Pakistan and bomb-selling: implicit villains in the Core, plenty of customers in the Gap
■"As Nuclear Secrets Emerge, More Are Suspected," by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, New York Times, 26 December 2004, p. A1.
This article details—in a nutshell—why I think it's a waste of time trying to use arms control treaties to stop technology flows from the Core to the Gap.
Pakistan got the bomb a long time ago from the Chinese, who got it from the Sovs. Where they've sold it is entirely to countries inside the Gap: North Korea (okay, my outlier), Iran, Libya. Where else do we suspect atomic mastermind Khan to have possibly sold stuff? This is where he traveled in his duties: Tunisia, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, and Kazakhistan—all Gap states. Middlemen were from Dubai and UAE, classic connectors inside the Gap.
Who helped in this process? Who sold the connecting technology? Here's the list from the Core: Switzerland, Netherlands, Germany, South Africa, Britain, Spain, Italy. Then there's a crew of Seam States that were involved: Malaysia, Singapore, and Turkey.
All in all, seem like non-proliferation treaties are working?