Today's drum beat on both North Korea and Iran
■"North Korea Said to Expand Arms Program: Nuclear Rods Turned Into Bomb Fuel, Atomic Expert Declares," by David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, New York Times, 6 December 2005, p. A9.■"Iran Hints It Sped Up Enriching Uranium as a Ploy: A move meant to gain an advantage in negotiations with the West on nuclear arms," by Nazila Fathi, New York Times, 6 December 2005, p. A9.
The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei "says he is not certain that the nuclear material his agency once monitored there has been converted into fuel for four to six nuclear bombs."
How much you wanna bet those cores have been weaponized?
ElBaradei consisting resisted pressure from the Bush administration to agree with their assessment of how close Saddam was to having the bomb. But with North Korea, he needs no pressure whatsoever (and he's received none), which makes his strongly held position all the more impressive. Now he's putting pressure on the Bush administration to act, not the other way around.
Bush has said time again America cannot abide by a nuclear-armed North Korea, and he's right to say so. There is very little confidence on our side regarding the decision-making of Kim Jong Il and our ability to deter his employment of these weapons. As for his willingness to sell anything to keep his regime going, enough said regarding the danger of proliferation.
China is North Korea's main economic lifeline, and thus our conversation on North Korea should focus on Beijing, not Seoul. China's long-term future will be one of dominating Asia economically, and thus politically and ultimately militarily—at least on the continent. It's hard to imagine that China's long-range view for Asia includes North Korea continuing to exist, so the question for the U.S. is, How do we speed up that decision-making process?
As for Iran, it's so obvious they're gaming us completely on this whole nuclear agreement issue with the Europeans. That tells me that nukes for Tehran are for bargaining, not for using. Whereas Kim is looking at his end, and thus must be considered a real threat to use nukes to avoid going down without a fight, Iran is destined to be a major security player in the Gulf no matter how the nuke issue turns out—it's just meant to be. Thinking ahead to a stable Middle East, there is no scenario that works that doesn't include a powerful Iran at least in peaceful coexistence with a U.S. military presence there. Iran getting the bomb is going to speed up our decision-making process regarding how we need to shape that bilateral relationship. The question is, Are we ready for that rapprochement? Have we thought ahead on our negotiating strategy? Do we know what we want in return?
Because if we don't, then Iran gets the bomb anyway and we get nothing from the process.