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July 31, 2004

Catching up on what's been said about PNM

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 30 July 2004

The past couple of days have been the first ones I've had in a very long time just to waste a few hours surfing the web and catching up on everything that's been written about PNM. I guess I've felt the need to take stock in the same way that my wife Vonne has felt the need to reorganize every drawer and closet in our house this week: we are only 9 days away from leaving for our big adventure in China.

Being an obsessive planner myself, I've plotted out what I want to cover in my daily blogs between here and our departure date of 9 August, so I've be taking the next week or so to catch up on reviews that have been posted about PNM, some translations of the old article, a side article concerning System Perturbations that's posted in an e-book online, etc. Yes, a mishmash of stuff that in the end may only be interesting to me, but I look at the blog as a sort of "for the record" entry form for me, so I feel like getting all this stuff put down on electrons before we head out and my weblog shifts from articles to pure travelogue. Don't worry, if something really cool comes up, then I blog that and simply squeeze these tasks into a shorter number of days, but dang it! I want the decks cleared before it's wheels up and we're cleared hot for China!

Today's task concerns two Reviewing-the-Reviews entries:

R. Grant Seals' review of PNM in the Reno-Gazette Journal, posted 5 June 2004

Booklist Reviews' review of PNM, distributed last spring

Following all that I'll deal with the following articles in today's catch:

A speech I've been waiting to hear from John Kerry

"Kerry Accepts Nomination, Telling Party That He'll 'Restore Trust and Credibility': Invoking His Past, He Vows to Command 'a Nation at War,'" by Adam Nagourney, New York Times, 30 July, p. A1.

"Kerry's Next Big Challenge: Wide Split in Undecided Votes: Suburbanites, Blue-Collars Disagree on Many Issues; Senator Needs Them All; Potential Bridge: War in Iraq," by John Harwood and Jacob M. Schlesinger, Wall Street Journal, 30 July, p. A1.

"The Nominee Seems a Happy Warrior: 'I'm John Kerry,' he says with glee, 'and I'm reporting for duty,'" by Alessandra Stanley, NYT, 30 July, p. P7.

"Kerry's Plan to Reduce Mideast-Oil Dependence Meets Skepticism," by John J. Fialka, WSJ, 30 July, p. A4.

Score a big one for the insurgency in Iraq

"Iraqis Postpone Conference as Kidnappings Rise," by Ian Fisher and Somini Sengupta, NYT, 30 July, p. A1.

"Saudi Plan for Muslim Force in Iraq Gains in U.S." by Christopher Marquis, NYT, 30 July, p. A6.

A good example of U.S. exporting rules in the global economy

"New Role for SEC: Policing Companies Beyond U.S. Borders: In Wake of 9/11 and Enron. Agency Hits Hard Abroad; Cutting Messier's Parachute," by Michael Schroeder and Silvia Ascarelli, WSJ, 30 July, p. A1.

Long live the 9/11 Commission! No . . . really!

"9/11 Panel Seeks New Life With Private Donations: Its budget dwindling, the commission turns elsewhere," by Philip Shenon, NYT, 30 July, p. A8.

A speech I've been waiting to hear from John Kerry

"Kerry Accepts Nomination, Telling Party That He'll 'Restore Trust and Credibility': Invoking His Past, He Vows to Command 'a Nation at War,'" by Adam Nagourney, New York Times, 30 July, p. A1.

"Kerry's Next Big Challenge: Wide Split in Undecided Votes: Suburbanites, Blue-Collars Disagree on Many Issues; Senator Needs Them All; Potential Bridge: War in Iraq," by John Harwood and Jacob M. Schlesinger, Wall Street Journal, 30 July, p. A1.

"The Nominee Seems a Happy Warrior: 'I'm John Kerry,' he says with glee, 'and I'm reporting for duty,'" by Alessandra Stanley, NYT, 30 July, p. P7.

"Kerry's Plan to Reduce Mideast-Oil Dependence Meets Skepticism," by John J. Fialka, WSJ, 30 July, p. A4.

I had never sat through a full Kerry speech before, and probably 99% of the American public hadn’t either, so this really was a hugely important “first impression” for Kerry to make. Having heard so much about how boring he was, I had very low expectations, all of which were summarily surpassed. Overall, I thought it was a very strong speech, one that tells me that Kerry is well-positioned to exploit all of his natural advantages: war record, stronger intellect, and—frankly—a far more impressive physical presence and gravitas that Bush, who still suffers from that frat-boy halo that seems to follow him everywhere he goes.

The speech was appropriately hawkish for the times and for the fears currently being captured in the polls, so Kerry is doing what makes sense: going on the offensive against what is currently perceived as Bush’s strengths (handling of terrorism and foreign affairs in general). I think the Dems believe that a campaign that focuses on that alleged strength will work well to their advantage, because that reputation is worn down with each passing day in Iraq. Kerry spoke directly to that dichotomy when he said America shouldn’t go to war without a clear plan for winning the peace as well. Yes, a bit of a laundry list in the middle, but some nice soaring rhetoric at the end. I gotta admit, the speech fired me up as a Democrat and made me feel nervous on Bush’s behalf. I think Kerry’s going to be a very strong candidate when it comes to fighting over that 1-in-5 voters who are still undecided.

Most of all, I liked how psyched Kerry himself seemed to be. The guy really did seem to be happy being up there, and if he can display that sort of ease and comfort with the challenge of being president, it goes a long way toward convincing people that he’s up for the job. In contrast, Bush has throughout his time seemed alternatively ill-at-ease, too casual, or too wound up. Kerry’s speech showed him to be someone with a real center of gravity; he looked quite comfortable in his own skin—Botox’d or not.

The only part of the speech that disappointed me was the reflexive linking of new transportation technologies with not having to care/wage war in the Middle East. I think that’s a very deceptive sort of sales job that targets our worst instincts. Kerry brayed confidently about changing the world, and if he means that, it has to include a future worth creating not just for America but for the Middle East as well.

Score a big one for the insurgency in Iraq

"Iraqis Postpone Conference as Kidnappings Rise," by Ian Fisher and Somini Sengupta, New York Times, 30 July, p. A1.

"Saudi Plan for Muslim Force in Iraq Gains in U.S." by Christopher Marquis, NYT, 30 July, p. A6.

The news that the national political conference is being postponed as a result of the rash of recent kidnappings and bombings is a very bad sign—almost on par with the Philippines’ decision to abandon ship. It can only embolden the insurgency. If 1 kidnapping gets you a coalition drop-out and 20 more nixes a crucial political milestone for the interim government, how can we expect to get a handle on this new tactic?

Now the glass-half-full interpretation says the whole conference process was being rushed anyway, that too few Iraqis knew about the preliminary political meetings that were designed to generate the 1,000 national delegates, that too many groups had opted out instinctively and needed more time to be brought into the mix, and that the UN was so worried about all these things that it was pushing hard to get the conference pushed back for these concerns to be adequately addressed.

What does the U.S. do with this extra time? Try like crazy to internationalize this occupation to reduce its West-vs-Islam flavor. The country working hardest on this goal right now is the one that owes us the most—Saudi Arabia. Naturally, no Saudi forces will be involved, but their effort at least shows how nervous the House of Saud is at the prospect of continued deterioration in Iraq. So long as America stands firm, the fact that things get worse in Iraq may be nerve-racking, but in reality, it may point to the shortest pathway for serious solutions to emerge from those most affected by the instability—Iraq’s neighbors.

A good example of U.S. exporting rules in the global economy

"New Role for SEC: Policing Companies Beyond U.S. Borders: In Wake of 9/11 and Enron. Agency Hits Hard Abroad; Cutting Messier's Parachute," by Michael Schroeder and Silvia Ascarelli, Wall Street Journal, 30 July, p. A1.

An interesting article that describes how the Securities and Exchange Commission is actually more aggressive overseas that it is at home:

As financial markets grow more global, the SEC is increasingly working with foreign regulators to track down wrongdoing at companies listed in the U.S. Sometimes, the SEC has pursued cases in countries where securities regulators have weaker powers and resolved them first, thanks to its ability to reach punitive settlements with defendants. Many countries’ legal systems don’t permit settlements, forcing their regulators to prove guilt in lengthy procedures.

But here’s the kicker that proves once again the profound nature of the rule-set reset that occurred because of the System Perturbation that was 9/11:

The SEC’s increased global role is in part a legacy of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. As the agency sought to establish whether the terrorists profited from the turmoil they wrought on financial markets, securities regulators around the world closed ranks. The bigger budget and strengthened powers the SEC obtained after the U.S. corporate scandals are also raising its international profile.

The horizontal scenario in financial markets that came out of the vertical shock that was 9/11 has entered its mature phase: the resulting rule-set reset is now creating further, far more profound outcomes than originally anticipated. Osama bin Laden laid 9/11 on the Core in order to disrupt its rule sets and generate greater disconnectedness both between the Core and Cap and inside the Core itself. In some superficial ways, al Qaeda succeeded, but in many more profound ways, it got exactly the opposite result it was hoping for. Understanding these connections helps us understand better how to effectively wage war within the context of everything else.

Long live the 9/11 Commission! No . . . really!

"9/11 Panel Seeks New Life With Private Donations: Its budget dwindling, the commission turns elsewhere," by Philip Shenon, New York Times, 30 July, p. A8.

I am really missing the logic on this one, unless it all starts being about giving panel members (one bad-ass collection of enormous egos, if you ask me) a permanent political platform. All any of these guys are needed for now is to testify on the Hill. Keeping the panel alive, through private donations no less, is entirely unnecessary. And that’s the main reason cited for this step: “logistical support” for members to keep lobbying the Hill.

That is complete bullshit. There’s no one on this panel who would suffer any hardship in this process. They’re all Washington insiders who can certainly catch the Metro to the Capitol, when required. To me, this is just these guys all jockeying for whatever jobs they think they can milk out of this situation, especially Hamilton and Kean who both seem keen on becoming the first intell czar.

Give me a break!

Here’s a no-brainer solution. The panel says it needs bucks, and their book is number one on Amazon’s bestseller list. How about asking the publisher that isn’t paying any author royalties to donate what would be that share to the panel for its operating expenses? Or does Norton feel like it deserves a windfall profit coming out of the pain and suffering endured by the 9/11 families and this country as a whole?

Reviewing the Reviews (Reno-Gazette Journal)

The Reno-Gazette Journal Online

Found this one thanks to a Google search. My comments follow:

Author offers new paradigm for the 21st century

R. GRANT SEALS
SPECIAL TO THE RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL
6/5/2004 07:55 pm

Thomas P.M. Barnett is a senior military analyst at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. He has a doctorate in political science from Harvard and has advised both the Pentagon planners and high-level civilians on war and peace, terrorism and security. His studies of the past decade or so have led him to formulate a theory that seems to explain the new post-Cold War world. It also seems to explain some of the Bush administration’s approach to Iraq.

His theory divides the world into two distinct areas: those affected by globalization and those not affected by globalization. The countries affected by globalization include Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Europe, Russia, India, China, Japan, Australia and, of course, the United States. Countries not affected by globalization include northern and western South America, most of Africa, the Middle East, Southern Asia (excluding India), Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia.

The countries affected by globalization are termed “connected” in terms of information flow, ideas, people and trade and are called the “Functioning Core.” The countries not affected by globalization are termed “disconnected” or “functioning in disconnectedness.” They fall under the “Non-Integrating Gap.” By and large, these countries are governed by dictators or have authoritarian governments that serve to keep the populace ignorant of world trends. For instance, after the United States toppled Saddam Hussein in Iraq, one of the very first things that happened was the spread of cell phones, which Saddam had strictly prohibited. In his new book, “The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century,” Barnett includes a map that shows the division between the two world areas.

The Functioning Core is stable. The countries in the Non-Integrating Gap that are disconnected from globalization are unstable and allow bad actors such as Osama bin Laden “to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their control,” so says Barnett. Barnett goes on to say that eradicating disconnectedness becomes the defining security task of the 21st Century.

Barnett also sees this as an opportunity. Fighting global terrorism must be subordinated to spreading economic globalism around the planet. The new strategy of preemption must be a means to the larger goal of complete globalization. “When all other reasonable measures fail, we bring war pre-emptively to entities seeking weapons of mass destruction for use against us or our allies. . .. We bring war against any entities that threaten global stability by threatening or waging war against key pillars of that (global) economy, to include the Persian Gulf economies.” He believes our warfare must be directed at despots, not at people. He proposes two types of “armies,” the conventional type, which wins wars, and the new type, which rebuilds countries and economies. We do not now possess the new type.

Finally, Barnett says overwhelming force is our ace in the hole and is the hallmark of the American way of war. Past experience has taught us that committing forces in a piecemeal fashion puts U.S. personnel unnecessarily at risk. This seems to be a part of Barnett’s theory that the U.S. Department of Defense did not follow. He bemoans going it alone and running the risk of members of the Functioning Core permanently withdrawing their support.

His book is worth reading and may become the document that defines the West or the Functioning Core in the 21st century as the philosophy of containment did for the Cold War in the 20th Century.

R. Grant Seals is emeritus professor of agricultural biochemistry and emeritus associate dean at the University of Nevada, Reno. He is a regular contributor to the Opinion page.

COMMENTARY: A very explanatory sort of review, which is interesting to me primarily because it draws so much from the section “The American Way of War,” a portion of Chapter 6 that’s never really been treated before in any other review. His use of the term “affected” in describing my definitions of Core and Gap troubled me a little bit, because of its imprecision: every state is affected by globalization, but not all of them can handle those effects well or even desire them to occur. But since he gives such a nice plug at the end, making the direct comparison to the containment strategy of the Cold War, it would seem petty to harp too much over that one term. Overall, he takes a complex book and gives a very straightforward rendition of the main concepts. Given the limited space and his kind words at the end, you gotta like it.

Reviewing the Reviews (Booklist Reviews)

Got this directly from Neil Nyren at Putnam. He clipped it from whatever insider pub these reviews get distributed in. The short blurbish-review follows, along with my commentary:

The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century, by Thomas P.M. Barnett (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 27 April)

Review

It has been generally recognized that the end of the cold war and the emerging threat of international terrorism presented new challenges in planning American diplomatic and military strategy. What has often been lacking is a coherent, integrated vision that assesses the new threats to American interests and provides a comprehensive plan for coping with them. Barnett, a senior strategic researcher and professor at the U.S. Naval War College, presents his operating theory, which sees the principal threat to American security arising from dysfunctional or so-called failed states, which provide fertile ground for the recruitment and sustenance of terrorists. On the other hand, as such past adversaries as Russia and China are integrated into global economic and political systems, they are less threatening. To counter these threats, Barnett suggests some bold, even revolutionary, changes in our military structure and in the dispersion and utilization of our forces. Of course, both his analyses and remedies are open to debate, but Barnett's compelling assertions are worthy of strong consideration and are sure to provoke controversy. ((Reviewed April 15, 2004)) Copyright 2004 Booklist Reviews.

COMMENTARY: This sort of insider review is really about forecasting reader interest, and I think this one does a very nice job of capturing the most interesting dynamics of the book: it diagnoses the problems and provides comprehensive answers. By citing the “generally recognized” new challenges, the reviewer suggests that my “revolutionary changes” are appropriately bold, although he holds off on offering any critical judgment. Ending on the “sure to provoke controversy” note is pure gold, meaning it’s telling stores and libraries to expect lotsa demand. Looking back on this review, it’s clear to me that a lot of the placement PNM got in bookstores came as a result of this sort of early critical appreciation of the book’s ambitious content.

