often.
Posted by Mark in Texas | March 1, 2008 7:42 PM
Agree with Mark in Texas.
A nuke in the West would be a catastrophe all right, but not the end of life as we know it.
We tend to discount our resiliency almost completely on this score.
Posted by Tom Barnett | March 7, 2008 8:54 PM