Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 30 June 2004

Spent the afternoon in Providence with Jean Michel Demetz of L’Express, the Paris-based magazine. He had read the book and wanted an interview, promising a significant story in the early fall (the summer is not a time for such stories in France—pure and simple).

It was a much better discussion than I expected, not because he was French but simply because he was a magazine reporter and yet his angle was not so much an angle as a simple exploration of feasibility in terms of the transatlantic relationship.

We talked a lot about the choices made by the West in the post-Cold War period, and especially those choices made by the Pentagon in terms of force structure (i.e., what they bought). We talked about the many variations of the Bush Doctrine. But what we talked about most was the missing A-to-Z global rule set on how to process politically-bankrupt states, and what it would take to make such a system come into being.

I enjoyed the discussion a lot, and it went for almost two hours over coffee. A real rarity with journalists: I actually found the argument truly stretching for me. Typically, what you do in an interview is regurgitate, not explore beyond.

What will this yield in September, who knows. No doubt, it will test my memory of my two years of French in the mid-1970s.

But the whole experience gave me some real hope . . . of a book deal in France.

The catch from Wednesday:

The scorecard for the Sys Admin force in Iraq

“Reality Intrudes on Promises in Rebuilding of Iraq: 2,300 Projects Planned but Fewer Than 140 Are Under Way,” by James Glanz and Erik Eckholm, New York Times, 30 June, p. A1.

“5,600 Ex-Soldiers Will Be Called Up: Ready Reserve Members to See Duty Overseas,” by Thom Shanker, NYT, 30 June, p. A1.

“As Threats to Oil Facilities Rise, U.S. Military Becomes Protector: Navy and Coast Guard Boost Presence in Persian Gulf, Brace for Long-Term Effort; Suicide Attacks on Terminals,” by Chip Cummins, Wall Street Journal, 30 June, p. A1.

House of Bush to House of Saud: the clock is ticking

“Bush Urges All Autocrats To Yield Now To Democracy,” by Susan Sachs, NYT, 30 June, p. A13.

“A Saudi Leadership Adrift: Monarchy Reacts Slowly to a Dangerously Changing Society,” by Hugh Pope, WSJ, 30 June, p. A7.

America: the great economic rule-set exporter

“Global Markets Await Action by U.S. Fed: Other Central Banks Will Face Pressure to Follow Suit on Rates; Borrowing Costs to Feel Impact,” by Craig Karmin et. al, WSJ, 30 June, p. C1.

“Human Rights Abuses Worldwide Are Held to Fall Under U.S. Courts: Foreigners Can File Suits, Justices Rule,” by Linda Greenhouse, NYT, 30 June, p. A19.

Integration inside the Core is the Old money into the New markets

“Gas and Oil Bring Japanese Money to Russia’s Far East,” by James Brooke, NYT, 30 June, p. W1.

“Developers Enter India Market—Indirectly: Ownership Restrictions Force Foreign Companies To Settle for Side Roles,” by Ray A. Smith, WSJ, 30 June, p. B6.

The classic sad Gap story: begging the dictators to let the aid in.

“Powell to Press Sudan to Ease the War for Aid in Darfur,” by Christopher Marquis, NYT, 30 June, p. A3.

Posted by at 11:07 PM | Permalink

“5,600 Ex-Soldiers Will Be Called Up: Ready Reserve Members to See Duty Overseas,” by Thom Shanker, NYT, 30 June, p. A1.

“As Threats to Oil Facilities Rise, U.S. Military Becomes Protector: Navy and Coast Guard Boost Presence in Persian Gulf, Brace for Long-Term Effort; Suicide Attacks on Terminals,” by Chip Cummins, Wall Street Journal, 30 June, p. A1.

The scorecard for our Sys Admin effort in Iraq has to be a “D.” The article cites the three big causes I’ve heard personally from numerous civil affairs officers who were there:

1. The procedures for contracting were bad: too slow, too tainted by waste, fraud and abuse, and too uncompetitive
2. The assumptions regarding the infrastructure were way too optimistic, plus the looting that occurred in the immediate aftermath of the war was a complete disaster
3. The ability to protect that which was rebuilt was simply not there in terms of the numbers of bodies required.

These are the big lessons learned from our first major attempt at Sys Admin-like rehab of a failed/destroyed society since World War II. Our jobs are cut out for us.

The desperate state of affairs on bodies has reached the point where we’re calling back ex-military into service, even though they’re not in the reserves, plus we’ve now got more Navy ships in the Gulf than we did during the tanker wars of the late 1980s and we’ve had to bring back the Coast Guard in force to help guard all the oil terminals there.

Again, our biggest failure in imaging how to win this peace was in underestimating our ability to wage war and overestimating our ability to wage peace.

The great rebalancing of the U.S. military has begun.

[P.S.—the WSJ story is the one about which I had a long talk with Chip Cummins a while back, an interaction I blogged.]

Posted by at 10:13 PM | Permalink

“A Saudi Leadership Adrift: Monarchy Reacts Slowly to a Dangerously Changing Society,” by Hugh Pope, Wall Street Journal, 30 June, p. A7.

Bush making all the right noises about what this struggle is really about: forcing serious political change in the Middle East. The good news on Bush’s side is that, if things go well in Iraq, the pressure grows on autocrats in the region. But you know what? It also grows if things go badly.

Either way, the House of Saud is looking more and more like late Brezhnev/Chernenko/Andropov Soviet Union.

Posted by at 9:17 PM | Permalink

“Human Rights Abuses Worldwide Are Held to Fall Under U.S. Courts: Foreigners Can File Suits, Justices Rule,” by Linda Greenhouse, New York Times, 30 June, p. A19.

George Magnus, chief economist of the investment division at UBS AG in London:

“In a globalized world economy, U.S. interest rates and the Fed sit at the heart of the system . . . Japanese, Chinese, British and Italian companies and governments raise and use capital in U.S. dollars as well as their own currency.”

“That powerful and continuing response by the world’s securities markets and central planners underscores the role the U.S. plays in the global economy, where the dollar acts as the world’s reserve currency, its capital markets are the widest and deepest, and the American consumer is the prized target across the planet.”

But it’s more than that, because not only does our legal system set a serious standard for the planet, it allows that outside world to utilize our own court system against us, thus greatly extending the pool of people who can participate in and experience U.S. justice.

You make think this is some new law made especially to manage globalization. It is not. The law that extends this participation to foreigners is 215 years old.

That is how long we’ve been doing this globalization thing.

Posted by at 8:20 PM | Permalink

“Developers Enter India Market—Indirectly: Ownership Restrictions Force Foreign Companies To Settle for Side Roles,” by Ray A. Smith, Wall Street Journal, 30 June, p. B6.

What defines the integration of the New Core is the willingness of Old Core economies to put serious amounts of long-term investment into these economies. It is not easy for the most part, but as that money comes in, it changes these countries’ legal and economic and political rule-sets from within.

Peace through trade? More like peace through equity ownership.

Oh, and notice how all these Core powers possess nukes, which is why I’m not—as I always like to remind—the second coming of Norman Angell.

Posted by at 7:21 PM | Permalink

“Powell to Press Sudan to Ease the War for Aid in Darfur,” by Christopher Marquis, New York Times, 30 June, p. A3.

Exhibit A for why we need a Core-wide understanding on an A-to-Z rule set on how to process politically bankrupt states: sweet-talking the killers to let us save some of the hostages to their malevolent use of power in some disconnected country. This leadership should not be in power.

There is enough military power in the Gap to perform this act of humanity. There are enough peacekeepers to manage what comes next. There is enough aid and enough NGOs and PVOs out there to work the rehab issue.

All that is missing is the will to cooperate. All that is missing the avowed desire to shrink the Gap.

Militaries around the Core know what has to be done. Business communities around the Core know what has to be done.

What we lack is the political leadership with the courage and the skill and the imagination and the will to actually pull it off.

We should all sleep better tonight. U.S. imperial power will not touch the killers in Sudan, so the killing will continue.

Ah . . . when dark-skinned people fall dead in a forest far, far away and nobody is there to hear them drop, is there really any sound?

Close your eyes and I’m sure you can hear it.

[webmaster's note: see also White House searches for words on Sudan

Posted by at 6:23 PM | Permalink

Dateline: SWA flight from BWI to Providence, 29 June 2004

I always knew as a kid growing up that I wanted a job where global headlines mattered to me, meaning I knew I wanted to work in a field where, if I picked up the paper and saw big things happening all over the world, then my day, my job, and my career would be somehow affected. Call it a sort of career connectivity; I simply enjoy that sense that everything matters.

I guess the worst sort of career for me would have been the opposite track, or a job in which no matter what happened around the world, nothing really would change for me in my work day.

The last few days have clearly given me that sense of big changes around the dial, and being in DC for the last three days gives you that weird sense of perspective, because this is a town that eats, breathes, and sleeps this stuff. I love briefing in DC because I can go at full speed, knowing that I don’t need to explain the references, or asides, or acronyms (something I sought assiduously to do when CSPAN taped me). Since I can go at full speed, I can add in more insider humor, plus I don’t have to cut back on the number of slides, and it’s more fun—frankly—not to have to self-edit or cut back on the material.

Today I gave two briefs. First one at Rayburn House Office Building involved about 25 House staffers from all over the country and both sides of the aisle. Staffers are an interesting bunch: pure junkies who love the work because they sure don’t do it for the money or the hours (which are small and long, respectively). I was scheduled to go for 90 minutes, went two hours solid and didn’t lose a soul. Very solid feedback, plus a request to consider briefing a significant number of House members the next time I’m in town. Oh, and would my publisher consider providing 435 “review copies” gratis?

Hmmm. Not my call. I sure as hell know I don’t have enough money to swing that.

Second brief is the biweekly brown bag at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Not surprisingly, I sense that hardly anybody in the room is from senior staff, since they all look so young. But eager young minds (I’m assuming the junior staff and interns) is just fine. About 40 in all for about an hour-fifty. At the end, an offer to join forces in studying postwar security generation issues. My host Frederick Barton, a senior project director with years in postconflict studies, describes the brief as “wonderfully subversive” and something he wants to pursue and expand.

Over the two days, it’s four briefs in about 30 hours, with roughly 9 hours of talking in front of about 350 audience members. My guess is that I’ve generated at least 8 significant future invitations. I will be singing “I can’t get no satisfaction” when I’m 65.

The catch from Monday and Tuesday:

Rule set resets in the Global War on Terrorism

“U.S. Hands Authority To Iraq Two Days Early: Fear of Attacks Hastens Move; Interim Leaders Assume Power,” by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, 29 June, p. A1.

“Iraq’s New History: Only Iraqis can reclaim their country from the purveyors of terror,” by Fouad Ajami, Wall Street Journal, 29 June, p. A14.

“High Court Backs Detainees’ Right to Challenge U.S.: In a Blow to Bush Policy, Ruling Says Terror Suspects Are Entitled to Hearings,” by Robert S. Greenberger and Jess Bravin, WSJ, 29 June, p. A1.

“14 Afghans Are Killed for Registering to Vote: Taliban suspected of killings in a bid to scuttle elections,” David Rohde, New York Times, 28 June, p. A3.

“U.S. Resumes Ties With Libya: Relations Renewed After 24 Years,” by Peter Slevin, WP, 29 June, p. A15.

Rule-set resets in the global economy

“Putin Wins Business Fans: Russian Leader’s Firmness Makes Multinationals Confident,” by Gregory L. White, WSJ, 28 June, p. A9.

“Outsourcing Storm Benefits India: U.S. Debate Creates Buzz For High-Tech Bangalore; Accenture, Others Lured,” by Jay Solomon, WSJ, 28 June, p. A3.

“China Overtakes U.S. as Magnet For Foreign Direct Investment: Survey Finds Corporations Are Increasingly Attracted To Emerging Economies,” by Michael R. Sesit, WSJ, 28 June, p. A2.

The coming political reset in American politics?

“First Ripple of a Political Tidal Wave: Michael Moore bids to become the Democrats’ answer to Rush Limbaugh,” by E.J. Dionne, Jr., WP, 29 June, p. A23.

“Chinks Appears in Bush’s Business Armor: Kerry, Sensing Opening, Tries to Gain Political Capital by Courting Corporate America,” by Jackie Calmes, WSJ, 29 June, p. A4.

Today’s yin and yang on China

“EU Rejects China’s ‘Market Economy’ Request,” by Dow Jones Newswire, WSJ, 29 June, p. A12.

“In China, Turf Battle Rages: Foreign Rivals Challenge Local Giants as Landscape Changes,” by Charles Hutzler, WSJ, 29 June, p. A12.

“Tortured Logistics Take Toll on Growth: Help for China’s creaky transport system is likely to come from foreign companies,” by Jane Lanhee Lee, WSJ, 29 June, p. A12.

Posted by at 6:09 AM | Permalink

“U.S. Hands Authority To Iraq Two Days Early: Fear of Attacks Hastens Move; Interim Leaders Assume Power,” by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, 29 June, p. A1.

“Iraq’s New History: Only Iraqis can reclaim their country from the purveyors of terror,” by Fouad Ajami, Wall Street Journal, 29 June, p. A14.

“High Court Backs Detainees’ Right to Challenge U.S.: In a Blow to Bush Policy, Ruling Says Terror Suspects Are Entitled to Hearings,” by Robert S. Greenberger and Jess Bravin, WSJ, 29 June, p. A1.

“14 Afghans Are Killed for Registering to Vote: Taliban suspected of killings in a bid to scuttle elections,” David Rohde, New York Times, 28 June, p. A3.

“U.S. Resumes Ties With Libya: Relations Renewed After 24 Years,” by Peter Slevin, WP, 29 June, p. A15.

The U.S. slips the reins of power into the hands of Iraqi leaders, and a new rule set is born in the Middle East—an evil regime decapitated and a new state resurrected by an outside coalition of states led by the United States. What legacies does this create? In my mind, the good ones will win out over time, and the bad ones will only lead to further tumult in the region—also to the Core’s advantage. The only that I am certain will not work to our—and the region’s ultimate—advantage is things staying exactly as the same as before. By going into Iraq a lot will necessarily change in that region—out of hatred for us and what we’re trying to do, out of fear of what we might yet do, and out of the hope that this time real reform may stick.

Iraqis will have to fight for their own state in the end, and the enemies of this fledgling state know that time is not on their side, so they might as well go for broke.

These are the words of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi cited in Ajami’s op-ed:

“America is being bloodied in Iraq but has no intention of leaving, no matter the bloodletting among its own soldiers. It is looking to a near future, when it remains safe in its bases, while handing over control to a bastard government with an army and a police force . . . There is no doubt that our field of movement is shrinking and our future looks more forbidding by the day.”

Zarqawi believes that enemy is the United States, but he is underestimating his foe. It is really the spread of globalization, a far more powerful and relentless opponent.

Other rule sets being adjusted in this global war on terrorism: the Supreme Court saying that even terrorist suspects have rights, meaning the GWOT involves the extension of rules or its accomplishes nothing at all.

Why? Because the rules matter. They matter when registering to vote is enough to get you killed. Amazing huh? Never happened here, did it?

Again, there is nothing inside the Gap that we can locate within ourselves, our past, our memories, which makes this effort not just a sacrifice for the sake of others, but a revalidation of who were are as a society.

Deals along the way? You bet. Some stinky? As far as I’m concerned, too many are way too stinky, like pretending Qaddafi is back among the respectable. But you pick your battles, you set your schedule, you plot for success at every earliest tipping point, meaning there’s a time for everything and everyone.

Posted by at 4:07 AM | Permalink

“Putin Wins Business Fans: Russian Leader’s Firmness Makes Multinationals Confident,” by Gregory L. White, Wall Street Journal, 28 June, p. A9.

“Outsourcing Storm Benefits India: U.S. Debate Creates Buzz For High-Tech Bangalore; Accenture, Others Lured,” by Jay Solomon, WSJ, 28 June, p. A3.

“China Overtakes U.S. as Magnet For Foreign Direct Investment: Survey Finds Corporations Are Increasingly Attracted To Emerging Economies,” by Michael R. Sesit, WSJ, 28 June, p. A2.

A trio of stories that tell us how much change has occurred in the last few years. Russia’s Putin winning over international business, something many Russian experts said wouldn’t possibly occur for years beyond this date because “robber baron capitalism” was totally out of control. And yet this progress is being made, and this new pillar of the New Core stands taller with each year.

Ditto for India, which is simply too good a trade partner for the U.S. to ever turn away from, no matter the latest fad of “fear factoring” in the media. Year after year, America is the world’s biggest target of FDI, meaning we insource jobs more than anyone else, even as we outsource them. And there are plenty of good estimates that say we come out on top.

But wait a tick! China passes the U.S. as the world’s biggest target of FDI last year! Absolutely amazing! More signs of a changing global economy order. More signs of new rule sets emerging.

Posted by at 3:01 AM | Permalink

“First Ripple of a Political Tidal Wave: Michael Moore bids to become the Democrats’ answer to Rush Limbaugh,” by E.J. Dionne, Jr., Washington Post, 29 June, p. A23.

“Chinks Appears in Bush’s Business Armor: Kerry, Sensing Opening, Tries to Gain Political Capital by Courting Corporate America,” by Jackie Calmes, Wall Street Journal, 29 June, p. A4.

Dionne makes the case that the emerging Democratic push for the White House is going to swell just like the ’94 Republican sweep into both houses of Congress. He paints Michael Moore’s phenomenal success with “Fahrenheit 9/11” in the same light as others did Rush Limbaugh’s explosion on the national political scene those many years ago.

The key evidence to Dionne: “In late August 2002, at the beginning of the buildup to the Iraq war, a Pew Research Center poll found that only 37 percent of Americans felt Bush had laid out a case for military action.”

In the end, it may be the story that Bush did not tell effectively about this war that will do his presidency in.

Meanwhile, signs abound that the business community is seriously considering Kerry. When that happened with Clinton back in 1992, and I was hearing that via my brother and others on Wall Street, I knew he had a serious chance to win.

But what is Kerry’s good story? Other than Bush had told bad ones?

Posted by at 2:59 AM | Permalink

“EU Rejects China’s ‘Market Economy’ Request,” by Dow Jones Newswire, Wall Street Journal, 29 June, p. A12.

“In China, Turf Battle Rages: Foreign Rivals Challenge Local Giants as Landscape Changes,” by Charles Hutzler, WSJ, 29 June, p. A12.

“Tortured Logistics Take Toll on Growth: Help for China’s creaky transport system is likely to come from foreign companies,” by Jane Lanhee Lee, WSJ, 29 June, p. A12.

Europe says, like the U.S., that they haven’t seen enough yet from China to call it a “market economy.” But that judgment is coming, it’s just a question of time. You can’t be the world’s #1 target of FDI and remain a non-market economy for long.

Another good example of that marketization of China coming full circle? When the Chinese Communist Party picks Dell for its order of several hundred new PCs, preferring it to the reigning domestic producer. Cripes!

But what really pushes China fastest down the pathway of more complete marketization is simply the logistics of moving all that commerce across a country roughly the size of the continental U.S. Again, back to the Decalogue: infrastructure determines all. For China to make the infrastructure happen, it will need foreign expertise aplenty, but foreign investment funds even more.

Posted by at 1:57 AM | Permalink

Dateline: Crown Plaza, Crystal City, Arlington VA, 28 June 2004
End of a long day. Started with 3&1/4 hour brief to new US Air Force class of one-star generals, then segued to 2&1/2 hour brief to the Secretary of Defense’s Corporate Fellows Program (a best and brightest group of officers sent to corporate America for a year to learn about the world outside the Pentagon). Day ends with a dinner meeting with some people who are offering me the possibility of a new home for this site that would leverage their next-generation capabilities on the web.

Meanwhile, it’s getting hard not to pick up the palpable sense, both here in DC and around the country, that Bush could well be going down in this election. Inside the Beltway, the State Department honors diplomats who openly challenged the White House on its foreign policies decision in Iraq over the past year (“Diplomats Honored For Dissent: Envoys Challenged Bush Foreign Policy,” by Peter Slevin, Washington Post, 28 June, p. A19), while the largest federal employees union announces its endorsement of Kerry (“Federal Employees’ Union Endorses Kerry,” by Christopher Lee, Washington Post, 28 June, p. A19). Outside the Beltway, Michael Moore’s “Fahrenheit 9/11” scores the highest box-office total ever for a documentary film in its first weekend, doing some serious business in so-called red states, or those historically considered in the Bush camp (“The Political ‘Fahrenheit’ Sets Record At Box Office,” by Sharon Waxman, New York Times, 28 June, p. B1). Beyond the borders of this country, the experience in Iraq calls into question the central foreign policy of this administration, or the so-called Bush Doctrine of preemptive war (“Iraq Occupation Erodes Bush Doctrine,” by Robin Wright, Washington Post, 28 June, p. A1.).

Where does all this seem to go? At the very least it engenders a weird sense of career crossroads for me: the material has never seemed stronger in terms of its appeal to a broad audience, and yet the natural partisanship of the election season leaves me feeling oddly protective of this administration even as its enters its period of harshest criticism surrounding the handover in Iraq. Part of me hates the notion of starting over with a new crew, because it’s a hassle and there’s so much inefficiency in waiting for everything to restart again in the Pentagon as one slew of political masters is exchanged for another. But another part of me gets excited by the challenge of testing my material’s bipartisan appeal—in effect the message is meaningless if it can’t be translated across administrations as they come and go (and they will always come and go as far as the Pentagon is concerned).

But the biggest part of me simply wants the U.S. military to succeed in Iraq, because ultimately this is my home team, with whom I live, work and breathe on a daily basis, and frankly, right now they’re facing the acid test in Iraq (“Biggest Task for U.S. General Is Training Iraqis to Fight Iraqis,” by Dexter Filkins, New York Times, 27 June, p. A1), so any sense of getting jacked up by a Democratic win in November that’s fueled by a sense of failure in Iraq makes me feel more than a bit queasy. It’s like cheering your team’s losses so it can get the top pick in next year’s draft.

For me, at least, a big part of working for the federal government is believing in what you do—day in and day out. I decided long ago that even as I worked as a Democrat within the Department of Defense, it wasn’t going to be a situation whereby I sat out “enemy” administrations (either literally by leaving the government or figuratively by “going my own way”) and only played goal line-to-goal line when “my” team was in power. Life’s too short, administrations are too long, and America means too much to me. Plus, in working with the first Bush administration (as contractor), then two Clintons (contractor, then government employee), and now back with Bush the younger (always as employee), I’ve always made a point on working on those aspects of the foreign policy I felt comfortable pursuing, even if I didn’t always care for the execution of that overall policy in an A-to-Z sense. In short, I prefer to strike whatever matches I’m provided than curse the darkness.

And yes, it’s not lost on me that much of my recent “rise” is based on the notion that my book presents a solution set to the strategic failure that our occupation in Iraq has so far yielded (even as I believe in its long-term success)—i.e., the notion that the need for the bifurcation of the U.S. military into separate Leviathan (warfighting) and Sys Admin (peacewaging) forces is “proven” by events in Iraq (e.g., the Michael O’Hanlon verdict on why I should declare “victory”). Absent that failure, a major portion of my emerging reputation as “strategic seer” would be missing-in-the-action that was yet another neocon success story (the comeback I often got in my brief following the success in Afghanistan was, “Our great-power-war military did just fine taking down the Taliban, so why should we refocus our forces on this new paradigm you offer?”).

Deep down I know that even if Bush loses (something I still remain personally skeptical about), nothing really changes in the international security environment that my vision, my book, and my material—I believe—so accurately captures. All that reality out there remains: globalization will continue to encroach upon the Middle East, that encroachment will engender a scary response from some in those quarters, and the global war on terrorism will continue to rage on—whether we engage it in an avowed fashion or not. The Gap will have to be shrunk and the U.S. military will be inevitably called upon in a frequent fashion to deal with the worst “bad actor” players and regimes within those regions. It all may be called something different by a different administration, but none of the underlying reality will change, even as the relative emphases placed on particular aspects will rise and ebb—as they naturally do over the course of time.

So what to do in the months ahead? The simplest and smartest answer is to stick with what I know best: working with the next generation of military leaders for the tasks I know they’ll be called upon to complete in a global war on terrorism . . . or whatever this struggle gets called next.

That’s what this day has been all about—a good reminder of where I work, whom I serve, and why I continue to love this job.

Posted by at 11:53 PM | Permalink

Dateline: SWA flight from Providence to BWI, 27 June 2004

Great communication Saturday from the Civilian Affairs Officers Association senior leadership: they want to get me in front of a very large National Guard audience as soon as possible.

Great email Sunday from a financial advisor whose last monthly report to his 500 clients ended with a P.S. that read: you have got to buy this book no matter what!

I get emails upon emails from people who say they’ve seen Book Notes, or the brief, or the WSJ page-one profile, or read the book, or been to the website (or done all of the above) and they always end with the promise to push all their friends/coworkers/relatives/neighbors to go out and READ THIS BOOK!

The viral marketing has just begun . . ..

The catch from Saturday:

The new hi-lo mix is Leviathan + Sys Admin

“Army Used Speed and Might, Plus Cash, Against Shiite Rebel: Battle’s Tactics Studied as a Model for the Future,” by Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 27 June, p. A1.

A woman’s right to vote . . . inside the Gap

“Out of Sight, Afghan Women Still Register to Vote,” by Carlotta Gall, NYT, 27 June, p. A1.

Koreas come closer: “The devil made us do it!”

“Koreas Sidestep U.S. to Forge Political and Pragmatic Links,” by James Brooke, NYT, 27 June, p. A1.

“U.S. Reports Scant Progress in Talks With North Korea,” by Joseph Kahn, NYT, 27 June, p. A3.

Naw, Russia and China with no strategic interests in a GWOT

“Police in Ingushetia Tell Of Rebel Assailants’ Skill And Lethal Ruthlessness: Attacks by bands of Islamic insurgents were well planned and coordinated,” by C.J. Chivers, NYT, 27 June, p. A5.

“China Pays a Price for Cheaper Oil: Sulfur-Laden Fuels Contribute to Growing Pollution Problem,” by Keith Bradsher, NYT, 27 June, p. B1.

Exporting insecurity is Michael Moore’s calling card

“All Hail Moore: Around the world in 80 insults,” by David Brooks, NYT, 27 June, p. A27.

Posted by at 10:51 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“Army Used Speed and Might, Plus Cash, Against Shiite Rebel: Battle’s Tactics Studied as a Model for the Future,” by Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 27 June, p. A1.

Great story about how the First Armored Division recaptured a string of towns in southern Iraq that were loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr:

“As described by top commanders in Iraq and senior policy makers in Washington, the campaign was a mix of military tactics, political maneuverings, media management and a generous dollop of cash for quickly rebuilding war-ravaged cities—a formula that, if it survives the test of time, could become a model for future fighting against the persistent insurrections plaguing Iraq.”

When I’m told that the Sys Admin function is a pipe dream, because you can’t expect a small force to be able to do both the small-scale fighting and the nation-building without putting the troops at too much risk (the other half of the Powell Doctrine—or “overwhelming force” at all cost), you read about an operation like this and you know we simply have no idea how good our people could be at this sort of follow-on stuff once we really give them the chance to both experiment and learn.

I’ve said it before and I say it again: the Iraq war proved the Leviathan force was essentially transformed, but the Iraq occupation transforms the transformation by shifting the future of experimentation in the direction of the Sys Admin function and—eventually—the Sys Admin force.

Posted by at 10:37 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“Out of Sight, Afghan Women Still Register to Vote,” by Carlotta Gall, New York Times, 27 June, p. A1.

Interesting story about how much harder it proves to be to get Afghan women registered to vote than men. Guy registration team pulls into town with 300 households and has everyone signed in within 3 days.

Female registration team pulls in on same day but has a much slower time of it. Why? Women rarely leave home compounds, so unlike the guys who simply assemble as required, the women must be visited by the registration team—household by household. And you just know this registration team is dressed as conservatively as possible, otherwise “they would throw stones at us.”

This door-to-door service is a simple compromise with tradition. In certain ultra-conservative Pashtun regions women simply never leave the house.

But these women will vote, and that’s all that matters for now.

[QUICK NOTE: The Sunday Times had a story about a bus carrying voter registration teams being bombed by the Taliban. Two women on board the bus died. Whichever god you worship, those two women were doing his/her best work.]

Posted by at 10:31 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“Koreas Sidestep U.S. to Forge Political and Pragmatic Links,” by James Brooke, New York Times YT, 27 June, p. A1.

“U.S. Reports Scant Progress in Talks With North Korea,” by Joseph Kahn, NYT, 27 June, p. A3.

The two Koreas are rapidly dismantling the propaganda-blasting hardware that’s lined the DMZ for many years, blasting each side with messages that neither listened to.

Just another sign of how the two sides are coming together. Kim Jong Il hasn’t changed much at all. On the one hand, he lets little experiments of marketization bloom here and there, but on the other hand he still stonewalls after the recent horrendous rail explosion disaster that left hundreds maimed, refusing to let aid workers come into the country to treat the wounded. Kim talks a nicer tune to the South Koreans, but still engages in major-league narcotics and counterfeit currency trafficking all over Asia. His gulag camps are teaming and desperately starving peasants still risk life and limb to escape, but heh! The next generation of South Korean youth think he’s not half bad!

