Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

■"Rulers for Life, and Longer," "Outlook" piece by Howard Schneider, Washington Post, 21 November 2004, p. B1.

■"Not Much of an Opening in the Mullahs' Robes," "Outlook" piece by Dan De Luce, Washington Post, 21 November 2004, p. B2.

There are term limits on rulers in the Middle East. Problem is, it usually requires a heart attack or kidney failure. As the top piece argues:

Death has become the de facto term limit.

That’s why the politics and economics of the Arab Middle East remain so dated and sclerotic. Arab heads of state in large part operate with lifetime sinecures. It takes something cataclysmic—a stroke or a U.S. invasion—to oust them. And then their sons or close advisers usually take over.

Just as happens to any system that lacks a way to reinvigorate itself with competition, new ideas and younger blood, the result is predictable: corruption grows, innovation wanes and progress halts. Economic monopolies get sluggish and unresponsive, and so do political ones.

Schneider goes on to argue that that’s why we shouldn’t expect too much good to come from Arafat’s passing, and he’s probably right. Yes, the possibly reformist leader always appears, but to what end? As Schneider points out, there’s always some excuse why change can’t occur, typically an external danger (Syria’s outstanding conflict/tension with Israel) or the threat of internal revolt (Egypt’s been in a state of “emergency” rule for over 20 years!). Yes, some of the states have the trappings of self-rule, like Egypt’s parliament, but that’s all they are—trappings. Only Israel has a political system where actual rule changes can occur in response to public demands. No surprise: Israel is the only country doing well economically in a broadband fashion. It’s also the only really globalized nation in the region.

So again, tell me that what’s really wrong with the Middle East are U.S. policies . . ..

The once place where I truly believe U.S. diplomacy could make a difference is in Iran. The revolution there is dead and buried, but so too largely is the impetus for reform. And yet, despite all the formalistic “death to America” rallies held there, it is the one country in the Middle East where the government hates the U.S. but the people do not. Everywhere else, you tend to find the opposite phenomenon: publics who hate us but governments willing to work with us.

By going after Afghanistan and Iraq, we gift-wrapped the crackdown for the mullahs, and set in motion their reaching for the bomb. We have to live with our choices, and decide how we can make the best of where they have taken us. And it’s called diplomacy.