July 29, 2004

Briefing the Kerry camp

Dateline: SWA flight from BWI to Providence, 29 July 2004

Struggling after a long day and two lengthy briefs yesterday.

Got up at 5:30 and headed out into the pouring rain to Providence for a SWA flight (my usual) to BWI. Then hop in a rental and off to the DC headquarters of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a big consulting/contracting/R&D firm that does work all over the dial, to include plenty for the Defense Department. I’m not there on official business, but as a private speaker giving a speech to a host of senior execs and analysts. SAIC likes the book and wants to hear more. Since I don’t/can’t really do individual corps one-on-one as part of my War College duties (although private companies are free to catch my act at conferences open to the public), this trip has to be done while on personal leave. A decent honorarium to cover costs, but nothing more.

Why bother? The trip is not so much for SAIC as it is for an opportunity to brief the Kerry camp. I mean, I’m certainty happy to brief such a distinguished firm and I’m sure I’ll sell some books in the process, but given how little personal leave I have after my Dad’s long decline and passing, I wouldn’t have made this trip if not for the additional request made by the Kerry camp’s foreign policy task force that’s focused on the Pentagon and DoD. In effect, SAIC covers my travel and gets a free brief while I donate my time to the Kerry campaign tonight.

Why brief the Kerry camp? Besides being a Democrat, I believe it’s always important to reach across party lines to any potential incoming administration. These sorts of briefs are standard-issue in election years, especially in the national security community because, you know what? We’ve got to live with each other administration after administration. The guys I brief tonight will be plenty familiar from the Clinton years, just like the guys who got briefed back in 2000 on the Republican side were plenty familiar from the first Bush Administration. If Kerry wins, the Bush people will go into exile at all the think tanks and the Kerry people will come out of exile from all the think tanks. If Bush wins, then that normal switcheroo gets delayed for at least four more years. But in the end, we’re always talking about—and to—the same basic pool of people, so the national security community is a lot more bipartisan than you might imagine, not to mention a lot smaller.

The brief at SAIC was the full-up version for about 40 staff. Not the strongest connection there, and certainly not a bunch that laughs easily. It felt like briefing my old crowd at the Center for Naval Analyses—just must be something about having all those INTJs in one room together.

The real fun was briefing the Kerry crowd last night in Chevy Chase, at the home of an old friend of mine. This guy is just A GUY, but he's also someone who talks to THE GATEKEEPER on this subject, who in turn talks to THE INSIDER, who advises THE MAN himself on national security (as does THE GATEKEEPER himself, naturally). Of course, THE INSIDER and THE MAN were in Boston, but still, even getting THE GATEKEEPER to show up at A GUY's house was quite a trick, simply because he's a seriously-connected gatekeeper and gatekeepers around THE MAN right now are in extremely high demand. Everyone wants to get to the gatekeepers, because these people can get you face time with the INSIDERS—just one step removed from THE MAN!

You just know I was tingly all over.

Brief went very long but very well. Felt like I was presenting to a bunch of early Christians hiding out in some catacombs; I just felt like some authorities would bust in at any moment and arrest us all.

In the free-flow discussion that goes deep into the night (leaving me with a late drive to BWI and a rousing 3-hour sleep in my hotel bed before getting up at 4:30 to catch my sunrise flight back to the college for my workday), I make my pitches here and there for what I think the Democrats' message can be on defense. Nothing you haven't heard me say here or on TV (or frankly, to the current administration over the past three years), just a bit more emphasized by the material I presented in my brief.

Bottom line: the vision I push is as much acceptable to the Kerry crowd as it is to the Bush crowd. But the Kerry crowd, while seeing so much of what they believe expressed in this vision, are a bit wary of looking like they want to engage in "nation-building" (the new "N" word in national security) any more than the neocons allegedly do. Why? It's because of all those nasty polls that say Americans want out of Iraq. But frankly, those polls only say that Americans hate to see their sons and daughters die in a situation that's badly explained and features a murky sense of both progress and outcome. If it has been a successful war followed immediately by a successful occupation/rebuild, we wouldn't be having these discussions or seeing those poll numbers today. So my line is a simple one for Kerry:

As President, I assure you that I will never send American soldiers overseas into harm's way unless we can win both the war and the peace. I believe we have the capacity within our current armed forces to succeed on both sides of that equation: not just to wage war without parallel but to wage peace without parallel. Because if we cannot secure the victory, we will find no wars worth waging in the global struggle against terrorism.

Moreover, until we strengthen our ability to win the peace that must inevitably follow wars, we will continue to fail in our attempts to attract allies to our cause. We know that smaller states around the world need to see a winning hand in any American-led military intervention overseas before they are able and willing to join. In short, they need to see our strength and commitment demonstrated before they can act with confidence—they need our leadership when it counts most. I will work with the U.S. military to ensure that winning hand, not just in the warfighting phase in which our troops perform so ably, but likewise in the peacekeeping phase where our armed forces need far more support from both the White House and Congress in terms of funding and manpower.

As President, I will assure that needed support will flow to our armed forces, and by doing so, America will have the military it truly needs to win this global war on terrorism, one that can not only engage in drive-by regime change but can also work—with allies, the United Nations, and the local citizens themselves—to generate lasting security in those regions around this world that otherwise will continue to breed the terrorists who will seek to do us harm. That's how I will make America not just secure, but respected around the world as a global leader for peace and justice.

Upshot of the meeting? THE GATEKEEPER approves of the notion of taking the next step. Will it happen? I worry about that no more than I've ever worried about the next brief up the chain with the current administration. It happens when it needs to happen, and I'll be ready when I need to be ready. I'm no more interested in THE JOB with that crew than I am with the current one.

As a visionary out to change the world, I don't need no stinkin' badges! I need converts. So I'll travel to any states—blue or red.

Here’s today’s and yesterday’s catch, put together in snippets of time here and there:

Kerry’s foreign policy: topic of the day not just for me

“Kerry Must-Sell: A Tough Foreign Policy: He Seeks to Portray Party as Steadier Than G.O.P,” by Roger Cohen, New York Times, 28 July, p. A1.

“Kerry’s Foreign Policy: Broad but Vague: Strategy Is to Present a Small Target for Bush, While Emphasizing Vietnam Record,” by Carla Anne Robbins, Wall Street Journal, 28 July, p. A4.

“A Nostalgia For The Consensus Of the 1990s,” by John F. Harris, Washington Post, 29 July, p. A1.

“The Wrong Way to Be Right,” by Richard Cohen, WP, 29 July, p. A23.

The first seeds of a shrinking-the-Gap strategy

“Farm Subsidies Again Take Front Seat at the W.T.O.,” by Elizabeth Becker, NYT, 28 July, p. W1.

“Failure in Cancun Haunts WTO: Trade Leaders Meet in Effort to Patch Difference Between Rich and Poor Nations,” by Paul Blustein, Washington Post, 28 July, p. E1.

“WTO Farm Pact Wouldn’t Be Panacea,” by Scott Miller, WSJ, 29 July, p. A11.

“Panel Sees No Unique Risk From Genetic Engineering,” by Andrew Pollack, WSJ, 28 July, p. A13.

More casualties in terrorists’ anti-access, area-denial asymmetrical strategy

“Jordanian Company to Quit Iraq to Save Lives of 2 Hostages: Powell warns that those who plan to stay must ‘not get weak in the knees,” by Ian Fisher, NYT, 28 July, p. A3.

“Killings Drive Doctor Group To Leave Afghanistan,” by Carlotta Gall, NYT, 29 July, p. A6.

“70 Are Killed By Car Bomber In an Iraqi City: Worst Attack in Month Since Power Transfer,” by Khalid Al-Ansary and Ian Fisher, NYT, 29 July, p. A1.

“Saudis Propose Islamic Force in Iraq: Idea Pushed as War to Expedite Pullout of U.S.-Led Military Coalition,” by Robin Wright, WP, 29 July, p. A16.

The biggest rule-set changes China generates are internal

“New Boomtowns Change Path of China’s Growth,” by Howard D. French, NYT, 28 July, p. A1.

“China’s MIT Upgrades Itself: Tsinghua Tries to Keep Pace With Nation’s Global Ambitions,” by Philip Tinari, WSJ, 28 July, p. A11.

Francis Fukuyama wants his Sys Admin force

“The Art of Reconstruction,” by Francis Fukuyama, WSJ, 28 July, p. A12.

Connectivity with an Islamic twist

“Techs Awaken to the Muslim Market,” by Jeremy Wagstaff, WSJ, 29 July, p. B4.

“Immigrants Keep Islam—Italian Style: ‘Modern Muslims’ Forge Hybrid Culture,” by Daniel Williams, WP, 24 July, p. A15.

Europe as the center of the go-slow ideology

“Love of Leisure, and Europe’s Reasons,” by Katrin Bennhold, NYT, 29 July, p. A8.

Would you invest in these Gap countries?<blockquote>

“At Colombia’s Congress, Paramilitary Chiefs Talk Peace,” by Juan Forero, NYT, 29 July, p. A3.

“Losing Energy and Investors: After Years of Growth, Bolivia’s Gas Industry Faces Hurdles,” by Juan Forero, NYT, 29 July, p. W1.

South Africa: And then there's AIDS . . .

“As AIDS Continues to Ravage, South Africa ‘Recycles’ Graves,” by Michael Wines, NYT, 29 July, p. A1.

Making globalization global = freeing the women in the Gap

“Her Virtual Prison: ‘Inside the Kingdom’ by Carmen bin Laden,” by Danielle Crittenden, WSJ, 29 July, p. D8.

“The New Macho: Feminism,” by Barbara Ehrenreich, NYT, 29 July, p. A27.

Kerry’s foreign policy: topic of the day not just for me

“Kerry Must-Sell: A Tough Foreign Policy: He Seeks to Portray Party as Steadier Than G.O.P,” by Roger Cohen, New York Times, 28 July, p. A1.

“Kerry’s Foreign Policy: Broad but Vague: Strategy Is to Present a Small Target for Bush, While Emphasizing Vietnam Record,” by Carla Anne Robbins, Wall Street Journal, 28 July, p. A4.

“A Nostalgia For The Consensus Of the 1990s,” by John F. Harris, Washington Post, 29 July, p. A1.

“The Wrong Way to Be Right,” by Richard Cohen, WP, 29 July, p. A23.

The flip-flop charge against Kerry on foreign affairs simply does not stick, but it’s basically all the Bush camp can come up with since Kerry basically agrees with the broad outline of Bush foreign policy (fight a global war on terrorism, no pull-out in Iraq or Afghanistan, and reserving the right for preemptive war). All Kerry promises is that he will do the job better, and given the state of U.S. standing in the world, that’s a fair argument to make.

Not just the Democrats, but basically the entire American public is looking for a return to at least some of the consensus we seemed to have as a nation in the 1990s. Key to that consensus was fiscal responsibility in the federal budget, a strong commitment to free trade, and a sense that U.S. alliances around the world were not only stronger, but getting stronger and larger with time.

The rule-set reset triggered by 9/11 created some expenses that aren’t easily wished away, and yet a lot of the spending we’ve engaged in for domestic security purposes is—I would argue—way overboard. It’s been a real feeding frenzy and the Republicans have turned on the federal spigot in a way that’s both amazing and fairly scary. Even the plus-up on defense wasn’t that warranted, because the challenge the Pentagon faces is more one of rebalancing that buying. Yes, the wars have cost, but a much better sales job on that could have been done. Remember, Bush’s dad pulled off—with Jim Baker’s help—Desert Storm at a profit in terms of international financial support. Strange to say it, but it seems like we need to return the Democrats to the White House in order to get federal spending under control.

On the commitment to free trade, there the Bush White House still looks better than anything coming out of the mouths of Kerry and Edwards. Is much of that election-year nonsense? Yup. Is most of it unnecessary given the passion of the hard left to remove Bush from power? Yup. So it’s a complete waste of time and sets bad expectations.

On the alliances question, here the Bush White House has much to answer for. There is no doubt that we have fewer allies and friends than we did four years ago, so the Bush Administration needs to sell the public on how they are going to reverse that very negative trend.

Why be so demanding with the current administration? After all, we were told by the Bush camp in 2000 that the governor’s lack of foreign policy experience would be balanced by all his “wise men” and Condi Rice, but look at the diplomatic track record. There’s nothing in this GWOT effort that mandates we scare the hell out of the rest of the world or alienate key allies. If we’re really right, and I believe we are, then we ought to be able to bring the rest of the Core with us—not just the Brits. Kerry is the diplomat’s son, just like Bush, but Kerry has spent two decades in the Senate specializing in foreign affairs, and that experience is both laudable and sellable in this election. Too nuanced? Too smooth-talking? The Bush camp better come up with tougher charges than that, because many Americans are looking for exactly those sort of characteristics after four years of with-us-or-a’gin-us!

Then again, I agree with Richard Cohen's op-ed: Kerry's strategy can't be one of simply saying we'll make the world love us. That's running foreign policy by international polling, and that's just Clintonism writ larger. But give Kerry this credit: even though U.S. polls show majorities wanting the U.S. out of Iraq, he's not promising to deliver that baby.

The first seeds of a shrinking-the-Gap strategy

“Farm Subsidies Again Take Front Seat at the W.T.O.,” by Elizabeth Becker, New York Times, 28 July, p. W1.

“Failure in Cancun Haunts WTO: Trade Leaders Meet in Effort to Patch Difference Between Rich and Poor Nations,” by Paul Blustein, Washington Post, 28 July, p. E1.

“Panel Sees No Unique Risk From Genetic Engineering,” by Andrew Pollack, Wall Street Journal, 28 July, p. A13.

“WTO Farm Pact Wouldn’t Be Panacea,” by Scott Miller, WSJ, 29 July, p. A11.

What always drives success at WTO meetings is the overwhelming fear of failure. When there’s not enough of it, then talks collapse, but when it’s overwhelming, then deals get cut. Cancun was such a collapse last year, and now the overwhelming fear of going 0 for 2 is pushing both Core and Gap states into more negotiable stances.

Everyone knows what has to give: roughly $300 billion of ag subsidies that Core nations lavish on themselves, effectively shutting out the bulk of the Gap from their markets in the one venue where they’ve consistently showed capability. How the Core expects Gap states to move up the production chain when we keep their ag sectors shackled is simply beyond me, but the myths of “the land” die hard.

The good news so far in these talks is that neither side is acting too bloc-ish, and splinter groups on both sides are approaching each other in a mutual search for earliest common denominators.

Along those lines, the National Academy of Sciences just came out with an authoritative report that said that “genetically engineered crops do not pose health risks that cannot also arise from crops created by other techniques, including conventional breeding.”

What that says is that bio-tech is different in degree but not in kind from the sort of crop cross-breeding that humans have been pursuing for millennia. For the Core to deny these advances to Gap nations desperate either to feed themselves or to boost production in areas where crops are hard to grow is simply wrong. I call it a “no brainer” in the book and am routinely vilified for it, but now that the NAS is officially on the record regarding the safety of bio-tech, the passionate arguments about “frankenfoods” can’t be defended as anything but ag protectionism—pure and simple.

