Unpacking the connectivity straw man (II)
Here is the most absurd reductionism: "If we fail in Iraq, then that proves disconnectedness is not the problem, and that all attempts to cure that through connecting failed or rogue regimes will trigger greater threat."
That's like saying, if this course of chemo doesn't work, the cancer isn't real.
I have a diagnosis and a prescribed cure. The latter has yet to be adequately explored, but that failure to date doesn't negate the diagnosis. It just means the research continues.
The difference between my vision and Robb's is that I can live with both failure and success. Robb needs bad things to happen, or he has neither diagnosis nor cure.
I could have structured my vision so. I just eschew that angle as inevitable fear mongering. Plus, I chose not to spend my life hoping that bad things will happen. Just not my chosen shtick.
That's not to unduly criticize Robb (I don't remember making any "John is ..." statements, which is what constitutes ad hominen). He's has a lot of good thinking, and being in the business I'm in, I'll never argue against exploring the dark side. I just argue for realizing that's exactly what you're doing when you're doing it. You are not exploring the totality of things. You are not seeing both yin and yang. And the danger comes when people start interpreting your work as comprehensive when it is not. That's basically my problem with Robert Kaplan and (sometimes) Ralph Peters: great stuff, but too often lacking context. If you're going to spot a weakness, you have to be able to spot the corresponding strength. The duality is always there.
I came to this conclusion early in my career and it was vastly re-enforced with Y2K: you can't strategize futures where you put all your marbles is having only bad things happen. If you catch yourself secretly delighted whenever there's something bad happening, you're not seeing the whole picture, and you're contaminating your vision. You have to have enough scope so that both good and bad can be taken with equanimity. Inevitabily, that means coming up with a long-term vision of sustained improvement on today's reality, because that's the history of mankind. If your vision is about how the world is "entering the new phase" of this or that disastrous reality, then you're basically short-terming the future, like some gold-hawker on cable TV. Deep down, those people know they're always wrong, but they spend a lot of time working to convince themselves and you that they're not.
To me, that's living on the churn. Fine for making money, just like on Wall Street. And if that's all I wanted to do, I'd make shitloads without really trying.
But I like really trying. I like trying as hard as possible for the best possible outcomes. When things go well, I'm happy as hell. And when go bad, I'm more determined than ever to find the way ahead. I find this mindset goes well with the vast majority of the military--saving the intell types. Not surprisingly, the darkest visions of the future typically arise fromt that community. Why? There again, they are tasked only to look at the downside. Do that enough, and you become intellectually stunted by that pursuit, like the diagnostician who only sees autistic kids so she sees autism everywhere she looks (just went through that one with Vonne Mei).
Grand strategy is for general practitioners--by design.
By all means, enjoy the dark side philosophers. I do myself. I just always try to remember their limitations, and to put their criticisms of my vision into some larger context.
Iraq proves a lot of things: that pretend states, once tapped, tend to fall into their constituent parts; and that some of those parts will do better than others (Kurds versus Sunnis, for example). It also proves that states cannot be created out of thin air, as some believe, but that they need to be grown. Growing states almost solely out of fear (security) is awfully hard, and typically pretty ugly. When states grow successfully, it's almost always overwhelming a private-sector driven economic function, as in, the more transactions, the more we need a good government/state to regulate them to the benefit of all. Frankly, that's how America grew up, despite our myths.
Iraq has not been allowed to develop any sort of economic critical mass. There is just too much bad blood to be explored by too many of the population, plus there are outsiders more than happy to push that agenda--for now. If we fail enough and the enemy succeeds enough, you can have yourself a nice little Lebanon that drags on for decades. But even Lebanon came back, now didn't it? And the way it came back was driven by positive connectivity with the outside world.
To say Iraq proves anything beyond Iraq is to miss a huge historical example staring us in the face: Dayton ten years later. Where are the huge losses there? Where is the out-of-control destructiveness of increased connectivity?
Was it perfect? No. But ten years later, how we handled the Balkans looks awfully good in comparison to the failures of this administration to effectively socialize not just the threat of Iraq but its ultimate solution set.
And all that proves is that Bush is better at dividing than uniting--plain and simple.
I say, run with that judgment all you want (I did in my last column), but don't pretend it speaks volumes to the future.
Comments
Connectivity and content flow:
It seems to me that there are many, many levels of connectivity flowing in all directions all at once – all the time.
I am talking about a massive multi-directional flow, sort of like stacks of parallel sheets of paper, each with a different but yet crystal clear message, one upon top of the other. Most are hidden only a tiny bit of information is visually obvious.