So South Korea becomes the biggest aid, trade, and tourism source, and Seoul becomes Pyongyang’s biggest apologist around the world.

Why can’t America just leave this lovefest alone?

I’ll tell you why. The harder the line we push the more South Korea finally begins to take some responsibility for the peninsula as a whole, instead of outsourcing all the security stuff to the Americans. This country should have been reunited at the same time the rest of the socialist bloc fell apart. This leftover from the Cold War needs to become Asia’s problem and thus Asia’s solution. So the harder the U.S. line, the more Seoul will step up.

In the end, Seoul must be the biggest player in the six-nation team that ends Kim’s maniacal regime. If young South Koreans who today are convinced that America is the real danger on the peninsula later claim that the reunification was pursued simply to halt “those crazy Americans” from starting the war, then so much the better.

Go ahead Seoul: tear down that DMZ!

Posted by at 10:24 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“Police in Ingushetia Tell Of Rebel Assailants’ Skill And Lethal Ruthlessness: Attacks by bands of Islamic insurgents were well planned and coordinated,” by C.J. Chivers, New York Times, 27 June, p. A5.

“China Pays a Price for Cheaper Oil: Sulfur-Laden Fuels Contribute to Growing Pollution Problem,” by Keith Bradsher, NYT, 27 June, p. B1.

The Russians are getting worried that the Muslim insurgents they’re facing down south are looking more and more professional and organized. On NPR Thursday night the Atlantic Monthly’s senior editor Jack Beatty mocked my notion that the U.S. and Russia might have common interests in a Global War on Terrorism against Islamic extremists, saying they were too busy with their own Islamic problems. But guess what? When that problem starts looking way more organized than it did a while back, the overlap of interests might seem a bit more apparent—even to magazine editors.

As for China and energy, surely there’s no overlap there with a GWOT which has an avowed goal of transforming the Middle East? Higher oil prices mean the “sweet” stuff (lower sulfur content and thus less pollutive) goes to the highest bidders, which doesn’t include China. So they get by primarily by buying the cheaper “sour” stuff with higher sulfer-content. What that pinch does to China is raise its already disastrously high pollution content in major urban areas. Think that’s gonna matter in a country facing a five-fold increase in cars in the next two decades?

No Mr. Beatty, China has no interest in helping America bring stability to the Middle East. None whatsoever.

Posted by at 10:05 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“All Hail Moore: Around the world in 80 insults,” by David Brooks, New York Times , 27 June, p. A27.

[webmaster's note: Movie Review: Fahrenheit 9/11 by Thomas P.M. Barnett]

Brooks really tears into Michael Moore in this column, primarily by quoting the stuff he routinely peddles abroad in Europe:

“[Americans] are possibly the dumbest people on the plant . . . in thrall to conniving, thieving smug [pieces of human anatomy].”

“We Americans suffer from an enforced ignorance. We don’t know about anything that’s happening outside our country. Our stupidity is embarrassing.”

“That’s why we’re smiling all the time. You can see us coming down the street. You know, ‘Hey! Hi! How’s it going?’ We’ve got that big [expletive] grin on our face all the time because our brains aren’t loaded down.”

“You’re stuck with being connected to this country of mine, which is known for bringing sadness and misery to places around the globe.”

“Should such an ignorant people lead the world?”

“Don’t go the American way when it comes to economics, jobs and services for the poor and immigrants. It is the wrong way.”

“The motivation for war is simple. The U.S. government started the war with Iraq in order to make it easy for U.S. corporations to do business in other countries. They intend to use cheap labor in those countries, which will make Americans rich.”

“The Iraqis who have risen up against the occupation are not ‘insurgents’ or ‘terrorists’ or ‘The Enemy.’ They are the REVOLUTION, the Minutemen, and their numbers will grow—and they will win.”

Posted by at 9:18 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 26 June 2004

Approximately one month following my interview with Alec Russell, DC bureau chief of the London-based Daily Telegraph, here is the resulting article finally. The length of time for him to generate the piece was clearly tied to all the other sources he tapped for either supporting or dissenting views.

Daily Telegraph
June 26, 2004

US military faces future as Jekyll and Hyde force
(Filed: 26/06/2004)

The idea that an army makes war and makes peace is gaining ground, writes Alec Russell in Washington

The sprawl of neat, identikit Virginian suburbs south-west of Washington is familiar to any aficionado of Cold War thrillers: this is the heartland of America's "military-industrial complex". It is here that military and intelligence chiefs make the decisions that shake - or at least shape - the world.
And it is here that, early one steamy morning recently, a dozen top officials and analysts gathered in a glistening plate-glass office block for a briefing that was to shake them to their core.

They had come to hear a dyed-in-the-wool Democrat and former teacher of Marxist studies argue that the American military should be split in two. The first, dubbed "Leviathan", would fight. The second, the "System Administrators", would rebuild failed states to pre-empt crises and so help secure America.

Together they would reshape the "Gap", a swathe of the world stretching across Africa and the Middle East, and much of Latin America and south-east and central Asia.

Tom Barnett, a professor at the US Naval War College, "packages" his message with a mix of very "un-Pentagon" allusions from Monty Python to Star Trek. But any shock at his zany approach is quickly overshadowed by the reaction to his thesis. It is, he concedes, an explosive idea.

"It's a generational thing," he said after a lively opening session. "A lot of the guys who fought this were the oldest in the room. They say it's their 'goddamned' army and they fear it's going to be turned into a bunch of peacekeepers.

" 'You want us to take someone down, tell us who it is and we'll go do it,' they say. 'Let us remain a warrior force. Don't screw us up'."

But with the American military clearly struggling in Iraq, his radical solution to the Pentagon's dilemma in how to confront the post-September 11 world is not seen as the heresy that it would have been a few years ago. His briefing has made its way through the upper levels of the Pentagon to the office of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary.

If you walk into the Pentagon's "transformation" headquarters, carrying Prof Barnett's book, The Pentagon's New Map, officials nod and say "ah, the book" - even if in some other parts of the Pentagon officials snort when you mention its name.

"There comes a time in history when rule sets are out of whack," says the professor. "There isn't any situation we can't go into where we can't run up a score of 100 to nothing at half-time. The problem is that we have a first half team and don't invest in the second half.

"We don't have any four-star generals working the second half. There are no four-star military police generals. Why? Because their work has been seen as a sideshow, an attitude that many in the Pentagon may be regretting given the scandal over prisoner abuse in Iraq.

"Leviathan will be like a metropolitan Swat team. They go in and do their stuff and as soon as the smoke clears they are out of there. Then there will be a force that is closer to society. It is 'your mum's military'. Its members will be older, married, more educated.

"In Iraq now, guys who aren't built for war-fighting are being forced to do it. I get calls from the corps of engineers out in Iraq and they're saying, 'Thank God somebody said this'."

Mr Barnett has expounded his theories at a time of extraordinary change for the American military. There are plans to cut by nearly half the 70,000 troops based in Germany by withdrawing the First Infantry and First Armoured divisions and replacing them with a brigade. Over the next two years about a third of the 37,000 troops in South Korea are being withdrawn.

The redeployments are in part a response to the changing nature of the military threat to America since the end of the Cold War. But they also reflect the zeal for radical change that marked Mr Rumsfeld's arrival in 2000 for his second stint as secretary of defence - his first was under President Gerald Ford - and the difficulties in Iraq.

The Rumsfeldian vision has not been well received in the Pentagon. Many uniformed officers see him as too overweening, and view his revolutionary proposals for cuts and changes with deep suspicion.

"I smile when I hear what is going on now," said one former high-ranking general. "Almost every sec def has spoken of transformation and yet their talk ends up full of sound and fury and signifying nothing.

"There is an institutional bias to keep things as they are. A lot of things Rumsfeld has agreed will drop dead if he leaves. And there are an awful lot of people who will be pleased to see him go. He came in saying, 'No more of this or that'."

Yet the course of events in Iraq and the need for rapid reaction forces across the globe have given an impetus to calls for change. "This is the age of the small, the fast and the many," said Retd Vice-Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the head of the office of transformation in the Pentagon. "We are moving away from the slow, the ponderous and the few."

The admiral has backed the Barnett vision, even if his experience suggests he is more of a natural "war-fighter" than a "nation-builder". And while a formal division of the army appears far-fetched, in light of the mishandling of Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion, the need for a radical overhaul of the army's ancillary units is undeniable.

Michael O'Hanlon, a senior analyst at Brookings Institute, said: "Barnett has already won. He should declare victory. It's not so much that he won the argument. Iraq won the argument for him."

This is not the first time that Prof Barnett has been "ahead of the curve". In 1991, as a young analyst, he briefed top admirals on the need to "embrace" the Soviet navy. Such was the outrage of his audience he had to break off his lecture.

"It went down like a lead balloon. Several admirals questioned my sanity. One wondered aloud if I was a 'pinko' or 'just plain stupid'. That got a lot of laughs and immediately my credibility was shot to pieces."

Six months later the Soviet Union was in ruins and he no longer looked so daft.

COMMENTARY: Not much to complain about in the piece. It’s actually the most well-pitched article yet on my “influence.” I say that because Russell stresses less my pull with people and more the simple pull of the vision. In other words, it ain’t about influence, but accuracy. If the vision is accurate, you should be able to spot the change.

I did like the bit about “your mum’s military”: a little bit of UK editing on that line. I also like the reference to “the book,” as it is described inside of the Office of Force Transformation. That makes me feel very good indeed—like I delivered the goods that Cebrowski originally hired me to generate.

The O’Hanlon quote is good too (the man is a high-quality quote machine), because it emphasizes the particular reality of the Leviathan/Sys Admin part of the vision: the failures in the Iraq occupation elevate that concept from whacko to imminently real. How do I know? Out of the many examples, here’s one I can openly cite: I was just asked to give the keynote address to Joint Forces Command’s first big lessons learned workshop to explore the new reality of postwar ops.

But declare victory? Hardly.

All this does is start the conversation and get the ball rolling. I’ve legitimized and given voice to something that must happen. Taking credit is a bit much; visions are like giving somebody with very poor vision a new pair of glasses that makes everything clear: they still have to do all the real work themselves, even if you get credit for pointing your finger in the right direction beforehand.

So buckle up, the real transformation of the U.S. military is just beginning.

Posted by at 5:10 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 25 June 2004

Last night on NPR's "On Point" show got a bit testy, largely because their in-house analyst, Jack Beatty, senior editor of Atlantic Monthly, insisted on constantly declaring all my ideas "incoherent," "impossible" and "dubious." Had he actually bothered to read the book? Naw. That would have interfered with his "expert analysis." Instead he glanced over the WSJ story and the op-ed I wrote for the Post.

It was an amazingly bold performance by Jack: pontificating with absolute assurance about how amazingly dangerous my vision was even though he hadn't actually bothered to look the book over. Makes you wonder if he also reviews movies he hasn't seen, plays he hasn't attended, and albums he's never listened to.

So, instead of real analysis from Jack, I got hyperbolic soundbites like "perpetual war."

Hey, wait a tick! Didn't I write an entire chapter about how to body slam blowhards who spout nonsense phrases when they have no command of the facts on the ground?

Good example: Beatty says my "diagnosis is dubious." He notes that the 9/11 terrorists did not come from unglobalized Afghanistan, but from very globalized Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon. He cites the numerous Victoria Secrets shops in mall frequented by the rich elite in Riyadh (sounds like some Tom Friedman in-depth analysis, yes?), the numerous Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets in Cairo (eat some KFC, become a finger-lickin' American instantly!), and Lebanon as the most cosmopolitan nation in the Middle East (hmmmm, in 1970 yes, but after two decades of civil war? Jack needs to visit Beirut again).

So I come back with a slew of statistics on trade, foreign direct investment, and such to portray the Middle East as unarguably the least connected region to the global economy—even more so than Sub-Saharan Africa and suggest that Jack's definition of a truly globalized society is a bit "distorted." I also note out loud that "Jack clearly hasn't read my book, because otherwise he'd have a better grasp of the data."

Jack has nothing to say about any of that, confirming my suspicion that his preparation for the show consisted of about 3 minutes of glancing over the two aforementioned articles.

The Brit subbing host, Julian Marshall, then asks me to describe the Leviathan-Sys Admin concepts, which I do in detail, and then asks Jack to comment on all those seemingly "can't-argue-with-that" ideas, but Jack dismisses all that radical restructuring of the U.S. military as just "tactical" stuff that he won't touch. Instead he says he wants to concentrate on "big picture" and then details how I plan to "scrap" NATO completely and how my ideas of allying with Russia, China, and India are complete madness since all three states have problems with Muslims already (apparently no overlap on issues to be found there). I, later in the show, counter with the reality of developing Asia's growing dependency on Middle Eastern oil, but Jack has nothing to say on global economics, as he prefers to stick with the "big picture" of why everything I say is complete balderdash.

The host lets me talk about shrinking the Gap at length and I describe the up-front role of FDI, but promos he recites later in the show ask whether my idea of making the military the "primary tool" of shrinking the Gap is dangerous, and will it lead to "perpetual war"?

Since I had given a very long answer at the start of the show regarding why the notion of "perpetual war" was nonsense, given a cursory reading of the global security environment (hell, I wrote a whole chapter on the subject), I started to get a bit testy as the show progressed. Basically I refused to answer one question on Iraq until I had a chance to blast them on constantly using the "perpetual war" phrase as a dishonest teaser to frighten the audience, and then I took both Marshall and Beatty to task for insisting that my vision called for "scraping NATO." I once again noted loudly that it was obvious that neither of them had bothered to read the book and were basing all this conversation on their readings of other people's criticisms of my work. Naturally, neither of them had any response to that, preferring to lecture me repeatedly on keeping my answers short and to the point! Apparently, I was just supposed to sit there and listen to them repeatedly describe "perpetual war" and my plan to "scrap NATO" and not refute either.

One caller is nice enough to call me a "total psychopath" who seeks a "force of little psychopaths" to carry out my "whacked out agenda."

Julian laughs and invites me to answer this "impassioned question," but instructs me yet again to keep my answer short (meaning no criticizing the hosts for being too lazy to bother reading my book whatsoever).

One caller from Green Bay WI (natch!) actually read the book, said he liked it, and gave me two great questions to deal with.

The show wrapped up with Jack Beatty once again decrying the myopia of my military-does-everything vision, saying a much better idea to shrink the Gap would be for the Core to end their high agricultural barriers to trade.

At that point I couldn't stand it anymore and started shouting into the microphone (I was in Providence, they were in Boston and NH): "Chapter 7 in my book! Chapter 7 in my book! You can read it all!"

Actually, I was mistaken in the heat of the moment. My description of that much-needed change in Core behavior is found on page 131 of Chapter 3, as well as pages 371, 374, 375, and 378 of Chapter 8.

You'd think "analyst" Jack could have actually come up with an example of what my vision really needed to encompass that wasn't actually mentioned a handful of times in my book, but perhaps I expect too much from lazy-ass journalists who moonlight on NPR.

Jack's only response to my pointing out that the very thing he accused me of lacking in my vision actually being prominent in my book was simply to retort, "Well . . . good!"

Then he noted how China was globalizing without presenting the U.S. with any security threats (hmmm, that sounds vaguely familiar to me . . . I wonder if I managed to get that bit into the book), and I responded with noting that none of the 9/11 hijackers came from China, but from the Middle East—that disconnected part of the global economy that Jack believes is highly integrated thanks to KFC and Victoria's Secrets outlets—which is why the GWOT is logically located there.

Jack flustered silently at that point and was never heard from again.

All I can say is that if Jack's journalistic work ethic was on display, God help his bosses at the Atlantic Monthly.

You may think I ask for too much effort from NPR on this, but I figure, if you book an author for an entire one-hour show, you need to have someone there on the air with him who's made at least some effort to peruse the book here and there, and isn't simply relying on what other people have said. The reason why my interview with Brian Lamb was so good on CSPAN was because he'd actually read the book quite thoroughly. Beatty could have been honest enough (dare I say man enough?) to actually admit he hadn't read the book, something most interviewers do openly when that's the case, but instead he blustered on without fear, declaring me a serious threat to serious strategizing everywhere. Beatty is one serious, prime-cut blowhard, but as the WPRI station guy told me after the show (WPRI is the NPR affiliate in Providence where I was), that's basically Beatty's designed role when "On Point" has only one guest and that guest has strong views.

So what does Beatty really believe in? He's sounded more hawkish than Rumsfeld in the past, blowing major smoke about smoking holes in the weeks after 9/11, but since I was on last night and was clearly identified with the Bush Administration, he blew a different tune, claiming that the majority of Americans wanted Bush "impeached." Rumsfeld wannabe one year, Michael Moore wannabe the next—you gotta like a man of principle!

Still, all in all, the show made for good radio. NPR can be so boring sometimes it's almost good to go to sleep by. Last night's "On Point" was clearly an exception to that far-too-often rule, but I have to state again how disappointed I was by the cursory preparation the people connected with the show put into its production. Nobody likes blowhards, but lazy ones are downright nasty!

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Today's catch:

The military I have worked with over my entire career

"Ask Someone Who Was There," by Maj. Stan Coerr, posted at http://www.247profits.com/Sites/frontline/FrontlineUpdate20040618.html

"Time to Act on N. Korea," by Vaclav Havel, Washington Post, 18 June, p. A29.

"Iran's Nuclear Ambitions: Teheran will always want a nuclear option. Regime change can ensure it's not a threat," by Ardeshir Zahedi, Wall Street Journal, 25 June, p. A10.

"Mistakes Loom Large as Handover Nears: Missed Opportunities Turned High Ideals to Harsh Realities," by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, WP, 20 June, p. A1.

"An Indian Paradox: Bumper Harvests And Rising Hunger: The World Has Enough Food, But Poor Can't Afford It; Grows Jobs and Crops," by Roger Thurow and Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal, 25 June, p. A1.

"Deadly Assaults Push Iraq Closer To Martial Law: Attacks Kill More Than 100; New Government Prepares A Controversial Crackdown," by Yochi J. Dreazen and Greg Jaffe, WSJ, 25 June, p. A1.

"Errors on Terror," by Paul Krugman, New York Times, 25 June, p. A25.

"To Alleviate Fears, the Saudis Will Now Allow Foreigners to Carry Weapons," by Neil MacFarquhar, NYT, 25 June, p. A13.

"Tunisia's Tangled Web Is Sticking Point for Reform," by Neil MacFarquhar, NYT, 25 June, p. A3.

"Brazil Leader Tailors Pitch To Investors," by Geraldo Samor, WSJ, 25 June, p. A9.

Posted by at 8:28 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

When I had to suffer through Jack Beatty's know-it-all diatribes about how a "landslide" of Americans reject this war and how it's dangerous to ask Americans to die for such a disastrous cause as our takedown of Saddam and occupation of Iraq has become, I found my mind wandering to my many years of working with the military and what I have come to understand about the people who make up this amazing institution. The following article, reprinted in full, reminds me all too well why the U.S. military is the best in the world—and easily the most underappreciated.

http://www.247profits.com/Sites/frontline/FrontlineUpdate20040618.html

Friday Jun 18, 2004

Ask Someone Who Was There

By Maj. Stan Coerr

George Bush coalesced American support behind invading Iraq, I am told, using two arguments: Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and the capability to deliver them, and Iraq was a supporter of Al-Qaeda terrorism, and may have been involved in the attacks of 9/11. Vicious words and gratuitous finger-pointing keep falling back on these points, as people insist that “we” were misled into what started as a dynamic liberation and has become a bloody counterinsurgency. Watching politicians declaim and hearing television experts expound on why we went to war and on their opinions of those running the White House and Defense Department, I have one question.

When is someone going to ask the guys who were there?

What about the opinions of those whose lives were on the line, massed on the Iraq-Kuwait border beginning in February of last year? I don’t know how President Bush got the country behind him, because at the time I was living in a hole in the dirt in northern Kuwait. Why have I not heard a word from anyone who actually carried a rifle or flew a plane into bad guy country last year, and who has since had to deal with the ugly aftermath of a violent liberation? What about the guys who had the most to lose – what do they think about all this?

I was there. I am one of those guys who fought the war and helped keep the peace. I am a Major in the Marine Reserves, and during the war I was the senior American attached to the 1 Royal Irish Battlegroup, a rifle battalion of the British Army. I was commander of five U.S. Marine air/naval gunfire liaison teams, as well as the liaison officer between U.S. Marines and British Army forces. I was activated on January 14, 2003, and 17 days later I and my Marines were standing in Kuwait with all of our gear, ready to go to war.

I majored in Political Science at Duke, and I graduated with a Masters degree in government from the Kennedy School at Harvard. I understand realpolitik, geopolitical jujitsu, economics and the reality of the Arab world. I know the tension between the White House, the UN, Langley and Foggy Bottom. One of my grandfathers was a two-star Navy admiral; my other grandfather was an ambassador. I am not a pushover, blindly following whoever is in charge, and I don’t kid myself that I live in a perfect world. But the war made sense then, and the occupation makes sense now.

As dawn broke on March 22, 2003, I became part of one of the largest and fastest land movements in the history of war. I went across the border alongside my brothers in the Royal Irish, following the 5th Marine Regiment from Camp Pendleton as they swept through the Ramaylah oil fields. I was one those guys you saw on TV every night- filthy, hot, exhausted. I think the NRA and their right-to-bear-arms mantra is a joke, but by God I was carrying a loaded rifle, a loaded pistol and a knife on my body at all times. My boots rested on sandbags on the floor of my Humvee, there to protect me from the blast of a land mines or IED.

I killed many Iraqi soldiers, as they tried to kill me and my Marines. I did it with a radio, directing airstrikes and artillery, in concert with my British artillery officer counterpart, in combat along the Hamar Canal in southern Iraq. I saw, up close, everything the rest of you see in the newspapers: dead bodies, parts of dead bodies, helmets with bullet holes through them, handcuffed POWs sitting in the sand, oil well fires with flames reaching 100 feet into the air and a roar you could hear from over a mile away.

I stood on the bloody sand where Marine Second Lieutenant Therrel Childers was the first American killed on the ground. I pointed a loaded weapon at another man for the first time in my life. I did what I had spent 14 years training to do, and my Marines - your Marines - performed so well it still brings tears to my eyes to think about it. I was proud of what we did then, and I am proud of it now.

Along with the violence, I saw many things that lifted my heart. I saw thousands of Iraqis in cities like Qurnah and Medinah - men, women, children, grandparents carrying babies - running into the streets at the sight of us, the first Western army to arrive. I saw them screaming, crying, waving, cheering. They ran from their homes at the sound of our Humvee tires roaring in from the south, bringing bread and tea and cigarettes and photos of their children. They chattered at us in Arabic, and we spoke to them in English, and neither understood the other. The entire time I was in Iraq, I had one impression from the civilians I met: Thank God, finally someone has arrived with bigger men and bigger guns to be, at last, on our side.

Let there be no mistake, those of you who don’t believe in this war: the Ba’ath regime were the Nazis of the second half of the 20th century. I saw what the murderous, brutal regime of Saddam Hussein wrought on that country through his party and their Fedayeen henchmen. They raped, murdered, tortured, extorted and terrorized those in that country for 35 years. There are mass graves throughout Iraq only now being discovered. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, out of Camp Pendleton, liberated a prison in Iraq populated entirely by children. The Ba’athists brutalized the weakest among them, and killed the strongest.

I saw in the eyes of the people how a generation of fear reflects in the human soul.

The Ba’ath Party, like the Nazis before them, kept power by spreading out, placing their officials in every city and every village to keep the people under their boot. Everywhere we went we found rifles, ammunition, RPG rounds, mortar shells, rocket launchers, and artillery. When we took over the southern city of Ramaylah, our battalion commander tore down the Ba’ath signs and commandeered the former regime headquarters in town (which, by the way, was 20 feet from the local school.) My commander himself took over the office of the local Ba’ath leader, and in opening the desk of that thug found a set of brass knuckles and a gun. These are the people who are now in prison, and that is where they deserve to be.

The analogy is simple. For years, you have watched the same large, violent man come home every night, and you have listened to his yelling and the crying and the screams of children and the noise of breaking glass, and you have always known that he was beating his wife and his children. Everyone on the block has known it. You ask, cajole, threaten and beg him to stop, on behalf of the rest of the neighborhood. Nothing works. After listening to it for 13 years, you finally gather up the biggest, meanest guys you can find, you go over to his house, and you kick the door down. You punch him in the face and drag him away. The house is a mess, the family poor and abused — but now there is hope. You did the right thing.

I can speak with authority on the opinions of both British and American infantry in that place and at that time. Let me make this clear: at no time did anyone say or imply to any of us that we were invading Iraq to rid the country of weapons of mass destruction, nor were we there to avenge 9/11. We knew we were there for one reason: to rid the world of a tyrant, and to give Iraq back to Iraqis.

None of us had even heard those arguments for going to war until we returned, and we still don’t understand the confusion. To us, it was simple. The world needed to be rid of a man who committed mass murder of an entire people, and our country was the only one that could project that much power that far and with that kind of precision. We don’t make policy decisions: we carry them out. And none of us had the slightest doubt about how right and good our actions were.

The war was the right thing to do then, and in hindsight it was still the right thing to do. We can’t overthrow every murderous tyrant in the world, but when we can, we should. Take it from someone who was there, and who stood to lose everything. We must, and will, stay the course. We owe it to the Iraqis, and to the world.

Stan Coerr is a SuperCobra attack helicopter pilot and Forward Air Controller, and was recently selected for Lieutenant Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve. He lives in San Diego.

Posted by at 8:06 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Time to Act on N. Korea," by Vaclav Havel, Washington Post, 18 June, p. A29.

Great op-ed in the Post. Havel notes that humanity has found out about genocide in the past through eye-witness accounts, and that we now have the testimony of thousands of North Korean refugees in our possession regarding the amazingly cruel regime of Kim Jong Il—"a man responsible for the loss of millions of lives."

As Havel notes, "[Kim] sustains one of the largest armies in the word and is producing weapons of mass destruction even as the centrally planned economy and the state ideology—known as juche, a blend of nationalism and self-reliance—have led the country into famine."

When these desperate political refugees escape into China, what does it do? It refuses to recognize them as required by international treaties, and forces them back across the border, where—when caught—these people are thrown into political prisoner gulag camps.

And if these famished people make it into South Korea? As Havel writes, "their presence there flies in the face of that country's official 'sunshine policy,' which, however well-intentioned, is based on constant concessions and appeasement"—a policy that, in the end, "only keeps the leader of Pyongyang in power."

What is Kim's goal in all of this?

"He wants to be respected and feared abroad and to be recognized as one of the world's most powerful leaders. He is willing to let his own people die of hunger, and he uses famine to liquidate those who show any sign of wavering loyalty to his rule. Through blackmail, he receives food and oil, which he distributes among those loyal to him (first in line being the army)."

Hmmm . . . food . . oil . . . sanctions . . . lots of innocent people dying . . . ah yes, that would be the UN that so many hope will run the world on its own.

Havel wants a better, more decisive response from the Core. So do I.

Posted by at 7:58 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Iran's Nuclear Ambitions: Teheran will always want a nuclear option. Regime change can ensure it's not a threat," by Ardeshir Zahedi, Wall Street Journal, 25 June, p. A10.

Good op-ed from Iran's former foreign minister (1967-71—long before the Shah lost the respect of his people). His point is that there is no question Iran wants and will get the bomb. The only question is whether we want the current regime to have it. An Iran that's moderate like India and opening up to the outside world is not an issue with the bomb. But one that actively exports terrorism around the region, calls for Israel's destruction, and makes no attempt to hide its state support to al Qaeda—that regime should never get its hands on the nuclear button.

Posted by at 7:56 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Mistakes Loom Large as Handover Nears: Missed Opportunities Turned High Ideals to Harsh Realities," by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, 20 June, p. A1.

Great retrospective from Post on what went wrong in Iraq. Key points: disbanding the Iraq military and then ending up with one about one-third of the size desired at the point of handover; not hiring Iraqis in huge numbers (as planned and promised) for public works efforts (and not spending that money nearly fast enough); but most of all for not having enough U.S. troops on the ground at the start of the occupation. Overall, the Coalition Provisional Authority blew it by not going for quick victories designed to win hearts and minds, instead dawdling along on long-term projects that were easily derailed once the insurgency picked up speed. To call the plan "naïve" is an understatement, but it really misses the point. After 15 years of the perverting effect of the Powell Doctrine on the Pentagon's force structure planning, our force is simply not well balanced enough to win in the second half of any "regime change" invasion (the nation-building/peacekeeping half). And when you're that underfunded, underprioritized, and routinely denigrated by the system for that many years, you simply try to cover up your deficiencies by jumping in feet first and hoping for the best.

You can try to blame the Vulcans, or Clinton, but the truth is that the Pentagon did this to itself over the past decade and a half. They have no one to blame but themselves.

Posted by at 7:54 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"An Indian Paradox: Bumper Harvests And Rising Hunger: The World Has Enough Food, But Poor Can't Afford It; Grows Jobs and Crops," by Roger Thurow and Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal, 25 June, p. A1.