And I agree with the Journal's appraisal of who will really win in any ag deal between Core and Gap: largely the New Core powers Brazil, China and India. Why? They "have the infrastructure and farming know-how to better take advantage of a trade deal." But guess what? Until you give them the incentives to invest in that ag infrastructure, Gap countries won't do it. May seem like chicken or egg, but the Core's got the chicken in a choke-hold right now.

More casualties in terrorists’ anti-access, area-denial asymmetrical strategy

“Jordanian Company to Quit Iraq to Save Lives of 2 Hostages: Powell warns that those who plan to stay must ‘not get weak in the knees,;” by Ian Fisher, New York Times, 28 July, p. A3.

“Killings Drive Doctor Group To Leave Afghanistan,” by Carlotta Gall, NYT, 29 July, p. A6.

“70 Are Killed By Car Bomber In an Iraqi City: Worst Attack in Month Since Transfer,” by Khalid Al-Ansary and Ian Fisher, NYT, 29 July, p. A1.

“Saudis Propose Islamic Force in Iraq: Idea Pushed as War to Expedite Pullout of U.S.-Led Military Coalition,” by Robin Wright, Washington Post 29 July, p. A16.

Another sliver of connectivity bites the dust in Iraq. Since the Philippines gave into the terrorists’ demands following their kidnapping of one Filipino truck driver, at least a dozen more foreigners have been similarly snatched and their companies or countries threatened with their deaths unless they leave Iraq.

Ditto for Doctors Without Borders in Afghanistan. They could handle having their people killed. After all, they've been there for 24 years! What they couldn't handle was the killers getting off scot free, because that just says the lives of Westerners operating there are basically worthless to the government—meaning no effort really required.

Meanwhile, the plans for the opening of the national political conference on 31 July continue apace, thank God. Because when the Iraqis stop showing up for their freedom, you can’t expect the foreign workers to stay on the job amidst all the death threats. The targeting of those Iraqis brave enough to work in the security forces will only get worse, I fear. On the same day 70 Iraqis are killed, the U.S. military reports four more lost in various events. Expect that sort of ratio to continue, sad to say, until the West is driven out completely and then the real purges could proceed.

Would it be better to accept ideas such as what the Saudis are offering in terms of an Islamic peacekeeping force inside Iraq? The idea seems to be that no countries bordering Iraq would participate, which carries a certain logic (especially for the Saudis!). So who would they get for this? They're talking Pakistan, Malaysia, Algeria, Bangladesh and Morocco. Right now the U.S.-led coalition has no Arab countries involved, so this would clearly be better than what we have now, but is it realistic to think that crew, even blessed by the UN, would offer much in terms of putting down an insurgency? Sounds to me suspiciously like declaring "victory," leaving the mess to others, and when it all falls apart, we're long gone. I have seen that scenario unfold before in the 1990s, yes?

The biggest rule-set changes China generates are internal

“New Boomtowns Change Path of China’s Growth,” by Howard D. French, New York Times, 28 July, p. A1.

“China’s MIT Upgrades Itself: Tsinghua Tries to Keep Pace With Nation’s Global Ambitions,” by Philip Tinari, Wall Street Journal, 28 July, p. A11.

The rapid urbanization of China is creating a slew of megacities. If, in its past, Beijing always cast a wary eye over the upstarts in a Shanghai or Hong Kong, now they are looking at over 150 cities of one million-plus citizens (compared to just nine in the U.S.) and ten cities of 4m and over. The sheer magnitude of all the urban planning going on in China constitutes a major rule-set reset, and not exactly one in slow motion. China’s urban population is growing at 2.5% a year, one of the fastest rates in the world. All this shows yet again that China’s historical integration with the outside world is dwarfed only by its amazing pace of internal integration.

All that development naturally taps the intellectual capital of the nation, which in turn forces a revolution in educational institutions, which are more pressed now than ever to crank out not just competent grads, but imaginative thinkers and leaders:

“We realized that the old system doesn’t fit with the current society,” says provost [of Tsinghua University] Hu Heping. “We need to produce people who can think for themselves and one day lead a powerful China.”

China’s red-economy has been straining the limits of the education system. Multinational companies, scrambling to expand, complain that the dearth of talented people is their chief constraint in China. As the same time, many college graduates struggle to find suitable jobs. Efforts of universities such as Tsinghua to better match graduates to China’s new jobs will be key in sustaining the country’s rapid development.

So who knows? Maybe all those “extra” males will be needed after all for something besides going to war?

Francis Fukuyama wants his Sys Admin force

“The Art of Reconstruction,” by Francis Fukuyama, Wall Street Journal, 28 July, p. A12.

I’ve always greatly admired Francis Fukuyama and have—at times—imagined myself following his same career pattern. One of the best books I used in my Ph.D. dissertation on East European-Third World security relations in the 1970s and 1980s was a collection of articles edited by Fukuyama. That’s right. Both he and I not only started as Soviet experts, but both of us came out of the same, far more narrow field of Soviet bloc relations with the Third World. Fukuyama left that narrow specialty far behind when he wrote “The End of History” in the early post-Cold War years, and since has become a bit of a jack-of-all-trades, but a big thinker par excellence. I hope to do similar things with my career as a result of finally bringing PNM to the world.

Fukuyama’s latest book is “State Building,” so his current ideas are naturally gravitating toward the same conclusions I’ve reached regarding the need for the Sys Admin force.

Fukuyama’s big point in this op-ed concerns the size of government and how we need to understand that asking most Gap countries to go smaller in their governments is the wrong way to go. Only when a state/economy/society reaches a certain maturity does it make sense to start asking the government to get out of the way. Until then, stronger public institutions are crucial for developing, especially in weak states. Fukuyama quotes Milton Friedman as saying he was wrong to tell all the former socialist states to privatize at all costs in the early 1990s: “But I was wrong. It turns out that the rule of law is probably more basic than privatization.” In other words, get the security, then the rules, and then the economics can unfold more freely.

Then, at the end of the op-ed, Fukuyama’s logic leads him to the same basic conclusion I reached in PNM: we need a new US Government entity that’s first and foremost about what I call the “back half,” or that transition space between war (the “front half”) and peace (that future worth creating that involves shrinking the Gap). Here’s how he ends the piece:

The Americans who presided over the successful reconstruction of postwar Europe and Japan were for the most part New Dealers who had just lived through a period of intense state-building in Washington. No similar cadre exists now. If there is any lesson to be drawn from our haphazard reconstruction of Iraq, it is that we need to reorganize all of our soft-power agencies (State, USAID, the civil affairs units of the military and the broadcasting agencies) to be better able to do both reconstruction and development. In the place of ad hoc planning, we need to provide a permanent institutional home for people with experience in prior efforts. Difficult and contradictory as these functions are, they will be as much a key to overall American power and influence in the coming years as the technological prowess of our armed forces.

What Fukuyama is basically calling for is a Dept. of Something that lies between the Department of Defense/War and the Department of State/Peace, and it’s exactly what I’m aiming for in enunciating the need for the Sys Admin force, because unless the Department of Defense creates such capacity, talking about the other parts that may eventually migrate toward it from the other side of the Potomac River will remain just that—talk and nothing more.

Connectivity with an Islamic twist

“Techs Awaken to the Muslim Market,” by Jeremy Wagstaff, Wall Street Journal, 29 July, p. B4.

“Immigrants Keep Islam—Italian Style: ‘Modern Muslims’ Forge Hybrid Culture,” by Daniel Williams, Washington Post, 24 July, p. A15.

Neat story. LG of South Korea (maker of my phone) wants to market cells in the Middle East. Their gimmick is an embedded compass that helps the faithful better locate Mecca for direction in their daily prayers—a total hit.

Other electronic marketing efforts: phones that recite the call to prayer, provide prayer times for more than 5,000 cities in a database, store electronic recordings of the Quran.

So long as approval is sought from the right authorities (apparently the Al-Azhar Al-Sharif Islamic Research Academy in Cairo is a biggie), it's relatively easy to market such products without offense. Some Muslims like the products because they allow for low-key worship, while others find that goal offensive in terms of seeming to deny who they are.

But defining who is a good Muslim isn't any more a set issue worldwide than defining who is a good Catholic—in fact probably far less because there is no central Islamic authority. So, in many ways, when Muslims migrate to Core states like Italy, they're a lot more on their own than adherents of other religions in terms of defining what's an acceptable mix of clinging to tradition and moving toward assimilation. So-called "modern Muslims" in Italy naturally lean toward hybrid solutions simply because their ranks stem from such varied sources around the world. As one guy put it (an American transplant from the Bronx who picked up his Islamic faith via Sudan): "There are all kinds of Muslims here, and most of them are modern. We don't have to print Islam on our T-shirts."

Europe as the center of the go-slow ideology

“Love of Leisure, and Europe’s Reasons,” by Katrin Bennhold, New York Times, 29 July, p. A8.

Europe emerges more and more as the go-slow center of the Core. If the U.S. tends to be all go-go on globalization, whereas many in the New Core can't seem to go fast enough in terms of integration, then it's Europe's growing role to be the Core pillar that emphasizes the opportunity costs in progress. They may be "poorer" in terms of goods acquired, but they seem to be trading that in for more leisure in their lifestyles—a very different social-economic rule set from either the U.S. or the workaholic Japanese.

The moderate resistance to globalization doesn't say "keep it out" like radical Islam, but simply advocates a go-slower approach. Over time, this is the great alternative political ideology that attracts many adherents throughout the Core. A cruder version of this is seen in the growing New Core focus on remembering the rural poor and making sure they get pulled up in the globalization process as well as the urban elites. Inside the U.S., it would appear to be the Democrats who will emerge more as the go-slower party and the Republicans as the go-go-globalization party, since the isolationist wing of the GOP is far less powerful (for now) than the anti-globalization ranks of the far left.

Would you invest in these Gap countries?

“At Colombia’s Congress, Paramilitary Chiefs Talk Peace,” by Juan Forero, New York Times, 29 July, p. A3.

“Losing Energy and Investors: After Years of Growth, Bolivia’s Gas Industry Faces Hurdles,” by Juan Forero, NYT, 29 July, p. W1.

Why does Colombia's economy run far too much on narcotics? Who wants to invest in a country where paramilitary commanders are invited into the national legislature under white flags and promises of no arrest? This trio of leaders sat in the national congress chamber and were treated like serious political players in the system instead of rebels and vigilantes who are in bed with narco-traffickers.

As one Humans Rights Watch official put it, "This is a very dangerous game and awful precedent. What this kind of circus does is raise the expectations for these individuals to strengthen their position by manipulating the public with some sort of family-values speech."

A Colombian congressman was even harsher: "What we see is the state and justice submitting themselves to narco-traffickers. This shows the great power paramilitaries and narco-traffickers have over Congress."

Colombia isn't really even a state anymore, just a collection of warlords running the countryside and a government running the capital. It's the Pakistan/Afghanistan of South America.

Meanwhile, in Bolivia, the political and economic rule sets there are so incoherent and weak that despite the huge global demand right now for new sources of natural gas, the government there can't get international investors interested in coming there. As the Times puts it: "The turmoil in this isolated, land-locked country in the center of South America has been quickly snuffing a nascent gas industry that seven years ago appeared to have no limits." Bolivia simply can't seem to come to any consensus—especially with indigenous groups—on how to exploit its gas resources for the benefit of all, so nothing happens to the detriment of all:

"There's total uncertainty regarding the legal, regulatory, political and social framework," Mr. Lopez [former vice minister of energy] said. "This is a sector that, having discovered the reserves, should be investing substantial amounts to develop the fields," he said. "Instead, it is an industry preparing for the worst."

And so Bolivia, in its political and social confusion, remains firmly mired deep inside the Gap.

South Africa: And then there's AIDS . . .

“As AIDS Continues to Ravage, South Africa ‘Recycles’ Graves,” by Michael Wines, New York Times, 29 July, p. A1.

Scary story. So many bodies pile up in some parts of South Africa that graves in cemeteries are being recycled, meaning old bones are dug up and new bodies put in.

If South Africa is to fall out of the Core, it will be because of AIDS, and this should be a scary lesson to all New Core states facing rising HIV populations—meaning Russia, India, Brazil and China.

Making globalization global = freeing the women in the Gap

“Her Virtual Prison: ‘Inside the Kingdom’ by Carmen bin Laden,” by Danielle Crittenden, Wall Street Journal, 29 July, p. D8.

“The New Macho: Feminism,” by Barbara Ehrenreich, New York Times, 29 July, p. A27.

Good review of book by Saudi ex-pat who once was the wife of Osama bin Laden's brother. The portrait painted is basically that of a women kept as a breeding pet in a totally male-defined culture:

Rarely could she leave the house—rarely, even, did she see sunlight. Courtyards had to be cleared of male servants before she could poke her head outside: she was not even permitted to cross the street alone to visit a relative. When she did venture out, she had to wear a choking abaya and thick socks to hide her ankles. "It was like carrying a jail on your back," she writes.

Interesting comparison. Reading the excerpts in this book reminded me of nothing so much as the descriptions of life inside a super-max federal prison for hardcore criminals. One is now located in my hometown of Boscobel WI and the prisoners there are completely invisible to the town just outside its walls. Prison-reform advocates say the isolating treatments are so cruel that they naturally drive the inmates down pathways of mental illness over time.

Barbara Ehrenreich hits a politically-incorrect nail on the head when she writes that "Many women have nothing to lose but their chains" inside such Gap regions as the Middle East. In her mind, the most incendiary (and Democrat-friendly) counterterrorism is feminism in our foreign policy, which frankly has been missing in action primarily because of the influence of the anti-abortion crowd in this country.

Yes, Democrats would risk the "girlie man" charge from tough-guy Republicans like Arnold, but when push comes to shove, we have to admit to ourselves that making globalization truly global will mostly be about liberating the women of the Gap and killing the hardcore males who stand in the way.

July 27, 2004

Reading the leaves—a father's remembrance

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 27 July 2004

Yesterday I took my first-born Emily to Hasbro Children's Hospital in Providence for her annual visit with the pediatric oncology people there. I expected nothing but good news and yet—as always—I was filled with dread.

First, there is that sense of returning to the scene of the crime that's a bit unnerving. Then there's simply the discussion over "late effects" and/or secondary cancers coming from the initial treatments, a conversation that no longer occurs in Em's presence at age 12 without her catching the drift in full. Finally, there's simply being around all those kids with cancer, which was never easy then and isn't any easier now (listen to Don Imus describe his kids cancer ranch sometime if you don't believe me), especially since your kid has "aged out" in the best sense of that phrase.

But there was just a bit more this time around, and that takes a bit of explaining.

When I first discovered Em's cancer by accident in the summer of 1994, it was during a trip back to my parents in Boscobel WI for the 4th of July. I had gone back with her alone because Vonne, my wife, had wanted some time alone from this boisterous 2-year-old, and I was all hot to run in the race of my youth—the Boscobel Firecracker 5-miler.

Well, after discovering the lump and being told by the local ER doc that it was probably just a hernia and "don't cut your trip short over it," my Mom and I looked at each other and knew immediately I was flying back East with Em first thing next morning.