Sometimes the information they each carry back and forth on their isolated plane suddenly flows up and down with the advent of a major event, a system perturbation, such as a glass of water being suddenly poured on the stack. In this case, some of the ink/info gets shared between levels up and down, but it may get garbled badly. If major events occur often, maybe the messages become mixed beyond all recognition. On top of this mess, no matter how much more water is poured on it, not all of the ink ever gets to each and every page. The ink may not even reach the outside edge of the very same page. When it finally dries out, sometimes the data just stays on the same old level never sharing content up or down at all. There were just too many layers (society etc...) to go through.
We are expecting way too much, way too fast.
The 4th Estate media pages in Iraq are TV and radio broadcasts from all kinds of sources that are pro/con/bewildered/whatever…, there is 1st Estate clerical “mosque talk”, and there are 3rd estate commoner mass demonstrations including passed on traditional tribal wisdom and inter-family and private family opinion. There is the new “5th Estate”, non traditional bloggers and even the remnants of the 2nd Estate nobility, the Sadam-ists. Never mind the outside influences like the Iranian’s and Saudi’s.
These are all competing and yet historically trusted “medias” that have existed for far longer than the “Cores” new message. All these medias have their own little sets of “rules” and in the end all extend their message only as far as the recipient trusts the sender and their particular rule set – but no farther.
This means to me that increased flow is both good and bad at the same time regardless of how hard someone tries to get out “the message”. And the message is going to stay mixed for a very long time until example shows new reality. Its not a zero sum game with a set time limit – it’s a reality based on a need for infinite, even deadly patience.
Posted by: Robert | May 22, 2006 12:47 PM
Tom said: "When states grow successfully, it's almost always overwhelming a private-sector driven economic function, as in, the more transactions, the more we need a good government/state to regulate them to the benefit of all."
I agree with your premise......to a point. All those private sector transactions are not possible without three basic conditions. 1. Reasonably honest government. 2.Private property laws. 3. Courts that will back the private property laws.
My opinion on this is informed by three things.
The first is a trip to Kenya where I met some furniture makers who made wonderful furniture at very reasonable prices. When I asked why they hadn't formed a co-operative to get their products exported to Europe and the U.S., they explained that if they became too successful the government would step in and take their businesses from them. That was during the Moi government, which I found out was basically a kleptocracy. I don't think the new president has changed things. Even though Kenya is supposed to be a democracy, it is a very corrupt democracy in which private property laws are not enforced or enforced selectively by the courts.
The second experience was seeing Hernando De Soto, the author of THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL, discuss his book on C-SPAN. IMO he really has discovered the secret of economic progress. It is quite simple and based on the above mentioned principles. The problem is that it is only practiced in the developed countries.
The other factor was an essay by a young Kenyan woman, June Arunga, in which she traced her path from wondering why Kenya and Africa were so poor while Europe and the U.S. were so rich. Her discoveries were free markets, honest government, and private property laws backed by courts were the factors that made the diofference. That essay can be found at: www.aworldconnected.org/article.php
She is now trying to teach her insights to other young Kenyans to bring about change in that country. I hope she succeeds.
My opinion is that to transform any GAP country we must concentrate on setting the above mentioned conditions that will promote private transactions.
Posted by: Jim Glendenning | May 22, 2006 1:25 PM
Agree on both posts. You are both reaching for the same thing I constantly reach for: a sense of critical mass. Until it's reached, mixed signals and outcomes are the norm.
Posted by: Tom Barnett | May 22, 2006 2:28 PM
I think this discussion is way more complicated than it need be. I could be over simplifying it, but another slant is there is good connectivity, and bad connectivity. I suppose one could argue there are many permutations. Connectivity for one party could be good, but the same connectivity bad for another. Then again, I believe the connectivity Tom writes about is connectivity within the context of rule-sets. Economic and cultural connectivity can be discomforting in the short run, but ultimately positive and benefits the whole.
An example of bad connectivity in Iraq would be the Iranian influence. It's connectivity in the strictest sense. And of course, it's only bad connectivity to those who have nothing to gain from it, only something to lose.
I think Iraq will struggle for a sense of normalcy for a good while yet. Doesn't mean there has to be a US military presence until then, but it is going to be another 8-10 years I think.
Clearly a more normal relationship between the US and Iran would speed that up, although I think it's unrealistic with the present players.
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May 22, 2006 2:56 PM