ARTICLE: Flaws Cited in Effort To Train Iraqi Forces: U.S. Officers Roundly Criticize Program, By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post, November 21, 2006; Page A01Ricks' piece is one of his best in recent months which is saying a lot.
The two Yingling quotes sum up the piece (and the problem) nicely:
Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, a staff officer with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 who worked with Iraqi units, came away thinking that the Army fundamentally is not geared to the task of helping the advisory effort.Again, all these moves and reports and reviews and lessons learned and commissions and quotes from officers on the ground point to the same undeniable reality: the SysAdmin is coming because the pain is building.
"The thing the Army institutionally is still struggling to learn is that the most important thing we do in counterinsurgency is building host-nation institutions," he told the interviewers, "yet all our organizations are designed around the least important line of operations: combat operations."
...
"Don't train on finding the enemy," he said. "Train on finding your friends, and they will help you find your enemy. . . . Once you find your friends, finding the enemy is easy."




Comments (8)
If the United States were to be occupied by a foreign military, I'm trying to figure out what I would call the scumbags among us they could call their "friends".
Posted by sonofsamphm1c | November 22, 2006 9:34 AM
Yeah! Then again, No!
I absolutely loved Pentagon's New Map. i came away thinking I'd read a book by someone who'd articulated and drawn the logical conclusions of a lot of my own thinking. (And drawn a lot further than my own shallow thoughts.)
I've been reading Blueprint for Action now for 6 months. I keep putting it down. You keep pissing me off. :)
Maybe it's parochialism on my part. I'm a Soldier. Every time you describe your vision ofthe SysAdmin force and the Army's role in it, my brain contorts a little.
But let me tell you why I don't think that's all there is to it. I think the bifurcation along generally service lines of the DoD inot Leviathan and SysAdmin would violate a large number of the economies of the Joint force.
I'm all for the split, in principle. In practice, though, I just can't see making hard distinctions between two forces. I see two distinct roles, often played by the same players, not unlike my beloved National Guard and our Federal and State roles.
Commanders, in my view, must be able to task organize from the Joint Force as they see the mission.
On a related note, in an area where I can see a hard fast deliniation being made, I recently read through a synopsis of a paper on the Democratic Leadership Council's website. A Princeton professor made the suggestion that perhaps the UN should be replaced by an expanded NATO.
I think a better idea would be to strip (a very reformed) UN of it's warmaking powers and responsibilites (which it has abrogated anyway) and make it responsible instead for SysAdmin operations in the world. Then give those warmaking responsibilities to NATO (an expanded NATO or a new organization more palatable to Russia with NATO as it's seed/template) which would then be responsible for the Leviathan operations.
It is at this macro level that I see a useful deliniation to be made just as the difference between President and Goveror as Commander in Chief are for us Guardsmen.
One Force, One Fight, One Future.
Posted by RTO Trainer | November 22, 2006 12:24 PM
I'm reminded of the "51% - Operation Goliath - Operation David" story of Lind's FMFM 1-A. Sounds like the more to have read this, the better it would have gone for them over there. It's not really too radical a position. SysAdmin 'force' must be distinct from war'fighting', surely, and, perhaps that does necessitate a physical split in the forces involved on the ground.
Heres a radical idea: Why not end the War on Drugs, thereby eliminating a large element of the bad guys' global black-market financing (and creating a HUGE tax base in this country if not all of the West as well) and leverage all Feds engaged in the endeavor into SysAdmin work, which their training better suits them for as against, say, your average soldier's? To my thinking (and I've yet to read your books, so, apologies if I mis-characterize), a SysAdmin force has to be de-escalatory with regard to confrontation, technologically savvy to facilitate/maintain/improve utilities and public works, and cross-culturally civic-minded so as to engender trust, function and transparency in government and law enforcement from the local level on up. Are we not, perhaps, leaving at least part of our first-string SysAdmin team on another, irrelevant (and likely counter-productive), playing field? Just thinking ... haven't really fleshed out the whole proposition yet.