As we drove up to the house back in Springfield, VA, I was somewhat stunned to see the big tree in front of our townhouse. Normally a deep green, the leaves were all brilliantly red, like they had been spray painted or something. It was really odd. I had this scary sort of feeling, like it was an evil omen or something. I couldn't stop thinking about the old Hebrew story from Exodus in which the slaves marked their front doors with sacrificial blood so that the angel of death would pass them by and kill only the first-born children of the Egyptians, except it felt like my house was being marked by some . . . thing for exactly that purpose.

Three days later we got the shocking diagnosis and entered into a two-week stay at Georgetown U Hospital in Washington DC. I don't think I walked outside for almost a week; it was that intense and real-time. Every hour was a draining decision or soul-shaking sort of judgment handed down from on high.

Finally, about seven days into the process, Vonne and I decided that one of us needed to head back home to check on things there, simply because we left the place in such a flash and had not been back since. A friend of mine drove me back, and as we pulled up the hill and our front-yard tree came into view, you could almost here the ominously growling strings of the symphonic soundtrack kick in—the leaves on the towering tree had now all turned a deep black.

While I was at the house, I got a call from Vonne: Em had gone into a special full-body scan procedure whereby they injected her with special, radiated substances that would allow her entire skeletal structure to be x-rayed in an attempt to see if the cancer had spread into her bones. This was pretty scary, because if it had, it was game over. If not, then we had a fairly firm grip on the extent of her metastases (i.e., right kidney sac, abdominal nodes on that side, both lungs). To have the test done, Emily had to lay very still in a completely blacked out room. As a two-year-old, she was sedated for the procedure.

Vonne, calling from the hallway, asked me to get back to the hospital right away. Every test we had done up to that point had come with a negative outcome, meaning it was always what we feared (yes to cancer, yes to spreading beyond her kidney into the sac, yes to nodes, and yes to tumors in both lungs). By this time, we had already left behind all the normal odds of this-or-that happening. We felt we were on a terrible losing streak that would only end with her death sentence, and Emily was going to receive it—unwittingly—lying in a dark room with only a stranger (a nice nurse) holding her hand in the blackness.

As I walked out the front door of our house and glanced up at the tree's now funereal tapestry of leaves, I had this inescapable feeling that God's judgment had already been transmitted down to us through the frightening image. And all I could think was, "F--k you!"

I got to the hospital and stood around with Vonne in the rather dark basement corridor outside the X-ray chamber where Em was still lying, recovering from the sedation. Scoping out the location, I could see the radiologists' on-site diagnostic room where they did their quick reads. It was just around the corner. Sticking my head in ever so slightly, I saw an intense looking young doc pouring over Em's x-rays.

I pulled back immediately at the sight because it felt like peeking into the star chamber deciding my kid's fate. Slinking back to Vonne in the hallway, we both just nervously paced around the area, unable to talk much to one another.

I kept playing the scene out in my head: if the doc had good news, he'd look us straight in the eyes as he came around that corner. It would be: "This is only a preliminary read, but it looks good. No cancer appears to be anywhere in her bones." If it was bad, his eyes would never exactly meet ours and the voice would be curt: "I don't have any complete answers at this time. I'll be delivering my full report to Emily's oncologist in a couple of hours. I'm sorry I can't tell you more right now."

At that moment I knew exactly how it felt to be standing in a courtroom waiting for a verdict of guilty or innocent. I just knew we'd either turn a corner or hit rock bottom in the next several minutes.

Funny thing was, I had no idea if we had really committed any crime.

Finally, after what seemed like forever, the doc comes bounding around the corner with a big smile on his face, looking us right in the eyes. He said something but I didn't catch a word of it. His non-verbal communication told me everything I needed to hear.

A week later, after we got home from Georgetown, I got up early the next morning, took out my axe, and chopped down that f--king tree. Then I shook my fist at the sky and told the Big Man that if he planned on messing with one of mine, he better come with a bigger bag of tricks than that.

He never did.

In our yard in Portsmouth we used to have two-dozen trees, including a stand of five trees in the front yard—the first ones you'd notice as you drove up to our house.

Well, one by one over the fall and winter we lost all five of those pines to Japanese beetles, which apparently love that type of pine. Nothing we could do about it except cut them down—each in turn as the months passed.

That sort of sucked, but I didn't pay it much mind . . . until the special little tree that sits between our house and driveway started to show signs of stress this spring. It's a small, decorative tree that we always dress up for various holidays. The kids all love this little tree because numerous birds have nested there over the years, plus it's where we stick our bird feeders in the winter, so we can watch and identify all the types that come there to feed.

It was—in short—our family's favorite tree.

Well, about the time I took Em in for her annual blood work, I noticed that the leaves on the tree were slightly tinged with red, as though they had entered their fall bloom.

A couple of weeks later when Vonne took Emily in for her annual x-rays, the leaves on the tree had mostly blackened.

By the time Em and I left the house yesterday for Providence, virtually all of the tree's leaves had rotted and fallen off, clearly indicating its rapid progression toward death. Apparently, it had suffered the same sort of "fire blight" that had decimated our tree back in Virginia ten years ago.

Now, I knew that all of Em's diagnostics were good, but the angst and the old feelings of dread were hard to deny as I drove the route to Hasbro.

And yet, the news was just as positive yesterday as it had been that July afternoon in 1994: Emily has reached a real turning point in her long-term survivorship. Her oncologist at Hasbro said that as a ten-year-survivor, Em has reached the point where the possibility of reoccurrence of her original cancer is virtually nil, so we'll be dialing down the diagnostics to just blood and urinanalysis, plus a biannual tracking of her heart's development and lung performance as she grows into adulthood. In sum, he said, it was time to start treating Em as completely cured.

No, I didn't chop down the tree the minute I got home last night, and I don't plan on shaking my fist at the sky any time soon either—not with this China adoption trip looming.

Still, it was nice to feel like we had moved Em off of one worry list just in time to make room for another young girl to take her place. We've been extraordinarily lucky to have kept her these ten years, but we'll take as many more as we can get. Same will hold true for Vonne Mei Ling—no matter how many dead trees I may bump into on the long journey between Rhode Island and Jiangxi Province.

Here's today's catch:

Slow but steadier progress in Iraq

"Early Steps, Maybe, Toward a Democracy in Iraq," by Ian Fisher, New York Times, 27 July, p. A1.

"U.S. Seeks to Provide More Jobs and Speed Rebuilding in Iraq: A focus on large projects has been criticized as wasteful," by Erik Eckholm, NYT, 27 July, p. A7.

The knock on NOC's

"Paying the Pumper," J. Robinson West, Washington Post, 23 July, p. A29.

"Scrutinizing the Saudi Connection: Questions the 9/11 commission left unanswered," by Gerald Posner, NYT, 27 July, p. A19.

Let's see . . . plus up foreign aid or search every cargo container?

"At Nation's Ports, Cargo Backlog Raises Question of Security," by John M. Broder, NYT, 27 July, p. A12.

Good coffee is one thing, good leaders another

"Rwanda Savors the Rewards of Coffee Production," by Carter Dougherty, NYT, 27 July, p. W1.

China-Taiwan: the ties that bind often chafe as well

"China Raises Economic Heat on Taiwan," by Jason Dean, Wall Street Journal, 27 July, p. A15.

The inevitable public debate in Japan on foreigners

"Tokyo urged to open doors to foreign workers," by Mariko Sanchanta, Financial Times.com, 27 July, found on story.news.yahoo.com

Slow but steadier progress in Iraq

"Early Steps, Maybe, Toward a Democracy in Iraq," by Ian Fisher, New York Times, 27 July, p. A1.

"U.S. Seeks to Provide More Jobs and Speed Rebuilding in Iraq: A focus on large projects has been criticized as wasteful," by Erik Eckholm, New York Times, 27 July, p. A7.

As Allawi the interim prime minister continues his efforts at establishing stability across Iraq in the face of a fierce, multiheaded insurgency, quiet but widespread efforts continue toward a legislative branch. Right now there are political caucuses convening all over Iraq to pick upwards of 1,000 delegates to a national convention next week in Baghdad. That convention is designed to select a smaller, 100-seat council that will play watchdog to Allawi's government until the full national elections are held in January—at least that's the plan. If the elections get delayed, this council could be a little bit more than "interim."

Of course, the caucuses are so much more than a delegate-picking scheme, they are the first real chance for organized political dialogue on a local level. Yes, many hardcore groups refuse to participate, but Allawi's government pushes ahead and it is right to do so. Waiting for everyone to get happy isn't democracy, but a recipe for political paralysis. Plus, since the process is so new for Iraqis, better to let them get through these sloppy first attempts prior to instituting a permanent constitution, slated for voting in late 2005.

Plenty of groups that refused to participate in Allawi's government are at least participating in this process, and that's a positive sign.

A long journey, no doubt, but these are positive first steps. That positive, small victories approach is how we should have approached the rebuilding process in Iraq, but typical of the Pentagon, we planned big, hugely expensive projects.

Rick Barton, an expert on such reconstructions at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in DC (and host to my talk there last month) puts it simply:

The projects have been way too large. Building large infrastructure is not usually what you do first in a post-conflict society. You need to get things going in the right direction, and the process will pick up speed later on. If you try to build pyramids in the beginning, it will suck up all the money.

Plus, going the "big contract, big contract" route means the funding goes primarily to large multinational corporations, leaving local Iraqis with little sense of ownership.

If keeping it small but beautiful makes sense politically, then it should make sense economically too.

The knock on NOC's

"Paying the Pumper," J. Robinson West, Washington Post, 23 July, p. A29.

"Scrutinizing the Saudi Connection: Questions the 9/11 commission left unanswered," by Gerald Posner, New York Times, 27 July, p. A19.

Lotta people sending me info on the infamous Hubbert curve analysis that "proves" global oil production is irrevocably peaking and thus inevitably heading toward a crash. The analysis is essentially correct but fundamentally myopic, because it largely misses a fundamental fact about global oil markets: they are not run by multinational corporations but far more by national oil companies, or NOCs. NOCs control 60% of production but control close to 90% of reserves, as West points out in his excellent op-ed in the Post:

The capabilities of the national oil companies vary widely. Some are as competent as the international firms. Others are deeply corrupt and lack the capital and skill to meet the sophisticated requirements of portfolio and reservoir management. Furthermore, exploration for new reserves can involve massive risks, which most governments are unwilling to underwrite, whereas the internationals, with huge balance sheets and diversified portfolios, are quite comfortable with these risks.

The thesis of the Hubbert curve is correct, but the conclusion that a fall in global oil production has inevitably begun is not. The Hubbert curve analysis applies where full commercial exploitation has taken place, but in many areas, other factors, including politics and policy, weigh in. It is true that production in most of the United States, Canada and the North Sea is in decline—there, exploration and production have been exhaustive. But the most oil-rich areas, notably Mexico, Venezuela, Russia and the Middle East, have not been fully explored.

As West so aptly puts it: "National companies are government agencies accountable to their governments first and the international markets second." Why don't NOCs fully exploit their reserves? As West states, "The indigenous oil industries in these countries, usually national companies, resist international foreign investment. They don't want the competition, nor do they wish to share the economic rent from the oil."

If the NOCs were to open up their national industries to competition, there would be a bigger pie for the country as a whole, but less control for the elites who dominate the NOCs and—likewise—the governments that own them. This is classic Gap state behavior: preferring a smaller pie that they can control more fully than a larger one that might escape their control. This is the essence of the oil curse: you treat wealth as a zero-sum concept. You act as though there is only so much wealth in the world, so you must hoard what you have. Getting Gap states off the oil curse forces them to treat wealth-generation as non-zero-sum, meaning everyone can get richer with the right investment in things like education, information connectivity, and tax incentives for foreign investment. Countries without such natural resources simply have to develop their people first and foremost if they want to get ahead in the global economy. They’ve got no choice.

What is wrong with the Middle East can't be solved by stopping the flow of financial support to terrorists groups. Yes, it would be nice if rich Saudis didn't fund al Qaeda, but that is only a symptom of what's really wrong with the Middle East: elites that hoard the natural wealth of the country while keeping the masses—especially the women—down and far too ignorant. Whenever publicly-owned companies dominate an economy, broadband economic development will be retarded—plain and simple. That skewed development pattern gives rise to political rigidity on top and suppressed anger below, and that's what defines the latent and real instability of much of the Gap. Deal with that reality—that fundamental disconnectedness—and you deal with the real roots of terrorism.

Let's see . . . plus up foreign aid or search every cargo container?

"At Nation's Ports, Cargo Backlog Raises Question of Security," by John M. Broder, New York Times, 27 July, p. A12.

Should America's big ports possess the best, most sophisticated technologies and terminal systems for transmodal operations? Certainly, we should aim for the same standards now achieved in Singapore, Hong Kong and Rotterdam, because such efficiency determines economic competitiveness to a large degree.

But how much should we focus on port security? Stephen Flynn, with his new book "America the Vulnerable," is generating a lot of sales and buzz like this article, by speaking of containers as "the poor man's missile" and saying "the question is when, not if" such containers will be used to deliver WMD into the U.S. He may well be right in his fears, but because he offers no context and thinks only of worst-case vertical scenarios, he tends to oversell his case. We've got the "bin Laden tax" already on the airline industry, and inevitably it gets place squarely on the shipping industry as well, either out of preemptive fear or in response to actual attack. But what we really have to ask ourselves is how much protection do we actually buy with such investments? There is simply no sense of balance in these arguments, or in this America-at-risk plethora of books now hitting the market.

Firewalling America off from the outside world may seem logical, but it really comes down to spending a lot of money on ourselves in order to reduce our connectivity with the global economy. Efficiency yes, but universal transparency is a chimera—a goal far more likely to reduce our connectivity than enhance or protect it. Plus, it does nothing at all in terms of reducing the sources of terrorism, or shrinking the Gap.

We are losing our sense of proportion in this global war on terrorism. Our instincts are always to pull back and look out for ourselves, instead of stepping forward and embracing the world for what it needs from us.

Port security is not about winning a GWOT, just about not losing one. When you play primarily not to lose, I guarantee you can't win.

Flynn can spread fear all he wants, and yes, he will inevitably be right, as even a broken clock is twice a day, but this is not a strategic approach to the problem set. We cannot prevent vertical scenarios like 9/11, and spending our scarce resources trying to do is misguided. We need to build robustness in terms of our ability to respond to and handle all the horizontal scenarios that result from a vertical scenario, because therein lies our true talents and strengths as the world's most horizontally networked society and economy and political system and military power.

As Peter Drucker admonishes, we need to stick with our strengths and outsource the rest. Our strength is connectivity, not firewalls. Our strength is engagement, not isolationism. This struggle is an away game, not a home game.

Good coffee is one thing, good leaders another

"Rwanda Savors the Rewards of Coffee Production," by Carter Dougherty, New York Times, 27 July, p. W1.

Interesting article on whether USAID should be focused on aid to growers' collectives or on encouraging individual entrepreneurs in the coffee business in Rwanda. Collectives are better at ensuring quality, but entrepreneurs tend to be the ones who bring in the technology that really improves production.

