ARTICLE: The Folly of 'Asymmetric War', By Michael J. Mazarr, Washington Quarterly, Summer 2008
This is a good counter to my arguments, but the logic is hopelessly trapped within the conflict paradigm and treats globalization and its effects as ancillary, viewing change through the lens of nation-state power--hence the need for large hedging against great power war.
But it does capture the essential divide between the great war types and the small war types and suggests the stakes involved for force structure.
Still, the hedging function is not hard, given our wealth. It only seems hard because, under Bush, we've put ourselves in the position of both assuming the vast share of the Leviathan load AND the vast share of the SysAdmin role. That's where Mazarr's thinking breaks down, in my mind: he cannot see the making rising great powers part of the SysAdmin solution, primarily because he views their economic rise in zero-sum terms.
That's where the lack of economics kills such arguments. It is war within the context of war and nothing else.
The fact that Mazarr has to defend his propositions against the charge of "isolationism" is all you need to know. It is an abandonment of America's historic role in starting, defending, and spreading the international liberal trade order--arguably the single greatest force for good in human history. Remove our military from this process and let the "fires" burn, as Mazarr suggests, and you're egging the world on toward a 1930s-style conflagration.
Bad economics (none really), bad strategy.
Honestly, to read something like this that aspires to grand strategy and see it so stunningly void of economics is very discouraging. We simply don't have the profs for the job in the national security community.
(Thanks: Galrahn)
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Comments (3)
Respectfully, for consideration:
a. Are we in error in thinking that economics has been absent or insignificant -- as a critical consideration in past and present grand strategy thinking -- and absent or insignificant as an important element in planning/decisions re: many/most wars?
b. If, in fact, economics has always been a critical consideration and always been an important element re: grand strategy and war, then should we acknowledge that it (economic considerations) (1) has not proven sufficient to preclude war and (2) has, in truth, often been the basis of strategy/war?
I guess the heart of my thought/question is: Because economics has always been such an important, critical and prevalent element of human life/civilization, have not strategies and wars always been determined and decided "in the context of everything else?"
Posted by Bill C. | July 3, 2008 9:02 PM
It’s a great read, but I agree that his thinking breaks down on the points that Tom has referenced.
A lot depends on a level of acceptance by the broader community that the US will take the lead in Levithan operations. As I see it, it does raise the issue of other nation states feeling slighted that they are left with the sysadmin side of things.
Countering that idea will make for good progress on the whole blue print.
As Mazarr points out countering insurgencies of every stripe involves far more non military action than military kinetic operations. A valid point but one that seems to ignore the work that has gone into outlining to usefulness of an internationally based sysadmim force backed up by a benevolent Leviathan.
Posted by David Sutton | July 3, 2008 10:09 PM
I've read it a couple times, and I believe it is a significant contribution to the discussion. I also think Tom has this exactly right.
I agree with Tom completely on this, and would highlight one further point to address Mazarr points on broad agency cooperation.
The US can count on all those other agencies for phase 0 work, but it doesn't matter how big their budget is, they will not be there post war.
Posted by Galrahn | July 5, 2008 12:13 AM