Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

The sad part is that this isn't a new problem, but one that has existed for years . . and the image of the "Ugly American" is brought to others in our world first . . By . . the State Department . .

ugh, large. when you put it that way, it's truly depressing :-(

The factions in Iraq and Afghanistan will adjust to rational behavior only when they grasp that the core and new core worlds can no longer accept the burden of letting them continue to first try everything else.

The potential rational leaders of those factions still think their influence is blocked by their most irrational peers. This mindset is the result of cultures existing for decades and centuries, partially as a result of mistakes by the core community of those earlier times.

I still think that change in Iraq and Afghanistan requires Iran and Pakistan to learn from those disaster sister 'states' and become rational within themselves, and thus provide positive influences to their less mature siblings.

It is a waste of time to expect an effective top down visible administrative approach from America's bureaucracies or those in the core to orchestrate cultural changes in gap cultures. That will require bottom up contacts that will at least be unhindered by our political and administrative bureaucracies.

But why should we blithely accept the judgement of a person who apparently has no experience in this field and in the past has been accused of poor judgement in other areas. See http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A17164-2004Feb5¬Found=true Are we falling prey to the "confirmation bias"?

Douglas MacArthur did not depend on the State Department in Japan. He was the closest thing to a "Viceroy" that we have seen in modern times. Almost absolute power. A one man show. We apparently thought we had a Viceroy to lead Iraq into the Disney like world of democracy, but something went wrong. Books have been written detailing the failures and mistakes made in the first four years of "Iraqi Freedom". Now here we are. I don't care for the recent simplistic analogy of Mr. Obama who said someone "Drove the bus into the ditch". You can get a bus out of a ditch. It's done all winter long in the Midwest.

What I see as the eventual end is the plan sarcastically referred to as "The Invasion in Reverse". Everyone that came in last....gets out first. As soon as the Iraqi people see that happening the chaos will begin. All the contractors have to go, then we have to re-form the Divisions and Brigades we have chopped up and scattered all over the country. We pull out the same way we went in....shooting.

A very ugly business. Could it be different? Yes, it could, but I don't see any MacArthur's in the mix. The folks who know what to do don't have the power and the folks who have the power, don't know what to do.

Now I need a drink.

Douglas MacArthur had several advantages.

First, His father Arthur had extensive experience establishing connectivity with Indian tribes that had revolted during our Civil War. Arthur used Buffalo soldiers as his agents so there was a significant cross cultural thing. Douglas learned from that.

Second Douglas later inherited a long running effort to 'civilize' the insurgents in the Philippines before WW II. Their loyalty to him during the war showed his success.

Third, Douglas had studied the Japanese culture extensively before and during WW II before adopting his military strategy and techniques.

Finally Marshall and Truman used atomic bombs to move Japanese extremists toward a more rational mindset, and an excuse to give up their 'rule or die' ethics.

I don't think anyone today would have that type mix of advantages.

Guess I'll have a drink a little later, too.

The relationships and abilities of the State Dept vis a vis DOD are always important, entertaining and even fun. But let's get real. There is no liklihood of a competent State department in any program, function, or activitiy as long as the ratio of its budget to DOD is such a fantastically low percentage. Basically State is funded to be non-operative as a diplomatic service or anything else. Just cut the Raptor program and fund STATE with the money. In the end it is all about funding.

Maybe I'm too close, but I see change in the military, the slow drag of change but it is change to be sure, and the signs going forward are positive.

Are there no positive signs for State? None?

I think it is a little too simplistic to equate Bush and Cheney with a State Department that has been in full rebellion against them since the day they were elected.

It's not a MacArthur that's needed by us for Iraq, but a young Jack Welch type (or a Steve DeAngelis), who can marshal ideas, resources and multiple negotiations on the fly in a Department of Everything Else, that has a name that a politician could vote for, such as, The Department of Reconciliation and Reconstruction. Tom should run a contest for a name with a signed book as a prize, like the boys at freakonomics.com did at least before they rolled over to the New York Times.

Yes, Mr.Cumming, that is a good illustration of the Washington DC mind set in action. DOD, which has been doing a job that the State Department refuses to do because the job needs to be done and nobody else will do it, should have it's budget cut because no good act should go unpunished. The money should be transferred to State because failure should be rewarded.

Some people wonder why the most consistently successful political campaign strategy is to run against Washington DC.

I agree so much with your Department of Everything Else concept but it needs more sorting out in the context of Defense & State. The first cabinet in in 1789 had only four departments, of which two were State & War (Defense). Clearly the 21st century need for a DoEE has evolved from these two original departments and the growing overlapping spheres of the two. Therefore the purpose of DoEE must be defined within the context of these two related departments, otherwise it seems it would become another Homeland Security type fiasco of confusing, not-understood bureaucracy.

Re: MacArthur's success. Remember, Japan was a homogenous society when it lost the War. It had resolved it's internal contradictions by the mid-1800's. There was no danger of Civil War after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Today, in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc., we are engaging societies which have not yet fought their own civil wars. I fear that technology, connectivity and globalization can not deny the inevitable any more than it could prevent our own American Civil War. Maybe the best we can do is avoid a Rwanda type or Cambodia type blood bath by promoting partition wherever permanent separation is possible (as in Ireland & Northern Ireland).

Japan was a homogenous society before WW II because its culture was isolated deliberately for a over a century by their leaders' response to excesses in Asia of the large European militarized merchant institutions. The Japanese leaders built upon centuries of cultural experience to convince the people that they were special and had to remain separate to avoid contamination.

Then after the White Fleet era the leaders' decided to orchestrate the necessary connectivity to maintain their special culture. They grasped the technology, education, administration, and military aspects without really experiencing the cultural and social roots behind them. Then successive regional wars provided common enemies in which each citizen had a role to oppose, and a place in success.

Despite MacArthur's deliberate attempt to preserve their sense of unity and special purpose, the emerging postwar Japanese democracy and open market economy experienced conflict and chaos, often with violence, as they attempted to modernize. The academic, political and business elite then fashioned the managed economy wherein each individual had defined purpose and place and a highly structured academic and work culture. Even though a strong modern economy was a major goal, it was discussed and developed in military terms.

Often, through the 1980s, when Japanese families lived abroad for business, the children were deliberately isolated to retain their sense of Japanese culture, and the adults were re-cultured upon return to the home office.

That was not true for all Japanese. Rural farm communities did not have to adopt the rigors of the orchestrated modernization, and they may have had less stress.

The 'modernization' of Japan was a closer deal than most Americans realized and our rational role in the process, driven by Cold War concerns, was very important.

There is a common aspect to the difficulties that Japanese and the other nations undergoing connectivity modernization today. If the people did not have the long term historical experiences that established a culture, then it is likely that they will only appear to understand the techniques and that serious mistakes and conflicts will follow. We even saw this when Russia abandoned communism and adopted the West's methods.

I think the trick is to find some leaders in the country who appreciate this issue and work with them through a mutual learning experience. It worked for Japan, Russia, China and seems to be working in Vietnam and a few other places.

Given that State was marginalized under Powell and mishandled under Rice, hard to know what it would be capable of in competent hands. This may be a rotten fish, but it has also rotted from the head down. The lack of a diplomatic surge is not the fault of bureaucrats, but our elected leaders and their top appointees.

Nostalgia for a man on a white horse won't lead anywhere. You go to war with the leaders you have, not the ones you want.

Louis, i'm going to let this one go, but please keep comments shorter, ok?