POST: Misreading the History of the Iraq War, by Pete Mansoor, SWJ Blog, March 10, 2008
I go all ways on this one. I think/know that the buy-off did precede the surge and COIN, but that the surge and COIN did make a difference. I think we have a happy confluence here, just like when we screw up, it's usually a confluence of bad luck and bad calls. So I don't find adding an additional factor to diminish the COIN/surge story. It's just a complex one. Sometimes success has many fathers because many fathers were involved.
Hmm. Not sure I like that construction . . . .
Anyway, I don't think we have to choose.
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Comments (1)
There usually is not enough time, information and resources to use detailed plans and directions during conflicts or catastrophes. At that point success depends on experience gained from earlier planning processes, insight on relevant principles gained from personal experiences and study of relevant history, and realistic insight on the potential and limits of available resources.
With sufficient numbers of experienced and motivated players to cover enough angles and locations, even with significant casualties, we usually get some satisfactory success.
If we fail, the brass and bureaucrats will say it was because we did not have a detail plan and procedures. If we succeed, they will say we were lucky, but we should develop a detail plan and procedures for a repeat.
Same-old, Same-old.
Posted by Louis Heberlein | March 21, 2008 5:38 PM