India is, in many ways, where China found itself at the beginning of the 1990s: they've solved the agricultural sector issues (got enough food), but now they need to really open up the industrial sector for the foreign direct investment that gets the national economy deeply integrated with that of the global economy. That's what China did in the 1990s, and that's why it is the powerhouse it is today. Until India catches up on FDI (it has really only begun to do so in the last few years), it will have rural poor who can't afford to buy the food that exists all around them.

This is why the turn to the Congress Party was unexpected: the rural poor feel left out of the globalization of the Indian economy up to now, which has remained highly isolated from the masses and concentrated in certain service industries. But unless Congress does a better job than the BJP in attracting FDI, it won't matter. Ideology is nice, but money talks.

Posted by at 7:50 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Deadly Assaults Push Iraq Closer To Martial Law: Attacks Kill More Than 100; New Government Prepares A Controversial Crackdown," by Yochi J. Dreazen and Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, 25 June, p. A1.

No surprise that the insurgency puts out as much effort as possible as the handover date nears. This strategy is as old as the hills: when the occupier gets ready to leave, ratchet up the violence so you can claim to have driven them out, plus you create such chaos that you improve your chances at grabbing power and instituting your repressive regime.

The bitch for the U.S. right now is that we're committed to keeping a lid on the violence and keeping the interim government in power. Since we have not done well in generating an Iraqi police force or military, we'll end up bodyguarding this regime in some very heavy-handed ways in coming months. None of it will be pretty, but we will learn from it and restructure our military as a result.

Posted by at 7:48 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Errors on Terror," by Paul Krugman, New York Times, 25 June, p. A25.

Bush-hating Paul Krugman rants on. A smart guy but he's gone so far over the deep end on Bush that he's no better than the NYT's Michael Moore on the subject.

Much ado over State Department report on terrorist acts around the world actually increasing in 2003—the worst total in 20 years. First edition of report claimed much lower numbers, but the definition of what to count was too narrow, so when analysts complained, the numbers were plussed up to reflect a better grasp of reality.

Krugman naturally sees a conspiracy—he of so much experience in doing this kind of security-issue data crunching over his career.

What I find so amusing is how Bush-haters take such delight in pointing out that there's more terrorism now than before 9/11, as if our finally joining this global war was supposed to result in the terrorists immediately giving up!

Imagine going to FDR in 1943 and complaining that his global war on fascism actually seemed to be backfiring because Japanese and German forces were fighting harder now than before! More than that, you could cite a huge up-tick in their attacks when compared to the period before 7 December 1941! Even worse, American casualties were rising!

Talk about having your head up your ass. And many of these idiots are considered "opinion leaders."

Posted by at 7:47 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"To Alleviate Fears, the Saudis Will Now Allow Foreigners to Carry Weapons," by Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times, 25 June, p. A13.

Saudis announce they are creating new rule set for Westerners that transgresses a very old one in the kingdom: they can now carry weapons to defend themselves against terrorists.

This move is designed to make foreign workers feel safer.

Yes, yes, happiness is a warm gun alright.

Posted by at 7:44 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Tunisia's Tangled Web Is Sticking Point for Reform," by Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times, 25 June, p. A3.

Nice story about how Tunisian authorities block access to any website they consider subversive, meaning anything that questions the rule of the government. Tunisia pays lip service to the concepts of democratization since 9/11, but monitors email in a wonderfully Orwellian fashion.

Actually, I should complain. I can't tell you how many times I am blocked from accessing websites while at work at the college. My favorite bone-headed example? I am not allowed to visit any "hate sites."

Pretty logical huh? I work at the "war college," but I shouldn't visit any sites that have to do with "hate."

I dunno, maybe I should just focus on the "love" sites . . . oops! Those are off-limits too.

Geez! Tunisia's not looking half-bad when I think about it . . ..

Posted by at 7:43 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Brazil Leader Tailors Pitch To Investors," by Geraldo Samor, Wall Street Journal, 25 June, p. A9.

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva swept into the presidency of Brazil with the air of a leftist reformer, a man of the people. And yet, he has won plenty of high marks from international observers for his business-friendly domestic reforms.

That's a neat balancing act that says Brazil remains in the Core. Here's the hard part though: "Although Mr. da Silva has won market applause for pursuing sound fiscal policy, Brazil still is struggling to attract foreign direct investment in such things as factories and equipment." The big hold-up according to investors? Government red-tape and poor rule sets on protecting patents and trademarks.

Still, da Silva is right to brag that "in just 18 months in office, we have already passed tax reform, social-security reform. We have approved a regulatory framework for the electricity sector. And Congress is voting on public-private partnerships and a new bankruptcy law."

When the FDI does start to flow, where should it go? No surprise, it's all about infrastructure and logistics to the tune of about $20B a year.

So let me get this straight: assuming you have security that allows your government to function, first thing you do is fix the rules, then that attracts the money from abroad, and then you build up the infrastructure, which in turn ends the bottlenecks on resources, and that'll get your economy growing, which should provide stability and increase marketization?

Brilliant. Simply brilliant.

I only wish I had put something like that in my book. Then blow-hard jackasses like Jack Beatty could read it and realize that my vision wasn't just about globalization-at-the-barrel-of-a-gun.

[sigh]

Posted by at 7:41 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

This is a test.

Posted by Josette at 6:22 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 24 June 2004

Dashing this off because I need to drive up to Providence to the local public radio station up there and appear on tonight's NPR show "On Point." They're pretty much giving me and the book the whole hour, which works out to about 45 minutes with all the news.

Today I got to chat briefly with a White House lawyer who's here at the college for a conference. He read the book, liked it plenty, and wanted to meet me briefly as a result. This fellow told me he sees the book on lots of desks inside the White House, and that he thinks it's being read there with a real eye for long-term strategy.

But of course, he had a bone to pick. Like a lot of people I interact with, he said he agreed with over 90% of the ideas. He just didn't like how I portrayed the USA Patriot Act of 2002 as "frightening" ( a word I do use on page 257) or as a "new rule set" per se. His point was a good one: in many ways, all the act does is extend a host of old legal rules that have been used for years and years regarding a number of "regular" crimes (sexual abuse of minors being one) to terrorism. More than that, the effect of those changes effectively dismantles the information firewall between law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies, something everyone—including the 9/11 Commission—seems so hot to do.

I replied that this was a "new rule set" for me, in that sense that old rules were being extended to cover what was—subsequent to 9/11—discovered to be a rule set "gap."

We went back and forth over that a bit, but before we broke up, I had to tell him that several reviews of the book tended to view my presentation of the Patriot Act as being highly supportive of its capacity to "remake" the social landscape of the US—in other words, that I was a quasi-fascist who delighted in it.

My new White House friend had to laugh at that one, as I myself often do. We agreed, that it was almost impossible to write anything about the act that does not send the extremists in both parties into fits of paranoid outbursts—such is the political dialogue of our age.

Today's catch:

Today's page 1 new rule thanks to 9/11

"Form and Function: Disguising Security As Something Artful: Ugly Barriers to Car bombers Put Up After 9/11 Morph Into 'Designer Bollards,'" by Mark Maremont, Wall Street Journal, 24 June, p. A1.

China wants market accreditation—now!

"China Contesting 'Nonmarket Economy' Status," by Charles Hutzler and Qiu Haixu, WSJ, 24 June, p. A15.

Egypt: the forgotten man in the Middle East future worth creating

"Egyptian Aide in Talks on Future Security Role in Gaza," by Joseph Berger, New York Times, 24 June, p. A3.

Better rules or better rulers in Latin America?

"Latin America Graft and Poverty Trying Patience With Democracy," by Juan Forero, NYT, 24 June, p. A1.

Beheadings as the new asymmetrical warfare tool of choice

"Afghan Officials Deny Reports Of Soldiers Beheading Prisoners," by David Rhode, NYT, 24 June, p. A12.

"Assessing a Gruesome Toll After a Rash of Beheadings: A terrorist act called the ultimate symbol of power over an enemy," by Daniel J. Wakin, NYT, 24 June, p. A12.

US to ICC: you can your own way (go your own waaay!)

"U.S. Drops Plan to Exempt G.I.'s From U.N. Court: Political Loss in Council: No Effect Seen for Troops—Outcome Is Tied to Iraq Prison Scandal," by Warren Hoge, 24 June, p. A1

Posted by at 3:30 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Form and Function: Disguising Security As Something Artful: Ugly Barriers to Car bombers Put Up After 9/11 Morph Into 'Designer Bollards,'" by Mark Maremont, Wall Street Journal, 24 June, p. A1.

In my brief, I declare that it is still possible on a daily basis to pick up a major newspaper (Post, Journal, Times) and see "every day some new rule set coming out of the 9/11 experience." I used to note that you could find one every day on page 1, which isn't as true anymore, since most of these rules are fairly boring and thus get stuck many pages into the paper (a lot have to do with record keeping).

So this story tickled my fancy, being in the middle column of the Journal. It simply describes how the second wave of car bomb-barriers is appearing and this second wave sees designers trying not just to hide the obvious functionality of the barriers but actually trying to make them seem artistic.

Now, most will note that this push for car bomb barriers really goes back to Oklahoma City. But like my talk with the White House lawyer, my point is this: after Oklahoma that new rule set applied only to key governmental buildings, whereas after 9/11 it applied to a far wider array of buildings both pubic and—more importantly—private sector. For example, when I was in the new CNN building off Columbus Circle in Manhattan in mid May to do Headline News, Lou Dobbs, and Dolans Unscripted, the first thing I noticed getting out of the car was the high-tech car bomb barriers they had ringing the place.

Posted by at 3:20 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"China Contesting 'Nonmarket Economy' Status," by Charles Hutzler and Qiu Haixu, Wall Street Journal, 24 June, p. A15.

China keeps losing rulings in the WTO, in large part because it is classified as a "nonmarket economy," which means it is subjected to one standard while market economies are subjected to another. For China to do better in these cases, it needs to be reclassified, something some states are already doing on their own—like Thailand and New Zealand (not surprisingly, small Asian economies who are adjusting to China's rise are the first to do this).

The U.S. and EU are holding firm for now. As Don Evans, the U.S. Commerce Secretary has argued, China "must stop micromanaging its economy, he said, and roll back controls over large enterprises, raw materials, real estate, the currency, and China's banking system."

Exactly when to give into China's demand is a tricky call, because China has some serious rule-setting ambitions of its own. As the chief negotiator for China's entry into the WTO once told his aides, "China will one day set the rules for others to follow."

Sounds bold, yes? But China needs to grow up a whole lot more to understand the meaning of that claim. Right now China is always arguing about "what the world needs to give China," and that makes sense in many ways given the changes the leadership is engineering there to make their internal rule sets synch up better with the Core's emerging rule sets. And yes, someday China's power in the global economy will mean it too will set some of the rules that others will have to follow. But setting rules is not about bossing countries around, but about enunciating rules that keep things as fair as possible. When China finally gets to the point of being able to enunciate some of those Core rules that define the workings of the global economy, their mindset will have to shift from today's "what can the world do for China" attitude to one that emphasizes "what the world needs from China."

Getting into the latter mindset is what global leadership is all about. China is nowhere near ready for that, although it is making all the right moves to get to that historical space. Let's hope the intellectual maturity arrives just in time, because nobody likes a bossy superpower—as this current White House has discovered to its regret time and time again.

I say again: globalization comes with rules, not a ruler. Remember that China, and you'll become the country the world needs you to become.

Posted by at 3:20 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Egyptian Aide in Talks on Future Security Role in Gaza," by Joseph Berger, New York Times, 24 June, p. A3.

It is easy to forget Egypt nowadays, because it's relatively quiet there. There is plenty wrong with Egypt, like their inability to rotate their leadership regularly, but there is plenty right too, like their ability to keep radical Islamists marginalized. You might argue the two must go hand in hand, and you may be right in terms of keeping the situation from getting any worse, but it's hard to see how Egypt progresses that way.

But it's clear that Egypt, no matter where it is internally in its evolution, has a serious role it can potentially play in improving the security situation in the Middle East. What this article is about is suggesting that Egypt sees itself as a possible patron of security in the Gaza Strip once Israel pulls out and stays behind its security fence. For this new "Berlin Wall of the 21st century"—as I like to call it—to have its desired effect, Israel will need help like this from surrounding states. Of that crew (Egypt, Jordan, Syria/Lebanon), Cairo offers the first best hope of getting something real done.

Posted by at 3:19 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Latin America Graft and Poverty Trying Patience With Democracy," by Juan Forero, New York Times, 24 June, p. A1.

Yet another article declaiming popular impatience with democracy in Latin America, the basic gist being that economic success is not forthcoming fast enough. Focus on the article comes close to matching my map: in South and Central America, every state cited for suffering the biggest backslides on popular support for democracy lies inside the Gap—save for Argentina (suffering its debt crises of recent years).

All this article points out is that security comes first, then economics, and then politics. Democracy is meaningless if you're not secure or if you're so darn economically cut-off from opportunity that you can't put food on the table. The anger and angst captured in this piece is not about rejecting democracy per se, but about demanding better in terms of economic performance. That requires both better rules and better rulers, so when some of these people say "look at what Castro has done in Cuba," they're betraying an ignorance that is stunning. Castro has run Cuba into the ground, and Chavez's nonsense in Venezuela has done little to improve anything there. This is not about turning away from democracy, but about getting the economic rule sets right.

Posted by at 3:18 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Afghan Officials Deny Reports Of Soldiers Beheading Prisoners," by David Rhode, New York Times, 24 June, p. A12.

"Assessing a Gruesome Toll After a Rash of Beheadings: A terrorist act called the ultimate symbol of power over an enemy," by Daniel J. Wakin, NYT, 24 June, p. A12.

You have an insurgency, and there's no way you're going to expel the highly superior military occupational force. So don't try to fight them, just go after individual civilians from the same country and cut off their heads, broadcasting your murders on the Internet. Pretend to yourself that this act gives you "ultimate power over your enemy." Wage your war of perversity for all it is worth. Tell the people that to cooperate with outsiders is death. Get them so afraid to interact with the outside world that they have no choice but to submit to your rule. Then turn your country into an dictator's paradise where women have to do whatever they're told, kids only get the education you deem they're worth to receive, and you and your elite cronies get to control all the wealth-generating natural resources.

It's a plan, baby. One that's certain to work against a flaccid, degenerate West that runs at the first sight of blood.

Right?

On the other hand, if you're trying to establish a legitimate government authority that actually encourages growing mass connectivity with the outside world, then you're careful not to engage in similar behavior, because you certainly don't want to be associated with that sort of brutality. Bad for business, bad for investment, bad for the soul.

Posted by at 3:17 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"U.S. Drops Plan to Exempt G.I.'s From U.N. Court: Political Loss in Council: No Effect Seen for Troops—Outcome Is Tied to Iraq Prison Scandal," by Warren Hoge, New York Times, 24 June, p. A1.

U.S. gives up trying to get blanket exclusion for U.S. peacekeeping troops in International Criminal Court. Doesn't mean much since we're not a signatory and have (now) 90 separate bilats with countries all over the Gap that promise their local governments won't sue us in the ICC over any military interventions we may pursue.

We say, we have a good military judicial system to deal with this, and we're right: inside the narrow confines of war we have a good judicial system for dealing with bad acts and bad actors within our ranks. But we do not have a good enough military judicial system for dealing with all the gray zones associated with peacekeeping, or the everything else. Eventually, we'll need two militaries for these two different jobs (war and peace), and those peacekeepers will field will have to come under ICC purview, even as our warfighters never do. Fair is far: war is about disconnecting and peacekeeping is about reconnecting. When you do the latter, you have to let you and your troops be connected to global rule sets, such as those embodied in the ICC.

Posted by at 3:15 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 24 June 2004

eMotion! Reports.com, an online publication devoted to "automotive/aerospace industries systemic intelligence" just put out a media advisory on their new postings. One of them will be a review of my reviews of my book, apparently pulled from this site. Here's the media advisory text, written by the publisher, Myron D. Stokes:

Good Morning:

Whether we like it or not, the world is indeed, at war. Obviously, not war in the traditional sense – it is asymmetric – but war just the same. According to my colleague Dr. Sheila Ronis, a national security strategist, “Global war begins with economic crises such as the major problems in Japan, the overheating of the China economy due to its insatiable, and now unstoppable appetite for raw material, and the continued instability within the Middle-East, compounded by the uncertainties of Iraqi War outcome. We are right now contending with macro-economic trends that are outstripping and outpacing any efforts to keep them in check. Crises not dissimilar to these in the 1930s directly led to World War II. Very similar and very dangerous. [Dr. W. Edwards]Deming once told me that Japan went to war because they thought their population was about to starve. Their backs were to the wall, and they felt they had no choice but to pursue this course in view of then existent US economic policies.

“War is often the inevitable aftermath of negative economic forces on nations, and we have to be mindful of the difficulties facing multiple nations simultaneously, now, as then. We are seeing in real-time the viability of the “core” and “gap” scenarios postulated by Dr. Barnett in his book “The Pentagon’s New Map.” Moreover, the Chinese view the global pie as a zero sum game; their win is a loss for the US in every category of the nation’s existence. However, if globalization is properly managed, the entire pie can grow. If it is not managed, that's when the industrial base could collapse. Conversely, the enemy is not globalization, it is, rather, the lack of managing it.

“The statement, ‘So goes the economy, so goes the military might’ is axiomatic. A non-linearist would say we are at the ‘tipping point’ and unless clear and implementable strategies for preservation of the US industrial base as represented by GM, Ford, Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, Northrop-Grumman, General Dynamics, Delphi and other core components emerge in the very short term, its relative stability will disintegrate followed by the possible collapse of the US economy.”

The forthcoming analysis "The Disintegration of Japan's Export-oriented Economy" will expand on this theme in addition to emergent Congressionally mandated initiatives designed to address the erosion of the US industrial base.

In the meantime, we present three features of note that are appropriate to our times: "Military Transformation Through Analytical Process" A peer review of the Inter-University Seminar proceedings late last year in Chicago that brought together some of the world's leading scientists, academics, military sociologists, military officers active and retired, and industry executives to discuss the geo-economic impact of 21st Century asymmetric warfare; "Reviewing the Reviews", a brief look at other media analysis, inclusive of Businessweek and the Wall Street Journal, of Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett's "The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in The 21st Century" following our own March 24 review "The Core and Gap" and lastly, an encore presentation of "Crisis on Asimov: A Vision of 2085" a look at the future of transportation derived from the application of Department of Defense "visioning" processes, and which acts as prelude to the a forthcoming University Press of America book by Dr. Ronis "Crisis On Asimov: Strategic Visioning for Governments, Industry and Other Organizations" (revised title). "Asimov" also honors the opening of the new Science Fiction Museum and Hall of Fame in Seattle; the brain child of Microsoft Co-Founder and private sector spaceflight pioneer Paul Allen and other noted visionaries.

Posted by at 12:38 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 23 June 2004

The concept of the Son of PNM book keeps lodging itself in my head and I can't get it out. No surprise there, and let me tell you why.

First, I am booking speaking engagements out to next spring already. So I'll be speaking in Canada at a PM-attended security conference, at Sandia National Labs, at a super-computing conference in Newport, at PopTech! in Maine, and the Accelerating Change 2004 conference in Stanford, at the Kennedy School at Harvard, at a conference of CEOs from the world's largest construction companies, and so on and so on. Giving all those briefs over the coming months will keep challenging me to extend the material, because, while I always like the brief to retain certain core concepts, I always want to see the brief as a whole grow and evolve, simply because it keeps it entertaining for me to deliver. Hence, I feel the need to point myself in the direction of Son of PNM.

Second, I am becoming involved with a lot of different military commands in their efforts at long-range planning. Which ones you ask? All the ones you'd logically think are really important right now. What's so exciting on that front is how seriously they're taking PNM as a strategic map to a future worth creating. What's so challenging is that once they put the book down, they want details on how that future will unfold step-by-step for their area of responsibility, or AOR. Because I can't get away with just waving my arms and saying, "Presto—a future worth creating!" I need to extend myself and the material for these conversations to continue, and that's where it gets interesting indeed.

My agent Jennifer is a very smart person, and so she logically locked onto the idea that the Son of PNM starts where the "ten steps to a future worth creating" left off. And the more I talk with various long-range planners at various commands about how they can integrate my material into their thinking, I find myself working that very same intellectual terrain.

I know now that the Son of PNM is both inevitable and good. But I still know it will be a year before I can write that proposal the way it needs to be written, so I turn Mark Warren (my editor) loose with the Emily Updates in the meantime, even I as will spend a significant portion of my creative thinking time over the next year generating the strategic concepts that will populate the next book.

In short, the story of the Son of PNM will be the same one I've been working on since I first drew up that "alternative global futures" brief back in 1996: the sequence and timing of future global integration. My starting premise now is that you have the Core and the Gap, so the first question is: what is the next area absorbed into the Core.

Answer there is pretty simple: the Middle East. So the questions then become: do this process succeed or fail? If it succeeds, which Core players play the most important roles (and who might seek to counter this process?). If it fails, how will it fail and will that failure be precipitated by, or result in, some portion of the New Core being lost to an alternative rule-set pathway (here we get into some Sam Huntington territory)?

Clearly, the U.S. is the prime player in integrating the Middle East, because it all starts with security. Because it does start with security, Europe sits more on the sidelines, doing business and peacekeeping here and there, but being too much of a head case on immigration to really open up to the region (so long as Turkey can't join EU, the EU can't join in this grand historical integration process).

So, if you survey the landscape, who else can play large in this endeavor? Put down Latin America as being too busy integrating economically with North America and Asia to matter on this one. Africa? Forget about it!

So that basically leaves the New Core pillars with serious vested future interests in the Middle East (in order of magnitude): India, China, Russia.

I put India at top of list due to proximity, historical ambitions, and sheer need for energy. Plus, it's growing economic ties with U.S. and its significant naval force factor in. Moreover, it's great security issue (Pakistan) only reinforces its desire to be a regional security player.

China is next due to magnificent need for energy, and general desire to be accepted as serious global player. In terms of historical ambitions, there's no real record beyond the confines of the Middle Kingdom itself (plenty big enough, as I constantly note: If you already control 1/5th of humanity, who the hell needs an empire?). Proximity is not the question, but distance, as China sits on the end of a long transport chain for energy flows. For China, its security issue is a complete drain (Taiwan), although it does push them in a naval direction, which is helpful, but overall, energy's the big driver.

Russia is last because energy is not the issue, just the opposite. Plus, it's big security issue makes it a bit more gun shy. Yet, the historical record and ambitions here are quite large, thanks to the legacy of the USSR, and since Russia wants to sell energy to everyone it can, it’s naturally drawn to the Middle East as a player (just too important a game to ignore—especially given all its old Soviet ties to the region).

So you look at Middle East and you posit three pathways: 1) we screw it up big time and no integration occurs either internally (mostly security focused) or externally (mostly network and business focused); 2) we succeed partially (winning the Sunnis countries but losing the Shiites and Iran); and or we succeed in full.

As always, the middle case is most interesting, because it's the most complex and most plausible. So let's say we succeed with Sunni countries but somehow draw a stalemate or worse with the Shiites in general—but namely Iran. Does the containment of the "radical Islamic threat" devolve into a containment of Iran-etc? If so, what is the sequence of engagement for my big three New Core powers? Does the U.S. contain an Iran by progressively bringing an India into a larger SWA security alliance? Russia too? Does that alliance expand all the way to China? Or not?

Or do any of these three New Core powers naturally gravitate into a countering-the-US position, thus allying themselves with Iran?

So the plotting of sequences is everything here, as it always is, with the great wildcard being Iran's strong efforts to acquire nukes. Frankly, it's smart on Teheran's part to push that agenda right now, because of everything that's going on. But it likewise locks them into certain pathways of confrontation with the U.S. We might assume all the time and allies are on our side, but that would be wrong. As the world turns to hydrogen, meaning we become more and more interested in natural gas and less in oil, Iran loses little of its important in the mid-term. Iran is the Avis of both oil and gas (meaning the important #2 in reserves), whereas the Hertz designation shifts from Saudi Arabia to Russia.

I say mid-term because there are good indications that natural gas is a whole lot more plentiful (especially when methane hydrates in ocean beds are factored in) than is currently assumed. Since we never really look for gas, we assume it's mostly found with oil, which we do look for. But there is plenty of evidence that gas is a lot more evenly distributed around the planet than that, and the shift to hydrogen is likely to fuel that search.

So back to scenarios, which are naturally layered here. You got three scenarios for the U.S.-led Old Core effort in the Middle East, which play out primarily at the level of individuals (like the GWOT in general). You also have three scenarios for key external variables entering the picture (India, China, Russia), more located at that nation-state level. Then there are the macro, or system-level outcomes: Core enlarged (Middle East added to Core), Core reassembled (some Mideast joins Old Core, but some spins off into some New Core constellation), and Core comes apart (Mideast never absorbed and Core fractures for trying).

That's the big picture of the big picture, which is worth about three paragraphs. Figuring out all the key scenario dynamics is what gets me the Son of PNM.

Today's catch:

The Iran goes nuclear scenario

"For Iraq's Shiites, Faith Knows No Borders," by Youssef M. Ibrahim, New York Times, 23 June, p. A27.

South Korea put to the test

"Killing Won’t Alter Plans for Iraq, Seoul Says," by James Brooke, NYT, 23 June, p. A11.

Do unto others as they would do unto you

"Afghans Behead 4 Taliban," by Reuters, NYT, 23 June, p. A11

On the other hand, immunity for our side is pretty nice

"U.S. Rewords A Resolution On Immunity For Its Troops," by Warren Hoge, NYT, 23 June, p. A10.

Why firewalling off the Gap sometimes makes sense

"Spread of Polio in West and Central Africa Makes U.N. Officials Fear Major Epidemic," by Lawrence K. Altman, NYT, 23 June, p. A8.

A clear sign we're stretched to the max on the GWOT

"U.S. to Offer Incentives to Sway North Korea in Nuclear Talks: Promises of aid in exchange for ending weapons programs," by David E. Sanger, NYT, 23 June, p. A3.

Why do I think Europe will sit on the sidelines?

"What Kicks the Continent to Life? (Not Politics)," by Alan Cowell, NYT, 23 June, p. A4.

MOE on Gap shrinkage

"Croatian Port Trades in Its Old Image," by Tomislav Ladika, Wall Street Journal, 23 June, p. B4A.

The New Core hunger for energy—signs abound

"China to Look Abroad for Natural Gas," by Xu Yihe, WSJ, 23 June, p. A15.

"India to Float A Modest Stake In Electric Utility: IPO Signals New Regime May Pursue Some Initiatives Promoted by Its Predecessor," by Eric Bellman, WSJ, 23 June, p. A15.

John—give them the global future worth creating!

"As the Recovery Gains Momentum, Democrats Are Forced to Refocus," by Jacob M. Schlesinger, WSJ, 23 June, p. A1.

Posted by at 2:28 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"For Iraq's Shiites, Faith Knows No Borders," by Youssef M. Ibrahim, New York Times, 23 June, p. A27.

Great op-ed by former NYT and WSJ reporter and one of the guys co-interviewed with me by Rolling Stone, Youssef Ibrahim, suggesting a theme a lot of analysts are pursuing in the current Iraq story: that the big local winner in all of this will be Iran.

Gist of this op-ed is that while Sunnis are all over the dial, so any talk of "united Islam" with them is nonsense, the same is not true for Shiites, who "stick together" like nobody else in the region. Plus, while you can deal with Sunnis by and large, it's a lot tougher with Shiites because of their harsher belief system that focuses (like all traditional ones do) more on the next life than this one—thus the powerful force that is martyrdom in Shiism. As Ibrahim points out, Shiism was born in defeat and has spent the majority of its existence living with suppression—except in Shiite-dominate Iran.

So say Iran gets the bomb and wields it as the great power of Shiites from across the region: are we naturally buying ourselves a partial victory even if/when we ultimately succeed in Iraq? Are we simply splitting the perceived Middle East into its historical breakdown between Arabs and Persians?

Posted by at 2:17 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Killing Won’t Alter Plans for Iraq, Seoul Says," by James Brooke, New York Times, 23 June, p. A11.

South Korea is learning what it means to actually stand up and be counted: sometimes your people will get killed and you will be vilified in the process. We have never really asked for anything strategic in return for our continued military support to South Korea: they simply pay the bills and we simply stay on the Korean peninsula. But getting South Korea involved in Iraq is whole other ball of wax, that may well transform both Seoul's view of its role in the world and its relationship with the U.S. As the old adage goes: occupations change the occupiers far more than the occupied.

Posted by at 2:12 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Afghans Behead 4 Taliban," by Reuters, New York Times, 23 June, p. A11.

Nice, huh? That should quiet things down in the region.

This war of perversity simply grows. Why? We're talking—in the end—about ending the control of men over women in the region. That's the bottom line with globalization: it radically empowers women in traditional societies in relation to men. When you mess with some guy's woman, expect the very worst. If you don't believe me, talk to a cop sometime about domestic abuse cases. It doesn't get any more perverse than that.

Posted by at 2:11 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"U.S. Rewords A Resolution On Immunity For Its Troops," by Warren Hoge, New York Times, 23 June, p. A10.