Here's the real meat of the article though:

Ultimately though, Rwanda's customers in the United States and Europe will deliver the final verdict on who makes the best coffee. Geoff Watts, vice president of Chicago-based Intelligentsia Coffee, began buying Rwandan coffee last year, and has found its cooperatives have delivered a quality product consistently, but Mr. Watts said that over time, their leadership tends to change, irritating customers who are looking for stable business relationships.

"The guy you're talking to this year may not be the one you deal with next year," Mr. Watts said.

Another bulk buyer of coffee put it more even more bluntly: "It doesn't matter to me whether it's a co-op or not. What I care about is the reliability of the partner."

Seems like USAID's aid should be focused on keeping stable leadership in these local enterprises more than anything else, which makes this a bit of a microcosm for a good portion of the Gap. Inside the Gap, roughly one-third of states cannot keep a leader as long as four years, and that is a terrible burden when it comes to attracting long-term trade and investment relations with the Core.

China-Taiwan: the ties that bind often chafe as well

"China Raises Economic Heat on Taiwan," by Jason Dean, Wall Street Journal, 27 July, p. A15.

China seems pissed off that all these years of economic integration with Taiwan has not paid off in a decline in Taiwanese nationalism, but this should be no surprise. Societies—as well as individuals within them—tend to compensate politically for things that unfold economically. So if economic integration is occurring, expect to see people use the political realm to compensate for their sense of lost identity and freedom of action by emphasizing that political identity and freedom of action all the more. Politics in an open system has always been about dealing with our worst fears. Taiwan fears being swallowed up economically by China, and so as that economic integration process deepens, expect ever stronger language regarding political independence from Taiwan. China should understand this development as a sign of success in their overall strategy of drawing Taiwan closer to the mainland. Those within China's political system who argue for military action are—quite frankly—the same ones who wouldn't mind seeing China reverse its path in terms of the political and economic freedoms that have emerged in recent years there. The hard-liners may argue for seizing Taiwan as the next logical step in China's rising global power, but it would be a disconnecting event of immense proportions that would probably only hasten the decline of the Communist Party's power. After all, someone would have to be blamed for the economic and political isolation that would result, and a more nationalized Chinese society is more likely to want to "throw the bums out" than turn against their nation's military forces.

In my opinion, if China militarily invades Taiwan, we'll be watching the Chinese Communist Party commit political suicide.

The inevitable public debate in Japan on foreigners

"Tokyo urged to open doors to foreign workers," by Mariko Sanchanta, Financial Times.com, 27 July, found on story.news.yahoo.com

Foreigners in Japan constitute barely 1 percent of the population, making Japan fairly disconnected socially even as it is enormously connected to the rest of the Core in terms of finance, trade, technology, and—increasingly—media content (talk to your kids about anime). Japan has long acted like it can maintain this social isolation, but it must inevitably crumble due to its aging population.

Like any advanced society, Japan tends to blame immigrants for everything bad that happens—especially the country's rising crime rate. But if Japan thinks it can control crime by keeping foreign workers out as its worker-to-retiree ratio plummets, then it is kidding itself.

For Japan to open up in the coming decades, it will have to change its society in some very fundamental ways. Many in Japan will decry these changes, always maintaining the superiority of the "good old days," but both the world and Japan itself will be a richer place for this human transaction. Japan will inevitably do its share to shrink the Gap because—in the end—demographics is destiny.

July 26, 2004

The real audience for PNM, or how I can live without a NYT review

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 26 July 2004

Friday I get an email from a TX-based academic who's doing a study of my work and comparing it to Niall Ferguson's. His basic take: we make similar arguments about America's role in the world, the big difference being that I describe a better future world resulting from this effort and that I include prescriptions and an actual strategy for the U.S. to employ in getting the world to that point. Ferguson, the cream-of-the-crop historian right now offers nothing of that sort—strictly a backward-looking comparison to the British Empire which he so loves.

That, my friends, is the difference between an academic historian and a practitioner in grand strategy: Ferguson can get by with diagnostics and analysis leading nowhere, but I actually have to come up with a road map, otherwise I'm a complete failure. That's because Ferguson's main audience is fellow historians and the academic crowd in general, whereas my audience is fairly specific: 1) our military; 2) other militaries; and 3) decision-makers in Washington. Ferguson needs the approval of his peers, a scholarly reputation, and good reviews. I need the approval of the "stars" (flag officers) and "bars" (lowering-ranking officers just entering into the senior ranks), broadband acceptance by the operators in the field, and real-world proof that my ideas either reflect or influence actual policy and strategy alterations.

That I do well in Ferguson's realm is nice (media appearances, nice reviews, I got NYT BSL status and he didn't!), but completely irrelevant to the book's impact. I didn't write an academic treatise looking at it from the outside, I wrote the memoir of an actual practitioner working on the inside. As such, I don't offer analysis so much as a manifesto for change.

When I get invited to address entire student bodies of professional military educational institutions like the Naval War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, that is impact. When those same colleges indicate they'll be distributing PNM to students and faculty, that is impact. When I find myself pulled into senior advisory roles with senior officers at Joint Forces Command, Special Operations Command, and Central Command, that is impact. When the administration has me repeatedly brief new service secretaries as they prepare for confirmation hearings, that is impact. When I brief foreign militaries, the House of Commons in the UK, or representatives from NATO, that is impact.

And when John Kerry's people arrange for me to brief their foreign policy task force on Pentagon issues, that is impact.

I have received more than a few reviews from academics stating that my approach isn't real-world enough to be used as a true policy guide, and that judgment is so laughably off-base as to make me cringe at the ignorance of those who offer it. I always knew PNM would have mega-impact within the defense community, because it speaks directly to them and offers them a real framework for engaging with the "everything else" they know instinctively impinges upon every intervention they undertake in this era of globalization. That the material seems unrealistic or Strangelovean to many academics is amusing to me, but nothing more, because the vast majority of what they put out in publications strikes me as completely divorced from any reality I have come to understand in working directly for and with the U.S. military over the past 15 years. For the most part, they seem to live in a dream world of theories and models, and when they do offer prescriptions, they are hopelessly naïve.

My stuff is real-world because it was born from hundreds of presentations directly offered to real-world operators, who will call you on the bullshit faster than you can click through your next PPT animation. Why I get to brief so many senior military leaders is because whenever their subordinates come across my stuff, they instantly realize that this is the most solid package yet of the host of ideas that they themselves in many instances have long been trying to articulate up through the ranks.

You wanna know the best review I've received so far? It was from Vice Admiral Eric Olson, Deputy Commander of Special Operations Command. His view of what military forces are good for is probably 180 degrees different from mine. The guy is Leviathan through and through, and I respect the hell out of him for that. During a formal interaction with him in front of all of his senior officers, his subordinates had urged me to push my case for the Sys Admin/back half focus in transformation. These younger officers knew full well how little he appreciates this argument, but wanted me to make the case in as strong as terms as possible. So I did. Olson listens intently, pauses for a few seconds as he considers what I said, and then simply replies "thank you," indicating he has absorbed the argument and will give it serious consideration.

That is the best review I've received so far on PNM. Five minutes with one of the most hardcore operators you can find in the U.S. military, selling him a vision I know he is opposed to, but doing it in such a way that he felt compelled to consider it seriously. It has taken me a decade-and-a-half to build a standing with operators inside the U.S. military to the point where I even get invited for such face time, so I know what a privilege it is, especially when younger operators push me forward to deliver messages up the chain on their behalf. That is real trust, and that trust is the only evidence that matters to me regarding PNM's deep impact within its targeted audiences.

So when I pull open the NYT Book Review yesterday and see John Lewis Gaddis, a highly-respected academic historian, reviewing Niall Ferguson's book Colossus (the entire issue was given over to a slew of "empire" books), and noting that his review contains a calculated mix of praise for the career with the usual backbiting on the details of the book, I think to myself: I can live without a NYT review, because all I'd get is yet another academic take on the "impracticality" of my policy prescriptions. And such a review would mean almost nothing to me, coming from that detached crowd, because the approval they offer concerns the cleverness and intricacy of the argument, rather than its substance. But since I did not write PNM for that crowd, much less for their approval, I cannot expect anything but the usual sneering disdain ("What is this stuff compared to our elaborate theoretical models?").

Their arguments go on forever, conference by conference, journal article by journal article, and review by review. They can go on forever because they never have to arrive anywhere. But my ideas have to arrive somewhere, otherwise the invitations will stop, the access will be denied, and my dialogue with senior military leaders will come to an end.

And you know what? I like it that way. Because the minute my stuff stops being relevant to my clients—the U.S. military—they should absolutely fire my ass. This business is too important for anybody to be wasting their time.

Here's the rather large catch from the Sunday NYT and today's Times and Journal:

Kerry's hope: "I can do anything better than you!"

"Voters Are Very Settled, Intense And Partisan, and It's Only July: Great Political Divide Increases as Parties Clarify Identities," by Robin Turner, New York Times, 25 July, p. A1.

"Kerry Sees Hope of Gaining Edge on Terror Issue: Promises a Safer Nation; Says Anti-Bush Rhetoric Will Be Discouraged at Boston Convention," by Adam Nagourney, NYT, 25 July, p. A1.

"A Duet That Straddles the Political Divide: The 'liberal sissy' and 'right-wing nut job' face off in this satire," by Steve Lohr, NYT, 26 July, p. C5.

The race to disconnect Iraq from the outside world is on

"Iraqi Insurgents Using Abduction As Prime Weapon; 2 Pakistanis Are Seized; By Taking Hostages, the Rebels Apply Pressure on American Allies," by James Glanz, NYT, 26 July, p. A1.

"Iraqi Urges Allies Not to Be Deterred by Kidnappings; Executive Is Seized," by Ian Fisher, NYT, 25 July, p. A8.

"Western Ways Force Iraq To Trim Water Projects: Security fears and red tape devour time and money," by James Glanz, NYT, 26 July, p. A8.

In praise of stupid government

"The New Magic Bullet: Bureaucratic Imagination; Outwitting terrorists may be beyond the ability of government," by Douglas Jehl, NYT, 25 July, p. WK1.

Non-lethals: the "star of tomorrow" for the last decade & counting

"The Pentagon is developing a new class of sci-fi-like 'non-lethal' weapons. But will they make war any safer or easier?: The Quest for the Nonkiller App," by Stephen Mihm, NYT Magazine, 25 July, p. 38.

Wars cost everyone money, including the military-industrial complex

"Defense Firms Encounter a Budget Crunch: Military Modernization Is in Jeopardy as Iraq Siphons Funds, Congress Doubts Technology," by Jonathan Karp and Andy Pazstor, Wall Street Journal, 26 July, p. B6.

Hillary's realism on globalization is as good as Bill's

"'Bestshoring' Beats Outsourcing," by Hillary Rodham Clinton, WSJ, 26 July, p. A14.

"What Works in the Rest of the World: Keep labor standards out of trade agreements," by William B. Gould IV, NYT, 26 July, p. A19.

"Trade Talks in Geneva Offer More Hope This Time," by Elizabeth Becker, NYT, 26 July, p. C1.

The cost of doing globalization: more on military-market nexus

"Foreigners Seem To Be Souring On U.S. Assets: Slowdown in Buying of Securities Reverses Trend and May Make It Harder to Finance Trade Deficit," by Craig Karmin, WSJ, 26 July, p. C1.

Latest bribe to Pyongyang fails

"North Korea Seems to Reject Butter-for-Guns Proposal From U.S.," by David E. Sanger, NYT, 25 July, p. A7.

Bad sign: WSJ editorial board souring on Putin

"Another Russian 'Ice Age,'" editorial, WSJ, 26 July, p. A14.

Brazil as the key Seam State in our neighborhood

"Brazil Carries the War on Drugs to the Air: Despite U.S. Concerns, a 6-Year-Old Plan Gets a Green Light; Drug runners may now think twice about making rude gestures to air force pilots," by Larry Rohter, NYT, 25 July, p. A6.

Oil curse works even in the Core, Norway finds

"Norway Looks for Ways to Keep Its Workers on the Job: A concern that Norwegians are losing their work ethic," by Lizette Alvarez, NYT, 25 July, p. A4.

The new Cheech and Chong for the globalization era

"High Times: A Dumb Stoner Comedy For a New American Century," by A.O. Scott, NYT, 25 July, p. AR1.

Kerry's hope: "I can do anything better than you!"

"Voters Are Very Settled, Intense And Partisan, and It's Only July: Great Political Divide Increases as Parties Clarify Identities," by Robin Turner, New York Times, 25 July, p. A1.

"Kerry Sees Hope of Gaining Edge on Terror Issue: Promises a Safer Nation; Says Anti-Bush Rhetoric Will Be Discouraged at Boston Convention," by Adam Nagourney, NYT, 25 July, p. A1.

"A Duet That Straddles the Political Divide: The 'liberal sissy' and 'right-wing nut job' face off in this satire," by Steve Lohr, NYT, 26 July, p. C5.

There really are few undecided voters out there, meaning to win the election is to dent the other guy's probables while accepting that you're not going to touch his base. As the Times article puts it:

Rarely has a presidential campaign been this intense, this polarized, this partisan, this early. The conventions historically begin the general election season, ending a lull after the primary seasons has wound down. But for months now, the general election battle has been fully joined.

Seventy-nine percent of the voting population say they've already made up their minds, compared to 64 percent who said that in 2000 at a similar stage. Only 1-in-5 votes are considered "persuadable" at this point in the election, compared to 1-in-3 back in 2000.

In my opinion, Kerry is right to base his campaign not on dumping Bush but on promising a better job by his administration:

I think I can do a better job than George Bush. I can fight a more effective war on terror. I can make America safer. I will bring allies back to our side.

Becoming president is THE major-league sales job in America. It's essentially a romancing effort, trying to convince Americans of the notion that four years of having to spend a lot of time with you is going to be tolerable, perhaps even pleasurable. While all reelection campaigns essentially pit an incumbent against his record, what the challenger must offer is a viable alternative, not just a default position. Kerry has to seem more tolerable to the remaining undecideds than Bush does, and simply calling Bush names won't be enough at a time when security issues are real. Kerry will have to inspire more trust and by doing so subtlety and indirectly call into question Bush's integrity. The real question, then, will be whether or not Bush has reached a real "tipping point" on integrity with enough Americans over the Iraq war. If he has, then he will have lost this election over the "vision thing," just like his dad did. But in Bush's case, it won't be because he disdained the vision, but because he explained it poorly.

People write me a lot saying that both parties should be employing PNM as a positive expression of what this whole global war on terrorism should really be about, because the cynicism of this race will probably dwarf that of either 1988 (is Kerry another Dukakis?) or 1992 (is Bush going down like his dad?). That's nice to hear, but it's a bit unrealistic on many levels. The PNM vision is too centric for use by one side or the other, and that is by design. That is why the Bush Administration can have me brief up nominees for top positions even as the Kerry camp invites me to brief their foreign policy camp. I want to straddle the political divide because that is exactly where national security should be located.

So let the food fight begin over personalities, and if you want a quick and dirty summation of what that will look like, check out the JibJab video on the web. It is so funny my son Kevin almost peed his pants laughing at it. We have played it in our house about 20 times and spent all of last weekend singing snippets to one another.

The race to disconnect Iraq from the outside world is on

"Iraqi Insurgents Using Abduction As Prime Weapon; 2 Pakistanis Are Seized; By Taking Hostages, the Rebels Apply Pressure on American Allies," by James Glanz, New York Times, 26 July, p. A1.

