ARTICLE: The Global Counter Insurgency, by Jonathan Morgenstein & Eric Vickland, SMALL WARS JOURNAL, February 17, 2008
Expect to read a lot of this sort of article that suggests global counter-insurgency is the equivalent of a grand strategy. In our premature excitement over aspects of the surge's success in Iraq, we now see analysts extrapolating wildly, with the same consequences: we view the world through violence, we see states as bulwarks against such violence, the USG is the biggest, inside the USG the Pentagon is the most competent, therefore the U.S. military can spearhead a global counter-insurgency strategy that manages the world.
The long war addresses friction, which is minor compared to the force of globalization's continued expansion. A grand strategy harnessing the latter to address the former, and does not pretend that addressing the friction constitutes addressing the universe of change going on. We don't have the capacity any more to determine an era, just to tilt its trajectory somewhat.
We don't want to go overboard on COIN thinking. It has its place, but it's not the sum total of anything. It is operational and tactical, but extrapolated to the global strategic realm, it simply loses coherence.
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Comments (1)
Actually, in our article, we specifically indicate it is NOT the military that should be the lead component in defeating this Global Insurgency. We emphasize time and again USAID, State, a renewed USIA, the CIA, Law Enforcement mechanisms and the Dept of Justice to strengthened rule of law mechanisms around the world. I'm sorry you read into this that "inside the USG the Pentagon is the most competent, therefore the U.S. military can spearhead a global counter-insurgency strategy". Moreover, we wrote the pre-cursor to this article in January 2006 which was published in the Boston Globe around then, so this really reflects nothing of your dismissive "premature excitement over aspects of the surge's success in Iraq".
Posted by Jonathan Morgenstein | March 6, 2008 1:57 PM