I just get so frustrated when reading articles like the one you referenced. Like when Hamlet begins, "What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculties!" and then becomes disillusioned... I, too, cringe at the fact that we have this immense pool of talent and skill, this depth of dedication, and a standing reserve of resources which is unrivalled, and yet - we can't line up translators, office supplies and properly trained (for their sake and the mission's) individuals? Too many aren't just still 'in the box', they're staring into just one of its corners...
Good Blog, Mr. Barnett
Posted by Isaac Russell | November 22, 2006 8:05 PM
Like the notion of ending the drug war, but on keeping US all Leviathan and make rest of the world SysAdmin, we have to have a legit marker in the second half game. Pure division of labor isn't diplomatically tenable. Europe simply won't go for "we clean up after your wars," especially as most of the casualties will be found there.
Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett | November 24, 2006 5:22 PM
Son:
That's a strawman argument (which you have a taste for).
Show me someone who's healthy and agrees to chemo and I'll show you a nut.
But show me someone with cancer who blows off chemo without thinking, and I'll also show you a fool.
Motivations for anyone trying to occupy U.S. wouldn't be the same for Darfur, now would it?
No good argument for peacekeepers in healthy U.S., but certainly is one for Darfur.
Sovereignty in a global community is like citizenship in a nation: it is to be earned not simply awarded.
Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett | November 24, 2006 5:30 PM
I think everyone is missing some key points. We have fought this war before and one of the enemies is human nature. Consider that combatants are members of distinct "contact cultures."
The Radiacal Islamic Jihadi is a modern-day "ghost dancer." He believes that the basis of the economic power of the West comes from his stolen birth-right and that through both physical action and sympathetic magic an apocalypse will result that will both eliminate the "infidels" and leave the "true believers" with all of the material wealth and power of the West. This is the same thought that drove the Native American ghost dancers. The American ghost dancers thought that they would, through their ghost dance, bring the destruction of the Europeans and inherit all of their material wealth.
The citizen soldiers we have deployed are in a contact culture as well; they are experiencing the culture shock of going from their peacefull civilian lives to being in military culture at war. Many of them still believe the "cargo cults" worshiped in the reserves. They have been exposed to the assumptions that when the great mobilization occur that they will be taken to the great GSA warehouse where "Q" will great them and give them the latest in James Bond Gear collection. Their ranks will be filled with new faces fresh from basic courses who will worship their wisdom. They will be taken to the great training site where profound and esoteric knowledge will be imparted on them that will allow them to be autonomous gods of war who will go forth achieve the quick victory then jet home for the victory parade.
With few reserve soldiers escaping mobilization belief in the reservist "cargo cult" is on the wane, to be replaced by other thoughts. Victory will come with perserverance and the effective employment of what is available rather that exotic toys and profound thoughts. Perseverence and effective action is the only way to defeat the "ghost dancers" of the Islamic jihadist movements.
Lets see the culture shock for what it is both in ourselves and in those who fight against us. Victory depends in some measure on our ability to manage and mitigate the culture shock and control the acculturation process both in ourselves and our foes.
If you look close at the articles such as "Flaws Cited in Effort To Train Iraqi Forces: U.S. Officers Roundly Criticize Program," I think the shocks within the military to the acculturation to Iraq can easily be seen.
Posted by John Frum | November 24, 2006 8:44 PM
sonofsamphm1c: If the United States were to be occupied by a foreign military, I'm trying to figure out what I would call the scumbags among us they could call their "friends".
Liberals.
Posted by Steven | November 27, 2006 1:49 PM
Sir, I'm not suggesting keeping the US all Leviathan. What I am suggesting is that it's impractical to make a hard and fast distinction in the DoD: These troops/forces are Leviathan, and these troops/forces are SysAdmin.
What seems far more practical to me is that DoD retain its current structure (some tweaking may perhaps be necessary), without a delineated split, but with the knowledge that the role to be played will be different given different circumstances, even to the extent that, like one of the famous Britsh regiments who, on being attacked from fore and rear at once, fired a volly, executed an about face and fired again (no mean feat with muskets), beating back both attacks, a (for example) Brigade can deploy for a SysAdmin mission, but change gears and perform a Levaithan task at need. Or in more current parlance, fight the USMC's "Three Block War."
Posted by RTO Trainer | November 27, 2006 4:09 PM