"Iraqi Urges Allies Not to Be Deterred by Kidnappings; Executive Is Seized," by Ian Fisher, NYT, 25 July, p. A8.

"Western Ways Force Iraq To Trim Water Projects: Security fears and red tape devour time and money," by James Glanz, NYT, 26 July, p. A8.

The Iraq insurgency is starting to look an awful lot like the efforts inside Saudi Arabia: targeting individual Westerners for the effect of instilling fear in the whole. Their goal is the same: get us out so that they can advance their violent bid for power. If we leave the region militarily, you can pretty much write off most states there in terms of either reform or progressive integration into the global economy. It'll be business as usual, which means using the oil revenue to keep propped up whatever ruthless elite manages to defeat the rest for authoritarian control over the daily lives of citizens.

By casting their lot so obviously with us, the interim Iraqi government can only survive by increased connectivity with the outside world, and that reality flies directly in the face of its opponents' desires for rule, which can only be achieved by eliminating outside support for the government. This is a fight to the finish: if the interim government succeeds in generating broadband economic and social connectivity with the outside world, far too many Iraqis will then have strong self-interest in remaining free of authoritarian rule, but if that connectivity is thwarted, then it all boils down to everyone desperately seeking protection from one side or the other—it's that simple.

The House of Saud may make brave noises about the inability of terrorists there to disconnect the Saudi economy from the outside world, but the Allawi government can afford no such bravado. This is not a surrounded West Berlin that we can airlift material into, but a chaotic situation of individual-level warfare where truck drivers are being picked off one by one. To the extent that the forces of disconnectedness succeed in Iraq, they will keep the overall situation there quite desperate in terms of infrastructure recovery—again forcing ordinary Iraqis into hedging their bets regarding the interim regime.

In praise of stupid government

"The New Magic Bullet: Bureaucratic Imagination; Outwitting terrorists may be beyond the ability of government," by Douglas Jehl, New York Times, 25 July, p. WK1.

Great piece by Jehl raises a good series of questions regarding how realistic it is to expect bureaucracies to become imaginative. As he points out, "government bureaucracies do not have a reputation for attracting visionary leaders who can imagine, and forestall, the next big surprise." Simply put, Americans don't want surprises from their government, but rather prefer to receive them from the private-sector—especially in the form of new technologies. Governments are mostly about setting rules regarding such surprises, not trying to anticipate them, which they'll never be able to do anyway.

The main push of the Commission's recommendations is on creating a cabinet-level intell czar, but there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that this will increase our nation's ability to generate a comprehensive grand strategy for the global war on terrorism. As Jehl quotes Donald Rumsfeld:

Does the U.S. need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists? The U.S. is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us!

The U.S. Government can either chase the chimera of trying to prevent 9/11s or it can settle down and pursue the far less glamorous but far more tangible goal of making globalization truly global in a fair and just manner. Only the latter goal will render such exclusionary ideologies as radical Islam essentially harmless as a potential global or regional movement for mass violence and/or repression.

It may not seem as sexy or Tom Clancy-ish to focus on the "everything else" in the GWOT, but without doing so, we're simply limiting ourselves to the "game within the game," or what I call waging war solely within the context of war.

Non-lethals: the "star of tomorrow" for the last decade & counting

"The Pentagon is developing a new class of sci-fi-like 'non-lethal' weapons. But will they make war any safer or easier?: The Quest for the Nonkiller App," by Stephen Mihm, New York Times Magazine, 25 July, p. 38.

My association with non-lethals goes back to 1998. I was just leaving the Center for Naval Analyses after years of trying to get the management there interested in my approach on alternative global futures that described the potential pathways of the international security environment primarily in terms of economic integration—as in, who's in and who's left outside, noses pressed to the glass? My assumption in this approach was that we could logically find the "enemy" of global stability in the latter category, or what I now call the Non-Integrating Gap.

That embryonic version of PNM never got any strong backing within CNA until after I left, and then it came not from CNA itself but from the Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate just set up down in Quantico—first by the Marines thanks to a push from General Tony Zinni following his negative experiences in Somalia (where he found himself wishing he had some real non-lethals at his disposal) and then subsequently expanded into a "joint" endeavor by the Joint Staff.

The directorate wanted analysis of alternative global futures that would show the broadband applicability of non-lethals, meaning analysis that showed they would be useful no matter how the international security environment evolved. My stuff fit the bill exactly, because no matter how I described the major regions of the global economy coming together in coming decades, there would always be some combination of less-advanced (or what I now call "less connected") regions left on the outside of the global economy, and therein we'd locate the vast majority of mass violence and threat in the system as a whole.

In many ways, then, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate profiled in this article was the very first consumer of the PNM vision. No surprise there, because this directorate is very much focused on Military Operations Other Than War and that is strictly a Gap-derived function.

Overall, this is a good, if rather dated article. Basically this article was written many times over the past ten years, and there is almost nothing in this piece that is new. What is new, of course, is that it is appearing in the NYT Magazine, which only shows how the "rise of the lesser includeds," or the increasingly supremacy of individual-level warfare/peacekeeping function, has come to dominate the global strategic security landscape. In short, MOOTW has been elevated from crap to a real pillar of grand strategy, because if you can't do MOOTW, you can't shrink the Gap.

Wars cost everyone money, including the military-industrial complex

"Defense Firms Encounter a Budget Crunch: Military Modernization Is in Jeopardy as Iraq Siphons Funds, Congress Doubts Technology," by Jonathan Karp and Andy Pazstor, Wall Street Journal, 26 July, p. B6.

A great myth right now is that war is good for the military industrial complex, when in reality peace is far more profitable. When it's peaceful, then O&M (operations and maintenance) funding remains small and there's plenty of acquisition money to buy new and very expensive platforms (e.g., ships, aircraft, tanks). But when there is a war on, then O&M skyrockets and the money for acquisition gets mightily squeezed. The only way the military-industrial complex can do well is if we get far better on what I call the back-half effort, or the nation-building that must inevitably follow the regime takedown. By doing the back-half more efficiently, then the U.S. avoids being bogged down in long-term occupations that dry up acquisition funding. So the notion that the military-industrial complex wants more Iraqs per se is completely backwards. What defense firms really want is a long peace where the U.S. rarely intervenes with the outside world but instead plots endlessly for war with a distant, high-tech foe like China in the Taiwan Straits around 2025. Defense firms like to build and sell stuff, not see it actually get used for anything.

Wars force change upon the industry, which cuts into profits. The Iraq war will likely be a huge challenge for defense industry because it will shift transformation's focus from the familiar front-half or Leviathan force to the back-half or Sys Admin force. And guess what? The guys who make non-lethals aren't the same ones who build fighter aircraft.

Hillary's realism on globalization is as good as Bill's

"'Bestshoring' Beats Outsourcing," by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Wall Street Journal, 26 July, p. A14.

"What Works in the Rest of the World: Keep labor standards out of trade agreements," by William B. Gould IV, New York Times, 26 July, p. A19.

"Trade Talks in Geneva Offer More Hope This Time," by Elizabeth Becker, NYT, 26 July, p. C1.

Hillary talks a realistic course on globalization, much like Bill did in his 1992 run for the presidency. Her line is a good one: it's not about penalizing low-cost countries but about making our labor more competitive. It's not about keeping jobs at all costs, but being able to "replace the ones we have lost with even better ones." Her answers are all right on the mark: "innovation, new job creation, workforce development, connectivity expansion, and collaboration between industry, academia, labor and government."

When I compare Hillary's realism on globalization to some of the boneheaded statements coming out of Kerry and Edwards, I can't help but find myself secretly hoping for a Bush win in '04 simply to set up her winning run in '08. My wife gives money to Kerry and Edwards, but I have yet to do so. In fact, I have never given money to the Democrats, much less the Republicans. As someone in national security, I've always felt it important to keep my party politics very low key.

And yet, I think I could donate to Hillary '08 right now. She doesn't kow-tow illogically to labor on protectionism but speaks realistically on workforce development, which is frankly the only route to go in the era of globalization.

As William Gould (a fmr chairman of the National Labor Relations Board) puts it:

In many ways international trade is a domestic issue: trade brings change, and change frequently means painful dislocation that can be assuaged only by social programs. In this context national health insurance makes sense, as does a wage insurance program like the one Bill Bradley advocated in 2000. What laid-off auto and steel workers need is the same as what their outsourced service and professional counterparts need: not a new trade war, but domestic legislation on health benefits and wages. That should be the focus of the trade debate in 2004.

Meanwhile, the dead-in-the-water negotiations of the World Trade Organization in its current Doha Development Round don’t seem so dysfunctional as they did a year ago, which shouldn't be a surprise. The WTO negotiations are routinely "derailed," only to be revived within months simply because the logic of freer trade is undeniable. Whoever wins in November better be ready for some serious deal-making on ag subsidies and protectionism here in the U.S. There is no making globalization truly global until we're willing to give on this issue. It's that simple.

The cost of doing globalization: more on military-market nexus

"Foreigners Seem To Be Souring On U.S. Assets: Slowdown in Buying of Securities Reverses Trend and May Make It Harder to Finance Trade Deficit," by Craig Karmin, Wall Street Journal, 26 July, p. C1.

Some scary news on the perceived falling demand for U.S. treasury bonds around the world, but specifically with the two biggest buyers of late—Japan and China.

Potentially more troubling was the slowdown in Asian purchases of U.S. debt—especially in Japan, which holds 16% of all U.S. Treasurys. That country's nascent economic recovery has eased the government's concerns about maintaining a weak currency to boost exports, in turn reducing the Bank of Japan's need to intervene and buy dollars.

Why is that so crucial? "Japan is to the U.S. financial markets what Saudi Arabia is to the world oil markets—the primary provider of capital," says one Banc of America Capital Management exec.

And what of China?

Other foreign investors' appetites for U.S. securities also have been waning, in part because rising oil prices have forced some countries to spend more of their dollar reserves on energy. That leaves fewer dollars to invest in the U.S. markets.

So China only purchases $1.7 b of U.S. Treasurys in the first five months of this year, a 91% drop from the previous year.

That is essentially how the feedback loop works now: if we do a bad job in the Iraq invasion, you see oil prices rise globally to account for the heightened uncertainty, that means China buys our debt less, and that can impact Japan's recovery as well since it's economic health is now largely based on exporting to China. If those countries can't buy our debt, we can't fund our federal deficit which right now is being fueled in no small measure by our rapidly rising defense expenditures. That means our ability to wage a GWOT gets undercut.

Is America a unilateral imperial power? It can't be, unless what it markets to the outside world in terms of security exports is something they are willing to pay for. But if we do our job poorly, we'll give such explicit and implicit allies little choice but to spend their money in an alternative fashion. That is the essence of the military-market nexus: the success of U.S. military interventions is important not just to America, but to the global economy as a whole.

Latest bribe to Pyongyang fails

"North Korea Seems to Reject Butter-for-Guns Proposal From U.S.," by David E. Sanger, New York Times, 25 July, p. A7.

No surprise here. North Korea declared it a "sham offer." Why? We actually expect them to disarm on WMD before they get the full benefits of the aid offered.

How stupid does Pyongyang think we are? They want all the butter up front and then, guess what? They'll say no on the guns again unless we offer even more butter.

This is the same old blackmail trick Kim has used for years. Don't expect it to change so long as it seems to be working.

Bad sign: WSJ editorial board souring on Putin

"Another Russian 'Ice Age,'" editorial, Wall Street Journal, 26 July, p. A14.

A bit alarmist in analysis, but a bad sign for Putin, who has otherwise garnered kudos from the international financial community. I wrote in PNM that the Yukos/Khodorkovsky trial could easily become the biggest political crisis of Putin's reign, and most of that judgment will come not from within Russia but from external sources of legitimacy like the Journal. So perception doesn't just matter here, it's almost everything.

Brazil as the key Seam State in our neighborhood

"Brazil Carries the War on Drugs to the Air: Despite U.S. Concerns, a 6-Year-Old Plan Gets a Green Light; Drug runners may now think twice about making rude gestures to air force pilots," by Larry Rohter, New York Times, 25 July, p. A6.

Here's the key analysis:

Two years ago, Brazil inaugurated the $1.4 billion Sivam radar system which uses American technology and for the first time allows the government to monitor air activity in the whole of the vast Amazon region. But after the initial decline of 30 percent, which Brazil attributed to traffickers' concerns about the improved tracking capabilities, illegal flights began rising again.

The Sivam radar effort is a good example of the major-league plus-up of military cooperation with Seam States following 9/11. But such cooperation isn't enough in and of itself, because monitoring can only get you so far. So when Brazil seeks to command its own air space like any Core nation does, it is really working hard to shrink the Gap by extending the rule of law over its own, internally lawless areas.

Oil curse works even in the Core, Norway finds

"Norway Looks for Ways to Keep Its Workers on the Job: A concern that Norwegians are losing their work ethic," by Lizette Alvarez, New York Times, 25 July, p. A4.

The oil curse is finally catching even Norway, where officials complain that years of oil wealth distributed to the masses has generated a society-wide sense of entitlement that is killing Norway's famed sense of hard work and self-reliance.

As one business leader put it, "We have become a nation of whiners."

That's the oil curse in the Core. In the Gap, those same whiners become terrorists because whining to the authoritarian governments there gets you nowhere.

The new Cheech and Chong for the globalization era

"High Times: A Dumb Stoner Comedy For a New American Century," by A.O. Scott, New York Times, 25 July, p. AR1.

Latest stoner movie ("Harold and Kumar Go To White Castle") features a Korean and a South Asian as the leads, and movie reviewer A.O. Scott captures the significance of that development:

At first glance they could be poster children for early 21st-century American diversity (either that or marijuana legalization), except that the very word would totally kill their buzz. The impressive thing about "Harold and Kumar" is that it takes such blithe account of the fact of multiculturalism while having very little use for the concept. Or really, given the standards of its genre, for any concept at all. It's not quite that ethnic differences don't exist, or that they're no big deal—being insulted or mocked or made to feel invisible has a way of turning into a big deal. It's more that belonging to a certain group has no inherent meaning and brings with it no particular obligations of behavior.

That is what's so scary to those groups inside the Gap trying to retain cohesive group identity: the notion that globalization/Americanization kills not only group identity but the very notion that such identity imparts obligations for certain behavior.

We watch a "Harold and Kumar" and see only another idiotic teen movie. But many in this world can be exposed to such images and see the end of their world as they know it.

July 25, 2004

Highlands Forum: the gatekeeper visits Newport

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 25 July 2004

Took yesterday off from blogging to work a lot of house maintenance and spend time putting things together for the great trip to China.

Friday was an interesting day I had been waiting to come about for a long time.

First, a little background: The Highlands Forum is an exclusive sort of meeting process that is put on by a private-sector organization (the Highlands Forum) for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They hold two big meets a year and a couple of small ones as well. Coming up in December they’ll be holding their 25th meeting, and it will involve a global ten-years-ahead look that replicates an effort done years ago. The obvious reason for such a look ahead is the national election: either we’ll have Bush II or a new administration.

I went to one HF back in December 1998 and I came away very impressed, not so much with the process, which is pretty standard, but with the quality of the people, which is just about unprecedented. It’s the kind of thing people come to even though they’re not getting their usual fabulous rates simply because it’s so cool.

