Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

For the second week in a row, your column has drawn from themes in American History to mirror current political and military conditions.
Your understanding of American history is refreshing and long overdue.

Some may nitpick the details but the overriding analogy is clear.

I trust these are snippets of what awaits us in your forthcoming book. ;)

The 'top dawgs' need to be oriented to thinking in terms of relevant strategy rather than contrived technical strategic war plans.

The Cold War strategy was always based on a variable mix of military, political, economic, social and psychological strategies and tactics that was adjusted based on monitoring the real situations. The key strategic political target was always in Europe, and other theaters had to be down played to protect those strategic interests. So real problems in secondary theaters were dealt with by improvised solutions.

Marshall, Truman, Ike, Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford understood. Both MacArthur and LBJ let personal career interests cause them to waste resources, blood, and attention on secondary temporary strategic interests. Not sure about JFK. He definitely wanted more emphasis on global conventional and special forces, but I still think it was to reduce the risk of nuclear war, to give us more options to distract Russia from strategic European targets, and more ways of dampening global hot spots used by Russia to distract us.

The DOD and Congress 'top dawgs' consistently translated our Cold War strategy into complex technical European war plans, developed expensive/specialized technical resources to fight that narrowly defined war plan, and then poured almost all its people resources into perfecting our skill at implementing that benchmark war plan. There was a lesser effort to plan and practice for a renewed Korean War even while our troops were constantly having to patch together ad hoc force packages of 'left over' resources to deal with real brushfires elsewhere.

Even things like mobility airlift, needed for the global brushfires, were justified and defined based on special needs for narrow, technically intense, theoretical European battlefields.

The only thing different today is that the 'top dawgs' are using China as their bench mark for their fictional strategic war plans. And we don't even have the need for a focused Cold War strategy today, let alone a tightly defined strategic war plan scenario.

Tom - I think we see a similar debate in most connected countries with significant military investment. Here in Australia we run the same argument, although I think it’s a little easier for us. The majority of engagements over next ten years will most likely be regional stability missions, plus any joint operations with allied partners. While we transform our army to meet these challenges, increasing troop numbers to highest levels since Vietnam, we also allocate time and resources to maintaining our inter-operability with the States. Abrams and F-35s are big ticket items, lots for buck for lots of bang, but I can’t see them providing much stability to a failing state in the pacific. But I think that your're right, the debate is the most important thing, to remind ourselves about the difference between need and desire.

I have been commenting at my discussion group about the failure of State in Iraq. Obviously, it needs an overhaul. Two things that stick out to me that need reform is the Unionization of State and it's methods of recruitment.

I would suggest that they abolish the FSO Union, and start recruiting new employees from the Military Academy Grads. That would provide some flexibility with the staffing, and bring in some trainees with a different POV.

Yes, I know. A "perfect world" recommendation. :>)

this is the age old business question, you need to spend more money in order to get more money. if you spend less you get less and less. more money equals higher salaries, etc. Its a vicious cycle that keeps increasing program costs

Hey historyguy:
I second your remarks. How can we privatize historians? Imagine a world in which history PhD's make as much as MBA's. I think we need that. For example, I've been trying to find some good books on pre-colonial African history, and I am not finding much. This tells me that almost nobody knows anything about African history. Yet, we are embarking on an era in which Africa is about to become central to global strategy. Trying to do that without an understanding of the relevant history strikes me as a prescription for major disasters.

Agree with others above, I absolutely loved this article.

stuart, excellent point. I was just thinking yesterday how what the Navy did off Liberia in late March is the most important naval event in 2008, if not this century, yet no media coverage and most people have no idea that it even happened or what is means.

Instead the Navy will be remembered in 2008 for a one-off anti-satellite episode that meant nothing in the large scheme.

The ironic thing is, a lot of Leviathan's needs are exactly the same as Sysadmin's needs. Marines make a point of being useable in both situations. Transport of large numbers of troops and material is needed in both situations, as is artillery and aircraft to provide covering fire for ground troops. It's too much to hope that the budget partisans would realize that and concentrate on meeting those common needs:P

It's amazing because I made this exact same argument in my Military Science class today regarding the division of labor falling between the Navy Carrier Groups and Air Force taking on conventional opponents, and the Army and Marines working in security and stabilization. And then I look on here and low and behold, somebody who earns a hell of a lot more than me has said the same thing, so it must be right.

It also has the benefit of not only making sense, but appealing to the sense of prestige each service holds. The Army and Marines get to keep their, "down in the mud, looking your enemy in the eye, warrior ethos." While the Navy and Air Force get to win the war with their whiz-bang gadgets. Obviously this isn't going to be a straight down the middle split. And the concept of Joint Operations will be key in allowing a smooth transition between the War and the Peace.

I envision the Heavy BCT's with Naval and Air Force support, taking on conventional forces, while SOF and the Airborne seize key objectives. Behind the Heavy BCT's come Stryker BCT's and Light BCT's with Civil Affairs to hold the cities and maintain order until conventional resistance has collapsed.

Once the enemy is no longer able to conduct operations at the battalion level, (Mission Accomplished?) and at which point the Heavy Brigades, Air Force, and Navy Carrier Groups have been conducting operations at an absurdly strenuous pace for several weeks, these units begin rotating out of the theater. The Navy begins preserving waterway access and maritime security, with Surface Warships instead of Carriers. The Air Force shifts to airlifting personnel and aid, with Globemasters instead of Raptors. The Army and Marines walk the streets providing stability, on foot instead of in Bradley's and Amtrac's.

Simultaneously, perhaps we could see the Leviathan partners such as the Commonwealth states rotate out their combat forces with multinational partners with their security forces.

This division of labor is happening now, at an extraordinary pace. The lines between the Leviathan and SysAdmin will get drawn through the various services, Heavy BCT's aren't about to move over to the Air Force, but they will coordinate their training and operations more with Air Force and Navy than they will with the National Guard or Airborne. Just as the Marines and Army have written the book on Counter Insurgency Operations, I suspect doctrine for Conventional wars will spew forth from a combination of the Army Maneuver Center for Excellence, Navy, and Air Force.

I envision the US military as having three divisions and roles, the members of which identify more with personnel sharing their role, than with the other personnel of their branch. The Air Force, Navy Carrier Groups, and Heavy BCT's are like the SWAT team, taking down the most dangerous actors in the global system. The Marine and Army Infantry are the beat cops, keeping the rule sets working. And the SOF are like the detectives, they track down repeat offenders and are always working, sometimes undercover.

And don't blame me for the name "Maneuver Center for Excellence," I'm from the other side of the Army.

Prior to going too far in this direction, we should all consider John Mearsheimer's Chapter Four: The Primacy of Land Power, in his important book: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.