The U.S. has been fighting the notion of its troops coming under the purview of the International Criminal Court going all the way back to its inception under the Clinton Administration. Simply put, we fear having our warfighters (not to mention our political decision-makers) tried for trumped-up and politically-inspired charges of war crimes.

That's the Leviathan talking, and on that point he makes perfect sense. But let's get real. The ICC must eventually have purview over our peacekeeping efforts, because in exporting security (as opposed to killing or rounding up bad guys) we need to support the rule of law like anybody else. Thus I've been saying all along: the Sys Admin force eventually submits to the ICC—no two ways about it.

That's a compromise we cannot avoid, and it's another great reason why the bifurcation of the U.S. military is not only inevitable but good.

Posted by at 2:10 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Spread of Polio in West and Central Africa Makes U.N. Officials Fear Major Epidemic," by Lawrence K. Altman, New York Times, 23 June, p. A8.

As I argue in PNM, there are three things worth firewalling ourselves off from the Gap for, simply because the free traffic in these "goods" is too high a price to pay for openness. One is terrorism ('nuf said). Two is drugs (gotta keep some lid). Three is pandemics.

Just this Monday I got my shots for our upcoming adoption trip to China, and doing so is sort of a primer on the Core-Gap breakdown. Travel in the Old Core and you don't need any shots. Travel in the New Core (like India or China) and the shots you'll get will be roughly the same shots they now advocate for all babies—even in the Old Core (hey, it's the price for enlarging the Core!). Go to the Gap and you need a shot for all sorts of exotic stuff, plus the stuff we tend to forget because we've successfully relegated it to the past.

This story on polio is an ugly one, reminding us how stuck in our nasty past is so much of the Gap.

Posted by at 2:09 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"U.S. to Offer Incentives to Sway North Korea in Nuclear Talks: Promises of aid in exchange for ending weapons programs," by David E. Sanger, New York Times, 23 June, p. A3.

Bush Admin floating concepts/proposals of bribing Kim Jong Il regarding his latest BS on nukes. How is that different from the flaccid Clinton approach of the 1990s? Not one bit. That only shows how tapped we are right now by events in Iraq. This is purely a temporizing approach designed to buy time—something that runty rat-f---er Kim is a genius at acquiring.

May God grant that man peace—reeeeaal soon!

Posted by at 2:07 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"What Kicks the Continent to Life? (Not Politics)," by Alan Cowell, New York Times, 23 June, p. A4.

Funny "letter from Europe" about what really motivates people there. No surprise. It's soccer-mania. Meanwhile, as the EU expands and moves toward a constitution, countries there have a hard time getting anyone to vote in the EU elections.

Hell, Europeans aren't even interested in the European integration process! How can we possibly get them interested in shrinking the Gap?

Posted by at 2:06 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Croatian Port Trades in Its Old Image," by Tomislav Ladika, Wall Street Journal, 23 June, p. B4A.

MOE is measure of effectiveness. You want to plot the Gap's shrinkage? You look for evidence like this. Great story on how Croatian port city is linking that nation up to the world outside, but especially to its erstwhile neighbors in the old Yugoslavia. Croatia becomes a great bridge between Old Core EU and (hopefully) New Core Balkan states.

Posted by at 2:05 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"China to Look Abroad for Natural Gas," by Xu Yihe, Wall Street Journal, 23 June, p. A15.

"India to Float A Modest Stake In Electric Utility: IPO Signals New Regime May Pursue Some Initiatives Promoted by Its Predecessor," by Eric Bellman, WSJ, 23 June, p. A15.

Plenty of stories about China "scouring" world for oil. Expect more like this one to appear regarding natural gas, which will triple in use in Developing Asia by 2025.

Also a good sign from India regarding its continued openness for Foreign Direct Investment needed to upgrade its decrepit electrical grid. Seems like the new boss will not be so different from the old boss.

Posted by at 2:04 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"As the Recovery Gains Momentum, Democrats Are Forced to Refocus," by Jacob M. Schlesinger, Wall Street Journal, 23 June, p. A1.

Economy ain't gonna do it, and as much as Iraq does "do it," voters don't like to switch midstream—historically speaking. My point: Kerry better lay out the future worth creating—both inside the Pentagon and around the world at large—rather than assume that more body bags in Iraq will get him elected.

Posted by at 2:03 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 22 June 2004

I've written in the past about all the media questions that typically center on whether or not my ideas are gaining ground inside the Pentagon. Admittedly, stories like the Wall Street Journal's piece by Greg Jaffe (now hanging framed in my basement) fuel that focus, but I've always maintained that, because the visionary's naturally focused on the future, his influence is logically found within the long-term process of educating the next generation of leadership. So it's not a matter of asking the current Secretary of Defense, but the one 2 or 3 slots down the road.

Here's an example of what I consider to be real visionary impact. It's a letter I got yesterday from the 2-star Marine general who's currently the Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at National Defense University. In it, she's referencing the 2 June brief I gave at ICAF (yes, the same one taped by CSPAN) at their end-of-year student conference:

Dear Dr. (Tom) Barnett,

I know Dr. Paul Davis has already passed on how much we appreciated your lecture during our anniversary symposium. But I also want to take this opportunity to not only personally convey my sincere gratitude for the lecture but also for the dynamic way you build and support your strategy. The enthusiastic reaction of the students did not surprise me. They, universally, expressed a regret that they hadn't been afforded a chance to digest your thought early in the academic year; and, we hope to rectify this for next year's class. What was a bit of a surprise was the speed and strength of the faculty support. There has been an almost universal move to inject your concepts and strategic thinking into much of our curriculum.

Knowing your schedule will be filling quickly, I have asked Dr Davis to work with you and our schedulers to find a date on when we might reconcile your demands in a way that your lecture will provide the maximum effect on the Class of 2005. I understand you have reached a tentative agreement on Wednesday, September 29. It is my fervent hope that we can capitalize on your outstanding thinking and wisdom. Again, I offer my profound appreciation for your support of our college.

Sincerely,

F.C. Wilson
Major General, USMC

What I liked about the letter was the sense that the vision had won over the staff, which is no simple feat, because we're talking about a lot of retired military officers who don't exactly jump at fads when it comes to their curriculum. In fact, I've had more than a few of that staff get up and walk out of previous presentations I've given at the college, so quick were they to dismiss the message in years past.

Of course, we all get smarter with experience—me no less than anyone else. So it's not a matter of everyone catching up to my "wisdom," but the vision finally experiencing synchronicity with the signals we're receiving from the strategic environment. In my mind, strategic vision is not about imagining some world that never was and then advocating its creation, but rather seeing the current strategic environment for what it really is, and—in doing so—spotting its potential for its progression toward futures truly worth creating.

Contingency planning is all about mitigating future failures, but strategic vision is all about exploiting future successes.

Here's today's grab bag:

The negative Clinton effect on 2004 campaign

"Clinton Book Generates Buzz Across Bookselling and Politics," by Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg and Jackie Calmes, Wall Street Journal, 21 June, p. B3.

The strong do as they will, and the weak turn to the Internet

"Saudis Seek America's Body as Militants Vow More Terror: Searching for a body during an Internet propaganda war," New York Times, 21 June, p. A8.

Islamic democracy—try this at home

"Islamic Democracy? Mali Finds a Way To Make It Work: In Old Caravan Crossroads, History of Getting Along Breeds Spirit of Compromise: A Coup d'Etat but no Junta," by Yaroslav Trofimov, WSJ, 22 June, p. A1.

Where's the beef? Brazil, of course

"How a Brazilian Cattle Baron Shakes Up World's Beef Trade: Mad Cow Boosts Mr. Russo And His Gradd-Fed Herd; A Bullish Move in Israel," by Matt Moffett, WSJ, 22 June, p. A1.

Same old abortion bugaboo perverts US foreign aid

"U.S. Is Accused of Trying to Isolate U.N. Population Unit: Critics see a bid to stop world groups that aid abortion abroad," by Christopher Marquis, NYT, 21 June, p. A3.

Let's be honest, almost everything is a bridge too far for NATO

"Gun-Shy NATO Is Wary of Iraq: Afghan Theater Teaches Alliance a Hard Lesson In Its Military Limitations," by Philip Shishkin, WSJ, 21 June, p. A14.

The military-market nexus evolves along many, many nodes

"U.S. Extends Program For Terror Insurance," by staff, WSJ, 21 June, p. A11.

"Sovereign Ratings: Tea Leaves? Moody's Upgrade of South Korea Fails to Move Government Bonds; Political Risk Is Tricky to Gauge," by Craig Karmin, WSJ, 21 June, p. C1

"High Court Ruling Goes Against Intel In AMD Case," by Robert S. Greenberger, WSJ, 22 June, p. A3.

The usual yin-and-yang on China

"China's Grads Find Jobs Scarce: Mismatch Exists Between Seekers' Ambitions and Market Needs," by Leslie Change, WSJ, 22 June, p. A17.

"Older Workers From U.S. Take Jobs in China," by James T. Areddy, WSJ, 22 June, p. B1

"Microcredit Efforts in China Stumble," by Jason Dean, WSJ, 22 June, p. A17.

"China Is Set to Ease Bankruptcy Law," by Kathy Chen, WSJ, 22 June, p. A17.

Posted by at 9:17 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Clinton Book Generates Buzz Across Bookselling and Politics," by Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg and Jackie Calmes, Wall Street Journal, 21 June, p. B3.

Fear expressed in this article is that there is only so much public attention span for politics and that Clinton is sucking up so much right now that Kerry will suffer as a result. "Both political parties say attention given Mr. Clinton will suck oxygen from the already limited political air at the expense of John Kerry." Moreover, the authors claim that Kerry and Democratic National Chairman Terry McAuliffe actually pushed Clinton to hold off on publishing the book until after the election. The compromise, apparently, was to rush it into stores in the early part of summer vice having it appear right at the election was climaxing (no pun intended).

Clinton is definitely a glory-hound, as all good politicians are, and you have to wonder if the Clinton household isn't more than ambivalent about Kerry losing this election, thus clearing the way for Hillary to run in 2008 against no incumbent.

But that only makes you wonder how long Bush would go into his second term before Cheney steps aside and the Bush heir-apparent is slipped into the VP slot. After all, that's how Yeltsin got Putin so instantly acceptable to voters in Russia back in 2000.

Hmmm, toss in Michael Moore' "Fahrenheit 911" and let the paranoid conspiracy types run wild!

Posted by at 9:08 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Saudis Seek America's Body as Militants Vow More Terror: Searching for a body during an Internet propaganda war," New York Times, 21 June, p. A8.

It is fascinating how quickly the Internet has emerged as the level playing field for both sides in this global war on terrorism to get their messages out there in front of the worldwide audience. In a war of perversity, the anything-goes-and-nobody-knows anonymity of the wild wild web is a perfect venue for the war of images.

But, honestly, anyone who thinks the Luddite, Taliban-type, al Qaeda terrorists are somehow going to win via the Internet has a screw loose. Every time they engage the outside world more and more on their terms, they truly end up being perverted far more than we do by delving into our barbaric past. Dipping back in time can be done with ease, and is easily excused and forgiven as "necessary" to the task at hand, but when you expose yourself forward, it gets really hard to pretend that somehow your future version of the "good life" is going to achieve true disconnectedness from all the perversity represented by globalization.

They say you can take the boy off the farm but you can never take the farm out of the boy. True enough, explaining how terrorists can routinely come to live among us and never become one of us. But it's also true that once you seen the bright lights of the city, small-town life is never quite good enough. We see this time and time again with authoritarian elites whose ideologies allow them to "protect" the masses from the "pollution" of the outside world and yet simultaneously allow them to enjoy those same "impure influences" at will—I mean, just check out the young Saudi princes whenever they travel abroad.

The best part of this article is at the end, when the Saudi government declares: "The perpetrators of these attacks seek to shake the stability and cripple security, which is a far-fetched aim." Then the reporter notes that the government said this "in a speech delivered in the name of King Fahd, who is incapacitated."

Riiiight. Hard to cripple a government "run" by a guy virtually in a coma.

Wait a tick! Where have I seen this before? Oh yeah, the Soviet Union right before Gorbachev took over . . ..

Posted by at 9:07 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Islamic Democracy? Mali Finds a Way To Make It Work: In Old Caravan Crossroads, History of Getting Along Breeds Spirit of Compromise: A Coup d'Etat but no Junta," by Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 22 June, p. A1.

Interesting left-column front-page WSJ story on how Mali is simultaneously predominately Muslim and a democracy. No great mystery. Their social rule set puts a premium on consensus and avoiding violent outcomes. Oldest trick in the book: get potentially warring groups to intermarry, or what they call "cousinage." So it's all in the family, my friends.

Posted by at 9:06 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"How a Brazilian Cattle Baron Shakes Up World's Beef Trade: Mad Cow Boosts Mr. Russo And His Gradd-Fed Herd; A Bullish Move in Israel," by Matt Moffett, Wall Street Journal, 22 June, p. A1.

Fascinating right-column front-page WSJ story on how Brazil is on the verge of becoming the leading exporter of beef around the world. That is some amazing connectivity, because we're talking a perishable item subject to significantly stringent health rule sets. To make all that work, you have to be connected to the world at large in a big, big way. I mean, Brazil is now the biggest provider of beef to Israel, one of 50 key markets for its beef around the world.

For now, Brazil free rides in terms of security. Israel means a lot to them as a market, but does Brazil pay much of anything to maintain security there? Or anywhere else for that matter? And yet many of their markets are inside the Gap, and thus vulnerable to significant bouts of insecurity.

I look at Brazil and I see a country incentivized to keeping things calm all over this world, and so I see a strategic partner waiting to be made.

These guys want to sell beef. We can see them strictly as a threat to our cattle industry or as a potential security partner all over the Gap. Which do you think is the better long-term choice? Which helps us to win us a global war on terrorism?

Posted by at 9:05 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"U.S. Is Accused of Trying to Isolate U.N. Population Unit: Critics see a bid to stop world groups that aid abortion abroad," by Christopher Marquis, New York Times, 21 June, p. A3.

The US Government has consistently cut off its nose to spite its face on foreign aid focused on controlling population growth around this world, simply because we let our internal rule-set clash on abortion infect our strategic judgment on how best to shrink the Gap. Time and time again we short-change UN efforts at stemming population growth as soon as we detect even the slightest hint that abortion might in some way be involved or facilitated.

It is amazing how so many conservatives will say we shouldn't try to dictate democracy to other cultures and yet we feel the right to dictate how women deal with reproduction the world over. The hypocrisy on that one is just stunning. By keeping women down across the Gap in this manner, we work completely at odds with just about everything else we're trying to do in this global war on terrorism. It is shortsighted in the extreme, not to mention culturally arrogant in the extreme.

Posted by at 9:04 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Gun-Shy NATO Is Wary of Iraq: Afghan Theater Teaches Alliance a Hard Lesson In Its Military Limitations," by Philip Shishkin, WSJ, 21 June, p. A14.

Americans need to understand that Europe has very limited capacity to help us inside the Gap when it comes to military interventions. On the Leviathan/warfighing side, there's basically the Brits, whereas on the Sys Admin/peacekeeping side, everybody can help out some, it's just that the combined effort does not amount to much. Give NATO a Balkans and then ask it to take over an Afghanistan and you're basically at their limit.

This is why any dream of getting serious NATO help in Iraq is just that—a dream. We need to generate NATO-sized relationships with NATO-sized militaries in Russia, India, and China, because we're going to need a lot of NATOs to fill in all the security sinkholes littered across the Gap.

Posted by at 9:03 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"U.S. Extends Program For Terror Insurance," by staff, Wall Street Journal, 21 June, p. A11.

"Sovereign Ratings: Tea Leaves? Moody's Upgrade of South Korea Fails to Move Government Bonds; Political Risk Is Tricky to Gauge," by Craig Karmin, WSJ, 21 June, p. C1

"High Court Ruling Goes Against Intel In AMD Case," by Robert S. Greenberger, WSJ, 22 June, p. A3.

Just a trio of stories that remind us that security and economics bump up against one another all the time.

First one is about the nexus between terrorism and insurance—the ultimate in middle-class risk mitigation. We're still working on a durable new rule set for that.

The second story is about the nebulous world of sovereign ratings, and how private companies like Moody's essentially offers systematically-derived (or so we're led to believe) odds on which countries are bad economic risks because they're really bad political-military risks. Moody's is essentially a bookie for the military-market nexus, offering odds to all takers.

Third story may seem oblique at first glance, but its about the U.S. Supreme Court siding with international courts in their attempts to force U.S.-based companies to come clean on requests for insider data when those companies are sued in global rule-setting courts. That may seem arcane, but it speaks volumes about the collective security of globalization versus the "rights" of multinationals to shield themselves behind the "sovereignty" of their home state. You want to win a global war on terrorism, you need that sense of global hierarchy in judicial systems.

Posted by at 9:02 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"China's Grads Find Jobs Scarce: Mismatch Exists Between Seekers' Ambitions and Market Needs," by Leslie Change, WSJ, 22 June, p. A17.

"Older Workers From U.S. Take Jobs in China," by James T. Areddy, WSJ, 22 June, p. B1

"Microcredit Efforts in China Stumble," by Jason Dean, WSJ, 22 June, p. A17.

"China Is Set to Ease Bankruptcy Law," by Kathy Chen, WSJ, 22 June, p. A17.

China has a hard time cranking out the college grads desired by global multinationals that come into the country to rent its raw labor, so expect educational reform on that basis. That's the global economy dictating to China about what a proper education entails. China will take this "humiliation" without blinking. Why? China understands that if it wants all these things, all this connectivity, all these transactions with the outside world, it has to adapt itself to what the world needs from it in terms of management skills. Until it gets enough on that score, expect multinationals to continue bribing older workers from their respective homelands to come to China and backfill as needed.

On the financial side of the house, the latter two articles show how China has to change its internal banking rule sets not just a little bit here and there, but all over the dial. Microcredit programs in China are not taking off like they do elsewhere, and that's bad when you're talking all that rural poor. What's a big reason? Government has too tight of control over credit resources. Why is that? Government fears business failures so it tries to rule over the private sector through its strict control over credit. What would ease that necessity? A nice new bankruptcy law would help. Once you have a system for dealing with such failures routinely, you can open up on credit, and maybe then your microlending will take off finally, easing your rural poor issues. See how it's all connected?

Posted by at 9:00 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 22 June 2004

Follow me closely here, because the math gets tricky:

· On May 6 FA lists their "top-selling hardcover books on American foreign policy and international affairs" for the month of April. PNM comes in at #11, two spots ahead of Niall Ferguson's Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (#13).
· On June 4 FA's list for May has PNM at #4 and Ferguson at #5.
· Then the print edition (July-August) comes out, and on the last page of the journal they provide a combined list for both April and May and guess what! Colossus magically comes in at #8 and I come in at #9!

Hmmmmmmmmm, that's some strange math. I outsell Ferguson separately in both months, but somehow he outsells me when the two totals are put together!

Riiiiiiiiiiiight.

Since PNM is about the only book on the list not decrying everything Bush, perhaps Foreign Affairs is trying to downgrade me a bit . . . (sniff!).

Posted by at 8:53 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 22 June 2004

The brief I gave at National Defense University on 2 June was taped in full by a CSPAN crew. The first word we got from CSPAN producers was that it would run—hopefully—prime time in late June or first week of July.

Then former president Ronald Reagan passed away . . . and three the Senate and House schedules back an entire week each—thus CSPAN can't tell us right now when they'll find time in the sked to show the beast in all its beauty. When Brian Lamb proposed the broadcast, he said I could follow the show with a live, in-studio segment where I took calls from viewers. Hopefully, they'll go through with that plan in the end.

Until we get more definitive word from CSPAN, that is all we know for now.

Posted by at 8:49 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 22 June 2004
The following is a short profile published on page 56 of the Summer 2004 issue of On Wisconsin! (magazine for University of Wisconsin alumni). To see the actual section of the issue on-line (PDF file), go to http://www.uwalumni.com/onwisconsin/2004_summer/pdf/ALUMNINEWS.pdf.

War Philosopher

When Thomas Barnett '84 advocates "shrinking the gap," he's not referring to cutting a chain store's inventory—he's talking about narrowing the divide between globalized nations and those least connected to globalization.

In his book, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (G.P. Putnam's Sons), the Naval War College senior strategic researcher and Pentagon adviser emphasizes, "States least connected to globalization overwhelming account for where we've gone with military forces since the end of the Cold War." To reduce the frequency of these interventions, he says, we need to move from a containment strategy to extending globalization, thus shrinking the gap between rich and poor countries.

"Extend globalization; invite everybody to the party; and when everybody's in, terrorists won't hold the same sway," he says. "The would-be suicide bomber will have other options; his life won't be as pointless."

Barnett, an award-winning instructor who was named one of Esquire magazine's "best and brightest" in 2002 and christened a "philosopher of modern war," collaborated with the broker-dealer firm of Cantor Fitzgerald in a pioneering study about globalization's impact on national security. It examined—among many scenarios—possible terrorist attacks on Wall Street. Ironically, several workshops that were part of the study were held atop the World Trade Center, which would be the main 9/11 attack target and would result in the death of many of the company's employees.

In Barnett's view, the attacks reflected the "ultimate rise of the lesser-includeds," or non-state actors striking out against globalization's main symbols of power. Theory had become reality.

As the assistant for strategic futures, working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Barnett advised senior leaders on "transforming" the Pentagon's long-range war planning from fighting "near-peer" armies to contending with the new type of threat. "I'm the most optimistic of all DOD [Department of Defense] strategists," he says. "We're on the verge of making war as we know it obsolete."

At UW-Madison, Barnett majored in international relations and Russian literature, studying the language with legendary instructor Lydia Kalaida, and singing bass in her Slavic choir. His junior-year selection to Phi Beta Kappa was a "life-changing event." At Harvard, he earned a master's degree in Soviet studies and a doctorate in political science.

Barnett's parents, John Barnett LLB'49 and Colleen Clifford Barnett '46, MA'55, JD'90, met at students at UW-Madison; all six of his siblings attended the university; and he met his future spouse, Vonne Meussling Barnett '82, MS'85, when they worked together at Paisan's, the University Square restaurant. The couple lives in Portsmouth, Rhode Island; has three children; and is in the process of adopting a baby girl from China—thus "shrinking the gap, one person at a time."

--Joel H. Cohen

Posted by at 8:43 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 22 June 2004

Where I appear on the radio this week:

· XM Satellite Radio/Channel 169 "The Power": appearing from 2-3pm EST on Wednesday, 23 June, with Bernie McCain on show called "The Dean's Talkroom" (PR note re: show: Bernie McCain, host of "The Dean's Talkroom" and a 40-year veteran broadcaster, has been a premier host at XM Satellite Radio's Channel 169, THE POWER, since its inception in late September 2000. THE POWER is the only National African-American Talk Channel on XM Radio. Bernie's distinctive conversational style engages audiences with the "finesse of an entertainer" and the "power of a prize fighter." With his distinctive passion for truth, Bernie explores the human interest that dwells beneath the surface of every headline. His stellar reputation and savvy style have also landed him interviews with some of the greatest minds of our time.

[http://testimonials.xmradio.com/programming/channel_page.jsp?ch=169]

· National Public Radio's show "On Point": appearing in the 8-9pm EST hour on Thursday, 24 June (PR note from the site says: " On Point is public radio's live evening news program - covering each day's important news developments and conducting conversations with newsmakers and thinkers from all around the world. The live, two-hour program is broadcast from 7-9 p.m. EST in Boston and is broadcast at various times on stations around the country. A hybrid of a talk program and a newsmagazine, On Point puts each day's news into context and provides a lively forum for discussion and debate. Topics chosen for the program are often taken from the biggest news stories of the day while others have a direct connection to issues that are at the core of what is urgent and important in the world at the moment. Interwoven are programs containing interviews with personalities, politicians, musicians, writers, and journalists. On Point host, Tom Ashbrook—combining a journalist's instincts with a listener's openness and curiosity—focuses on the relevant issues in any given story, decoding news and issues along with the listeners.").

[http://www.onpointradio.org/]

Where I'm to be found in print right now:

· Fire and Movement magazine in op-ed entitled, "Gaming War Within the Context of Everything Else" (not sure of date, but when I am, I will blog the article)
· Fortune magazine 7 June special issue (investment guide): quote on p. 42 of editor-in-chief Steve Forbes' personal column
· Rolling Stone current issue (July 8-22) just out on stands (Ray Charles on cover): part of group interview on Iraq, found on pp. 63-66.
· On Wisconsin current issue (summer 2004): profile on page 56 of this magazine for University of Wisconsin alumni
· Still waiting on Alec Russell profile in UK's Daily Telegraph (gave interview in late May); anybody see this please give me a head's up (Russell said he hopes to complete the article this week for Saturday's issue).

Posted by at 8:35 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 21 June 2004

CNN is neat about putting out transcripts of appearances on their major shows. Here's the capture from my 25 May appearance on News From CNN (Wolf Blitzer's noon news show), which I blogged back then. I post it here simply to enter it into the record, knowing that some people might be interested in the text if they didn't happen to catch me.

NEWS FROM CNN

The Fight for Iraq: Full Court Press; General Ricardo Sanchez Rotated out of Iraq; Interview With Author Thomas Barnett

Aired May 25, 2004 - 12:00 ET

BLITZER: President Bush's 33-minute speech last night disappointed some critics who say he didn't offer an exit strategy for U.S. forces. My next guest says American troops may never be coming home from the Middle East, and he also says no exit strategy may, in fact, be a good thing. Thomas Barnett is a professor at the U.S. Naval War College. He's the author of "The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century."

Mr. Barnett, thanks very much for joining us. Why do you believe that U.S. troops may be stuck in that part of the world forever?

THOMAS BARNETT, AUTHOR, "THE PENTAGON'S NEW MAP": Well, I think you have to look at a global war on terrorism in a strategic fashion. And I think we have to do something that we as the American people have a hard time doing, and that is, think long term.

There's a variety of ways you can deal with a global threat vectoring into this country. You could try to throw up firewalls around the United States, try to keep them from entering. I don't think that you will accomplish much in that regard, and I think that you will disable our economy, probably pervert our society over the longer term.

You can try to go around the world and hunt down these terrorists as much as possible. But as Israel has demonstrated in their efforts in the West Bank and in Gaza, it's difficult to try to track these guys down. And what you tend to generate with their assassinations or the killings of these people is more terrorists over time.

So I think the strategic long-term answer is, we have to figure out what goal is of the Osama bin Ladens and the al Qaedas of that region. And my argument is, in effect, what they're trying to do is drive the West out of the Middle East so they can effectively hijack the Middle East out of what they consider to be a corrupt world system. That means, if we're going to win a global war on terrorism on the overhaul, we have to connect the Middle East to the outside world faster than they can disconnect it. And that's not going to be accomplished by June 30th, obviously.

BLITZER: All right. Well, let's get to the specific issue of the exit strategy. As you well remember, after Vietnam, General Colin Powell, among many others, said don't get involved in a military adventure unless you have an exit strategy for getting out. There is apparently no exit strategy right now. And you think that's good?

BARNETT: Well, I think the Powell doctrine really perverted our planning and our thinking about war by always putting out there this notion that as soon as we catch the bad guys or leave enough smoking holes in terms of the enemy, that we get out of there as quickly as possible. And I think that all that does is set you up by drive-by regime change in a global war on terrorism.

I think if you are really going to create successes, you are going to have to integrate the societies that are left behind once you take down the bad leadership, like a Saddam Hussein. And by focusing on an exit strategy, we basically field what I call a first-half team in a league that keeps scoring till the end of the game.

In the second half of this effort, we are under-funded, we are under-manned, we are under-equipped. And right now we're under the gun in Iraq. And that's a problem, because it creates, I would argue, with our troops on the ground there, a sense of strategic despair, that there's simply too many of the opposition to deal with.

We can't possibly kill or eliminate them all. And eventually our situation will become untenable, when what we need to create is a sense of strategic despair on the part of the insurgents. We need to have such a profound multinational peacekeeping presence that it's the insurgents who look around and say, my god, there are too many of these people, we can't possibly kill them all. Let's get out of Dodge.

BLITZER: Well, when you heard the president's speech last night, were you encouraged that he does have a strategic military vision to get the job done?

BARNETT: I think he largely bypassed that issue. I think what we saw last night was an enunciation of a political sort of withdrawal that allows us to claim that Iraq is once again politically in control of its country. But if you're not in control of the security of your country, you're not really in control of much of anything in Iraq. So I think what we saw last night was an attempt to make the American public feel confident about what is -- what is logically going to be described as a very long-term occupation on a military basis by describing it as a political withdrawal in time for an election season.

BLITZER: A lot of discussion over the number of U.S. troops in place in Iraq, whether there have been enough over the past year or so. What is your bottom line?

BARNETT: Well, my bottom line is, we needed to get -- we needed to make the deals to get a very robust multinational participation. Not just from a Europe, which puts in about 20,000, 25,000 when you add it all up, but we needed to get a Russia, a China, an India. We needed to get long-term strategic partners who are as incentivized, or, I would argue, more incentivized in a future stability in Iraq and a Persian Gulf.

