Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

"We waited too long" to deploy counterinsurgency strategy? This is a half-truth. You're correct that we waited too long to recognize the insurgency for what it was (at least if we believe books like "Cobra II"). But after we did recognize it, in 2004, say, it took two years to complete the Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Doctrine. This is the first counterinsurgency doctrine in twenty years or so. It is based on two years of meeting and research that included many academics and government figures as well as the military. It calls for major shifts in first principles. So the other half or the truth is that two years for such a massive change of such a massive bureaucracy isn't really all that long. As a disclaimer, none of this takes any blame away from Bush/Rumsfield for the disaster that happened 2003-06. It does give credit to Bush for the change. Also it does give credit to Bush for announcing the change after the 2006 elections, when it wouldn't be seen as an election ploy. I see Bush here in a role conflict as commander in chief and as head of the Republicans. He chose commander in chief so as not to affect troop morale, as it would have been if the strategy shift had been seen as an election ploy. In this case, Bush showed integrity. Even though I'm no Republican (God knows), Bush is truly the anti Nixon when it comes to national security.

I would ask: I have friends in Afghanistan on the PAK border; So, how does the experience in Iraq affect the policies to be applied in Afghanistan. I have read that Iraq success has little relivance as the Afghan society is further back in time than Iraq, double the territory and more population. A pessimistic picture it would seem. And, more importantly I hear directly from the soldiers that they feel morale and capability is down significantly. One point, they are treated as a backwater and the lessons learned in iraq on another tour are ignored as is the expereince of the Sr non coms. Its akin to learning to learn all over again... Example: I have recently received a request to obtain and send "mess kits" the old US ones similar to the boy scouts ones are OK, but the WWII German and more modern E Geman one (3 piece ones) far better... a wonder no one gets them any more... causes one one to thing.

IMO the way things have worked out in Iraq may have been the only way, given what we didn't know about Iraq, that things could have gone.

Bremer and the Provisional Authority were a mistake, but the Iraqis, particularly the Sunnis, needed to learn that al-Qaeda was not their true friend. In addition it took a lot longer than projected to stand up and season the Iraqi Army.

There was a synergistic effect in the Anbar Awakening, the Surge, the standing up of the IA, and Petraeus's change in tactics. They all contributed to the decreasing violence and the increasing chances of economic development.

Maybe some major changes just take tincture of time for all the pieces to fall into place.

Robert, the most comprehensive assessment I've seen recently is this after action report by GEN Barry McCaffrey.

Nathan, Read it, that was at the base of my question.

My take; it almost outright calls for the establishment of the DOEE/police/Admin etc. or we risk total failure. Since I doubt that will happen any time soon and the military approach is the one currently in play, I am interested in what we do in the interm as my buddies dodge mortars on the PAK border every day.

RN: 'half-truth' is too strong, like half was left out on purpose (that's the connotation, anyway, in my experience).

besides, plenty of people knew about the complications of COIN and they were ignored. Shinseki asked for the right number of troops for COIN.

you're relatively new here, and you are welcome. but tone down the default critical approach and comments.

Roque,

Many in the Army and Marines advocated a number of the changes that the COIN eventually codified--long before the document was published. Their arguments were ignored by the Bush Administration for a very long time. Then, after the 06 election, Bush basically outsourced the war to the generals.

So no, very little credit should be given to Bush and Co. They botched the interagency up front, then pretended the insurgency wasn't real, then ignored their officers begging for changes in tactics, and then finally washed their hands of the whole mess, ignoring the need for a diplomatic surge.

This thing works out finally despite the Bush administration. It works out because our system works: the military pushed hard for what was right and so did the opposition party, and the people voted their desires.

Tom:

Thanks for answering. I mean no disrespect by saying that your post is a "half-truth". I intended that expression to be taken literally, as in "it only tells half the truth", not as an implication that your post was somehow dishonest.

The COIN manual was published in December, 2006. An interim manual was published in October 2004. That's where I got my "two years" timeline. However, a draft version of the manual was available by the summer of 2006. This is where I got my "role conflict" interpretation of Bush's behavior. I know it's only speculation, but the Republicans would have benefited in November from such a major shift in strategy; Nixon would never have waited until after the elections, no matter what the stakes in morale or even in lives. Therefore, I insist that Bush deserves credit for waiting the process out--indeed for not even publicizing it before its publication.

I'm aware that "many in the Army and Marines advocated a number of the changes that the COIN eventually codified--long before the document was published." That's the main reason it was written to begin with. Thus, one can easily interpret these early calls for a new COIN doctrine as part of the process that led to the new COIN itself.

I'm going to quote from the introduction to the COIN manual. Be so kind as to bear with me.

"...the sad fact is that when an insurgency began in Iraq in the late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it. [...] Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Jack Keane concurs, ... 'We put an Army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. It doesn't have any doctrine, not was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency...'

