Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

While I am sympathetic with the Air Force's plight, I tend to agree with Kosiak. John Boyd and the reformers were right: the lure of every increasing aircraft performance has finally caught up with the Air Force. The AF essentially is going to have to "gut" just about every other mission it has (including space and paring manpower) to buy F-22s, F-35s and new tankers. Yet the current and future missions would seem to dictate more airlift capability and more special ops platforms (and replacement of the tanker force) versus increased air superiority.
For the life of me, I cannot understand why the F-15, F-16 aren't fully capable of handling any foreseeable air threats, and A-10 along with F-15Es and some F-16s is still highly effective in the close air support role.
If I were king, I would have kept the F-15, F-16 and A-10 production lines running, dumped about $1B a year into fighter R&D as a hedge against "somebody in the world" trumping my air superiority, and then dump the savings (Current F-22 flyaway costs are somewhere around $135M per copy. An F-15E, the most expensive version, was about $45-50M per copy) into more airlift, fixing the tanker problem, and buying more special ops stuff.

Finally, I hate to tell my AF friends this, but if UAV technology continues on its current pace, there will soon come a time when it will be patently foolish to risk a manned aircraft in any high threat environment. but old habits die hard, and the Air Force leadership is not inclined to listen to this message until it is too late. As B.H. Liddell Hart so eloquently stated, "the prophets must be stoned; that is their lot and the test of their self-fulfillment." I think Tom has probably experienced a little bit of this adage since crafting PNM and launching on his reform crusade.

For the life of me, I cannot understand...

because there's no really good reason, Blair ;-)

Well, the Air Force may be relatively slow at accepting a new charter, but they adapted B-1 along with its sibling fighters to daily precision bomb Afghanistan Taliban/AQ fighters off mountains, in valleys, and in-between other houses all over Afghanistan's worst terrain ... while minimizing civilian casualties. The strikes are directed by networked local controllers, just as are those of the Marines and Navy.

On the other hand, main battle tanks and heavy stuff of armored and mechanized infantry divisions have not had a role of note. But then they can practice and spend money in the home states of key senators.

The situation is a little different in Iraq because of terrain, Hussein heritage, and other factors. But there are similar insights.

Yes, it is expensive to do this type air war with expensive manned equipment, but that situation is evolving. Pretty soon the Army will also have cost effective long range precision strike weapons to add and they will play more. Still the smart boots on the ground will be the Army main value.

The real critical aviation high tech legacies that need to be maintained are the analytical, operational, logistics and development skills necessary to field an effective, appropriate force in a timely manner. That funding effort should not be driven by accounting ($/equipment unit) bean counting, or fictional war scenarios just to get money to maintain those capabilities.

Losing a Billion dollar B-2 last week got headlines. How many news articles noted that expensive design and manufacturing techniques developed in secret for the B-2 migrated in unclassified form to Boeing for use on the 777 and 787. That kept them completive with the government funded Airbus company. (California retirement fund stockholders had objected to investing in new design/manufacturing technologies for airliners and wanted Boeing to keep cranking out the old designs.)

The secret and open technologies developed and employed for today's type military operations will not be as visible as those of the B-2/777, but they may have broader impacts on our economy and society.

No surprise here. The USAF is/will be broke (fiscally and functionally). While the F22 kicks ass, it costs waaaaay too much. I'd rather have 3 F18E/F's than one F22. Not to mention, a couple more F15E's.

The General's at the top don't have the integrity to admit that they bought off more than they can chew. Of course, Congress takes a lot of the blame (parts for F22 built in something like 40+ states).
UAV's are the way to go, all around.

Then there is space. Surprisingly, satellite costs have not gone up as fast as fighters. Now an F22 is nearing the cost of a WGS satellite, of which we're buying 5. Still, the Space and Missile System Center out in Los Angeles and to a lesser extent in Albuquerque, is totally dysfunctional. They never admit failures, never say no to new programs, have an insane span of control and won't admit they're become the stooges of the Aerospace Corporation.

As for cutting manpower, it's already been cut to the bone.

the Air Force needs to cancel programs and concentrate remaining funds and personnel on systems and functions that are sustainable.