It's China and an India that are going to depend on oil and energy coming out of the Persian Gulf far more than a Europe or the United States over the next 20, 25 years. There are deals to be made. We asked India for 17,000 peacekeepers several month back; we did not close that deal.

What have we've done since? Well, we've declared or made clear our intention of declaring Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally. I think we're sending the wrong signals to a Russia, an India, and a China. And if we the right kind of numbers there, it would be not more American, but more of those kind of country demonstrating clearly that the world is not going to leave Iraq.

BLITZER: I interviewed the other day the foreign minister of Pakistan, who made it clear that if there is a new U.N. Security Council resolution, it does have the international backing. Pakistan would presumably be willing to deploy troops, and maybe India as well. And that's what president is now pushing with the British government, a new U.N. Security Council resolution.

Will this set the stage for that kind of multinational force that you want?

BARNETT: I think the question is, how much is this administration willing to engage in the sort of horse deals and swapping that needs to be done to make these countries feel like they're getting some tremendous payoff from engaging in this somewhat risky activity on their part. I mean, there are deals to be made with Russia regarding their proposed entry into the World Trade Organization, or with regard to how they feel about NATO's expansion.

There are deals to be made with China, that is concerned about our plans for putting on missile defense shield in east Asia. And there are deals to be made with an India. The question is whether this administration is prepared in this heightened political season to make those kinds of deals, or whether this country would be better off after an election with a different administration that might be able to start with a clean slate and make those deals, which I argue we could have made months ago, but the price tags are much higher now.

BLITZER: Thomas Barnett, thanks very much for joining us.

BARNETT: Thanks for having me.

Posted by at 8:30 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 21 June 2004

CNN is neat about putting out transcripts of appearances on their major shows. Here's the capture from my 18 May appearance on Lou Dobbs Tonight, which I blogged back then. I post it here simply to enter it into the record, knowing that some people might be interested in the text if they didn't happen to catch me.

LOU DOBBS TONIGHT

Israel Declares Gaza Gateway to Terrorism; Iraqi Prison Abuse Charges Widen

Aired May 18, 2004 - 18:00 ET

DOBBS: Bill, thank you very much -- Bill Schneider.

My next guest says the Pentagon must now quickly apply the lessons of the war in Iraq. And that mean restructuring the U.S. armed forces. Thomas Barnett says the military should be divided between what he calls a leviathan force for high intensity wars and a system administrative force to rebuild nations. He's the author of the new book, "The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century."

Thomas Barnett served in the office of secretary of defense between November 2001 and June of last year and joins me now.

Good to have you here.

THOMAS BARNETT, AUTHOR, "THE PENTAGON'S NEW MAP": Thanks for having me.

DOBBS: The lessons that you talk about not applied to this point in Iraq, nor by this military. Why not?

BARNETT: Well, you could say, in many ways, we've been learning these lessons going all the way back at least to Somalia, the reality that what we're facing in the post-Cold War era isn't so much the high intensity conflict that we are so well adapted to, but, really, what we call under this rubric military operations other than war, basically, the everything else.

DOBBS: Tom, you are a gifted analyst, strategist, and writer. But when you say high-intensity war that we are so suited for, what high-intensity war have we demonstrated great success, strategic thinking in, in the last two or three decades?

BARNETT: I would argue the first Desert Storm conflict and I would argue what we did in Kosovo and what we did in, recently, last year in Iraq, meaning, when we're facing military forces on the ground, we know how to take them apart, basically dismember them almost at will.

But what we're not structured for is what comes after. Basically, we've been building for a high-end scenario for the last 10, 15 years, looking for a near peer competitor to appear on the strategic horizon once the Soviets are gone. We are really focused on say a China 20 years from now and not so focused on what happens in Iraq after the hostilities end.

DOBBS: Your writing in "Esquire" magazine reminded all of us of the Bush administration's fixation on China as not only a strategic competitor in an economic sense, but also a geopolitical sense.

BARNETT: Right.

DOBBS: Do you think that is eliminated?

BARNETT: I think it was eliminated by 9/11.

But I think what people have to understand with the Pentagon is, what the Pentagon basically does is, it spends its time thinking about, imaging future war and then building a force to fight that future war. And we basically decided around '95, '96, that China was that long-term paradigm that we were going to size our forces against. We have not gotten off that, which is why we're short on equipment and personnel and training. We just haven't rebalanced to meet the challenges we're facing in Iraq since May 2003.

DOBBS: As you talk about high intensity wars, there are those who would say deft, nimble, brilliantly executed in the war to seize Baghdad.

BARNETT: Right.

DOBBS: Botched, pathetic and bungling in the period since.

BARNETT: It's been a tough road. I would argue this force has the best capability of any military on the planet to do this kind of activity. Is it good enough to secure the kind of success we were hoping to get following the takedown of Saddam, absolutely not. More over, if we demonstrate that, we don't attract the coalition partners who want to join that aspect, the peace keeping more than the war fighting, because that's what they're built for.

DOBBS: The peace keeping they're built for instead of the war fighting, one might argue, Tom, that's of limited use to us. If it is to be our blood and treasure that is spilled around the world in the war against radical Islamist terrorists, having to mop up operations by a group of nations that we then attach to a coalition seems like more PR than substantive assistance and the work of real allies.

BARNETT: I would disagree in the following sense. We lost about 150 souls in six weeks of combat. OK, I think we can do that well and keep our losses proportional to the gains we achieve. We have lost what 500, 600 and counts in the 12 months since the "End Of major hostilities in Iraq." I would argue most of the militaries around the world are built for that and eager for that sorts of opportunities. When I talk to foreign militaries and describe that back half force, that system administrator force, most come out of their seats and say this is what we can marry up with.

DOBBS: The two issues that arise with your considerations and the Pentagon's obvious valuation. One is, do we want to be a nation executing nation building as a matter of primary national strategy, a reflection of our national interests. And do we want to engage ground troops because those 736 Americans have died seemed like a high cost to all of us for a strategy that is unclear and an unclear goal. Don't you agree?

BARNETT: Well, I think it was explained badly. I think if you're going to deal with a global war on terrorism, if you are going to deal with foreign terrorist threat into the United States, there is a variety of ways you can approach this. You can try to firewall America off from the outside world. I don't think you can stop really anything. You can hunt down and kill terrorists as fast as possible. As Israel learns in the West Banks, you can't kill them faster than you can grow them. And the more you kill, the more they grow them. So, what you have to do is deny the enemy his strategic goal. And what Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda's strategic goal is to drive the West out of the Middle East so they can hijack the Middle East out of the world. That means we have to integrate the Middle East faster than they can disconnect it from the outside world.

DOBBS: We thank you very much, Thomas Barnett, for being here.

BARNETT: Thanks for having me.

DOBBS: Thank you.

The Pentagon's new map, the 21st century -- Timely.

Posted by at 8:25 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: SWA flight from Raleigh NC to Baltimore MD, Father’s Day, 20 June

I got a copy of the current issue of Rolling Stone (and yeah, it’s the recently deceased Ray Charles on the cover—not me) while I was taking my family out for a Friday night (early Father’s Day) meal at our favorite Japanese restaurant in Swansea MA. My punishment for this good deed was having to sit through Garfield—the Movie with my kids while my wife took in The Terminal (much better).

I forgot to bring the issue with me on my trip to North Carolina, so I had to pick up another one on the road. Below is the relevant text from the group interview I participated in asynchronously by phone. I only include those portions of the article where my responses were used, but I detail all the questions en route. Following these excerpts, I have some commentary on the process and the piece.

Oh, and yes, I did pick up a copy of the Sunday New York Times at Raleigh's airport before I took off, just to make sure the Book Review section had the Best Seller listing that included me in it. It did, and I immediately set the copy aside for safekeeping. I already printed out a nice hard-copy of the list and am having that framed with the jacket of the book, plus a blown-up small poster-size version of the cover—all nicely matted.

What Next? Rolling Stone convenes a panel of experts to discuss what went wrong in Iraq—and where we can go from here

By Amanda Griscom

8-22 July 2004, pp. 63-66.

[box on page 64]
THE ROLLING STONE PANEL

· Gen. Anthony Zinni Commander in chief of Centcom, 1997-2000; special envoy to the Middle Eaast, 2002-2003; author of Battle Ready
· Gen Wesley Clark Supreme allied commander, Europe, 1997-2000; led NATO military campaign in Kosovo
· Rand Beers Counterterrorism adviser to President Bush, 2002-2003; national security adviser to Sen. John Kerry
· Sen. Joseph Biden Ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
· Thomas P.M. Barnett Strategic adviser to the Defense Department, 2001-2003; faculty member of U.S. Naval War College; author of The Pentagon’s New Map
· Fouad Ajami Director of Middle Eastern Studies at Johns Hopkins University
· Sir Jeremy Greenstock British diplomat in Dubai and Saudi Arabia, 1969-2004; U.N. representative, 1998-2003; special representative for Iraq, 2003-2004
· Youssef Ibrahim Managing director of the Dubai-based Strategic Energy Investment Group; former Middle Easter correspondent for the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal
· Bob Kerrey Senator from Nebraska, 1988-2003; president of New School University
· Chas Freeman U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 1989-1992; assistant secretary of defense, 1993-1994

[opening text and first question]

At the end of 2002, as the Bush Administration prepared to invade Iraq, Rolling Stone convened a panel of experts to assess the march to war. Things have since gone far worse that most imagined. There is no evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction—the rationale used to justify the invasion. The fighting continues to escalate long after Bush declared “mission accomplished,” and the White House tried to ignore the abuse and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers. As the U.S. prepares to hand over control to an interim Iraqi government, we reconvened key members of our panel, along with some new experts, to examine the current situation in Iraq. What went wrong—and what should we do now?

Before we look forward, let’s look back. What have been our biggest strategic blunders since we invaded Iraq?

GEN. ANTHONY ZINNI: We’ve had a year of disasters. The strategy going into Iraq was patently ridiculous—this idea that we’d generate Jeffersonian democracy the plant the seed of freedom in the Middle East. The rationale was even worse: We grossly overstated the threat and cooked the books on the intelligence. They we put on the ground a half-baked pickup team that has alienated the people and can’t connect to viable leadership.

GEN. WESLEY CLARK: We went in with far too few troops and seat-of-the-pants planning. We’ve been there for more than a year, and the borders still aren’t being controlled—jihadis and extremists are coming in from Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Fuel convoys are getting routinely attacked; oil facilities and police stations are regularly targeted.

RAND BEERS: The precondition to freedom is security. You can’t succeed in beating the insurgents unless you can convince the people that they can be protected.

THOMAS P.M. BARNETT: It was a major mistake for the Bush administration to say to potential allies, “If you’re too big a pussy to show up for the war, we’re not going to let you in on the peace or rehab process—and don’t expect any contracts.” We had such a macho view of war that we completely miscalculated the dangers of peacekeeping.

FOUAD AJAMI: Now we’re a Johnny-come-lately for a U.N. resolution to internationalize the political process. You might call it deathbed multilateralism.

[subsequent questions where my answers are not included:
· What about the blunders behind the scenes at the White House? (Biden, Kerrey)
· What would happen if we did pull out in a hurry? (Zinni, Ibrahim)
· Would civil war spill over the borders to create a regional conflict? (Biden, Beers)]

So let’s assume we’re in it for the long haul. How do we even begin to regain control?

ZINNI: Security is the most important issue short-term. I’m talking probably at least a year and twice the number of boots. People won’t help build a new Iraq unless they can walk to a police station—much less a voting booth—without fear of getting killed.

BARNETT: The Bush team needs to eat crow and make the tough deals necessary to internationalize this. They need to call a summit meeting of the major powers, including Russia, China and India, and say, “We have a problem in Iraq. Our loss would be as big a loss for you—economically and otherwise—as for us. What will it take to get 10,000 Chinese troops, 10,000 Indian troops, 10,000 Russian troops? What do you want in return?” We know what the deals are. India would probably demand, for example, that we don’t declare Pakistan a major ally. Russia wants full membership in NATO. China might ask us to stop planning a missile defense in northeast Asia.

ZINNI: You have to see the bar scene from Star Wars, where there’s a lot of different uniforms, not just all American desert cammies.

BIDEN: We need to rapidly train an Iraqi army and police force. They need to feel they are fighting for themselves. If I’m president of the United States, my orders to our generals and ambassadors are, “If I see you once on Iraqi television, you’re fired. I want Iraqi faces on Iraqi television.” It should take two to three years to get 35,000 Iraqi troops out there.

[subsequent questions where my answers are not included:
· Should we even be talking about a June 30th hand-over? Are we prepared? (Clark, Ibrahim, Greenstock, Ajami)
· We keep hearing that the violence will escalate around June 30th and the year-end elections—that it will only get worse before it gets better. (Freeman, Zinni, Kerrey)
· We went into Iraq thinking it was a secular state, but the political rhetoric among Shiite and Sunni leaders has intensified. Is religion taking the place of politics? (Ajami, Greenstock)
· Is the concern that as the religious tenor among Iraqis intensifies, they will begin to identify their struggle as part of the larger conflict of Islam vs. the West? (Zinni, Ibrahim, Beers)
· We often hear that the war on terror has supercharged radical Islam and energized recruitment of terrorists. What evidence do we have to support this? (Freeman, Beers, Ibrahim)
· Should we view radical Islam as the enemy? (Zinni)
· Surely the Abu Ghraib prison scandal didn’t help. Should Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld or other Bush officials resign? (Beers, Biden)
· Speaking of Cheney, how does this instability affect contractors such as Halliburton? (Zinni)
· What about our oil concerns? We often hear that a prime reason we went into Iraq was to get access to its oil as our ties to Saudi Arabia falter. (Greenstock, Freeman, Ibrahim)
· Has the war at least produced a new respect for American military power? (Ibrahim, Biden)]

What does the future of war look like? Will we face World War III?

ZINNI: My son is a Marine captain, and he’s going to face a changed battlefield—messier than Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq. It’s no longer honorable fighting, where you defeat the forces of a nation-state on the battlefield. He’s going to face all sorts of violent components—insurgents, terrorists, warlords—as well as environmental challenges and humanitarian problems.

BARNETT: We’re going to end up replicating the struggle again and again. Like spraying the cockroaches in one apartment and scattering them to the next—we’re driving terrorists to the next country over. Sort of like rooting out old Japanese warriors on some isolated Pacific island twenty years after World War II, we’re going to be killing off the last of these guys years from now in deepest, darkest Africa.

[last question where my answer was not included: In the near term, is a change of administrations the best way out of the quagmire? (Ibrahim, Kerrey, Biden)]

Could I have scored more responses in the total? Hard to say. I was clearly the least weighty of the group in terms of gravitas and experience (and probably the only guy under 50 among that crowd), so I didn’t expect to register as frequently as others—like Zinni or Biden, both of whom seem to be running for jobs quite openly in the possible Kerry White House (Beers already has the national security adviser spot locked down—Kerry . . . who knows?). I guess Ajami, Greenstock, Ibrahim, Freeman and myself were considered more neutral or—perhaps in my case—more supportive of Bush (although my guess is that Griscom really glomed onto me due to my careful neutrality expressed in the Esquire article’s final four paragraphs). In all, pretty much a bunch collected to be critical of the administration, as reflected in the opening text by Griscom. No surprises in any of that: Rolling Stone can’t be expected to be anything other than vaguely counter-establishment (even as it has become quite “establishment” within the music industry).

I know that if I had said a lot of things more opening critical of Bush I could have been more prominent, although it would have been hard to bash Bush more than Zinni, who’s on a real crusade (although he’s selling books too—smart man . . . getting Tom Clancy’s name in huge letters atop the cover . . . 8<). But I figured it was cool enough just to be included with this panel of heavy hitters that I didn’t need to disgrace myself by getting so painfully partisan, which is not my style nor my substance anyway.

All in all, I was pretty pleased with how it turned out. My wife Vonne liked it plenty, saying I sounded sharp and concise and like I knew exactly what I wanted to say (editing down from 75 minutes to three short paragraphs can do that). She said she agreed with all my points, and felt most readers would too.

So I survive my brush with Rolling Stone just fine, and in the end, it’s pretty cool to be in an issue.

Posted by at 8:14 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: 55th Annual Worldwide Conference of the Civil Affairs Association, Hilton North Raleigh, 19-20 June 2004

At the beginning of June I got a rather desperate call from the Civil Affairs Association: they were looking for a replacement keynote speaker for their end-of-conference awards dinner down in Raleigh NC the night of the 19th. Being desperate myself for personal leave days (looking ahead to our lengthy trip across China in search of Vonne Mei Ling), I said yes because I figured I’d pick up a couple of comp days while helping out a very worthy organization. The CAA represents military officers from all over the world who engage in sys admin-style ops in countries following either war or some humanitarian disaster. The organization goes way back to the seminal experience of civil affairs officers in both postwar Europe and Japan (they actually followed en masse very closely on the heels of the D-Day invasion force).

I had to sked my flights on Saturday pretty tight so as to be able to coach my son’s last baseball game and MC the end-of-season party, but I was able to catch a 2pm flight out of Providence and routing through BWI to Raleigh, arriving just in time to set up in the ballroom, slip on my tuxedo, and make the opening salad of the meal. The crowd was about 250, with CA officers from every service, plus a serious contingent of them from allied militaries (first time I’ve seen a senior German officer ever, and I must say they still favor the light grey uniforms reminiscent of the Confederacy). The dinner with awards following dragged on until 9pm, so my talk plus Q&A went until 10:15. I was taking questions from people off-line after the event broke up until about 11:30. Then it was time for room service.

It was one of my better performances, despite the late hours, primarily because my allergies were pretty much gone for the day. But I think the biggest reason was because I had a crowd so receptive to the basic notion of Sys Admin work—that and the fact that it was such a diverse audience in terms of every service being represented (so the jokes about individual services got big laughs). Afterwards people seemed awfully pumped up, despite the late hour, so I felt like I’d really ended the conference on a big note. Plus, I got to sign a bunch of books people brought with them, and I was made an Honorary Member of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Corps (do these guys engage in PR or what!).

Oh, and they gave me one of those nifty command medallions that I like so much.

Did that make up for the fact that this was a non-paying gig that took me away from my family for an entire weekend so I got to spend Father’s Day just like my birthday—typing away on the floor at Baltimore-Washington Airport? No. What made up for that were all the stories I heard from the reconstruction effort in Iraq following the war. A lot of these guys had done serious time there, after Afghanistan, after Bosnia, after Somalia and Haiti—these guys get around. Not the kind of stories you repeat, but I felt awfully privileged to hear them—especially when offered in support of my ideas and the “good work you’re doing in spreading this message!” I expect future invites from a variety of military institutions around the country and the world as a result of this talk, and I look forward to them all.

If it’s fun to wage this battle one briefing room at a time, it’s even more fun to wage it one ballroom-full-of-officers-from-all-over-the-world at a time.

The catch from my weekend reading:

Remembering our past when we look to beheadings in the Gulf

“Acting on Threat, Saudi Group Kills Captive American: After Beheading, Militant Leader Is Reported Slain by Police,” by Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times, 19 June, p. A1.

Around the dial on future Middle East scenario pathways

“It’s a Dirty Job, But They Do It, Secretly, in Iraq,” by James Glanz, NYT, 19 June, p. A1.

"Pressure Builds on Key Pillar of Saudi Rule," by David B. Ottaway, Washington Post, 8 June, p. A18.

"U.S. Wary as Iran Works to Increase Influence in Iraq," by Robin Wright, WP, 12 June, p. A16.

"Kurds Advancing to Reclaim Land in Northern Iraq: Arab Settlers Displaced: Americans Fear Growing Migration Could Spark More Ethnic Strife," by Dexter Filkins, NYT, 20 June, p. A1.

"The Suburban Lure Of the West Bank," by Greg Myre, NYT, 20 June, p. WK3.

Posted by at 4:13 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“Acting on Threat, Saudi Group Kills Captive American: After Beheading, Militant Leader Is Reported Slain by Police,” by Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times, 19 June, p. A1.

The first thing I thought when I saw the Nick Berg beheading coverage was that, if it had been possible, Native Americans in the old West would have gladly videotaped and posted on the Internet their scalpings of settlers and/or Calvary soldiers for their broader, social terrorizing effect. Same would have been true for the Klu Klux Klan.

The beheading of Lockheed Martin worker Paul Johnson is the most visceral evidence yet that far too many Muslims (not all, mind you, but still far too many) are viewing the U.S.-led occupation in Iraq as the excuse for any sort of perversity imaginable against infidel outsiders. No real surprise in that, for we are there to dramatically change their ways of life by accelerating globalization’s up-to-now creeping embrace of the region—threatening the very fabric of its traditional family structures.

But more than that, the way the beheading was excused as revenge for every past act of violence ever perpetrated by the West/US/Israel against Islam says Iraq is becoming the “chosen trauma” of a significant portion of the population in various Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East. This is tough news, suggesting that the road ahead will be a long one—although not a completely new one for us.

This country went through long periods when we, just like Saudis are today, debated the ins an outs of legitimate killings of those we considered less than human—like Native Americans and African slaves. When we’ve engaged in total war in the past, we’ve seen that sort of debate crop right up in very impassioned fashion—just take a quick look at WWII propaganda about killing “Japs.”

There is a very serious global war going on right now, but in reality, the U.S. and our society is only peripherally involved—through our troops on the ground in Iraq. The real global war is between the growing connectivity facilitated by the spread of the global economy and those regions where that encroaching phenomenon will forever change life—as those who’ve long lived there have known it. It will never feel like total war on our end, but it already does on their end—hence the frightening ambivalence among so many Muslims in the Middle East about what constitutes the legitimate killing of Westerners.

Posted by at 4:02 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“It’s a Dirty Job, But They Do It, Secretly, in Iraq,” by James Glanz, New York Times, 19 June, p. A1.

"Pressure Builds on Key Pillar of Saudi Rule," by David B. Ottaway, Washington Post, 8 June, p. A18.

"U.S. Wary as Iran Works to Increase Influence in Iraq," by Robin Wright, Washington Post, 12 June, p. A16.

"Kurds Advancing to Reclaim Land in Northern Iraq: Arab Settlers Displaced: Americans Fear Growing Migration Could Spark More Ethnic Strife," by Dexter Filkins, New York Times, 20 June, p. A1.

"The Suburban Lure Of the West Bank," by Greg Myre, New York Times, 20 June, p. WK3.

In my book, in the section entitled, "The Big Bang as Strategy," I lay out four potential pathways for the Middle East following the takedown of Saddam. Below is the slide I use in the brief to explain the four scenarios:

Now, any good collection of scenarios needs to seem plausible, no matter which box you're talking about. Typically, you try to position the current reality in the lower left-hand corner, and the desired reality in the upper right-hand corner, with the two other boxes signaling potential alternative pathways from a straight worst-to-best case route. If you do your job right, your two questions generate four scenarios for which any given week of news stories can provide ample evidence are possibly unfolding. In other words, a quick perusal of the weekend papers should give you a story or two that seem to validate each of the four possible scenarios.

You might think, "No, the stories should all point to one scenario, because that proves your strategic thinking is dead-on!" But in my mind, the whole purpose of alternative scenarios is to allow you to process complex, ambiguous data flows in such a way as to disaggregate the various possibilities they display. In other words, you want to center your scenario 2x2 matrix in such a way as to capture the major pathways possible from today's perspective—not to limit your conceptualization of the future to one-and-only-one potential pathway, but to keep your mind open to a variety of "ponies" all running in the same race. New stories, then, are treated like "bursts of speed" displayed by one of the horses in the race, suggesting that they might be pulling ahead.

To give you a sense of how I check my own 2x2 matrices of scenarios, here's a collection of stories that I think speak to all four potential pathways listed above.

The first article about the new, secret sewage treatment plant in Iraq speaks volumes about what the real conflict in Iraq is all about now—a fight between those forces seeking to administer a system so that it can connect back up with the world and those who will seek every opportunity to destroy any such connectivity because the “good life” it suggests means the end of their dreams of power.

It has come down to this: the U.S. Agency for International Development, through its contractor Bechtel, creates a new facility for treating sewage in Baghdad and its very location is now a military secret. You can bet it's guarded by security personnel, if not American troops. If nothing else, this tells you how crucial the sys admin-type activities have become in the war against the insurgents: here we are guarding Iraq's own infrastructure against terrorists. What an amazing turnaround from a year ago when we were targeting the command and control infrastructure of Saddam's regime!

But that basic dichotomy defines the emerging bifurcation of the U.S. force: the Leviathan destroys infrastructure and connectivity, whereas the Sys Admin force protects and restores infrastructure and connectivity.

If that first article speaks to the lower left-hand scenario whereby Iraq becomes a long-term intifada-like situation for the U.S. and its allies (I mean, when you have to guard the sewage-treatment plant, that's pretty bad), the second article on Wahhabism coming under building pressure to moderate itself inside Saudi Arabia speaks to the upper right-hand scenario of serious reform unfolding in the Gulf.

This Post article by David Ottaway is a real eye-opener, suggesting not only a coming wave of educational reform in the kingdom, but a serious build-up of popular sentiment for the empowerment of women in that society, something the religious authorities there still condemn outright as "copying 'infidel' Western women" and something the West is trying to impose on Saudi society as a means to divert ordinary people from the true faith. And yet, recent polls suggest that over 90% of ordinary citizens favor the "empowerment of women," even as only two-thirds of them want to see women be given the right to drive!

Still, for women's issues and educational reform to be at the top of the agenda in popular Saudi discussions on the future of Wahhabism in their society says plenty about how ripe that country is for serious social change.

The third and fourth articles on Iran's seeming growing influence in southern Iraq and the restlessness of the Kurds in the north (moving back into areas from which Saddam had previously expelled them and—by doing so—implicitly enlarging the areas under Kurdish control) speak to the Arab Yugoslavia scenario, meaning the fluid situation in Iraq only sets off a host of other instabilities across the region –i.e., the system is perturbed.

Finally, the last article on the continued allure of settlements in the West Bank for Israelis desperately seeking affordable housing speaks to the upper left-hand scenario regarding the "security fence" now going up between Israel and what will inevitably become a formal Palestinian state that includes both the West Bank and Gaza. In some ways, that new—as I call it—Berlin Wall for the 21st century is as much as attempt to stem that flow of Israeli humanity into the West Bank as it is an effort to firewall off Israel from suicide bombers. And no, that good fence will not make for good neighbors any time soon . . ..

Again, a good collection of scenarios doesn't simply range from good to bad, or from repulsive to desired, or even from plausible to implausible. Any good set should feature scenarios that all seem quite plausible and thus reasonably clustered not just in the there-and-then, but in the here-and-now as well.

Posted by at 3:59 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: big tent at former drilling field, Naval War College, Newport RI, 18 June 2004

Sweltering, muggy day as I sit for well over 2 hours, wearing my heavy fuscia-colored (for Harvard) PhD academic gown. Always nice to watch the 500 or so US and foreign officers get their diplomas (several being former students of mine), and yet it stinks to have to stay camped out for so long on such an uncomfortable day, wearing so damn much regalia, under this breeze-killing tent. Worse, either my cologne or the brilliant pink (don't ask) fabric of my gown (or both) seems to attract a particularly annoying brand of marine gnat (we're right on the shore of Narragansett Bay).

Still, the event is the essence of the college and its mission, so minor unpleasantries aside, you're greatly honored to be there. A lot of these guys and gals are heading off to command positions at the front lines of this Global War on Terrorism, so you wish them all the best, even as you can only imagine some of the difficulties ahead. But these guys tend to be intrinsic do-ers who prefer to be out there, on the pointy end of the spear, so most consider today a day of liberation from the drudgery of papers, readings, and tests. I will consider it one as well, as soon as I'm out of this gown.

This morning I find out I might be shipping out soon myself on an unexpected trip overseas, but that decision is at least 48 hours away, so I head into the weekend focused on spending what time I can with my family.

Here' today' catch:

"Chaos" of 9/11 response simply showed rule set gaps

"Panel Says Chaos in Administration Was Wide On 9/11: Breakdowns Seen: Gap in Communication Left Pilots in Dark on Shootdown Order," by Philip Shenon and Christopher Marquis, New York Times, 18 June, p. A1.

"Sept. 11 Panel Deals Bush a Blow on Iraq: In Dismissing al Qaeda Link, Commission Undercuts President's Credibility on Going to War," by Greg Hitt and Jacob Schlesinger, Wall Street Journal, 18 June, p. A4.

The end of the free ride in Russia

"Cash vs. Benefits: Efficiency, of Assault on Russia's Soul? What is a perk worth? More than Putin will give us, many worry," by C.J. Chivers, new York Times, 18 June, p. A3.

The usual on China-Taiwan

"China-Taiwan Relations Sour, Dousing Hopes for Major Plans," by Dan Nystedt, WSJ, 18 June, p. B2.

Not just China scouring for oil

"Indian Oil Firms Scour Globe: Surging Demand Compels World-wide Quest for Energy Supplies," by Eric Bellman, WSJ, 18 June, p. A9.

Perfect home-away game breakdown

"Senate Votes to Add 20,000 Soldiers to Army: An effort to halt deployment of a missile system fails," by Carl Hulse, NYT, 18 June, p. A21.