"Doctrine is the 'the concise expression of how Army forces contribute to unified action in campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements... Army doctrine provides a common language and a common understanding of how Army forces conduct operations."

Thus, I understand that the new COIN doctrine is a very basic part of our military. This is why I can't fault Bush/Rumsfeld for "ignoring" the criticism of the old doctrine. Changing something this basic cannot be done more than once. There's no room for trial-and-error. It has to be right from the start. So, "a number of changes" does not add up to a new COIN doctrine. Bush/Rumsfeld were not willing to patch up the old doctrine--where they may have been willing to "listen to" the criticisms. They knew the Army needed to revamp its entire COIN doctrine. However, the did "listen to" the criticisms in the long run: these criticisms led to the formulation of a new COIN doctrine.

I said before that I'm not taking any blame away from Bush for the years of anarchy and terror in Iraq. It was his mistake. Even he has not evaded this responsibility. But then, to blame Bush for the failure while failing to credit him for the success strikes me as inconsistent. Either he's commander-in-chief or he isn't. I take your "outsourcing" comment in this vein: there's no "outsourcing" going on with respect to basic strategy. That's the president's job. If he abdicates his responsibility, then that's his choice to make. But I haven't seen any evidence of this. Have you? Whether "the generals" came up with the new COIN doctrine without Bush's approval or even knowledge is not relevant to this point at all. He still gets the blame when things go wrong, outsourcing or no. Therefore I say he should get the credit as well. Plus, I think it's extremely unlikely that the Army could spend the resources involved in producing the new COIN doctrine without the president's knowledge or approval, whether or not he approves the final product. However, these questions are typical of the ones that can be answered only after the fact, when now-classified papers are made available to historians. All we have to go on right now are leaks and spin. I say it's best to ignore all this in the interests of keeping my analytical mind clear. If I can. I mean no disrespect but your ideas like they "pretended the insurgency wasn't real" comes from the world of political spin, not history. How do you know such a thing if their thoughts are not made public and will not be made public until some future date. Right now all we know about their thoughts is what they want us to know. It's not hard for me to imagine that they "pretended" and "ignored" only in public, for some reason of their own, while at the same time pursuing the new COIN doctrine with all due urgency.

I haven't seen them "washing their hands of the whole mess". What are you referring to? As for the "diplomatic surge" you advocate, the above caveats apply: this kind of diplomacy is almost by definition secret. Think back to the late 80s, for example. People calling for negotiations between Israel and the PLO and so forth. People were doing this right up to the point when the Oslo accords were announced. Who knew? Nixon's trip to China is another good example. Why would negotiations with Iran be any different than these examples? Were they "ignoring the need" for diplomacy or were they simply not ready to show their hand? Do you really know the answer to this? I don't, so I simply assume that analogous processes that evolved in history will be important when considering today's situation. Again, doing this allows me to keep my analytical mind clear of the politics. I need all the help I can get on this point, I admit. So, where did I do wrong here?

As for your idea that "This thing works out finally despite the Bush administration," see the article in Foreign Affairs by O'Hanlon, Pollack and Biddle: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/08/standing_down_as_iraq_stands_u.html

This is not to take anything away from the military and the opposition party (although I do wish that the opposition party would step up to the plate and claim the credit). You and I differ because I don't want to take anything away from the president either. He's part of the system too.

Sean, CNN had a recent segment about GEN Shinseki's farewell letter, regarding his estimate for troops in Iraq: "he purposely inflated that estimate to give commanders more flexibility."

Nathan: i'll go you one better: Shinseki was probably also acting out of the Powell Doctrine and inflating the numbers because he a) didn't want to do it or b)wanted to make sure he won overwhelmingly. i think Tom has said words to this effect some where.

anyway, you're right: Shinseki's use of the right number doesn't mean right preparation or COIN readiness.

Sean: You say, "Shinseki's use of the right number doesn't mean right preparation or COIN readiness." So you agree with me that "'a number of changes' do not add up to a new COIN doctrine"? Do you agree, or not, that the time it took to order a new doctrine (2003-2004) plus the two years it took to write and publish the doctrine (2004-2006) are unfairly characterized as "ignoring the insurgency" or "pretending the insurgency wasn't real"? If you disagree, and you insist on the latter characterizations, then how does this square with the fact that during this time Bush was preparing a new COIN doctrine?

RN: i agree that "'a number of changes' do not add up to a new COIN doctrine". i do not agree 'that the time it took to order a new doctrine (2003-2004) plus the two years it took to write and publish the doctrine (2004-2006) are unfairly characterized as "ignoring the insurgency" or "pretending the insurgency wasn't real"?'

there was no need to have a new, official COIN published by UChicago to address some of those things.

major blame is also levied for so little preoccupation planning, totally botched 'lost year', insisting on such a small footprint (on the cheap) that left the occupation shorthanded, and the total interagency failure. feel free to add your own.