The one I went to six years ago was on Y2K, and it was very good, meaning it pushed my thinking along quite a bit. In fact, some of the biggest images and concepts I came up with for the project were things I first scrolled down on paper during that meeting. Of course, I had just run one of my Y2K GroupSystems wargaming exercises days before, but the point is, the Forum really succeeds in getting the creative juices flowing.

I did not present at that meeting, but others like John Petersen and Peter Schwartz did. It was my first meeting with the legendary Andy Marshall, so fun all around.

I have waited six years to be invited back, and always wondered what it would take to get such an invite. It never came through all the path-breaking NewRuleSets.Project work with Cantor Fitzgerald, nor in any of the work I did for the Office of Force Transformation. Apparently, it took the NYT-bestselling book to get me back, along with a serious plug from Art Cebrowksi, director of OFT. In a recent meeting with Dick O’Neill, the President of HF, Art apparently told him he really needed to see my brief and consider it for the upcoming December alternative global futures event, which naturally is going to feature an all-start cast of political heavies from both Kerry’s and Bush’s camps, plus some media stars like Thomas Friedman, etc., plus the futurists types like myself and Schwartz, who will be running the scenario stuff. Should be a lot of fun.

Well, I have to tell you, when such an opportunity like that emerges, it usually involves me going to DC and giving a brief or two to the essential gatekeeper, or having a gatekeeper just happen to be in the audience for some previously established presentation (that happened to me in May when a Kerry camp person saw the brief and later set up a presentation that I’ll be giving Kerry’s foreign policy task force team in the near term). But the general pattern is clear: I travel to them, they don’t travel to me.

Well, Dick O’Neill actually spent the day and came all the way up to the Naval War College to have me give him the mega-brief over two hours. He was an easy audience in the sense that he’s so read into these kinds of things that you can go super-fast with him, plus he’s constantly leaping ahead in the logic, so he’s always anticipating downstream material in the brief. In short, no heavy-lifting on my part and very nice on the ego because he’s putting so many of the concepts together in meta-analytic statements that show he really gets the larger meaning of the material from the get-go. Briefing a guy like O’Neill (fmr Navy captain) one-on-one is like being able to run at full speed, which is great.

The whole purpose of his visit was to check me out for the December meeting, and the verdict was positive. He’s offering me a big chunk of time early in the meeting to do both the brief and engage the high-level crowd in Q&A. No quickie 45-minute stint here, but 90 to deliver and more time for Q&A. Then I get to participate in the rest of the meetings over the 4-day affair. Plus, the book is bought by Highlands and given out to everyone there as the featured publication for the meeting. Very nice.

Getting that sort of face time with that sort of audience should be a lot of fun, the only question being how much I extend or alter the material between now and then. I have a feeling that once back from China, I will be itching to start laying out a successor brief of sorts, which means I’ll be shrinking the standard pitch and adding new material on the back end—always an interesting process. But I expect to have about a dozen or more briefing ops between now and early December to try out new material, so I should be ready with something that both sums up the book well and moves it a bit further down the road. The new material I’m imagining will be further exploration of the Leviathan-Sys Admin split, plus more on the global A-to-Z rule set on processing politically-bankrupt regimes, plus the scenario sort of stuff I’ve considered as part of my interactions with Central Command (the overlapping timelines material that I’ve broached on now and then in the blog).

All in all, it should be a real opportunity to spread the word and move some minds off of old dimes.

Friday was a nice sign: the gatekeeper actually coming to visit me instead of the other way around. That’s both a sign of respect and a measure of the growing demand. I actually had to back out of a conference at Stanford that was scheduled for September but recently got moved to early November, when I have basically promised the Office of Secretary of Defense I’d give a speech to the Australian military down in Sydney, and I have to admit, I felt relieved to see the days open up on my September schedule, because otherwise I was looking at two California trips over two weeks, and that gets to be a bit much in terms of wear and tear and time away from home. But I took it—that sense of relief I felt—as a real sign that I’m in danger of overloading my schedule. I need to do the high-end stuff that OSD really wants and pays attention to, plus the right high-level summitry stuff in the political realm, plus the right private-sector audiences willing to keep me out of bankruptcy as I wait for PNM to “earn out” the advance and actually start paying me some new money. Beyond that, I need to get very picky about every small college and civic group that wants me to come and give a talk, otherwise I’ll be on the road all the time and quickly succumb to travel burnout.

Here’s today’s catch:

As in any war, it’s hurry up and wait

“Congress Plans Special Hearings On Sept. 11 Panel: Rare Meetings in August; Commission Says It Plans to Pressure Officials to Act on Findings,” by Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Philip Shenon, New York Times, 24 July, p. A1.

“Slow Change Is Expected After Report,” by David Johnston, NYT, 24 July, p. A8.

“Why America is Still An Easy Target,” [book excerpt] from Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable, Time, 26 July, p. 38.

Grand strategy ill-defined: if we’re not bad, they must be

“War of Ideology,” by David Brooks, NYT, 24 July, p. A27.

The big GWOT troop shift: too bad Asia isn’t more like Europe

“In Agreement With South Korea, U.S. to Move Troops From Seoul,” by Thom Shanker, NYT, 24 July, p. A4.

NRIs: you can go home to India again!

“Indians Go Home, but Don’t Leave U.S. Behind,” by Amy Waldman, NYT, 24 July, p. A1.

Philippines’ Arroyo: looking out for the OFWs

“U.S. Rips Philippines for pulling out of Iraq,” by Associated Press, found in Newport Daily News, 24 July, p. A3.

As in any war, it’s hurry up and wait

“Congress Plans Special Hearings On Sept. 11 Panel: Rare Meetings in August; Commission Says It Plans to Pressure Officials to Act on Findings,” by Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Philip Shenon, New York Times, 24 July, p. A1.

“Slow Change Is Expected After Report,” by David Johnston, NYT, 24 July, p. A8.

“Why America is Still An Easy Target,” [book excerpt] from Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable, Time, 26 July, p. 38.

Congress will want to seem responsive to the Commission report, so we’ll be treated to some showy hearings in August that demonstrate how serious everyone on the Hill is regarding the reshaping of the intell community that MUST be done. Why? Because it’s an election year and because everyone will want to make sure they’re not on the hook for the next attack, whenever that comes. As I wrote in PNM, “Doesn’t it seem weird that the same senators who prattle on during Sunday news programs about how the world is a chaotic, unpredictable place still always seem to show up on C-SPAN following some security disaster to decry yet another ‘intelligence failure’? Who are these people kidding?”

They’re kidding us, of course, and we accept it because it’s what we want to hear—that the next 9/11 can be prevented by inventing a new office or two inside the White House.

“If only an intelligence czar could have pieced together all the information we’ve examined over the past year and instantly figured out 9/11 on 9/10, then it never would have happened!”

Remember folks, these guys were the same ones who promised to eliminate the federal debt within a decade or so. We believe because we want to believe.

The only game that matters is the away game, not the home game, because what’s broken in this world is not us, but them—not the Core but the Gap. But addressing the latter is much harder than band-aiding the former. No one will get unelected for not dealing with the roots of terror, but those same “bums” may well get tossed out for not preventing the next 9/11.

So we will continue to pay what Peter Schwartz likes to call the “bin Laden tax.” Why? Because it’s largely spending on ourselves instead of those who really need it in the Gap. Which, frankly, is why a Stephen Flynn is such a darling of the national security crowd. He wants to make America safe and wants to spend all available GWOT money on America itself, not the Gap whatsoever. So his sort of fear-mongering is very acceptable: “Look at all our connectivity with the outside world! Look at how unmonitored it is! Be afraid! Search everything! Monitor everything!”

This sort of inward-looking approach is essentially our strategic abandoning of globalization—to the extent we actually engage in this sort of thing. The return-on-investment in firewalling the Core is far less than shrinking the Gap by exporting security there. Yes, some belt-tightening makes a lot of sense, but when you see the center of the fear-selling being our border with the outside world and our inability to predict the future, you should be very afraid, for most of this effort will be completely wasted and send the worst sort of signals to the Gap: “we’ve got ours and we’ll do whatever it takes to protect it!”

Isn’t that just what President Arroyo of the Philippines said?

Grand strategy ill-defined: if we’re not bad, they must be

“War of Ideology,” by David Brooks, New York Times, 24 July, p. A27.

David Brooks, usually very astute by my standards, buys into the 9/11 Commission bit on this being a war of ideas first and foremost, and I must say I find that fairly disappointing. The fight-fire-with-fire crowd comes into two sorts: they kill us so we kill them, and they defame us so we defame them.

Yes, we’ll kill them when we get the chance and yes we’ll argue our case to the best of our ability, but making the war symmetrical is a false hope, because it never will be. On our side is globalization—this huge, nearly unstoppable historical force that will remake the Middle East in an image far more recognizable and acceptable to us than to them. On their side is simply the fear of that process and a desire to stop it first and foremost by blaming us, demonizing us, and driving us and our unholy ways out of their neighborhood.

Telling them that their fear-threat reaction is wrong will get us nowhere, because their fear is real and well-founded. Simply telling them that resistance is futile will only get their backs up more in terms of resistance.

What we need to offer is not ideology but connectivity. We should not be in the business of telling them how to repackage themselves to adjust to integration into the global economy, but simply offer them the tools as much as possible and signal our patience in their efforts to shape that connectivity and those content flows in such a way as they can find acceptable.

Even radical Islam is wrong only in degree: their desire to stop globalization’s encroachment is too much, but their innate sense that they must do whatever it takes to slow down its destructive social onslaught is essentially correct. They need the sense of our permission to manage the content flows as they see fit so long as they allow broadband connectivity to emerge for the masses.

Their fear isn’t wrong, nor in many ways is their hatred of the change they see coming. Choosing violence to stop that historical process is wrong and we should say so, but that does not constitute our ideology waging war against theirs. We cannot make Islam, even radical Islam, the problem. We can only make connectivity the answer and let this civil war within Islam work itself out.

The big GWOT troop shift: too bad Asia isn’t more like Europe

“In Agreement With South Korea, U.S. to Move Troops From Seoul,” by Thom Shanker, New York Times, 24 July, p. A4.

This is the real conundrum of the current Defense Department effort to scour the Core for extra troops needed for the Gap: if only Asia were as far along historically as Europe, we could reduce our presence there as quickly as we’re going to in Europe. But the essential difference is that Europe is essentially Old Core whereas Asia is essentially New Core, and so treating both as the same does not work.

There is no NATO counterpart in Asia, and until there is, any efforts to reduce our troop presence there will come at a real cost—and at a real risk to the Core’s possible fracturing. We will never shrink the Gap by fracturing the Core, so we need to be very careful here.

The obvious solution is that we need to put a NATO-like entity in place in Asia ASAP. But that will not happen under any circumstances, I will argue, except in the successful takedown of the Kim Jong Il regime in North Korea. Doesn’t have to be a military invasion, but there must be military unity of purpose on our side—a side that is defined as the U.S., China, Japan, Russia and South Korea.

We can dick around with Kim Jong Il like we did with Saddam for another decade or so, but we will inevitably bite this bullet. Doing so with a clear sense of what we want to get out of it will make our chance of success all the more probable, not just in terms of ridding the world of Kim, but in cementing Asia to the Core in a very permanent sort of way.

NRI's: you can go home to India again!

“Indians Go Home, but Don’t Leave U.S. Behind,” by Amy Waldman, New York Times, 24 July, p. A1.

The Non-Resident Indians are coming home finally in numbers to India. And what they bring back with them is a lot of American ways. This is yet another example of the silent but profound social bonds being built between India and the U.S.

If Pakistan possesses any strategic thinkers, then surely they can see the writing on the wall. Indians are becoming a social and political force in the U.S. after years of becoming an economic one. Nothing like that is happening with a Pakistani community inside the U.S., nor are we seeing any great flow back to Pakistan like the one this article details going into India.

India and the U.S. will be strategic allies in the years and decades ahead, and that bodes very poorly for a Pakistan that cannot clean up its act.

Philippines’ Arroyo: looking out for the OFW's

“U.S. Rips Philippines for pulling out of Iraq,” by Associated Press, found in Newport Daily News, 24 July, p. A3.

A simple excerpt here says it all:

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo denied any break with the United States during a foreign policy speech today, making clear that she felt she had to put the welfare of its 8 million citizens working overseas at the top of her priorities. Their remittances power the Philippine economy.”

The Overseas Filipino Workers embody that nation’s economic connectivity to the Core, meaning they define the national security asset most worth protecting in any role that country assumes in a GWOT. Understanding war within the context of everything means we understand this reality.

Waging GWOT solely within the context of war means we just get pissed off when the Philippines appears to have abandoned our Iraq coalition.

July 24, 2004

The 9/11 Commission Report: a national security self-help guide

Closer to an actionable grand strategy? No.

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 23 July 2004

After all the previews and leaks, to actually get the report is naturally a bit anti-climatic. But it's more disappointing than that, in my mind, because it's basically a self-help guide that seems to suggest that what's really broken in this global war on terrorism is the United States itself—or specifically the national intelligence community. I have to admit, this judgment is so easy to make, so pat in content, and so unimportant over the long haul that I cannot consider the commission to be anything less than irrelevant to the real tasks at hand:

1. Understanding the world for what it is in this era of globalization

2. Understanding the threat of terror as a function of that world and the spread of the global economy and all the influences it inflicts upon traditional societies

3. Enunciating a genuinely coherent U.S. grand strategy to deal with that world in a way that terror is reduced as a threat over time—i.e., making globalization truly global in a fair and just manner

4. Reshaping our national defense establishment to meet that challenge—i.e., the bifurcation of the force into a warfighting Leviathan force and a peacewaging Sys Admin force

5. And then letting the Intelligence Community, as well as the Congressional oversight community, reshape themselves in order to both serve and communicate with that increasingly bifurcated military force structure.

In their infinite wisdom, the Commission jumps right to #5 and pretty much ignores the rest—save for a facile swipe at a "grand strategy" of winning hearts and minds among terrorists and would-be terrorists—you know, the usual vague stuff about getting at the "root of the problem."

But guess what? Altering the Intelligence Community's organizational charts won't do that. At best we may understand the world a bit better only to find the IC at greater odds with the Pentagon regarding what needs to be done about it. We are not going to generate a new grand strategy from the IC up (if you want to see how bad such strategies can be, read Anonymous or Richard Clarke), and it sure as hell won't be centered on winning the hearts and minds of would-be terrorists—much less killing them in increasingly clever ways. This is symptom-treating at its worst, but we reach for it because—frankly—it’s the easiest approach for Congress to take: write a bill forcing a certain amount of organizational change and then designate some counter-terrorist center (or better yet, designate a whole slew of them and spread them around numerous congressional districts) and be done with it.

This is America as self-help obsessed: in the end, we decide it was really all our fault, or "a failure of imagination."

Geez! That's a line going all the way back (at least) to the investigations over the Apollo 1 launch-pad fire. Couldn't the Commission at least come up with a new line? Or was that—in itself—a failure of imagination (or more prosaically, a failure of composition).

For now, this whole Commission process reads like a bad Allen Drury novel. I'm just waiting for some blackmailed homosexual to step forward and admit 9/11 happened simply because he mistakenly got into bed with an al Qaeda operative and then gave him all the key-codes lest he be forced out of his closet.