Saudis debate finer points on when killing foreigners is okay

"Debating Killing of Foreigners in Kingdom: Time is running out for an American held in Saudi Arabia," by Neil MacFarquhar, NYT, 18 June, p. A11.

Posted by at 8:00 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Panel Says Chaos in Administration Was Wide On 9/11: Breakdowns Seen: Gap in Communication Left Pilots in Dark on Shootdown Order," by Philip Shenon and Christopher Marquis, New York Times, 18 June, p. A1.

"Sept. 11 Panel Deals Bush a Blow on Iraq: In Dismissing al Qaeda Link, Commission Undercuts President's Credibility on Going to War," by Greg Hitt and Jacob Schlesinger, Wall Street Journal, 18 June, p. A4.

NYT headline proclaims "chaos" of U.S. Government response, but of course, it doesn't use that term (U.S. Government) and instead says "Administration," meaning Bush & Co. That is frankly an editorial comment unworthy of the front page.

First, there was no chaos—a vastly overused term. There were merely key gaps in communications. People did the right things throughout the system as best they could, including Cheney giving the shootdown order on planes as the events continued to unfold. "Chaos"? If it's real chaos, the Administration wouldn't have managed even that. Government workers would have abandoned posts, and there would have been rioting in the streets from panicked populations, etc. None of that happened.

Meanwhile, across the U.S. Government and military, a lot of things were set in motion according to plans already in place. Were huge gaps discovered in those plans? Yes. But that reflects the new nature of the attack, something that frankly we've never been prepared as a government to deal with (hijacking commercial jets and using them as weapons). Yet somehow the FAA managed to safely land 4,500 planes all over America very rapidly, without a soul lost. Chaos? In my mind, pure partisan, editorial bull shit from the Times.

What the WSJ story offers is some interesting polling data: Bush's approval numbers are about the same on the economy and Iraq (low 40s), but his handling of terrorism in general is 56%. What's interesting is that gap between Iraq and terrorism, further evidence that this White House did not effectively frame the Iraq war within the larger context of the Global War on Terrorism.

Posted by at 7:52 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Cash vs. Benefits: Efficiency, of Assault on Russia's Soul? What is a perk worth? More than Putin will give us, many worry," by C.J. Chivers, New York Times, 18 June, p. A3.

Big scary bill in Russia's Duma from Putin: proposing to scrap decades of free this and that for masses, substituting government stipends in their place. A lot of old-timers would suffer most in this scenario. As one independent Duma member put it: "For the Russian people it means completely changing their psychology and their tradition, a Soviet-style tradition of life in Russia."

Putin really wants to prioritize government subsidies for those who need them most, whereas providing things like free public transportation for all means everyone gets something, whether they need it or not—something this government simply cannot afford as it moves ahead with market reforms.

That Putin is moving ahead with this very difficult dismantling of one of the last vestiges of Soviet central planning only demonstrates how committed he remains to reform.

Posted by at 7:49 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"China-Taiwan Relations Sour, Dousing Hopes for Major Plans," by Dan Nystedt, Wall Street Journal, 18 June, p. B2.

Typically overblown reporting on China-Taiwan: famous Taiwanese singer has her concert canceled in China because of local protests against her perceived support for Taiwan's independence movement. It is considered a bad sign of deteriorating relations between the two sides means a host of bilateral issues will be put off.

And they will. But will investment flows slow at all? No. The economic integration proceeds apace. It's just the political and social forms of connectivity that get held up in these periods of official "anger."

Should we be surprised? No. The logic of economic integration continues to work its boring magic, and as that process continues, the reality of the two sides drawing together over economics spurs anxiety for each regarding what should logically be accompanying social and political integration. So the fear factor we see in these spats doesn't speak to a growing disconnectedness between Taiwan and China, but merely reflects the growing economic bonds that progressively draw them together.

Basic lesson we see time and time again on globalization in general: connectivity breeds contempt at first, gradually giving way to peace over time as political and social and security rule sets catch up with the economic connectivity that leads the way.

Posted by at 7:47 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Indian Oil Firms Scour Globe: Surging Demand Compels World-wide Quest for Energy Supplies," by Eric Bellman, Wall Street Journal, 18 June, p. A9.

We've all seen lotsa articles like this on China. This is a rare one on India, but expect to see a whole lot more.

This only underscores the reality that both India and China are becoming dependent on secure energy flows from the Persian Gulf, which is why both nations should be in Iraq right now. That they're not only shows the lack of strategic planning and vision inside both the Pentagon and the US Government in general.

Posted by at 7:45 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Senate Votes to Add 20,000 Soldiers to Army: An effort to halt deployment of a missile system fails," by Carl Hulse, New York Times, 18 June, p. A21.

Senate decides to add 20k soldiers on their own to the Army, but fails to stop the costly deployment of the missile defense system the Pentagon wants to erect around the U.S.

The 20k more soldiers are a pure response to the Sys Admin responsibilities this Administration faces in the unfolding Global War on Terrorism, whereas the missile shield is a terrible hangover from the Cold War past that assumes we can somehow firewall ourselves off from the dangers "over there."

Countries firing missiles at us is not the threat we face, and if it's a non-state actor doing it, that bomb will far more likely come in a suitcase. No, we need to stay focused on playing the away game in the Middle East, dealing with terrorism at its roots. 20k new soldiers does that, Star Wars does not.

Posted by at 7:42 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Debating Killing of Foreigners in Kingdom: Time is running out for an American held in Saudi Arabia," by Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times, 18 June, p. A11.

The case of Paul Johnson is triggering some unprecedented debates within Saudi society, but the tenor of those debates show how far that society needs to go before it can really join the world. This story details some of the finer points on that debate, like when it's still okay to simply kill any foreigner you may come across. This is why I say comparing the Gap in general to old Wild West of America is not far-fetched. Frontier justice abounds in societies where taking the "law" into your own hands is not just considered okay, but your "sacred duty." These situations simply reflect societies where the development of secular law has been severely retarded.

Posted by at 7:40 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 17 June 2004

In case you missed it, my webmaster posted a copy on my site's front page. It's the second ad I've heard of. First one was half-pager for 17 May issue of The New Republic. This once is a nice size (one-third width of page and runs from top of page to crease) and nice placement (above crease, page 9, Arts section). Does it drive traffic and sell books? Putnam described it to me as a "connect the dots" effort for anyone who may have seen or heard about the book on CNN, Headline News, Fox, CNNfn, CNBC, NPR, CSPAN, etc. and just needed to be reminded: "Oh yeah, thaaaaat book!"

My main man at Putnam, Editor-in-Chief Neil Nyren says the books are still moving out of their offices at very solid speed, with significantly more than half the run already in circulation. Assuming the industry standard percentage gets returned unsold, we're already into the tens of thousands of books sold, which feels awfully good because that number sold already surpasses the typical first-printing run of the vast majority of books like mine (political, hefty). I always knew the book would do the usual sort of business for it's type, but this is going way beyond that—with the NYT Best Seller designation to boot (something very few of those books achieve and—frankly—only a couple or so hundred achieve in non-fiction across an entire year). So no complaints. As Neil predicted, this book would sell well but in a steady, building fashion. The NYT BSL achievement was driven by the CSPAN Book Notes appearance—fabulous but an anomaly.

Meanwhile, the push for more PR is neverending. Just signed up for live NPR On Point show on 28 June. Just agreed to interview by French journalist writing for L'Express, which is just about the coolest, biggest mag in France. Still waiting on London's Daily Telegraph profile, but if it's anything like the AP effort, it will appear far later than I expect. But that's fine, having PR pop up regularly over the summer is just what the publisher ordered. Just yesterday I got a nice plug online from The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, although it referenced the original Esquire article only and not the book. But still, any mention is better than none and a good mention is better than a bad one, and this one was good.

Over the longer haul, several possibilities exist. I'm working to get on this PBS show out of San Jose called Uncommon Knowledge. Arranging that one is mostly logistics, because you need to get to CA to film it. Got a proposal in front of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting for a documentary based on the book. Should get a thumbs up or down by end of summer. Putnam's still pushing me to some big interview shows, and I've signed up to do some pretty big conferences in the fall. Then there will be the hoped-for next iteration of this site. All in all, plenty to look forward to.

But yeah, I'd still the reviews. Washington Post promised one, but we're still waiting (many papers tend to run about 2 months post pub date for everything but instant best sellers). I'd love one from the Wall Street Journal, but they do so few, and Jaffe's story was a quasi review of the best sort (front page), so that's probably too much to hope for. As for the Times, I know exactly who I'd want to review it: David Brooks. But I fear that dream date is already come and gone as a possibility. Word I got from Putnam is that once Times passes on review, they don't change their mind.

Eventually I will stop whining, but damn it! It's all I got for now. Still, gotta take the NYT Best Seller list on Sunday over any review. I just hope to God they don't print some abbreviated version of the list (like to only 12 or 13!) so they can shove the Children's List or How-To List at the bottom of the column, cause they it would feel a bit like a technical knock-out. Even in this virtual age, you want to hold the paper in your hand.

But just in case . . .  

Hardcover Nonfiction

Published: June 20, 2004

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/20/books/bestseller/0620besthardnonfiction.html

1 DRESS YOUR FAMILY IN CORDUROY AND DENIM, by David Sedaris. (Little,Brown,$24.95.) The humorist's latest collection of essays.

2 EATS, SHOOTS & LEAVES, by Lynne Truss. (Gotham, $17.50.) An Englishwoman expounds on the use and misuse of punctuation marks.

3 BIG RUSS AND ME, by Tim Russert. (Miramax, $22.95.) The host of "Meet the Press" remembers his father and the other important teachers in his life.

4 PLAN OF ATTACK, by Bob Woodward. (Simon & Schuster, $28.) A behind-the-scenes account of the Bush administration's decision making as it drew up plans to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein.

5 *FATHER JOE, by Tony Hendra. (Random House, $24.95.) A noted satirist recalls his decades-long friendship with an English Benedictine monk. Excerpt

6 BATTLE READY, by Tom Clancy with Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz. (Putnam, $28.95.) The evolution of the United States Marine Corps, from the Vietnam era to the post-9/11 years.

7 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, by Ron Chernow. (Penguin Press, $35.) A biography of the first Treasury secretary and chief author of The Federalist Papers. First Chapter

8 MORE THAN MONEY, by Neil Cavuto. (ReganBooks/HarperCollins, $24.95.) A financial journalist who has multiple sclerosis presents portraits of other people in business who have overcome obstacles. (+)

9 FOUNDING MOTHERS, by Cokie Roberts. (Morrow, $24.95.) The ABC News commentator details the lives of the many women (Abigail Adams and Martha Washington among them) who "raised our nation."

10 ON THE DOWN LOW, by J. L. King with Karen Hunter. (Broadway, $21.95.) Exploring the lives of ostensibly straight black men who have sex with men, and the health consequences for the black community.

11 *SECRETS OF THE CODE, edited by Dan Burstein. (CDS Books/Squibnocket, $21.95.) Essays by a variety of experts — theologians, art historians, scientists — on themes relating to "The Da Vinci Code."

12 THREE WEEKS WITH MY BROTHER, by Nicholas Sparks and Micah Sparks. (Warner, $22.) The novelist and his sibling describe their trip around the world.

13 AGAINST ALL ENEMIES, by Richard A. Clarke. (Free Press, $27.) President Bush's former counterterrorism coordinator criticizes the administration's handling of events before and after the 9/11 attacks. First Chapter

14 THE PENTAGON'S NEW MAP, by Thomas P. M. Barnett. (Putnam, $26.95.) A military analyst assesses the prospects for war and peace in the 21st century.

15 REWRITING HISTORY, by Dick Morris with Eileen McGann. (ReganBooks/HarperCollins, $24.95.) A former adviser to President Bill Clinton "deconstructs" Hillary Clinton's autobiography, "Living History."

16 *TRUTH & BEAUTY, by Ann Patchett. (HarperCollins, $23.95.) A novelist recalls her friendship with Lucy Grealy, the author of "Autobiography of a Face."

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/20/books/bestseller/0620besthardnonfiction.html

Got it? Flaunt it!

Posted by at 7:49 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Repost from June 17, 2004

"Sept. 11 Plotters Initially Planned Broader Attacks: Commission Reports Find No Iraq-al Qaeda Link; Mohammad's 'Second Wave,'" by staff, Wall Street Journal, 17 June, p. A1.

"Panel Finds No Qaeda-Iraq Tie; Describes a Wider Plot for 9/11: Challenges Bush: A Chilling Chronology Rewrites the History of the Attacks," by Philip Shenon and Christropher Marquis, New York Times, 17 June, p. A1.

I will confess: I've skimmed all the reports/articles/etc. about the 9/11 plot for the past almost three years, and there is nothing in this commission report that I see as new or particularly "chilling."

The big points one by one:

"Al Qaeda had planned it for years!"

This only confirms the basic pattern of major al Qaeda ops distant from the Middle East: they are very hard to arrange, take a lot of planning, and typically are in the works for years. To me, this news is nothing but good. If we keep the pressure up on the al Qaeda network, the chances of it being able to mount something big and serious in the U.S. is greatly diminished.

"The attack was originally designed to be much larger!"

This we know of from basically every big op they try. Al Qaeda was all set to pull something like 15 planes all hijacked at once well before 9/11. That plot fizzled. So they had grandiose designs on 9/11 too? Big deal. Their limited logistical network convinced Osama to scale it down. So you tell me: which news is more scary/reassuring? The intention to try bigger or the reality that forced them to scale down?

"No connection between Iraq and al Qaeda!"

That one was always a shakey notion at best, one of the three dozen or so rationales offered by various Bush Admin officials during the run-up to the war. It never meant anything to me. Saddam had multiple priors and multiple warrants. We took him down with relative ease when we could—at a time of our choosing, just like any cops. You don't need to catch Ted Bundy actually killing a woman to arrest him, you do it whenever you can. It's like people wanting us to find Saddam mixing sarin gas with Osama himself, otherwise it was all a sham. But in the end, this is just the incoherence of the Bush Administration's explanations for the war in Iraq coming back to haunt them. As I've said or written many times, I think there's no question that if you want to defeat international terrorism based out of the Middle East, you need to go after the threat in a strategic fashion, meaning you deny them the long-term goal they seek (a hugely disconnected Middle East). Going after Saddam does the trick better than any other target we could have taken on, and if we create a true center of gravity in the Global War on Terrorism in Iraq, then so much the better. It's a lot harder chasing them all over the world than simply throwing down the gauntlet in Iraq, and with the bombs now going off in the Persian Gulf and not here in America, the mass violence of this "war" is now located exactly where it needs to be—over there in al Qaeda's neighborhood and not over here in ours. Moreover, professionals are now fighting and—yes—dying in this war, but wars are like that, and that is why we have a military. To me, going into Iraq forced America to finally deal with the mess that is the Middle East. Until we deal with that mess, this GWOT isn't going anywhere but toward a stalemate.

Posted by at 6:54 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Repost from June 17, 2004

"Saudi Arabia Refines Its Assessment of Al Qaeda Threat: Kingdom Itself Seen as a Target," Washington Post, 8 June, p. A18.

Can I get a Duuuuuuuuuh!
 
Saudis finally starting to harden all their soft sites around the country. I say, "Join the party, G.D. it! You're the guys paying for it!"

Here's the good excerpt:

"The brewing conflict between the government and the militants has forced many people here to reassess where they stand. In a nation where large segments of society support native son Osama bin Laden's efforts to destroy the United States and its Western allies, mainstream Saudis who cheered him are starting to realize that the government bin Laden and his followers really wanted to topple all along was their own.

'Many people thought that this was just talk, people saying extremist things, but that's it, just talk,' said Abdul Muhsen Akkas, a member of the Saudi consultative council, a group that advises the royal family. 'Somehow we had the belief that our people would never cross that bridge' and attack the kingdom's economy and social structure.'"

You note, the House of Saud isn't exactly cracking ass to run around the world and help anyone other than themselves deal with al Qaeda. So yes, they'll crack down at home and yes, they'll try to stop the "charity" funding that flows to the terrorists, and yes, they'll rethink the whole madrasses educational system, but know this: the House of Saud isn't really interested in building any connectivity (security, political, economic, social) that calls into question—in the slightest—the legitimacy of their rule. That legitimacy is slowly eroded by globalization's creeping advance into the region, because the resulting connectivity and content flows are threatening to the House of Saud's still very traditional definition of society.

So they try to keep the world out as far as the masses are concerned, whereas the rich elite go wherever they want in the Core and do whatever they want when they get there—sort of like they shed their "observant Muslim" thing the second the Saudi Air flight leaves the tarmac in Riyadh, only to reacquire it the second their return flight touches down. Neat sort of piousness if you can stand it.

But simultaneously enjoying globalization (at least the elite) while keeping it at bay is a deeply self-limiting strategy on two counts: 1) you don't really develop economically and thus remain vulnerable on the question of regime legitimacy, and 2) your inherent lack of broadband connectivity makes you an attractive target to extremists who dream of disconnecting you completely in order to institute their hoped-for authoritarian regime.

You can't go half-way on globalization, although you can work the speed of integration somewhat. But the House of Saud seems to want to keep the content flows and connectivity highly segmented within their society: for all on top, some below, but largely non-existent for the observant, in-the-dark masses. One way they manage this is to use a lot of external labor as guest workers. 

But it's a decrepit system that breeds complacency and lack of vision. Here's the killer excerpt that really makes the point:

'The regime in Saudi Arabia today is a regime of old men. It is like the Soviet days,' said Ferhad Ibrahim, a political science professor and Middle East specialist at the Free University of Berlin. 'They don't have a strategy against the terrorists. They have a crisis. The whole political system has a hard time functioning.'

Even so, some Saudi intellectuals say, the attacks have renewed popular support for the government and sparked a backlash against the militants. They say many Saudis are afraid that al Qaeda is trying to ruin the nation's economy and isolate the kingdom from the rest of the world."

Yeah, I'd say they're beginning to get it.

Posted by at 5:12 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 16 June 2004

Our fourth child was born Yong Ling Zhou, but she will be known to us as Vonne Mei Ling Barnett. Her original name meant something along the lines of "the gift of harmonious chimes," and we will keep the "chimes" part as a legacy from her origins.

Her new name is designed to bond her deeply with our family.

Vonne Mei, her two-part first name, will link her to her new mother (first name Vonne), her new older sister Emily (middle name Vonne), and her new maternal grandmother (middle name Vonne, used as her first name). Thus Vonne becomes our daughter's firm link to our extended Meussling family's legacy of Vonnes.

Mei, the second part of her first name, links our new daughter to my side of the family, as Mae was my maternal grandmother (never met). We use the Chinese spelling of this name because we want that connection as well, and because Mei means "beautiful" in Chinese.

Ling, our daughter's middle name, will preserve her original Chinese first name as her legacy to her biological family. As this point, we do not know if this first name was chosen by her original parents (occasionally true) or given to her by her orphanage in Jiangxi Province (more typically the case). Either way, that name is a huge and very important link to her past, something we seek to respect deeply over the course of her life in our now-enlarged family. Ling means "chimes" in Chinese.

By preserving her original first name and using the Chinese spelling Mei, our new daughter is linked culturally to her cousin, adopted from Guangdong Province by my older sister Maggie approximately three years ago.

And finally, by legally adopting her in the United States under the surname Barnett, our Vonne Mei will be permanently joined to that extended family on my side.

Vonne Mei Ling Barnett was born on 4 November 2003, to a woman or couple that decided she would not be able to thrive in China, and so made the difficult choice to grant her a different pathway somewhere outside of China. That incalculable gift establishes a very strong link between our family and the civilization that is China.

In one phone call, we have become a Chinese-American family, and a new connection is born between China and the United States.

Here's today's catch:

Rule-set resets are a very tricky thing in the GWOT

"Redefining Torture: Did the U.S. go too far in changing the rules, or did it apply the new rules to the wrong people?" by Amanda Ripley, Time, 21 June, p. 49

"Where the Land Is a Tinderbox, the Killing Is a Frenzy: Across Africa's midsection, man and nature conspire to set off murderous outbursts," by Somini Sengupta, New York Times, 16 June, p. A4.

"Zimbabwe Stocks Up On Jets, Arms," by Tom Carter, Washington Times, 15 June, p. 1.

"Russian Trial Opens Messy Chapter: Yukos Case Could Influence Course of Commercial Law And Business Under Putin," by Guy Chazan, Wall Street Journal, 16 June, p. A12.

"Investors Worry About China: D'Long's Plight Suggests Problems With Nation's Stock Markets," by Kathy Chen, WSJ, 16 June, p. C14.

"China's Growing Clout Alarms Smaller Neighbors," by Michael Vatikiotis, WSJ, 16 June, p. A12.

"Foreign Buying of Securities Is Strong," by Dow Jones Newswires, WSJ, 16 June, p. B9.

"Attacks on Iraqi Pipelines Halt Most of Country's Oil Exports," by Hassan Hafidh, WSJ, 16 June, p. A3.

"Bloc of Lockerbie Families Urges End to Libya Penalties: Deep divisions over whether even to talk with Qaddafi," by Matthew L. Wald, NYT, 16 June, p. A12.

"Fox Seeks to Allow Mexicans Living Abroad to Vote in 2006," by Tim Weiner, NYT, 16 June, p. A6.

Posted by at 6:52 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Redefining Torture: Did the U.S. go too far in changing the rules, or did it apply the new rules to the wrong people?" by Amanda Ripley, Time, 21 June, p. 49.

This one almost writes itself thanks to the sub-title. A major theme in my book is that 9/11 and the resulting Global War on Terrorism triggers a rule-set reset not just across America, but much of the world (e.g., there has been a huge upsurge in new laws targeting terrorism throughout the Core). This reset consists mostly of adding in new rules where gaps are now perceived to exist, as in, "Clearly, we're missing the rules to deal with this particular problem."

Nowhere has this rule-set reset been trickier than in the area of handling, interrogating, and putting on trial suspected terrorists. Surest sign? Most of our internal debates have been about what to call these people (Enemy combatants? Terrorists? Criminals?) and which of our legal systems should handle them (the whole debate about courts versus military tribunals versus internationally sanctioned courts). The new rules on interrogating prisoners in the GWOT stayed out of the headlines by and large until Abu Ghraib broke as a story. Yes, there were ongoing complaints about Guantanamo, but the US Government, the media, and the public pretty much let that slide until Abu Ghraib put all these issues squarely on the table.

Should we be surprised that memos are being discovered that suggest "that since late 2001 the Administration has been quietly but fundamentally reshaping America's stance on torture," as the Time article reports? Not really. After 9/11, this administration—and frankly any that follows—knows that the public will hold them far more responsible for the next 9/11 than they did for the original. I don't want an administration that is too timid in this response, because I expect my judicial system and my legislative arm to deal with any excesses. To expect the executive branch to self-police itself in zealousness is, in my opinion, the wrong expectation. We get to vote them out of office every four years if we're unhappy with their record.

Will any administration have the opportunity to race ahead of the courts and legislative branches in this ongoing rule-set reset? Absolutely, because that's what an executive function is for: dealing with the day-to-day stuff at the speed required. It's up to the other two branches of the government to self-correct and recalibrate over time, so there should be no surprise that the sequence is: executive branch races ahead, oversteps here and there, and later gets investigated by Congress (resulting in new laws of protection) and "struck down" in various instances by the Supreme Court.

My point is this: no one wants more 9/11s, and to avoid them requires a certain tightening up of the rule set. For the current administration to pursue this with vigor does not signal some Orwellian future or some tilt toward fascism, but merely the executive branch doing what it is designed to do in times of crisis. The rule-set reset is proceeding in a completely normal fashion. Our job as citizens is to speak up when we're unhappy with what the press uncovers, and push our representatives in Congress to pursue any abuses with their customary vigor, expecting the courts to step in as they can in response to suits, constitutional challenges, etc.

Bottom line: our political system is operating just fine. The rule-set reset was both necessary and quite typical in how it's unfolding.

Posted by at 6:28 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Where the Land Is a Tinderbox, the Killing Is a Frenzy: Across Africa's midsection, man and nature conspire to set off murderous outbursts," by Somini Sengupta, New York Times, 16 June, p. A4.

Great NYT article on persistent conflicts in central Africa, arguing that you need to think of all the competing pressures as though you're looking at a Russian nesting, or matryoshka doll. Yes, in the outer layers you find all the familiar pieces: "tribe and creed, resentment against outsiders, competition for political power, an overabundance of guns and frustrated young men to put them to use." But the little "doll" you find at the middle of it all is the age-old fight between the farmer and the cowboy.

I know, it's almost enough to make you want to start singing that song from the musical "Oklahoma": "Oh the cowboy and the farmer should be friends . . .."

But it's basically true: many of these violent outbursts in central Africa get dressed up by the media and experts with all the "outer layer" explanations, when in reality they start with struggles over who gets to control the land and how. As the reporter puts it, "It is as old as civilization itself, the clash of men attached to their cattle and men attached to their land. It is a clash of two cultures, two ways of being in the world."

What drives this fight more and more is a combination of factors, such as desertification, over-harvesting of trees for firewood, and soaring populations. In short, this is all about sustainable development. Sure, once the machetes come out, then it's all about tribes and religions and ethnic cleansing and political power, but the driving force beneath all that is the inability to pursue sustainable development pathways.

You can say, "give them more aid and that'll do the trick," but you'd be only partly correct. Until better rules are put in place to attract foreign investment and external trade that involves something other than raw materials or simple commodities like food, this cycle is unlikely to end: people will continue to barely scratch out a living, having as many babies as possible to man the farms/herds, etc., and keeping their daughters home from school as a result.

What tends to stand in the way of such better rule sets emerging? That would be Africa's "Big Man" problem, or the corrupt dictators who tend to treat the national economy primarily as an unending source of personal enrichment. That's the biggest rule set reset required for Africa: ending the notion that the only way to become rich is to control the government and exploit that power for all the corrupt gain it's worth. That's why they're so few millionaires there, because it's very hard to become rich in Africa without being part of the corrupt political systems of rule.

Posted by at 6:23 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Zimbabwe Stocks Up On Jets, Arms," by Tom Carter, Washington Times, 15 June, p. 1.

Robert Mugabe, long-time brutal dictator of Zimbabwe, whose people face possible starvation in coming months (the UN estimates that two-thirds of the population lacks access to sufficient nutrition), has decided that his government needs to buy $240m worth of jets and other military equipment from . . . China.

What threats does this man face? Only internal resistance or, if the UN ever got off its ass and actually did anything, possibly even more international sanctions. What Mugabe should really fear is a U.S.-led regime-change force swooping in and arresting the S.O.B. and carting him off to the International Criminal Court for a laundry list of charges, but don't hold your breath on that one—the suffering of black Africans rarely gets anyone inside the Core excited enough to do anything more than throw another sanction on the fire.

Why is China selling the goods? Simply to make money. Beijing has forced the military to stop self-financing by producing consumer goods in recent years, which only puts more pressure on it to reap whatever profits it can by selling arms overseas. China's military argues that it needs lotsa funding to continue their long-term military build-up for a lot of the usual "national prestige" reasons, but let me be clear: that sales job is greatly facilitated because our Pentagon, in its own internal logic, centers its long-term plans for great power war around the assumption that China is the rising near-peer competitor we must inevitably fight.

Thanks—in no small part—to that international security dynamic which keeps the military-industrial complexes both here and in China feeling good about themselves, Zimbabwe gets the arms it so desperately needs . . ..

Mmmm—that's a good warm feeling, yes?

Posted by at 6:21 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Russian Trial Opens Messy Chapter: Yukos Case Could Influence Course of Commercial Law And Business Under Putin," by Guy Chazan, Wall Street Journal, 16 June, p. A12.

"Investors Worry About China: D'Long's Plight Suggests Problems With Nation's Stock Markets," by Kathy Chen, WSJ, 16 June, p. C14.

"China's Growing Clout Alarms Smaller Neighbors," by Michael Vatikiotis, WSJ, 16 June, p. A12.

"Foreign Buying of Securities Is Strong," by Dow Jones Newswires, WSJ, 16 June, p. B9.

I wrote in the book that Mikhail Khodorkovsky's trial (fmr CEO Yukos) would end up being a defining moment for Vladimir Putin's rule, and it's finally starting today in a Moscow courtroom (you gotta remember I was writing last fall).

Here's the opening paras from the great WSJ article:

"The trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, due to start today, is one of the most ambitious prosecutions ever launched by Russia's post-Soviet authorities and reopens the murkiest chapter of the country's recent past—the messy privatization of the 1990s.

Seen in capitals and boardrooms east and west as a crucial signal of the way Russia is heading politically under President Vladimir Putin, the Khodorkovsky case also could have profound ramifications for the way business is done and commercial law is interpreted in Mr. Putin's Russia. Already, the case has raised questions about the former KGB agent's commitment to the rule of law and other basic democratic institutions.

Defenders of Mr. Khordovsky, the founder of the Russian oil giant OAO Yukos, denounce the charges as retribution for the billionaire's funding of opposition parties that challenged the Kremlin. His lawyers have categorized a litany of violations of due process they allege have taken place since the case began last July with the arrest of co-defendant and close Khordovsky associate Platon Lebedev on charges of fraud and tax evasion.

