Why do we let Pyongyang and Taipei run America's relationship with China?
■"S. Korea Joins China in Criticizing U.S. on N. Korea," by Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, 27 October 2004, p. A18.■"U.S. North Korea Policy Faces Strains: As Diplomats Look to Revive Talks, Hard-Liners Weigh More-Coercive Options," by Gordon Fairclough, Wall Street Journal, 8 November 2004, p. A13.
■"Powell's Comments in China Rile Taiwan: In Apparently Unintended Remarks, Secretary Says Island Is Not Independent," by Edward Cody, Washington Post, 28 October 2004, p. A18.
■"On Bush, the Communists and Their Foes Can Agree," by Philip P. Pan, Washington Post, 24 October 2004, p. B3.
■"Strait-jacket: December elections could edge Taiwan closer to a symbolic declaration of independence—and the United States toward military conflict with China," by Trevor Corson, Atlantic Monthly, December 2004, p. 54.
North Korea will be a focus of the second Bush administration—bet on it. But the neocons need to get far more imaginative in their approach—not with North Korea but with China. Rather than having Beijing talk to us about what we need to do to placate that nutcase Kim Jong Il, we need to be talking to Beijing about what they need to okay his takedown—either by an "offer he can't refuse" or a coup engineered by those around him through the promise of golden parachutes or a quick-strike invasion designed to get the man himself, along with his WMD.
The U.S. needs to stop trying to work this issue through Seoul, which will never get over its fears on the subject, and instead make the deal through Pyongyang's sole remaining backer—China. We need to figure out their price and display a firm willingness to pay it in spades. The relationship that needs to be built over Kim's grave is between America and China, with the end result being an East Asia NATO-like entity that locks-in a strategic relationship between us and China at today's relatively low prices.
The carrot-and-stick bullshit is never going to work with Kim, and the conversation with Seoul and Beijing never seems to get beyond their legitimate fears about North Korea's collapse in the face of heightened U.S. pressure. We need to move the conversation to where it needs to be: asking both countries but especially China what it wants on the far side of a Kim takedown and figuring out how best to deliver. Everyone knows what the likely asking prices are. The only question is, How much do we value Kim's removal?
For now, that crazy little man is running the show not just in Pyongyang but frankly in capitals all over the six-nation dial (the six countries that come together over this issue are South and North Korea, U.S., Japan, Russia and China). We are ceding all the initiative to him, as is he's the real issue here, when he's not. The real issue is the future of U.S.-Chinese relations.
We do the same thing with Taiwan: we cede control of the situation to that island and whatever leader it happens to elect. Because of our "defense guarantee" offered decades ago in an entirely different strategic environment, Taipei gets to drive U.S. national security policy toward China on this issue, which is just plain nuts.
The notion that America would sacrifice thousands and thousands of its troops to defend Taiwan from China after Taipei decided that it just couldn't live anymore without the word "Taiwan" appearing in parentheses behind its official name of Republic of China (a notion some experts fear will be explored following the coming December elections) is bizarre beyond belief. Taiwan isn't going anywhere economically except into China's orbit, as is the rest of Asia. That's an historical reality that's unfolding whether Taipei likes it or not. China isn't interested in torpedoing its economic juggernaut in order to militarily threaten—much less conquer—Taiwan. All it wants is to maintain the illusion that someday the two countries will be joined, even if they maintain completely separate governments and militaries. In short, China wants only to prevent the sense that reunification is impossible, and if that's the price for locking the Chinese into a strategic relationship at today's prices, I say we pay it.
The reality is, when push comes to shove on Taiwan, the U.S. won't be willing to come through on that defense guarantee. We decide when we go to war with other countries. We don't leave that decision to some politician in Taiwan whose dream of national self-actualization could easily end up costing America a huge number of casualties. It just ain't going to happen, and when you slap that operational reality up against the long-term strategic background of our emerging partnership with China on a host of global issues, even entertaining that notion seems rather incredible.
The Chinese leadership (not the people) are happy Bush won, because they see a guy they believe they can deal with him on economic issues effectively. The neocons have shown a willingness in the past to make difficult calls when the time called for it. They better be ready for one over Taiwan, because the scheduling of that call won't be ours to make under the current set of "guarantees."