Katrina's lessons learned include the usual calls for better blended SysAdmin force
■"Katrina, Iraq Aid Efforts Hit Same Hurdles: Military Officials Say Crises Highlight Poor Coordination Between Federal Departments," by Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, 7 September 2005, p. A4.■"Remembering Help Received After Sept. 11, New York Sends 303 Officers to Louisiana: Lending aid to a force battered by stress and resignations," by Al Baker, New York Times, 7 September 2005, p. A18.
■"Navy Pilots Who Rescued Victims Are Reprimanded: A commander criticizes an effort that saved 110 people," by David S. Cloud, New York Times, 7 September 2005, p. A21.
The comparisons of Katrina to Baghdad are in full swing, with the same basic judgment being offered: DoD is great when it gets going, but the overall coordination of federal agencies remains missing in action. FEMA isn't up for it domestically any more than State is up for it overseas (neither has enough pull when so many of the physical assets of response belong to the Pentagon), and NSC is basically a creature of the White House, not of the federal bureaucracy (although just wait for the blue-ribbon reports declaring NSC the logical "coordinating lead" on such domestic events just like so many have WRT to the next "Iraq").
Better step is the interim one of establishing permanent joint task force command elements that combine numerous federal agencies in a pre-packaged command structure. We need a standing JTF capacity for SysAdmin abroad and for at home, and the difference between the two would really be negligible, because the functions are so similar (stabilizing and reconstructing after a tumultuously destructive event). There is no real sense in reinventing the wheel for "home" versus "away" games (the stupidest strategic concept we have ever invented). We should pursue a big enough capacity, with sufficient global networking, so that we can handle a Katrina at the same time we're doing Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. (and so we could accept help from fellow Core states without it seeming weird-like fire departments sharing resources as required).
I mean, there's no embarrassment for New Orleans when NYC sends some cops, and the NYPD is smart enough to send those with military experience. They know SysAdmin work when they see it, and the security element isn't routine. By internationalizing our SysAdmin force/function, we take the zero-sum element out of the equation, making clear to all that market access on the far side is not only desired, but encouraged.
Or, we can sit around bitching about China's "infiltration" of Africa, like that's a strategic crime or something.
Solutions stare us in the face, as do resource requirements. In a world of Baghdads and Katrinas, we need less Leviathan platforms and more SysAdmin ones, so we don't find ourselves making Sophie's choices between moving potable water and picking up American citizens stranded in their own country (!) by floodwaters. What's tragically stupid about forcing U.S. Navy helicopter pilots to make those choices is that we created that crisis ourselves by systematically under investing in SysAdmin force structure (lotsa helos, for example) over time by over investing in Leviathan force structure. Not enough cops, not enough helos, not enough SysAdmin in general.
Some naval helo pilots involved in Katrina are so angry about being told not to divert to rescue ops as they see fit that they've stopped wearing their SAR (search and rescue) patches that say, "So others may live."
Remember that when someone tells you that we'll never get people to join the military to do SysAdmin ops.