Mr. Putin insists that the case is a criminal matter for the courts to decide.

In contrast to other indictments of high-profile financial crimes in Russia, which have sometimes fallen apart in court, the charges prosecutors have made public against Messrs. Khordovsky and Lebedev appear to stand up to scrutiny. Western experts say they describe fairly straightforward acts of criminal fraud, embezzlement and tax evasion, and are generally well-written and well-pled."

But also don't be surprised that Khordovsky goes down hard. Many a Russian will tell you that the theft and fraud of the early 1990s' privatization process was unbelievable. I had one Russian give me his privatization voucher as a souvenir (worth 10,000 rubles at the time—before the hyper-inflation kicked in) even before the process began—so convinced was he that it was a complete sham (I still have it—see!).

The check was the government's way of giving average Russians a chance to buy into the newly-minted companies being created by privatization, but my friend was so convinced that a few insiders would acquire these huge government assets for a song, that he didn't even bother to cash his. If I asked him today about Khordovsky's trial, I'm sure he'd say this guy was getting his just rewards. As one Russian friend recently told me, imagine Bill Gates "buying" the Microsoft of 1993 from the U.S. Government lock, stock and barrel for $500 million and then becoming America's richest man as a result. If he went down in a trial, would you cry for him?

Well, Bill had his trial over monopoly charges not too longer after Russia's slimy privatization process, but his court case was about ten steps past this trial in what it said abut the state of American business rule sets today compared to those of Russia today. You have to remember, Russia blew right out of its lengthy period of state-owned monopolies and into a sped-up, robber-baron capitalism phase, and now it's storming into Teddy Roosevelt-like attempts to tame and—in some instances—bust up such huge conglomerates using showy corruption trials.

My point is this: don't get all afraid for democracy and free markets on the basis of this trial. This is a Russian rule-set reset and it's a totally expected and necessary step in Russia's continued evolution toward firm, private-sector-oriented, business rule-set development.

China's seems farther along that path, and in many ways it is, but that doesn't mean rule-set resets aren't always lurking around each possible corner. There will be many scandals exposed within companies across China as more and more of them come under investor scrutiny thanks to their public listings on stock exchanges. The more money China accepts from foreign investors, the more transparency they will demand.

But the more transparency that foreign investors demand, the more at ease the world will inevitably become regarding China's rising economic power—if those demands for transparency are met.

Right now China is concluding bilateral trade agreements with individual Asian states, and it can seem like they're strong-arming each and every one for the best possible deals thanks to their new-found power as not just producer of damn near everything, but—far more importantly—the voracious consumer of damn near everything.

Rather than fretting over these bilats, the US and Japan should be helping small Asian states maneuver China toward a serious Pacific Rim free trade agreement, or a multilat that would bond the U.S. and China together with Japan, South Korea, and others regarding East Asia's economic future. Even just working hard in that direction would be worthwhile, because of the discussions of merging rule sets that would necessarily occur as part of the process of dialogue.

Plus, such merging of economic rule sets could only encourage the development of similar bonds in the security realm.

Why push for such things? Need I remind you again about China and Japan being so nice about buying all that sovereign debt we continue to float—that public deficit-driven debt that allows us to wage a Global War on Terrorism?

Yet another example of the military-market nexus we all need to pay far more attention to—on Wall Street, on Main Street, and inside both the Pentagon and Beijing's Forbidden City.

Posted by at 6:12 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Attacks on Iraqi Pipelines Halt Most of Country's Oil Exports," by Hassan Hafidh, WSJ, 16 June, p. A3.

There has long been the much-touted security scenario (vertical in the extreme) that says everyone vastly underestimates how little it would take from terrorists to stop virtually all of the oil coming out of the Persian Gulf for weeks or even months on end. The horizontal tails resulting from that one would be profound, triggering rule-set resets all over the dial (possibly far more in Asia than in the U.S.).

All I'm saying when I highlight this apparent insurgency/terrorist success in turning off the flow in Iraq is: don't think it can't be done in Saudi Arabia, no matter how much the House of Saud pretends otherwise.

Posted by at 6:03 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Bloc of Lockerbie Families Urges End to Libya Penalties: Deep divisions over whether even to talk with Qaddafi," by Matthew L. Wald, New York Times 16 June, p. A12.

This is a sad story: Lockerbie families pushing the White House to end the sanctions on Libya. Why? Because they believe our leopard friend has really changed his spots? Because they totally discount the recent stories about Qaddafi ordering a hit on the ruling member of the House of Saud?

Not really.

Most families got an initial payment of $4m from Libya last September as part of the UN-sanctioned deal to end its sanctions on Qaddafi's regime. However, $6m still sits on the table, and that $6 mil ain't moving until the US Government officially ends its sanctions (freeing up $4m) and takes Libya off the list of countries it says sponsors terrorism (the other $2m).

Hmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.

Is this a global "war" on terrorism or a global torts case on terrorism? I mean, if it's all just about compensation, why not simply figure out our bill and mail it to Osama himself?

Posted by at 6:00 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Fox Seeks to Allow Mexicans Living Abroad to Vote in 2006," by Tim Weiner, New York Times, 16 June, p. A6.

Mexican president Vicente Fox will push his Congress to allow Mexican ex-pats living in the U.S. to vote in future elections for president there.

Fox can't run for re-election, but clearly he's doing this because his pro-business party would benefit over the long haul. But it's not just the rightist party in Mexico that favors this, because the leftist and centrist parties favor it as well.

Fox says he pushes this measure as something that would end "an unjust form of political discrimination."

Huh?

All this effort says to me is that the political overlap between Mexico and the U.S. will only continue to grow more profound thanks to the ever-increasing economic integration that makes Mexico such an integral part of the U.S. economic union. But more than that, this development tells me that the eventual joining of these Mexican states into some larger political union with these United States seems both inevitable and historically logical.

There is nothing sacred about 50 member states belonging to this union. Remember, we started with only thirteen.

Posted by at 5:00 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 15 June 2004

Got an interesting email from Iraq yesterday. Here's what it had to say:

Sir,

I am presently in Iraq, and just finished reading The Pentagon's New Map last night. Many of the items discussed in your System Administrator function are currently underway, but from my perspective in a very uncoordinated effort. I am a US Navy Seabee, and for some time I have been hoping that our senior leadership finally confesses that our construction function has long been sold out to Kellogg, Brown & Root. It is time for us to find a new niche, and with added resources, or consolidating resources with current Civil Affairs Groups, we could stand at the forefront of a "hands-on" System Administrator team. What are your thoughts, and could you possibly guide me in developing a point paper to this end?

And again, Sir, your book was a wonderful read.

Very Respectfully,

[rank withheld] [name withheld]
[unit withheld], Detail Falluja

How did we deal with this reality as it emerged over the post-Cold War era?

First, we pretended it wasn't there. That was called the Powell Doctrine (shooting stops, I'm outta here!).

Second, we technologized the problem as much as possible, but since most of that technology and acquisition spending went to the Leviathan side of the house, our warfighting capacity grew, but our Sys Admin/MOOTW capacity did not. Thus we enter Iraq with a Humvee population of 100k units, but only 2% of them are armored ("Who wants to draw straws for the armored Humvee seats today?")

Third, we ran our people ragged, tapping our Reserve Component for things like Civil Affairs so much these guys and gals became de facto Active Duty.

Fourth, we outsourced like crazy, which is where all the Brown and Roots come in. Most of these companies come from the oilfield services industry, which only makes sense: over the years, oil and mining firms were the only companies willing to enter war zones to acquire the resources trapped there, so such protective services sprang up around them out of the original oilfield/mine services industry (originally just about fixing and maintaining oil wells, mining sites, etc.).

What's scary about out-sourcing the Sys Admin role inside the Gap? The biggest problem is that you're asking the private sector to impose security rule sets on environments that are fairly chaotic, and being the private sector, they're gonna do what they need to (at cost) and nothing more than what is necessary to make the client happy. Serving the larger collective security needs of the people stuck in that chaotic environment is not part of their contracts, so they do the minimal and nothing more. In sum, they do not invest in the future security of any environment, they simply provide it as a short-term service.

Who should naturally provide security as a long-term collective good? Well, that's naturally the venue of governments. But who will provide it for the Gap, where governments are weak? UN won't do it, cause it's too respectful of national sovereignty (At least they can die and suffer knowing they're doing so as members of a sovereign state!). The U.S. can do it, but it tends to have to get itself all worked up to make the effort (sort of a mob justice on the high end, and the mournful CNN-effect induced pity on the low end).

What's lacking in the global system is a system for dealing with negative security situations in the Gap, or politically bankrupt regimes. UN Security Council starts the process by pointing fingers (and little else) and International Criminal Court sits on far end ready to judge the guilty parties (just that little issue of actually arresting anyone and bringing them to justice). In between those two reasonably worthy starting and end points is a vast wasteland of capability disabled by disorganization, lack of enunciated vision, and simple agreements among the main players—in large part because they don't all actually sit around a table on these issues.

I argue here and elsewhere that if the US shows it can field and successfully employ a Sys Admin force that follow up to its peerless warfighting Leviathan force, then we'll enable the global system as a whole to fill in the blanks on this much needed A-to-Z global rule set on processing politically bankrupt states—and that this accomplishment is a crucial first step to solving the security issues inside the Gap that prevent its shrinkage and absorption into the Functioning Core of globalization.

All my Seabee on the ground in Falluja is asking for is permission (from someone, please!) to start the dialogue needed within the Defense Department on how to rationally restructure itself for the Sys Admin role. His main beef is the blurry line between public and private-sector issues, and that's a great one to focus one, but there are others.

In answer to this guy's question, here's what I wrote back:

Glad you found the book useful; it was meant to be.

Off the top of my head, I think your point paper would need to offer the following:

1) overview construct for categorizing what needs to be done in any "sys admin" effort (sorting scheme)

2) diagnostic of who's doing what now (ex of Iraq)

3) diagnostic of who's overperforming/underperforming/mispositioned

4) series of possible new models of configuration, offering some analysis of mutations over time as the process progresses (Phase IV is likely to be a series of mini-phases)

5) analysis of the plusses and minuses of each model

6) your preferred chop of Model 1 for Phase IV-A, moving onto Model 2 for Phase IV-B, and so on

7) list of recommendations/next steps for actions or studies/what this would mean for your particular speciality/etc.

I would be very interested in seeing something like that written from a boots-on-the-ground perspective, meaning I think it could be magnificently impactful on thinking back here. It is a tall order, no doubt, but I assume you feel up to it based simply on your raising the possibility.

I would be happy to see drafts of what you're attempting and to offer advice as your effort unfolds. I admire your ambition and dedication for thinking this up. I hope the book inspired this.

Thanks for serving America and the world,

Tom Barnett

The emails keep coming from Iraq and the Green Zone and Central Command and Special Operations Command. These guys and gals are all working the global war on terrorism at the front lines. Why PNM speaks to them is because it accurately describes the world they find themselves in. Many people don't want to hear about that world or the changes it demands from us, but for those stuck out there dealing with it on a day-to-day basis, all PNM really does is provide the language for a debate they're desperately eager to have.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Here's today's catch:

Outsourcing the Sys Admin function to lowest bidders in Iraq

"Nation Builders and Low Bidder in Iraq: After Abu Ghraib and Falluja, why are we still outsourcing?" by P.W. Singer, New York Times, 15 June, p. A23.

"21 Killed In Iraq And Dozens Hurt In Bomb Attacks: Blast Strikes a Convoy: Iraqi Leader Is Outraged at a Suicide Assault as the Violence Surges," by Jeffrey Gettleman, NYT, 15 June, p. A1.

"Green Groups Bloom in China: New Generation of Activists Attempts to Clean Up Country," by Peter Wonacott, Wall Street Journal, 15 June, p. A13.

"To Conserve Water, China Lifts Its Price," by Peter Wonacott, WSJ, 15 June, p. A13.

"U.S. Led a Resurgence Last Year Among Millionaires World-Wide," by Robert Frank, WSJ, 15 June, p. A1.

"A Glass Bubble That's Bringing Beijing to a Boil," by Joseph Kahn, NYT, 15 June, p. A1.

"Maoist Attack In Nepal Kills 21 Policemen," by Reuters, NYT, 15 June, p. A8.

"Cable Thievery Is Darkening Daily Life in Mozambique," by Michael Wines, NYT, 15 June, p. A3.

"World Briefing: Iran: A Nobel Advocate," by Reuters, NYT, 15 June, p. A6.

Posted by at 7:25 PM | Permalink

"Nation Builders and Low Bidder in Iraq: After Abu Ghraib and Falluja, why are we still outsourcing?" by P.W. Singer, New York Times, 15 June, p. A23.

"21 Killed In Iraq And Dozens Hurt In Bomb Attacks: Blast Strikes a Convoy: Iraqi Leader Is Outraged at a Suicide Assault as the Violence Surges," by Jeffrey Gettleman, NYT, 15 June, p. A1.

First article is a great op-ed by a noted expert on the privatization of military functions since the end of the Cold War.

Here's the opening and closing paragraphs:

"From the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison to the mutilation of American civilians at Falluja, many of the worst moments of the Iraqi occupation have involved private military contractors 'outsourced' by the Pentagon. With no public or Congressional oversight, the Pentagon has paid billions of dollars to companies that now have as many as 20,000 employees carrying out military functions ranging from logistics and troop training to convoy escort and interrogations. Yet despite the problems and the widespread accusations of overbilling, it appears the civilian leadership at the Pentagon has learned absolutely nothing from the whole experience…

The strength of systems of democracy and capitalism are that they are supposed to be self-correcting and self-improving. When mistakes are made, lessons are learned so that the errors are not repeated. When it comes to the private military world, though, our government seems to be doing its utmost to learn nothing. It repeatedly ignores not just the basic lessons of better business, but also those of smart public policy."

Meanwhile, as the bombings experience the inevitable uptick the closer we get to the hand-off (if nothing else, the insurgents "claim" the bombs forced the Americans to "capitulate"—an old terrorist strategy whenever gifts are offered), we can see the real tipping point emerging in Iraq: Will Iraqis be able to handle even the limited self-government we offer on 30 June? Here's the analysis from the page 1 NYT story:

"Yet even as the violence is peaking in Iraq, American forces are deferring, more and more each day, to Iraqi security services. Much of the political handover has already happened, and American officials say it is now important to allow Iraqi security services to play a bigger role. As a result, a power vacuum seems to be forming."

This culture has enjoyed no responsibility for their own order for so long, they simply have no sense for it. Decades of Baathist authoritarianism have left Iraqi in a state of infantile development regarding political order: they simply lack the self-respect needed to order themselves. They have lost the father figure and so glom onto the next one that appears: the U.S. Leviathan force.

Why reconfiguring ourselves better for the functions of the Sys Admin force is so crucial is that we need to be able to guide such brutalized and infantilized societies back to the point of sufficient self-respect and self-confidence to be able to rule themselves. That is not an overnight process, as Iraq demonstrates, meaning we'll need to stay for a long time, but stay in the form of a force optimized for enabling that growth to occur within that society, not something simply imposed by a superior warfighting force.

That's why I call the Leviathan your Dad's military ("Don't make me come in there!") and the Sys Admin force your Mom's military ("Oh, you make me so proud when you do that for yourself!").

Posted by at 7:12 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Green Groups Bloom in China: New Generation of Activists Attempts to Clean Up Country," by Peter Wonacott, Wall Street Journal, 15 June, p. A13.

"To Conserve Water, China Lifts Its Price," by Peter Wonacott, WSJ, 15 June, p. A13.

As China develops it learns to value things differently, especially in terms of the environment. There was no such thing as any environmentalism inside China under the Communists, but as the CCP mutates into whatever it's claiming to be right now, it's clear that the resulting personal freedoms accompanying all this economic development is leading to more grass-roots activism on environmental issues.

Will it happen overnight? No. But will it continue to blossom along with the development? Absolutely. China is traversing history right now at an amazing pace, and this is just another good example of the right direction it's heading in.

And it's heading in that direction primarily because it's learning to let the market price things more logically than central planners, armed with the idiotic logic of Marxism-Leninism could. Water is treated as free until you price it, and as China starts pricing it more realistically, protections will emerge. Why? Societies protect things of value—it's as simple as that.

Posted by at 7:05 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"U.S. Led a Resurgence Last Year Among Millionaires World-Wide," by Robert Frank, Wall Street Journal, 15 June, p. A1.

Neat article about the global growth in millionaires last year. What I liked best were the regional breakdowns:

• 2.6 m in Europe


• 2.5 m in North America


• 2.0 m in Asia-Pacific


• 0.6 m in Latin America, Middle East and Africa combined.

The existence of millionaires speaks to economic rule sets that promote and protect wealth-generation. Where you don't have that, wealth tends to be subject to zero-sum rule sets, as in, there's only so much to go around. Lacking such firm economic rule sets is the key reason why the Gap remains the Gap.

Posted by at 7:03 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"A Glass Bubble That's Bringing Beijing to a Boil," by Joseph Kahn, New York Times, 15 June, p. A1.

"Maoist Attack In Nepal Kills 21 Policemen," by Reuters, NYT, 15 June, p. A8.

There are no Maoists in the birthplace of Mao anymore. Instead there's a booming economy where many do really well, others just okay, and still more are scrambling to join the party—basically a microcosm of the global economy.

So Beijing is now a place that's undergoing a massive facelift in anticipation of the Olympics, and in that massive facelift all sorts of public debates emerge about the aesthetics and morality of new urban developments such as the monstrous glass-domed National Theater building going up now. What's at stakes are all sorts of things: preservation of Chinese culture, definitions of Chinese culture, definitions of Chinese greatness, and so on and so forth.

These are all problems of success, not failure, which is why there are no more Maoists in China today. Maoism basically takes Leninism further back into the past in order to achieve its revolutionary goals of authoritarian rule: it says you need to go all the way back to the time of the peasants to effect a true socialist revolution. That retreat back into time shows how bankrupt Maoism was as a development model ("I dunno, maybe we could simply make a great leap forward and catch up!"), and explains why China went nowhere economically until Mao died and Deng took over. In the end, Deng will go down as the true father of modern China, not Mao, who gets credited with uniting the precapitalist collection of regions that China was pre-WWII under a single political rule and nothing more.

Maoism is basically a Gap ideology: "Revel in your precapitalism! It only means you're that much closer to achieving a truly socialist brand of egalitarian poverty whereby your countrymen can be united under a brutally centralized authoritarian leadership!" So where do we find it thriving today? In only the most disconnected regions of the world, like Nepal.

Posted by at 7:00 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Cable Thievery Is Darkening Daily Life in Mozambique," by Michael Wines, New York Times, 15 June, p. A3.

One of the saddest examples of why a Gap state like Mozambique doesn't get anywhere over time: There is so little there of value other than the raw materials that people can get their hands on, that thieves will steal the very elements of connectivity that would have otherwise served as the basic infrastructure for development. Mozambique's stunted development means the people there are forced to eat their seed corn on a regular basis to achieve something so basic as producing aluminum pots and pans. The country's only aluminum smelter produces only for export, and the economy imports no aluminum, so the people make do on their own by tearing down electrical cables and smelting the aluminum found therein. It's like watching the snake devour its own tail.

Simply put, Mozambique is so disconnected from the global economy that it can't make something like the importing of aluminum pots and pans happen. What do you need to make that happen? I mean, I know there are companies that want to sell aluminum pots and pans there. It takes enough rule sets and infrastructure to draw that economic connectivity in from the world outside, and apparently Mozambique's government can't manage even that. So the eating of the seed corn continues apace and Mozambique remains firmly stuck deep inside the Gap.

Posted by at 6:55 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

"World Briefing: Iran: A Nobel Advocate," by Reuters, New York Times, 15 June, p. A6.

A Canadian journalist has her head bashed in by Iranian police and dies. She had been arrested for taking pictures outside a prison where political dissidents are held. Now her family is effectively trying to seek prosecution of the Iranian Intelligence Ministry official believed responsible for her death. This story announces that the Nobel Peace Prize human rights activist and lawyer Shirin Ebadi is going to be allowed to represent the family in the proceedings that will result in Iran's hard-line judiciary system, where the government official is to be tried for "semi-intentional murder."

Do not think for a minute that Ebadi gets this very dicey trial without the global recognition afforded by her Nobel prize. That sliver of connectivity empowers her to continue pursuing the good work she does to promote human rights inside the cowered nation that is Iran under the mullahs' continued authoritarian rule.

Posted by at 6:51 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 14 June 2004

Clinton announces his massive book tour will not just be about selling books, but will also involve a campaign of ideas in support of John Kerry’s campaign for president (“Clinton Planning To Use Book Tour To Assist Kerry: Coordinating With Party,” by David D. Kirkpatrick, New York Times, 14 June, p. A1.). Clinton will be touting his legacy, and offering it in sharp contrast to the scary security environment and tough economic times of the past four years under Bush. Clinton’s plugging for his book and Kerry will be identical in nature: weren’t you better off four years ago? Didn’t it seem safer? America more respected in the world? Remember the projected budget surpluses and the elimination of the national debt?

Will Clinton’s book tour cast a stronger political spell than the just-concluded Reagan extravaganza? Perhaps. Reagan’s pull on the popular imagination naturally wanes with time. The youngest people around who were able to vote for him are now in their mid-30s. Plus, Reagan’s pitch was a one-time if week-long deal, whereas Clinton will be giving speech after speech, and we all know what a great campaigner he is.

Here, the strategic pause generated by Reagan’s passing may actually help Kerry. Now it will be Clinton all over the dial, reminding everyone of what it means to be Democrats who win. If Iraq fades as an issue, then Kerry can focus on the economy, the deficit, and generalized fears of terrorism and increasing isolation from long-time allies—all items that can be sold as issues Clinton and a Democratic White House proved better at dealing with across the 1990s than the Bush White House has done since 2000. It won’t all be true, but it won’t exactly be a hard sales job.

But Clinton is a bit of a glory hound, and overshadowing stale Kerry is also a possibility, one that plays better to Hillary’s run for the White House in 2008 after the public can logically be expected to be really tired of Bush (yes, it almost always happens after 8 years). So it’ll be interesting how Billy, the Comeback Kid, comes back this time. Will a dead icon stir more memories than a tarnished living one?

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Today’s catch:

The political solution set emerging in Iraq?

“Shiite Cleric Is Forming Party That May Play Role in Elections: Moqtada al-Sadr, a rebel, moves toward the mainstream,” by Edward Wong, New York Times, 14 June, p. A7.

“In Race to Give Power to Iraqis, Electricity Lags: U.S. Falls Short of Goal for Reviving Output,” by James Glanz, NYT, 14 June, p. A1.

“In Saudi Arabia, Lives of Fear: Why Some Westerners Struggle to Stay as Terrorist Attacks Mount,” by Hugh Pope, Wall Street Journal, 14 June, p. A15.

“Recruiters Try New Tactics to Sell Wartime Army,” by Monica Davey, NYT, 14 June, p. A1.

“Private Space Mission Is Ready for Takeoff,” by J. Lynn Lunsford, WSJ, 14 June, p. B1.

Posted by at 11:17 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“Shiite Cleric Is Forming Party That May Play Role in Elections: Moqtada al-Sadr, a rebel, moves toward the mainstream,” by Edward Wong, New York Times, 14 June, p. A7.

“In Race to Give Power to Iraqis, Electricity Lags: U.S. Falls Short of Goal for Reviving Output,” by James Glanz, NYT, 14 June, p. A1.

Moqtada al-Sadr sends strong signals he wants to come in from the cold and be accepted as a legitimate political player in the upcoming elections. He wants to turn his military capital into political gain, and he’s pretty wily to do so. He can be washed clean of a lot of heinous acts all at once by doing so, because his acceptance of the legitimacy of the upcoming elections will be impossible for anyone to trump with old charges. Everyone in the interim government and the U.S.-led occupational authority will be forced to accept his change of heart at face value, grateful they all will be for any realized decline in violence.

Yes, eventually Sadr would run out of militia men willing to be killed, and this switcheroo immediately allows him to distance himself from all those deaths in his name, but the temptation of actually gaining a seat at the table of power that will emerge from this election is probably too much to pass up. After all, Shiites are the largest voting block in the country and Sadr is riding high in popular imagination after calling for and directing much of the Shiite-based counterinsurgency effort of the past weeks.

Sadr’s no dummy. He knew the political handoff was coming on 30 June no matter what, but if it comes peacefully, he’s clearly the second banana to Ayatollah Sistani. Starting a no-win insurgency and losing lots of followers might have seemed like a waste of lives, but the great man has won much political capital in the process, and now that the inevitable is arriving, it’s time to cash in those chips for whatever they’re worth. Sadr’s at least Sistani’s political equal as a result of the insurgency, no matter the outcome, and if the would-be Big Man had to waste a host of young lives in the process, then so be it.

Once the election has occurred, the sense of authority and ownership over the situation in Iraq will shift dramatically from America to Iraqis themselves—the newly elected government. At that point, it’ll be important to actually prove the government can work on some level, to deliver the goods—so to speak. So destroying the infrastructure really gets to be counterproductive as self-rule approaches—even for al Sadr. Once he’s won his share of votes, he wants to be able to take credit for things like stable utilities just like any other politician.

Posted by at 11:10 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“In Saudi Arabia, Lives of Fear: Why Some Westerners Struggle to Stay as Terrorist Attacks Mount,” by Hugh Pope, Wall Street Journal, 14 June, p. A15.

“Recruiters Try New Tactics to Sell Wartime Army,” by Monica Davey, New York Times, 14 June, p. A1.

Westerners have been working quietly in Saudi Arabia for decades. My sister-in-law’s parents were teachers within this large ex-pat community in the kingdom for many years before retiring and coming back to America, and they told of a very good life there.

But that life is fast disappearing thanks to al Qaeda’s concerted and consistent effort to target Westerners with terrorism. Many long-timers are leaving, some for good and some—as per their custom—for a long summer holiday back in the States. Whether or not they return in the fall will depend on whether or not the situation improves. But this much is clear, when the long-timers start leaving the ship, it’s really sinking fast.

Saudi Arabia used to feature a per capita income of about $28k a generation ago. Now it’s about $6-7k and it’s dropping fast, thanks to the huge demographic youth bulge that drives up the total population year after year. Almost all of the mass violence in the world occurs in states with per capita incomes of $3k or less, and at the rate they’re going, the Saudis will close in on that number faster than anyone could have anticipated 20 years ago. Westerners may well be right in leaving before the inevitable civil strife spreads beyond just specific terrorist acts against “infidels.”

If you think it’s hard for companies to recruit for war zones, it’s also hard for the military to recruit during an extended war period—something we’ve never done in this all-volunteer force of the past three decades. There’s little illusion in joining the Guard and Reserves nowadays, as there was in past years. Recruits know full well it’s not just some weekends and a fat chance of going overseas. Since the military can’t really afford to jack up the financial inducements too much, they’re offering some unusual options regarding length of service and the ability to serve side-by-side with friends.

Expect more such innovations in coming years, because there will inevitably be a great renegotiation of what military service means as this global war on terrorism unfolds. Some “boys” will go to wars and come back, but others will head out for peacekeeping missions and simply rotate, rotate, and rotate for years on end—effectively never coming home. Those two distinct missions will eventually yield two very different recruiting strategies—not to mention two very different militaries.

Posted by at 11:07 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“Private Space Mission Is Ready for Takeoff,” by J. Lynn Lunsford, Wall Street Journal, 14 June, p. B1.

Since the beginning of space exploration decades ago, it has remained fundamentally a public-sector affair, which of course has yielded one very slow growth curve following the “space race” between the superpowers. That public-sector dominance has kept the private-sector entrepreneurs out of the game for far too long.

You will say, “But space travel is dangerous!” Any more than the early years of experimental flight and the subsequent emergence of commercial flying? People seem to forget all the scores of pioneers who lost their lives in that great historical endeavor, but it’s what yielded the incredibly safe system we have today.

Instead of treating space travel as similar, we’ve deified it to the point of absurdity. We lose some astronauts and it’s a great national tragedy that shuts down NASA for months on end. I have never figured out what’s so damned sacred about dying in space (much less flying to or from space). Imagine how long it would have taken to achieve the commercial airline industry if we had been that anguished over every fly boy who killed himself in the early years of aviation.

As commercial space flight nears, we will finally begin to see the rapid explosion of human space travel that we’ve all been dreaming about for decades. Yes, people will die in horrible accidents, but it won’t be any more tragic than your average car wreck—something that happens every day all around us. And I say that development is not just good, it’s great. We need new challenges and adventures—not just for the guys with “right stuff” but for anyone willing to take on the challenge.

But even more than any of that, we need to get out there in near space and fill it with commercial activities that dissuade our own governments from militarizing the region with their nonsensical dreams of Star Wars. We’ll spend quite a few lives in the process, but it’ll be well worth it.

Posted by at 11:03 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 14 June 2004

Since I spent yesterday whining about the Times not reviewing my book (there, got that out of the way fast today!), let me start out today by noting my undying love for the Wall Street Journal (capitalist rag that it is!).

Got this email from Mike Downing, a regular visitor and PNM reader:

Don't know if you're aware of it, but there's a weekly TV show called the Wall St. Journal Report, usually on at an obscure time. Here in Columbus, OH. It's 6:00 am Sunday. I happened at wake up early this morning and catch it.