CEOs who fail are replaced. coaches who don't win are replaced. commanders are replaced in the USN if a ship runs aground. but flags are not replaced when an occupation is totally botched. nor is the Commander-in-Chief. (in fairness, Rumsfeld was eventually fired.)

Sean: The failures of the war are obvious and undeniable and I'm not trying to do so. In fact, neither has Bush: his speech announcing the surge said so. I've said as much in these pages before.

You say, "there was no need to have a new, official COIN published by UChicago to address some of those things." I never said anything about the UChicago publishing it. By "publish" I meant that it was authorized as official military doctrine. This happened in December 2006. The UChicago published the book in August 2007. Obviously. Don't try to score cheap points off me by using such obvious straw men. So I'm ignoring your cheap shot in the interests of civility, which you lectured me on some time ago.

Therefore I take your point to be that there was no need to wait to complete the manual before taking action where things were obviously falling apart. I really don't have an opinion about that, being pretty much ignorant about military affairs. I'm assuming that if Petraeus and other generals wanted to wait then they had good reasons for it. It was their decision to make and I'd feel petty to criticize them without any particular expertise of my own. Maybe you do have such expertise, though. What reasons can you offer in criticism?

In any case, I think it's true that they were "addressing some of those things" before December 2006, albeit on a piecemeal basis. For one, Petraeus himself was in charge of Mosul and then of training the Iraqi army before he went on to supervise the new manual. I assume he was already addressing some of those things. There are surely other examples. The point is, there was no doctrine and therefore no overarching "common language and common understanding" about how to attack the insurgency. The generals decided to wait and produce a new doctrine to achieve this common understanding instead of simply continuing to act on a piecemeal basis.

Without excusing the inexcusable failures of the years 2003-2006, I say that the two years it took them to produce a doctrine and a strategy to achieve it isn't really all that long considering the seriousness of the situation and the massive changes required. They deserve credit and even admiration for this, in spite of the failures. The fact that they declined to cast blame, bitch about it, and cave in to rising demands to quit and instead "doubled down" (as the saying goes) and made it happen makes me proud to be an American. Sorry if this sounds old fashioned to you.

It is unfortunate that commanders-in-chief can't be replaced when they commit such egregious errors. But the upside of this is that this immunity is guaranteed by the constitution. The only way to replace them is by election. This is one reason I was so disappointed in the opposition party in 2004. Bush had made such a mess of things and left himself open for anyone who could come up with a better plan. Unfortunately Kerry wasn't up to the task. So along with Bush, I blame the opposition as well for not doing their job. Too bad we can't fire them too.

while i may have been exaggerating, cheap shot/strawman was not intended. you're overreacting.

i have great admiration for much of our military leadership, especially those on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. i have no admiration left for the civilian leaders (and some of the military) who conducted the initial stages of the Iraq war. i am especially proud of the American service personnel who have served under very difficult conditions.

good idea to blame the Dems. i have often said that they wouldn't contend until they got more in touch with middle America (geographically and socially) and that we were all the poorer for it.

Sean: People usually don't intend to use straw men to take cheap shots. They just do it without thinking. It's human nature. You admit you were exaggerating, though, which is another way of saying you were making a caricature of my views, or using a straw man and taking a cheap shot. Not that this is in the least offensive to me. It's a lot of fun sometimes. But I'm honestly trying to learn something from people who don't share my views. I need to improve my thinking. If someone points something like this out to me, like you did some time ago, I simply admit it, apologize if necessary, and try to move on.

So... you have great admiration for much of our military leadership--just not the part that "ignored" the insurgency and the part that "pretended it wasn't there". You also exempt Bush from your admiration even though he also waited until after the '06 elections to announce the changes, knowing that he was shooting himself in the foot politically. Our disagreement centers on this and my saying that you are being unfair to the military leadership. I have offered many reasons to support my point.

If you agree that the Army was working on a new COIN doctrine from 2004-2006 and you agree that the changes made in our tactics, although they were important precursors of the final COIN doctrine, until then were not achieving success, then how can you insist that the leadership in the period 2003-2006 was "ignoring" the insurgency or "pretending it didn't exist"? I've tried to show you that plainly they were doing just the opposite: they were undergoing a massive change in counterinsurgency doctrine to meet the threat. You say they should have done something sooner (and not waited to complete the process in 2006) but you offer no arguments to support this. I can imagine why they wanted to wait and especially I can defer to their professional experience and judgement since I admit I really don't know what I'm talking about. You surely have much more knowledge and experience than I do on this matter. So why not share it? I'm being honest in saying I'm ready to learn. These issues are very important to me and I need to come to the best assessment possible for my own peace of mind.

I shared your views at one time--until 2006 when the new COIN doctrine was published and the surge was announced. Until then, I assumed that they were "ignoring" the insurgency and so forth. When the changes were announced, I saw that I had been wrong and changed my views accordingly. This is why I'm being so insistent with you. Was I right the first time? Why? Or what?