Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

■"A Fight for Shiites," op-ed by Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post, 26 November 2004, p. A39.

Great op-ed by Krauthammer reminds us of how we need to remain realistic about what a “national” election in Iraq will really accomplish, and what it will really signal:

In 1864, 11 of the 36 states did not participate in the presidential election. Was Lincoln’s election therefore illegitimate?

In 1868, three years after the security situation had, shall we say, stabilized, three states (not insignificant ones: Texas, Virginia and Mississippi) did not participate in the election. Was Grant’s election illegitimate?

There has been much talk that if the Iraqi election is held and some Sunni Arab provinces (perhaps three of the 18) do not participate, the election will be illegitimate. Nonsense. The election should be held. It should be open to everyone. If Iraq’s Sunni Arabs—barely 20 percent of the population—decide they cannot abide giving up their 80 years of minority rule, ending with 30 years of Saddam Hussein’s atrocious tyranny, then tough luck. They forfeit their chance to shape and participate in the new Iraq.

As I like to point out in my brief, there is no conflict you can cite me in the Gap today that can’t be located within America’s past. Watching segments of the Sunni population fight on with great perversity today is like watching remnants of the Confederate army fight on for months and even years following the Civil War. Like those Sunnis, there were simply some who refused to give up the dream of white rule in the South, and so they segued from the conventional struggle of the war to guerrilla tactics following its end and ultimately to the long-term institutionalized terror of the KKK network. The reality being, no one gives up power easily.

Krauthammer’s point is that American troops are dying—in effect—to prevent the Sunnis from trying to reestablish, through civil war, their minority rule. In the end, as he puts it, “This is the Shiites’ and Kurds’ fight.” Which gets me to the logic that drives my upcoming Esquire piece: we need to find—or create through some radical diplomacy—some local ownership for this fight. The partners are rather obvious, as are the logical asking prices. The question is, who will have the courage to forge the deals?