Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

Looks like Tom turns the idea of Combined Arms on its head.

In jest, I suggest we give the Air Force the tanks and the artillery. Those ground pounders don't need such big guns.

It would have been intersting to see what the success of OIF I would have been like had we used only airpower without 19 year-old violent youths with rifles to actually maneuver against the enemy. Somehow I think the decisive OIF I campaign of three weeks would have lasted much, much longer (remember Kosovo? Remember the Lebanon War of '06, when the Israeli air force attempted to maneuver against a highly conventional, ATGM-equipped Hizbollah militia, and lost?)

You ought to not lump Mattis in with those who drink your Koolaid on the SysAdmin function. Mattis does indeed "get it." But recall that back when he was CO of 7th Marines, and there was great hoopla about the RMA, and "influencing the mind of the enemy," he said, "Sometimes the best way to influence the mind of the enemy is to put a bullet in it." Perhaps the greatest Maneuverist of our times understood that, at times, sometimes to win you have to resort to attritive methods. By the same tolken, somehow I doubt Mattis today would buy into your construct that leaves the warfighting to the Air Force/Navy and the "peacefighting" to the Marines/Army. Mattis is a maneuverist and a combined-arms advocate. He is the last person in the military to give the blue suits the warwinning functions.

Oddly, it seems the Generals never learn . .

Recently I've been following the history of the "Attack" Bomber/Fighter . . and while being extremely usefull whether involved in a "Big War" or COIN, it's real history is sparse, to the extent of being ignored . .

By 1943 the Army contracted to build the A-26 invader, then decided it was to be used mainly for bombing, so changed it's configuration to "B"-26 at the end of the War . . Came Korea, it was a "B"-26 used as "Close support" and "night support", something the Jets couldn't do . .

Came 'Nam . . We had to rebuild 40 B-26's, re-configure it back to the "A"-26 (treaty's 'n politics) and it was a great COIN and close support aircraft . . until we wore all 40 of 'em out . . Then we used the Bearcat, but it was never quite as universal . .

Until the A-10, which is the product of some genius when it comes to close support and COIN . . and we're using them up, wearing them out . . with none to replace them . . All the while listening to the Generals who tout the helicopter and the pilotless aircraft . . and eschew aircraft like the A-10.

Point being, COIN isn't romantic, it isn't front page war, it isn't big ticket for a lot of the defense contractors, but today's military had better have a big chunk of their budget dedicated to COIN and the guys who teach the gap countries how to keep the lights on . . All the dumb stuff that deals with Ahmed on a bicycle with a kilo of Semtec and an RPG . . and his native community that either supports him, or wants to be rid of him . .

Building a Military to fight China or Russia is almost base stupidity . . China doesn't want to conquer us . . if they did, they'd just call in the note . . .

The swap isn't between Army and Navy so much as it is a change for the Army, as they go back to their pre-WWI roots. The Navy under this division of labor scenario would maintain status quo, or even expand it's Sysadmin functions. Keeping big, blue-water forces for "winning wars" is exactly what Big Navy wants, and formal doctrine casting the Navy as a war-winner is playing into their hands. The AF will also rejoice over being cast as war-winners, because that gives them all the more reason for more F-22s and a new bomber. It doesn't seem to me that a specified division between Army/Marines on one hand and Navy/AF on the other helps further the requirement that the Navy and AF diversify their hardware. Where's the incentive for the Navy to buy smaller-than-LCS ships in lieu of new destroyers, or for the AF to buy more UAVs in lieu of new fighters?

If I was the opposing force, I would be thinking: Nice. They are dividing their forces and, accordingly, (1) will be much less effective at either/any task and (2) will be much more easy to conquer.

So much if this debate will be hedged by what if’s and crystal ball type theory, that’s what unmakes the whole thing the most slippery military debate in decades.

To simply define the coming needs of not just America but every modern military organisation with one rule set or another - big wars or small wars - is ludicrous. We know that the majority of future military engagements will most likely be versions of the battle in Iraq (hopefully managed a little better). Large engagements with massive amounts of firepower backed up by sys admin style ‘peace managers’.

It will take a careful and long term plan to ensure the needs of both operational sets are met. As talented as the SOCOM trigger pullers are, we need regular troops to handle large mobile style operations and to hold the line afterwards. AF and Navy can finish a fight pretty quick but boots on the ground is the necessity for afterwards.

And until American has figured out how to make friends and influence allies into coming on board in a way that sees Russia, China, India etc placing their boots and the same ground, then the Sates will need to keep battalion plus sized units available for rapid deployment and long term tours.

At risk of beating a dead horse, this whole debate overlooks one thing; just because one size can't fit all doesn't mean that one size can't fit many. The A-10 that's coming in handy for ground support was also supposed to be a primo tank killer in its day. The amphibious warfare ships that enable quick aid delivery to remote islands were originally designed for Normandy-style amphibious assaults. And, again, many of the same transport craft are used either way.

Leviathan/Sysadmin aren't wholly separate realms of activity, but interrelated. Why can't they realize that and cut the squabbling, at least until the joint needs are taken care of? Oh, wait: this is a government bureaucracy we're talking about here . . .:P

I've had my one-on-one time with General Mattis (twice), so I don't need any conjecture there.