Bush's pedal to the metal on Syria-hard to argue against
■"U.S. Turns Up Heat on Syria to Leave Lebanon: Egypt, Saudis Join Push to Remove Troops," by Robin Wright, Washington Post, 3 March 2005, p. A20.■"Syria Under Pressure: Worse Trouble May Lie Ahead," by Hassan M. Fattah, New York Times, 3 March 2005, pulled off web.
■"Get out now, Bush tells Syria: The hard line on Lebanon helps the White House heal its rift with France," by Paul Korning, The Globe and Mail, 3 March 2005, p. A1.
■"Hezbollah set for key role in Lebanon: Parliamentary balance of power in hands of Iranian-backed group's 12 deputies," by Mark MacKinnon, The Globe and Mail, 3 March 2005, p. A13.
The Bush White House is pursuing a multi-pronged strategy: strong words in public, sterner ones along diplomatic channels (twisting some local arms to join in and working hard on this issue with the Europeans, basically healing much of our rift with France in the process), and threatening sanctions. The timing is good: Bashar al-Assad has reduced Syrian troops in Lebanon significantly since coming to power, from roughly 20k to 14k. Now the White House has the Egyptians and Saudis saying all 14k should go in the next two months. Apparently, we have convinced local governments that this is a key prerequisite to making peace come to Palestine and Israel.
What trouble lies ahead? Assad assumes a siege mentality, backtracking on some nice internal reforms since the invasion of Iraq. Okay, some loss there.
Bigger issue: where does Hezbollah go now? It's clearly the big player in Lebanon, and the connectivity to Iran is also clear. Hezbollah is both militant and Shiite. It's effectively Tehran's instrument of veto over peace in the region. The Parliament is split between pro- and anti-Syrian elements, putting Hezbollah in the driver's seat, because whom they side with will win.
This is what King Abdullah was talking about when he warned about a Shiite "crescent" running from Lebanon through Iraq and Iran. Our successes in transforming the Middle East have all had the same effect: removing Tehran's problems and elevating its allies. This is why it makes so much sense to find some modus vivendi with Iran. There is no future worth creating where Iran is not involved. We can wait on the mullahocracy to fall, or we can make that an end to these means (Big Bang) and not wait on this. People want to paint my call on Iran as appeasement, but I think it's the fastest way to getting what we want. The Big Bang is rumbling on. The question is, do we want to secure these gains or keep them at risk? Which way gets us to security faster? Which way more completely values the sacrifices we've made to date?