Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

Globalization is such a misunderstood topic. Perhaps it's impossible to understand it in a way which allows successful prognostication. But it's a good point here that Military leaders are making decisions based on assumptions about topics they are not experts in. They accept the paradigms of globalization and use them to affect military strategy and planning for years to come. I'm still waiting for a leader to emerge who understands the greatness of America and the opportunity to perpetuate our influence by using globalization as an impetus for action.

From Parag Khanna's perspective, the goal is to achieve the allegiance of the Second World.

What military force structure/capabilities/strategy will best aid in accomplishing this task?

Sean,

The reference to "Gentiles of the Army" is a little obscure for me. A search of the weblog for "Gentile," gives today's two posts, a post that mentions a former Jewish girlfriend and a post about an article by Gary Gentile about China trying to buy Conoco. I was wondering is this referring to paranoia about China or about insiders and outsiders or does it matter. The line from "A Man for all Seasons," comes to mind, perhaps he thought, "I trust I make myself obscure."

Waveman,

Don't get caught up in Khanna's imperial notions of struggles for allegiance. We're not working Gap and Seam States to diminish Chinese influence. The rise of globalization's network trade makes all that OBE.

The Gentile reference is to LTC Gian Gentile, a former battalion commander who served in Iraq who is now writing articles in opposition to the massive intellectual shift in focus from Major Combat Operations to Counterinsurgency.

The good news is this: It is vitally important to have a man like him in the midst of this intellectual change to provide healthy criticism. The focus on COIN is good right now because of what we're doing in Iraq and Afghanistan and because it is such a big swing from the way we were thinking 5 years ago, but in typical Army fashion, I expect most of the organization to slip into COIN-centric groupthink in another 5 years.

I also agree with part of LTC Gentile's views, that counterinsurgency doctrine is quickly replacing and overshadowing the Army's broader operational doctrine. I also agree that the US still needs to carry a heavy, heavy Leviathan punch which--sorry, Dr. Barnett--could never be accomplished by air power and the Marine Corps alone. The Army's heavy armored formations and major combat operations capability is therefore still very much essential.

However, I also think that LTC Gentile fails to see the political, economic, and social aspects of warfare, that exist simultaneously with the military aspects, as important. Officer that think like him yearn for the days of WWII when warfare was simpler. What they miss is that all those elements were still there, just not as pronounced and definitely not as difficult to comprehend since we were dealing with fellow Europeans.

Having a balanced economic and political basis for defining the military role in globalization will not assure success.

The British government's policy orientation partnership with the British East India Company seemed very effective and smart in connection with the globalization situations of their time. In the end, they created unintended long term problems in Asia that caused conflicts that harmed both Asia and England. It also wasted global efforts and created a false strategic conflict with Russia, and even hastened the American Revolution.

The early American involvement in globalization for economic, social and 'virtuous' political reasons also had unintended consequences. We sent a white fleet to force Japan to open up to globalization and confirmed in the minds of its leaders earlier insights gained from the Dutch East India Company that America was Japan's long term problem. Even TR's efforts to act as a mediator in power conflicts in Asia and Africa caused concern about our interests. At home, many people saw our efforts in Latin America as driven by the private interests of our new heavy industry and United Fruit Company type businesses rather than any virtues, or shared benefits for Americans.

One old British insight we too often forget is that "nations don't have any permanent allies (or enemies) ... just interests." Of course those interests should be defined and updated in the context of historical insights and a broad insight of evolving society, technology etc.

Each time there are new big nation kids on the block, the 'mature' kids seem to fall back on dumber earlier perspectives triggered by the new kids thrashing around.

Sometimes we need to let the new kids talk strange. For decades after WW II Japanese business students and executives were taught to think of their business and economic strategies and tactics in military terms, and to have military like motivation sessions. I've still got old U.S. newspapers with articles about Japan's new economic war on America, which were really being used to motivate necessary economic and technical modernizations in America.

So, beware a U.S. military establishment or society's apparent conversion to an insight on globalization based on economic, social and political factors. They may be just 'talking the new talk.'

Gerry,

"Gentiles of the Army" refers to LTC Gian P. Gentile, the subject of the WSJ article Tom posted. LTC Gentile was a squadron commander in Iraq and is currently a prof. of history at West Point.

Tom: Please reconcile your last: "We're not working the Gap and Seam States to diminish China's influence" with your first: "We do that and China's won the Gap without firing a shot ...." Thanks.

Waveman, his two statements aren't so far apart. If we play the imperial game a'la Khanna, we lose; we would be huge amounts of our military and diplomatic resources trying to counter China, which would be free to gain influence on its own terms by simple virtue of its high population and low ethical standards.

But if we play our own game, we win by influencing China- and Europe- even as they influence the Gap.

I think the key is to develop connectivity and infrastructure in the Gap. Spreading stability by utilizing the SysAdmin Force allows us to have an advantage in being involved in infrastructure development, and once we establish a reputation for doing it well, investment will flow rapidly into countries that are undergoing the A-to-Z rule set for politically bankrupt states. The first to invest will be able to make the most $, so it behooves us to be as involved as possible in Gap development and stability.

CDT Echo Boomer's comment may be helpful.

The key is to make as much money as possible off of the Gap. So we do not want China to "win the Gap" (even if integration of the Gap into the global economy is, thereby, best accomplished) because then we would lose out on making mucho $ in this lucrative enterprise. (The EU probably has this same concern -- getting its fair share).

Thus, "we are not working the Gap to diminish China's influence." We are working the Gap to get our fair share of the development $?

waveman: "we are not working the Gap to diminish China's influence" = we are working the Gap to get our fair share of the development $.

Tom has said somewhere (words to the effect) that our competition with China is not some with some future military near-peer, but who can develop and access the most markets. we can't beat Chinese labor or 2-sigma solutions in Africa. better to team with them