They were doing a little segment at the end of the show on Father's Day
gifts, including a section on books. PNM was the first book they
mentioned(and held up prominently for the camera). I don't remember the comment exactly, but it was something along the lines of "a fascinating new way of looking at the world."

Thanks to Mike for telling me about this.

As for the Grey Lady . . . I am told by Putnam to expect an advertisement from them to appear in the New York Times around Thursday of this week. AHA! We are inside the castle walls with this one!

Posted by at 5:07 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portstmouth RI, 14 June 2004

My agency just forwarded me an offer from Yayinlari, a publishing house in Turkey. My agent Jennifer says it is one of the most prominent and efficient Turkish publishers. A modest run of 3,000 books with an appropriate advance, but I couldn't be more thrilled. I mean, who I am to publish a book in Turkey (much less Turkish!)?

So now PNM will be in three languages: English (okay, American given all the slang and pop culture references), Japanese and Turkish.

Apparently, the Turkish publishers who are buying the rights do not take offense at my designating Turkey as part of the Gap. I know 3,000 copies probably aren't enough to pull Turkey into the Core.

Then again, if the right 3,000 Turks read it . . ..

Nah, I got it backwards on that one: I need the right 3,000 or so European Union bureaucrats to read it.

Posted by at 4:37 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 13 June 2004

Despite my continuing anger and embarrassment over the New York Times’ refusal to review my book (or perhaps driving it), I just love reading the Sunday Times. There’s no Sunday Wall Street Journal, and frankly, the Washington Post, outside of the Outlook section, is significantly weaker than the weekday version (not surprising for workaholic DC). But the Sunday Times is strong from stem to stern. The Week in Review is typically strong, the book reviews are among the best, Arts & Leisure is probably the strongest of the bunch (giving you all sorts of overview analysis of movies, music, theater, opera and so on), and the Sunday magazine often contains one or even two really solid stories worth reading all the way through (although James Traub’s article today on Iran’s nuclear program was a complete snooze).

But what always amazes me about the paper is how many great stories there tends to be in the A section. Without a doubt, one of the best bets to find several great stories on how things are moving across the country and the world is the main section of the Sunday Times. It’s almost a barometer of my futurology fitness: if I’ve spent the week wondering about some issues and then I see the articles capturing the same emerging sentiment or analysis on page 1 of the Sunday Times, I feel “fit” versus “flabby” in my ability to sniff out tipping points. If I were to locate the brain of the NYT, it would be on page 1 of the Sunday Times.

As for the ego, that would definitely be the op-ed page, which has become such an avowed star-system with the Times that the quality has really gone downhill in recent years. It’s almost like a daily reminder of the Heisenberg Principle (or Observer Created Reality): once you make the reporter the center of attention, all the analysis goes downhill. Paul Krugman and Maureen Dowd are the worst examples, but Thomas Friedman is catching up. For now, Nicholas Kristof is keeping it together, but slippage is inevitable. You have to admit, though, it’s an efficient production system, because all they need to do is bag up the op-eds every two years and it’s an instant bestseller, with a guaranteed review in the Times and lots of advertisements and TV appearances that all come together to pretty much predetermine its “brilliance’’—even if it’s only a rehashed collection of op-eds. But think of it, you pay something like $40 a month for the op-eds in the first place, and then they nab you for $25 later just to have them all stitched together.

But enough with the carping and back to the main point: yesterday I wrote about how the Reagan funeral extravaganza created this profound pause in the whole Bush-is-going-down-because-Iraq-is-a-disaster scenario that many political analysts seem to buying whole cloth. I mean, everybody likes a sequel of a popular story, but the problem is Bush 43 is a real improvement on Bush 41 and Kerry just ain’t Bill Clinton (unless he’s waiting to break out a can of I-can-feel-your-pain whupass on the campaign trail).

My points were basically that it shut down Kerry for a significant period during which Bush seemed like he was bottoming out due to Iraq, meanwhile the whole Iraq thing quietly shifted from a complete-disaster-of-neocon-making into something a whole lot more hopeful, primarily because it’s now Iraqis running the show with the U.S. slipping into the background and working more as System Administrators dispensing aid that rebuilds Iraq’s social networks and economic infrastructure and as the on-site military Leviathan dedicated to serving as the fledgling regime’s bodyguard.

Judging by the emails I’ve gotten from various people on-site in the Green Zone, the splitting of the U.S. military force into Sys Admin and Leviathan roles isn’t just emerging, it’s basically there. It’s not a question of predictive powers or—even more ludicrously—the notion of influence, but simply the ability to spot undeniable strategic realities as they emerge. It’s not a gift, but a skill. It can be learned, taught, self-developed, and kept up through consistent use.

Why I say that is because I feel strongly that anybody can develop this skill with enough effort and that America as a whole needs to develop this muscle if we’re going to ever reach a happy ending in this global war on terrorism, moving far beyond that limited goal to what I call the global future worth creating.

So here’s my answer to the eternal question of what is the one thing I’d want when stranded on the desert island in terms of information flow: the Sunday New York Times. Pound for pound, it’s the best.

Today’s evidence includes:

Will this election be determined by Iraq?

“Iraqis Start to Exercise Power Even Before Date for Turnover,” by Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, 13 June, p. A1.

“Road for Relief Team Is Gauntlet of Enemy Fire: ‘We can’t fix anything if they’re shooting at us,” by Michale Kamber, NYT, 13 June, p. A16.

“Behind the Scenes, a Restless and Relentless Kerry,” by Jodi Wilgoren, NYT, 13 June, p. A1.

“Approval in May,” results Gallup Polls, NYT, 13 June, p. A25.

“A Nation Divided? Who Says? On gay rights, gun control and abortion, there’s a whole lot of agreeing going on,” by John Tierney, NYT, 13 June, p. WK1.

“Why America Sees the Silver Lining: ‘Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control,” by John Leland, NYT, 13 June, p. WK1.

“And Yes, He Was a Great Communicator: A president’s debt to Jefferson Smith, George Bailey and Tom Joad,” by Geoffrey Nunberg, NYT, 13 June, p. WK5.

“Short on Priests, U.S. Catholics Outsource Prayers to Indian Clergy,” by Saritha Rai, NYT, 13 June, p. A13.

“Saudi Gunmen Kill American; Qaeda Claims Another Death,” by AP, NYT, 13 June, p. A8.

“Israel Says Children Enlist Children as Suicide Bombers: Peer pressure among Palestinian teenagers to become martyrs,” by Greg Myre, NYT, 13 June, p. A3.

Posted by at 3:54 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“Iraqis Start to Exercise Power Even Before Date for Turnover,” by Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, 13 June, p. A1.

“Road for Relief Team Is Gauntlet of Enemy Fire: ‘We can’t fix anything if they’re shooting at us,” by Michale Kamber, NYT, 13 June, p. A16.

“Behind the Scenes, a Restless and Relentless Kerry,” by Jodi Wilgoren, NYT, 13 June, p. A1.

“Approval in May,” results Gallup Polls, NYT, 13 June, p. A25.

“A Nation Divided? Who Says? On gay rights, gun control and abortion, there’s a whole lot of agreeing going on,” by John Tierney, NYT, 13 June, p. WK1.

“Why America Sees the Silver Lining: ‘Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control,” by John Leland, NYT, 13 June, p. WK1.

“And Yes, He Was a Great Communicator: A president’s debt to Jefferson Smith, George Bailey and Tom Joad,” by Geoffrey Nunberg, NYT, 13 June, p. WK5.

The first article gives a great rundown of what’s already changing inside Iraq as the handover date approaches. A good clip:

“Walid Saleh, planning director for the Water Resources Ministry, said his ministry used to be controlled by a team of six American water experts. Now, Mr. Saleh said, these advisers have become ‘consultants.’

‘They work for us,’ Mr. Saleh explained. ‘They are very good technicians and they give us expertise. But we make the decisions.”

Will there be assassinations and casualties ahead? Absolutely, but the number of Americans dying will likely drop dramatically over coming weeks and months, and with Iraqi leaders taking any heat in front of cameras, I think we’ll all be surprised what a non-issue Iraq may end up being come November when Americans are stepping into voting booths.

Meanwhile, Kerry’s profiles remain stuck in the “what’s-he-really-like-in-person” mode, in part because there’s no clear message that he’s delivering, other than “I’m not Bush!” And that’s unlikely, in my mind, to sway the middle unless he steps up and delivers a far more positive vision of where he wants to take America.

Bush does have overall approval ratings that suggest a loss (47%), but likewise the highest historical loyalty ratings within his own party (89%). But here’s the good news for Kerry, there is a big mushy middle that agrees on most things, and they want to hear a positive message regarding the future—not just one worth avoiding (his pitch on four more years of Bush unilateralism) but one worth creating.

Americans are simply built that way. We’re a nation built by people who came to these shores convinced they could pull off something better on their own if only they could escape the stultifying rule sets and pessimism of the homeland. That’s why, when polled, two-thirds of Americans stated their belief that success is something determined primarily by their own efforts, not forces beyond their control.

Take that, conspiracy theorists!

But Kerry needs to get beyond his Senate-speak, which is about as non-inclusive as it gets. He needs to generate the intimate tone that Reagan was a master at, and as the last article points out, it’s not exactly hard, even if it’s a lost art. It’s mostly about speaking directly to people (using the word “you”) a lot, and employing lots of “yes” and “and.” It’s about immediacy and intimacy and, yes, a sense of personal connection to dreams and desires and—you know—that naïve optimism that defines the American spirit.

Posted by at 3:43 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“Short on Priests, U.S. Catholics Outsource Prayers to Indian Clergy,” by Saritha Rai, New York Times, 13 June, p. A13.

The Catholic Church in America is so short of priests to do masses that special intention masses (a mass dedicated to remembering a dead relative) are being sent overseas for clergy in India to perform. I know this squeeze situation from my Mom’s own complaints about having a hard time getting a mass said for my recently deceased Dad back home in Boscobel WI.

And no, it’s real Catholic priests in India who perform the masses, not Hindu clergy sporting brand-new parochial accents. But you have to ask yourself how much worse it’ll need to get in the U.S. before we’re reduced to that. Personally, I see great potential for inter-faith strategic alliances here . . ..

Posted by at 3:37 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“Saudi Gunmen Kill American; Qaeda Claims Another Death,” by AP, New York Times, 13 June, p. A8.

“Israel Says Children Enlist Children as Suicide Bombers: Peer pressure among Palestinian teenagers to become martyrs,” by Greg Myre, NYT, 13 June, p. A3.

Al Qaeda shoots an American in the back after he parks his car in his garage. Nice. Another is kidnapped with promises of torture.

Al Qaeda’s efforts to drive out all Westerners from Saudi Arabia continues apace.

Meanwhile, Palestinian efforts to find enough suicide bombers to kill Israelis is scrapping rock bottom: now we’re talking sweet-talking teenagers talking other impressionable teenagers that blowing yourself up is a really cool way to go. There’s the perfect definition of selling a future worth eliminating.

So tell me which side we should be on. People complain about the security wall as an example of disconnectedness. But I see it more like a firewall, or an immune-system defense against the viral disease that Palestinian culture has become—a culture of death, despair, and utter spiritual disconnectedness.

And yes, I do understand the professed internal logic of dying for the cause and rushing right to paradise, and I consider that one of the most pathetic, self-delusional lies that any religion has ever invented. Frankly, it is nothing more that a canard perpetuated by leaders to get people to die on their behalf.

Posted by at 3:12 PM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 12 June 2004

I will admit that I am a Republican, just four days each year. As the sole proprietor of Barnett Consulting, I pay my estimated taxes every 15 April, 15 June, 15 September and 15 January. Today I wrote the checks for my state and federal estimates, and man, I’m feeling awfully Republican right now.

I’ll get over it, as I always do—it just takes longer each year. But it is much harder to stomach taxes when you don’t simply have them withheld by your employer. Of course, you might add, “Your taxes pay for things like Naval War College professors!”

True, true. Then again, it does feel kinda odd to have to pay the government in order to get it to pay your salary.

Hmmm. Makes me wonder if there are dollars in my personal economy that just keep constantly going back and forth from me to the government to me to the government to me to . . . without ever actually buying anything—like some sort of perpetual fiscal machine.

I guess I could be more hypocritical: I could be one of those retired military types who rail on and on about wanting smaller government while cashing all those pension checks year after year.

Yes, yes, everyone wants the government to stop wasting money . . . on those people, which are often defined as everybody except themselves, of course, because “we really deserve it!”

And, of course, we all do, which is what gets you’re a very big government.

It seems only natural to prattle on about big government, taxes, and military budgets this week, what with the 6-day spectacle that was the Reagan remembrance. I don’t begrudge the man this last great political moment, because he was the towering political figure of the last three decades. He will go down much like an FDR—the guy who defined his nation for many years (really, through 3 presidencies to include Bush 1) and his party since 1976, when he first stepped onto the national stage. To be a Reagan Republican today is a lot like what being an FDR Democrat was at the middle of the century: it’s simply identifying yourself with the dominant political theme of your era.

While I did not vote for Reagan in either election, nor was I fan of his administrations, he did make for a magnificent president in the sense of representing this country to itself and the outside world. The man was simply well cast in the role, plus his personal journey from young liberal Democrat to old stalwart Republican was so very American: there are few things sadder than a young conservative or an aging liberal, because both seem to declare the same basic fallacy that life teaches them nothing. Reagan was a life-long learner and, despite his fairly strict rule set about wanting smaller government and trusting individuals to do the right thing on their own, he was a masterful compromiser. People forget that he got so much of his agenda to flow through a Democratic-controlled Congress not because he refused to bend, but because he knew when and how to bend.

At times, I do find myself wishing—not because I’m a Republican but because I’m an American—that George W. Bush actually was as much like Reagan as both he and many of his admirers like to portray him as. But Bush has not mastered that art of compromise, and thus he is disliked by so many Americans even as many of them have basically desired his strong leadership since 9/11. Reagan did many things that many of us did not like, and yet he made us like him, whereas Bush does many things that many of us do like, and yet he makes it hard to like him.

There are so many similarities between Bush 1 and Bush 2 that it is tempting to believe history is repeating itself here again, but Bush the Younger clearly wants reelection (unlike his burned out dad in ’92) and Kerry (I fear) is no Bill Clinton when it comes to campaigning.

Then there is this strange, highly political interlude that has been the Reagan week-long extravaganza. I think Reagan’s big goodbye will be a turning point in this campaign. It created this huge pause during which Kerry fell silent, Bush basked in Reagan’s glow, Republicans everywhere remembered who they are and why they are, and Iraq quietly slipped into a new, possibly far more favorable pathway. Right up to Reagan’s death is was all bad news from Iraq all the time, but following this long pause where Reagan dominated the news cycle for an entire week, many Americans may find themselves waking up to a new morning in Iraq.

Now there’s an Iraqi running an Iraqi government, as interim as it may seem. But still, when bad things happen in Iraq now, it’ll be Allawi standing up at the press conference, not Bremer or some American general. Then there’s word today that Moqtada al-Sadr is signaling his willingness to support the interim government (NYT, 12 June, p. A5, “In Shift, Rebel Iraqi Cleric Backs New Government He Had Once Mocked,” by Edward Wong). Do I expect that to last forever? No, but it may last long enough for Iraq to segue into a far quieter phase that is quickly lost in the attention spans of Americans as we head into summer.

Give Iraq a couple of months to settle into something close to normalcy and it might look far better come Labor Day than anyone would have allowed just a week ago. I expected this development would come naturally on its own as the political transition date approached, simply because it created a put-up-or-shut-up moment on prospective Iraqi leaders and—being an optimist—I figured Iraq really does have enough of the right people to govern itself reasonable well now that Saddam and his henchmen are gone from power.

And when we look back on this election and realize that Bush’s approval rates hit low tide just before the grand Reagan spectacle, only to rebound slowly but surely over the summer and into the fall as the election neared, then history may well judge that Ronald Reagan’s last, very political act was to have the timing of his passing actually prove to be a pivot point in a presidential election campaign.

Knowing Reagan, such a development would delight him to no end.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Today’s Catch:

The great race has begun between India and China

“Made in India vs. Made in China: Multinationals See Big Upside To Subcontinent,” by Keith Bradsher, New York Times, 12 June, p. B1.

“White House Reconsiders Its Policy on Crisis in Sudan: Weighing whether conditions have risen to the level of genocide,” by Marc Lacey, NYT, 12 June, p. A3.

“G-8 Gathering Ends Without Iraq Agreement: U.S. Allies Decline to Send Personnel or Forgive Debt,” by Jackie Calmes, Wall Street Journal, 11 June, p. A7.

“Europe Knows It Needs a Lot of Immigrants, But It Also Fears Them,” by Floyd Norris, NYT, 11 June, p. C1.

“China’s Expansion May Be Easing: Soft Landing Could Stem Inflationary Pressures Threatening Global Growth,” by Andrew Browne et. al, WSJ, 11 June, p. A2.

“Asian Scavengers Feed China’s Hunger for Steel,” by James Brooke, NYT, 11 June, p. W1.

“U.S. Seeks Pacts With Russia To Raise Natural Gas Exports: Dangling a $15 billion carrot to help finance a new plant,” by Erin E. Arvedlund, NYT, 11 June, p. W1.

“An Oil Enigma: Production Falls Even as Reserves Rise: No Clear Picture Emerges to Explain Discrepancy,” by Alex Berenson, NYT, 12 June, p. A1.

Posted by at 8:57 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“Made in India vs. Made in China: Multinationals See Big Upside To Subcontinent,” by Keith Bradsher, New York Times, 12 June, p. B1.

Big global corporations getting tired of trying to break into Chinese domestic markets are increasingly eyeing India with its easier entry points. So corporations continue to go into China to rent the labor and export the resulting manufactured goods, but more and more they enter India to both manufacture there and sell there.

Some economic strategists believe this is why India will eventually overtake China as an economic power, and it essentially comes down to India having a better internal rule set and less of a socialist legacy to deal with.

The truth is, all these predictions of one “winning” over the other are a complete waste of time. China leapt ahead of India across the 1980s, and that pushed India to open up its economy in a similar fashion in the early 1990s. China became the big foreign direct investment magnet in the 1990s, and India made similar efforts to attract the same flows in the past several years. So China’s been the lead, and India the second for the last twenty years, but if India were to pull ahead in certain categories, the demonstration effect would simply flow in the other direction—not leaving China behind but pulling it along.

This race is just beginning to heat up.

Posted by at 8:55 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“White House Reconsiders Its Policy on Crisis in Sudan: Weighing whether conditions have risen to the level of genocide,” by Marc Lacey, New York Times, 12 June, p. A3.

Another slow-motion crisis, another search for the right word. Is this genocide, or just a really bad government letting a lot of its own people die systematically?

Hmmm. Seems to me to be yet another example of rule sets out of whack in the system. Nobody wants to see this happen. Everyone knows it’s bad. There’s no great mystery about what’s happening. We search for words because none of the ones we have now match any global security regime that’s built to deal with the problem.

Sudan has a bad government, but because it belongs to the UN and the UN treats every state as equally sovereign, there’s really nothing out there in the system to deal with it in an A-to-Z fashion, even as everybody would like to see that place somehow ruled by something other and hopefully better than what they got now. What we do have is some UN convention on “genocide,” so we wait around debating exactly what that word means and thousands upon thousands die in Sudan.

You think words don’t matter, well just one of them is killing Sudan.

Posted by at 8:50 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“G-8 Gathering Ends Without Iraq Agreement: U.S. Allies Decline to Send Personnel or Forgive Debt,” by Jackie Calmes, Wall Street Journal, 11 June, p. A7.

“Europe Knows It Needs a Lot of Immigrants, But It Also Fears Them,” by Floyd Norris, New York Times, 11 June, p. C1.

The non-event that was the G-8 meeting is a bad indicator of this administration’s inability to cut the deals needed to achieve serious and lasting change in the Middle East, something we’re simply not going to be able to pull off on our own. Not getting troops was one thing, but cripes, we couldn’t even get them to forgive Iraq’s debts. That’s some serious payback for how we treated them in the run-up to the war.

But a Europe that gets itself deeply involved in connecting the Middle East to the world would likely find itself opening up against its will to all those brown people on the other side of the Mediterranean. This would make eminent sense demographically, but culturally it’s proving very hard for Old Europe.

If we don’t think these things are connected in this disconnectedness, then we’re likely to end up waging wars all by ourselves inside the Gap.

Posted by at 8:47 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“China’s Expansion May Be Easing: Soft Landing Could Stem Inflationary Pressures Threatening Global Growth,” by Andrew Browne et. al, Wall Street Journal, 11 June, p. A2.

“Asian Scavengers Feed China’s Hunger for Steel,” by James Brooke, New York Times, 11 June, p. W1.

Another article about China’s hoped-for soft landing seemingly unfolding. Here’s the interesting factoid: China generates only 3% of world output, but it’s draw on raw materials worldwide is far and above that, to the point that China’s manufacturing requirements are driving upwards of 15% of world growth.

That demand is so great that it’s actually having a very nice environmental effect: China is sucking scrap metal from all over the world, pushing scavengers to reclaim rusting metal from abandoned facilities and factories all over Eurasia, but especially in former socialist states Russia and North Korea, both of which are full of rotting factories. China is growing so fast it’s actually helping to clean up the old socialist bloc in the process.

Posted by at 8:44 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

“U.S. Seeks Pacts With Russia To Raise Natural Gas Exports: Dangling a $15 billion carrot to help finance a new plant,” by Erin E. Arvedlund, New York Times, 11 June, p. W1.

“An Oil Enigma: Production Falls Even as Reserves Rise: No Clear Picture Emerges to Explain Discrepancy,” by Alex Berenson, NYT, 12 June, p. A1.

The U.S. is trying to arrange natural gas contracts with Russia, which is the Saudi Arabia of natural gas. People in the energy business will tell you that global natural gas markets today are much like global oil markets were 30 years ago: dominated by governments and long-term bilateral deals. So when America runs low on natural gas Washington turns to Moscow.

In the oil industry, it’s no longer like that, even as governments still control the vast bulk of oil reserves. The biggest four oil companies, for example, own only about 4% of global reserves. That’s it! So if you think ExxonMobil and BP rule the world on energy, you don’t understand that they’re basically just middlemen nowadays. But because oil is traded quite fluidly on a global scale, that makes them still very important, even if they don’t actually own the oil.

Governments own the oil in the ground, and they tend to be very secretive about how big those reserves are. We know everyone tends to exaggerate them somewhat, but we don’t know by how much. Our slim window into this world is afforded by the transparency required of public companies, like those big oil corporations. It seems like all of them have been caught in recent times admitting that they’ve overstated their reserves somewhat (Royal/Dutch Shell being the biggest offender), and this may be the reason why oil production has been falling in recent years even as oil reserves have seemingly grown. The reason behind these exaggerations are probably market driven, meaning companies are guilty of trying to meet the Street’s persistent expectations for constant growth.

If publicly-traded companies feel this sort of pressure to exaggerate, what do all those national oil companies feel pressured to do, when it’s not just profits on the line, but a sense of national power, prestige, or diplomatic leverage?

That’s not my way of insinuating the “coming crash” or anything like that, because I think that “crash,” however and whenever it is perceived/declared/manufactured for political reasons, will only send the world into the inevitable segue that is the coming hydrogen age.

Where are we going to get all that hydrogen economically? Hmmm. That would be natural gas. And whose the Saudi Arabia of natural gas? Hmmm. That would be our old enemy/new friend called Russia.

I know why it’s hard to get Russia to care about Saudi Arabia, but you’d think it would be easier to round up a few NATO troops for Iraq—sitting right next door.

Posted by at 8:34 AM | Permalink | Comments (0)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 11 June 2004

Off from work today due to US Government being sort of shut down for Ronald Reagan’s funeral. So I mow the lawn, run some errands, take kids to and from school, and chaperon my middle child Kevin’s end-of-year school party. I bring my face-painting gear and end up doing about 40 kids, but just cheek art.

At the end of the party I find myself feeling awfully tense, and I’m wondering why. I mean, I’ve got people coming up to me all the time now congratulating me on the book, telling me they just bought it (it’s selling very fast at the Naval War College’s bookstore), or recounting some TV show they saw me on. It’s been 48 hours since I found out about the NYT Best Seller list, so I should be as happy as can be.

Then I realize why I’m feeling so tense. Spoke with my agent this afternoon. Jennifer is a great lady and I enjoy having her as my agent, but she unwittingly triggered my low-grade panic attack by floating the idea of going to Putnam with a proposal for a follow-on book—you know, strike while the iron is hot. As soon as she said it, I spun her a wonderful tale about an option book that just sprang naturally out of the concluding chapter (Hope Without Guarantees), or something that basically ran down those “10 steps to a future worth creating.” Hell, I know there’s a book there, just waiting to be written, and the idea matched her instincts. So I promised her some short proposal by the end of the month that we might forward on to Neil Nyren at Putnam, getting it under his nose before the August doldrums hit the publishing world.

It’s a logical next step: Putnam’s discovered me and shepherded me through book #1, which just happens to crack the NYT Best Seller list. So now it’s only natural to extend the run and go for book #2 that really explodes on the national consciousness and catapults me as an author far beyond PNM. I know I could write something, hell, probably something really good, and I know Putnam would love to grow me as a writer, because that’s what they do.

The question is, What do I want to do next?

Here’s the hitch. I have a ten-year-old manuscript of my diary of my daughter Emily’s battle with cancer as a three-year-old. At 200k, it probably needs to lose at least 100k and then add in some shaping material both fore and aft of the main text, plus perhaps some 20/20 hindsight commentary from myself and my wife looking back on the diary itself.

It’s a neat and easy project, plus it gets me refocused on family by involving my spouse and our first-born. It’s all just so huggy-huggy-inclusive, and frankly, after writing a book on war and peace, that sounds pretty good—something small and intimate and all Nicholas Sparks-ish.

[Tom pauses to fantasize briefly about emoting on Oprah, with his loving spouse and writing partner at his side . . . God, there would have to be some fabulous sex after something like that . . . I mean, rock the universe sort of stuff . . . probably in a five-star hotel executive suite . . . the kind with a Jacuzzi plus shower in a walk-in bathroom to die for . . . Ahem!]

Anyway, I think the original diary is some of the best writing I have ever done, as does my agent Jennifer. Mark Warren of Esquire is also convinced it could be a great book, and is ready to sign on as my editor again.

Jennifer wants to push this book, but she wants the PNM follow-up too. As my agent, she needs to tell me that the kid-with-cancer book will be a tough sell, and that the easiest sell right now is “Son of PNM.” I’m not averse to further success, but I don’t just want to crank something for the sake of cranking something.

Then again, I can sign a contract this Sept for a book that’s due a year from then, so it would follow a year after the paperback release of PNM in May 2005. The contract would simply focus my attention, not just in the blog but in my day-to-day thinking. I’d be stupid not to run with that ball, if it can be had, so all I really need to do is get comfortable with a book proposal idea and start building the text in my mind over the fall, winter and spring, and then just crank it out (as I must as a writer) when I reach a critical mass next summer. Doesn’t have to be the 150k PNM; it can be something far slimmer and more focused. Cripes, I write 3k here almost every day, so what’s the big deal?

I guess my ambivalence and angst at Jennifer’s proposal is that I don’t yet feel like I’ve recovered my wind from PNM. What attracts me to the “Emily Updates” concept (turning the diary into a book) is that I’ve already written the text, by and large, so that project would be editing (mostly Mark Warren) plus writing new shaping material (which frankly I love doing so much I don’t consider it work). Plus, if that gets to be the next book, then maybe I reposition myself as a writer of profound (hopefully perceived) stuff in general, vice the military analyst guy.

Then there’s the avenue of simply doing both. The “Emily Updates” is something I work in terms of editing and shaping through the end of the year, and by then, I have a clear idea of how the Son of PNM is going to be laid out. I work the data collection on that one over the first few months of 2005 and then crank 100k over the following summer, delivering something to Putnam on time. The joy of that sequential scenario is that I am full-time “writing man” outside of my duties at the college, so I don’t sweat the decline of Barnett Consulting and I simply accept the notion that my future is one of being a writer.

Hmmmm. I’m getting tired just describing these possibilities. Maybe this all simply nuts to consider trying. Maybe I’m drawn to the Emily Updates because I fear my ability to handle another book from scratch anytime soon, what with a new child joining our family, plus all the continuing ancillary stuff flowing out of the PNM itself. Maybe this option book concept is simply too much, too fast. It does violate my basic rule: don’t write until you feel the need—the overwhelming need—to put something down on paper.

Then why in the hell am I wasting my time on this blog everyday?

[thinking . . . thinking . . . Jacuzzi in five-star Chicago hotel . . . thinking . . . really good sex . . . thinking . . . what was I writing about?]

Oh yeah!

Maybe because I’m one of those thinkers who thinks best when he’s writing or speaking—you know, in the output mode. I mean, I do like writing the blog. It’s like playing the piano every day: either you exercise those muscles or you lose the fluidity. I know I love to write, so why the hell not pursue both the Emily Updates and Son of PNM?