Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

Tom:

Brooks looks to have the same problem that I and many others seem to have (as you pointed out in your comment to me re: your blog posting "The Struggle for the Soul of the Global Middle Class" of August 1st).

a. We tend to look at political factors when determining success, failure and dangers of globalization. Herein, we see significant divisions, stalemate and reason for concern (ex: no international community -- no global middle class -- new multipolar world forming). Within this politically deteriorating context, Brooks et al, look to LOD.

b. Whereas, you wish us, in determining the progress, success and safety of globalization, to bring our eyes to focus on what has and is being achieved on the economic / quality-of-life fronts (to wit: dramatic and historically unprecedented cooperation and success -- in spite of political difficulties such as those noted above).

Your take on the future, if I understand it, is that: Economic requirements will eventually force an erosion of these temporary political difficulties and reverse this trend of political deterioration.

Roger that?

Correct on basic dynamics, but even there you describe a world based on your high-end expectations. Better than democracy, look at high-trust versus low-trust environments and don't be surprised that the latter are infected with more authoritarian structures. If you want to change those structures, how best to proceed? Rapid transformation toward democracy or creating the economic conditions that first encourage and then demand higher trust levels?

I don't see the political deterioration you cite. Putin is a huge improvement on Yeltsin. You may not like what he costs politically, but I am willing to accept his bargain for quite some time, given how he reduces things I need to worry about as an American strategist.

As for China, I don't see the deterioration either. I see lots of improvement.

The political deterioration I see most is the West's lack of self-confidence at this point in history: freak-out artists on both sides of the Atlantic struggling mightily to get us reoriented East-v-West, us-v-them, dems-v-dictators. Right at the point when our economic system is triumphant, we chose self-sabotage because of a lot of atmospherics that spook us. Our lack of strategic patience here is our own worst enemy.

No, it won't be done by Tuesday.

How come is it that we're constantly deriding ourselves for our lack of strategic patience and yet prefer coming up with these quick fixes (like a new line on the globe that says, "we're good and you're bad!")?

Physician, heal thyself.

Whether you have a success depends on what you want to have. There are a lot of people who don't define success the way you do. Or as you observed,

>>"Give me a break. The world economy booms and expands like >>never before. We've never had more peace We've never seen >>such poverty reduction.

>>But no, we can't dictate a new world order of our choosing."

From a certain point of view it is better to be the dominant power of a fragmented and dangerous system than it is to be an equal partner in a community you can't control. "It is better to rule in hell than serve in heaven." This point of view is more likely to follow if "America" is defined not in terms of ideas, but as an ethnic group (Lou Dobbs) or a State (Dick Cheney).

I agree. When you're right, you're "right on!". And you're right and "right on!" a lot. (I've thought and said the same thing with and about David Brooks and his columns.)

Brooks also misses the point of Marshall, Acheson, Stimson, Kennan, Nitze, McCloy, Forrestal, Dulles etc. etc. These men were effective not because they were a small elite in whose hands power was concentrated or even because America held a lot of aces.

They were effective because they largely came from two backgrounds: international finance from Wall St. law firms or diplomacy ( either as FSO's or from the high level military jobs during WWII) and they understood how the world worked and the limits of power at a genuinely deep level, the economic connections that made nations move, stand still or go to war. They played to America's strengths in a way that made it as attractive as possible for other countries to see their national interests as aligned with our own. The temptation to drive the hard bargain was mostly resisted and we led by going first to help, not to take.

A greater contrast with the USSR - that looted Germany and Manchuria and was killing hundreds of thousands of Eastern Europeans in purges - could hardly have been imaginable

"We should not confuse a post-Caucasian world with a post-American one. The former is inevitable and good. It comes with the territory of creating a global middle class. The latter simply will not ever happen."

As insightful and well-put as anything I've read in the last year. Bravo. Well done. Thank you.

Interesting post and comments. When we, the US, stops leading by example we lose power throughout the world. That's bad for us and the world.

Let's be clear & honest. Brooks praises Truman & Acheson today but if he were working for the power elite back in the day, he would have been a paid propagandist for the Rabid Republican Who Lost China Lobby. As a Lucian scribe, he would be hailing the brave, noble Chaing Kai Shek and accusing Truman/Acheson/Dems of losing China, redbaiting to the end. With hindsight he picks the winning team. No intellectual consistency there.

WW II is over. That artificial brain trust has passed on. Barring foul play, should the Chinese hybrid be viable, the simpler laws of statistics and demographics will rule the future. LOD or not.

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html

I doubt one can have a longer view than Zhou had.

Jack, remember that population levels depend on where you draw the borders. As China rises, expect larger meta-countries like the EU (or the much-freaked-about NAU) to become more attractive as a compensation.

The very idea of "elite-based concentrated power" is inherently contradictive to the idea of "democracy"...