Meanwhile, the process of reorganizing the Intelligence Community will consume gajillions of congressional committee hours and kill millions of trees, but none of it will move us closer to an actionable grand strategy (nor an appropriate national defense establishment to carry it out) that really deals with the world for what it is and not America for what we fear it isn't—meaning safe and secure from the next 9/11.

We will never be safe and secure from the next 9/11, because we will never be safe from "them" until all of "they" are brought inside the "us." When there is no more Non-Integrating Gap, there will only be a stable Functioning Core that is universal, and war as we know it will essentially end for all time.

Yes, there will always be individuals and groups railing against the system, but they will be forced to wage their individual-level wars within a system that is truly all-encompassing, giving up their eternal dream of hijacking some chunk of humanity and taking it permanently off-line from the corrupt, capitalist world system (and here we will really locate Fukuyama's "end of history" and the beginning of the joy that only a Gene Roddenberry might have imagined).

Our increased ability to track incoming terrorists strikes is pretty meaningless against the larger strategic backdrop of the real task at hand: truly connecting the Middle East to the global economy in a broadband fashion faster than the bin Ladens and Zarqawis of that world can disconnect it, or keep it all limited to just oil.

But that is not the easy or even acceptable solution in this self-help obsessed society that is America, so we will focus on what we know and love best—ourselves. We'll rearrange deck chairs on the Titanic that is the Intelligence Community, whose main problem isn't its org chart but its obsessive secrecy. We'll try to make ourselves more attractive to others, hoping that if we send them happy thoughts, their hearts and minds will be won. We'll pretend that somehow fixing the U.S. Government alone will alter the overarching reality of globalization's aggressive onslaught on traditional cultures all over the Gap ("No no no! It's really all about how you perceive us and our policies! Love me! Love me! Love me!").

I've been watching Ken Burns' "Civil War" on DVD as I exercise on the treadmill late at night, after the kids go to bed. Whenever I watch anything on the Civil War, it reminds me that, in many ways, it marked the beginning of the world we now live in. The first great wave of Globalization began soon after its conclusion, and the nature of that war presaged the two world wars that would later be fought around the planet, but primarily within Europe as civil wars themselves.

When I watch the documentary series, I see a Core-North imposing its will and integration upon a Gap-South that prefers to continue with its exclusionary rule sets by which some rule and others are ruled. I see a Core-North with all its frightening mixing of the races and cultures and industries and ideologies bearing down on the bucolic South that seems so pristine in its oneness—albeit bought at the price of slavery. I see southern insurgents fighting. Why? As Shelby Foote puts it (I paraphrase here), "Because you Northerners insist on coming down here and changing our ways." I see the Gap-South's romanticism of the land and its rejection of modernity and change and industrialization. I see the Core-North's ruthlessness as an invading force decried and yet embraced as the necessary "remedy." I see a war that begins as one to save the Union swiftly becoming one to rid the Union of the terrible scourge of slavery—the ultimate in disconnectedness.

And I see many things that resonate in this current struggle: the references to good and evil, the references to "our God" versus "their god," the messianic spirit, the anti-war sentiments, the civil wars that rage on "quietly" inside the Gap/Islam itself, the charges of imperialism and "outsiders" forcing change against "our will," a president who cannot possibly win reelection because he's so badly mishandled this war, and a military suffering "unacceptable losses" and yet still attracting idealistic recruits without any great effort.

Oh, and I see Colin Powell as George McClellan.

I have said many times before that we can see the road ahead simply by looking within ourselves and remembering our past. The vibe I pick up from the Commission's report is that typical sort of can-do Americanism that focuses on "fixing the problem" by rejiggering the system—our system. In reality, the system we must seek to fix is not our own, but the world's.

The real task ahead, if we hope to win a global war on terrorism, is to generate the understanding across the Core as a whole of how we shrink the Gap. That is a huge, multifaceted problem that requires a variety of approaches. Within the security realm, it requires first and foremost a Core-wide A-to-Z rule set on processing politically-bankrupt regimes within the Gap. If we don't deal with that problem set, progress will not be had in the GWOT. We will never generate progress until the Pentagon transforms transformation from its past focus on the front-half, warfighting Leviathan force to the back-half, peacewaging Sys Admin force. That progress will be had first and foremost inside two relatively obscure U.S. military commands: Joint Forces Command in Norfolk VA and Special Operations Command in Tampa FL. As this force is imagined and set in motion in these two laboratories of transformation, it must be put to test by Central Command, also located in Tampa FL. As the success of that restructured force points to new understanding of warfare and the need for new weapons, platforms, and organizational structures, the process of change will permeate the Pentagon itself. As that happens, the Intelligence Community and the Hill will be force to remake themselves in order to support and interact with that changing military. And as that entire process evolves, we will see the White House, the State Department, and the rest of the U.S. Government begin to imagine what it will take to generate the global A-to-Z rule set on processing politically-bankrupt states within the Gap.

The 9/11 Commission is a complete sidelight to this entire process. You will not read anything of importance there regarding this primary task of U.S. national security in the 21st Century. But, as Charles Hill writes in today's Wall Street Journal ("Commissionism," 23 July, p. A12), "the demand for near-perfect certainty is a deeply entrenched delusion," so expect much sturm und drang about this report in coming months. It will, just as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security itself, constitute great sound and fury that in the end will signify almost nothing.

What we are witnessing in this process is one giant, preemptive ass-covering exercise by politicians on both sides of the aisle. All these officials really want you to know is that "next time" it won't be "my fault" because "I told you so."

At this point, if you're read PNM, you gotta be tempted to accuse me of talking out of both sides of my mouth. After all, my three-pronged strategy begins with making the Core resilient in the face of, and resistance to the effects of, 9/11-like System Perturbations. Isn't that all the 9/11 Commission trying to do?

Perfectly reasonable comeback, say I.

No, I don't think it's wrong in and of itself to recommend what the Commission is recommending. I don't think it will harm anything, but neither do I think it will fix much of anything. My real fear is that this grand commission's vision becomes a substitute for further thinking, as in, "Oh yeah, we have a commission and they fixed all that! You know, something about some 'czar' and then winning hearts and minds, or something like that."

Because the Commission stuck its nose into the Iraq War question (links between Saddam and al Qaeda?), and because they've waxed vaguely about a "grand strategy" in the GWOT, I'm afraid that too many people will come to view what should be our real grand strategy through the soda-straw of these awfully narrow recommendations. A GWOT does not come anywhere near a grand strategy, because a grand strategy cannot revolve around some definition of the enemy, but must revolve around some definition of a global future worth creating. Substituting al Qaeda for the near-peer competitor or the old Soviet threat isn’t the answer; understanding the world in all its complexity is. Al Qaeda and the current situation in the Middle East simply defines the current expression of resistance to the spread of globalization. Fixating on that resistance will make us guilty of waging war solely within the context of war and not within the context of everything else. That sort of soda-straw perspective gets you the fantastically narrow answers of a Richard Clarke, an Anonymous, and this Commission, which I might sum up as kill them better, abandon our bad policies in the Middle East, and give me a g.d. intell czar!

None of those approaches will move us in the direction of the strategic goals we seek in the mid- (connecting the Middle East to the world) and long-terms (making globalization truly global). In fact, they are more than likely to be counterproductive to those ends if they constitute the bulk of our approach. In short, these are Gap-containment strategies, not Gap-shrinkage strategies.

They all disappoint me as failures not only of imagination but of empathy. At their roots, they are all America-first strategies that speak to our needs and fears while ignoring those of the Gap's—which I sure as hell don't define in terms of the terrorists and dictators there but the everybody else, or the masses there.

What the Commission does is primarily play to our fears and our natural desires to recoil from the outside world. They want us to be afraid, very afraid of the big bad world outside, over there. And they want to make us safer by increasing our ability to see bad things coming at us earlier, when what our grand strategy really needs to be about is making good things go on over there sooner as opposed to later.

You may say that the Commission is only doing what they were supposed to do, so why am I picking on them so much? Again, if the Commission had stayed in their lane and hadn't taken on Iraq and the entire GWOT as their alleged purview, I would fear the negative impact of this report far less. But because their ambition has outpaced their vision, the capacity for this report to do more harm than good is real. It's real primarily because it speaks more to bad futures to be prevented rather than good ones to be created, and because its targeted audience is the American public when it should be the entire world.

9/11 wasn’t about America, so "fixing" 9/11 has to be about so much more than just America.

July 23, 2004

The 9/11 Commission Report: a national security self-help guide

A Failure of Imagination

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 23 July 2004

After all the previews and leaks, to actually get the report is naturally a bit anti-climatic. But it's more disappointing than that, in my mind, because it's basically a self-help guide that seems to suggest that what's really broken in this global war on terrorism is the United States itself—or specifically the national intelligence community. I have to admit, this judgment is so easy to make, so pat in content, and so unimportant over the long haul that I cannot consider the commission to be anything less than irrelevant to the real tasks at hand:

1. Understanding the world for what it is in this era of globalization

2. Understanding the threat of terror as a function of that world and the spread of the global economy and all the influences it inflicts upon traditional societies

3. Enunciating a genuinely coherent U.S. grand strategy to deal with that world in a way that terror is reduced as a threat over time—i.e., making globalization truly global in a fair and just manner

4. Reshaping our national defense establishment to meet that challenge—i.e., the bifurcation of the force into a warfighting Leviathan force and a peacewaging Sys Admin force

5. And then letting the Intelligence Community, as well as the Congressional oversight community, reshape themselves in order to both serve and communicate with that increasingly bifurcated military force structure.

In their infinite wisdom, the Commission jumps right to #5 and pretty much ignores the rest—save for a facile swipe at a "grand strategy" of winning hearts and minds among terrorists and would-be terrorists—you know, the usual vague stuff about getting at the "root of the problem."

But guess what? Altering the Intelligence Community's organizational charts won't do that. At best we may understand the world a bit better only to find the IC at greater odds with the Pentagon regarding what needs to be done about it. We are not going to generate a new grand strategy from the IC up (if you want to see how bad such strategies can be, read Anonymous or Richard Clarke), and it sure as hell won't be centered on winning the hearts and minds of would-be terrorists—much less killing them in increasingly clever ways. This is symptom-treating at its worst, but we reach for it because—frankly—it’s the easiest approach for Congress to take: write a bill forcing a certain amount of organizational change and then designate some counter-terrorist center (or better yet, designate a whole slew of them and spread them around numerous congressional districts) and be done with it.

This is America as self-help obsessed: in the end, we decide it was really all our fault, or "a failure of imagination."

Geez! That's a line going all the way back (at least) to the investigations over the Apollo 1 launch-pad fire. Couldn't the Commission at least come up with a new line? Or was that—in itself—a failure of imagination (or more prosaically, a failure of composition).

For now, this whole Commission process reads like a bad Allen Drury novel. I'm just waiting for some blackmailed homosexual to step forward and admit 9/11 happened simply because he mistakenly got into bed with an al Qaeda operative and then gave him all the key-codes lest he be forced out of his closet.

Meanwhile, the process of reorganizing the Intelligence Community will consume gajillions of congressional committee hours and kill millions of trees, but none of it will move us closer to an actionable grand strategy (nor an appropriate national defense establishment to carry it out) that really deals with the world for what it is and not America for what we fear it isn't—meaning safe and secure from the next 9/11.

We will never be safe and secure from the next 9/11, because we will never be safe from "them" until all of "they" are brought inside the "us." When there is no more Non-Integrating Gap, there will only be a stable Functioning Core that is universal, and war as we know it will essentially end for all time.

Yes, there will always be individuals and groups railing against the system, but they will be forced to wage their individual-level wars within a system that is truly all-encompassing, giving up their eternal dream of hijacking some chunk of humanity and taking it permanently off-line from the corrupt, capitalist world system (and here we will really locate Fukuyama's "end of history" and the beginning of the joy that only a Gene Roddenberry might have imagined).

Our increased ability to track incoming terrorists strikes is pretty meaningless against the larger strategic backdrop of the real task at hand: truly connecting the Middle East to the global economy in a broadband fashion faster than the bin Ladens and Zarqawis of that world can disconnect it, or keep it all limited to just oil.

But that is not the easy or even acceptable solution in this self-help obsessed society that is America, so we will focus on what we know and love best—ourselves. We'll rearrange deck chairs on the Titanic that is the Intelligence Community, whose main problem isn't its org chart but its obsessive secrecy. We'll try to make ourselves more attractive to others, hoping that if we send them happy thoughts, their hearts and minds will be won. We'll pretend that somehow fixing the U.S. Government alone will alter the overarching reality of globalization's aggressive onslaught on traditional cultures all over the Gap ("No no no! It's really all about how you perceive us and our policies! Love me! Love me! Love me!").

I've been watching Ken Burns' "Civil War" on DVD as I exercise on the treadmill late at night, after the kids go to bed. Whenever I watch anything on the Civil War, it reminds me that, in many ways, it marked the beginning of the world we now live in. The first great wave of Globalization began soon after its conclusion, and the nature of that war presaged the two world wars that would later be fought around the planet, but primarily within Europe as civil wars themselves.

When I watch the documentary series, I see a Core-North imposing its will and integration upon a Gap-South that prefers to continue with its exclusionary rule sets by which some rule and others are ruled. I see a Core-North with all its frightening mixing of the races and cultures and industries and ideologies bearing down on the bucolic South that seems so pristine in its oneness—albeit bought at the price of slavery. I see southern insurgents fighting. Why? As Shelby Foote puts it (I paraphrase here), "Because you Northerners insist on coming down here and changing our ways." I see the Gap-South's romanticism of the land and its rejection of modernity and change and industrialization. I see the Core-North's ruthlessness as an invading force decried and yet embraced as the necessary "remedy." I see a war that begins as one to save the Union swiftly becoming one to rid the Union of the terrible scourge of slavery—the ultimate in disconnectedness.

And I see many things that resonate in this current struggle: the references to good and evil, the references to "our God" versus "their god," the messianic spirit, the anti-war sentiments, the civil wars that rage on "quietly" inside the Gap/Islam itself, the charges of imperialism and "outsiders" forcing change against "our will," a president who cannot possibly win reelection because he's so badly mishandled this war, and a military suffering "unacceptable losses" and yet still attracting idealistic recruits without any great effort.

Oh, and I see Colin Powell as George McClellan.

I have said many times before that we can see the road ahead simply by looking within ourselves and remembering our past. The vibe I pick up from the Commission's report is that typical sort of can-do Americanism that focuses on "fixing the problem" by rejiggering the system—our system. In reality, the system we must seek to fix is not our own, but the world's.

The real task ahead, if we hope to win a global war on terrorism, is to generate the understanding across the Core as a whole of how we shrink the Gap. That is a huge, multifaceted problem that requires a variety of approaches. Within the security realm, it requires first and foremost a Core-wide A-to-Z rule set on processing politically-bankrupt regimes within the Gap. If we don't deal with that problem set, progress will not be had in the GWOT. We will never generate progress until the Pentagon transforms transformation from its past focus on the front-half, warfighting Leviathan force to the back-half, peacewaging Sys Admin force. That progress will be had first and foremost inside two relatively obscure U.S. military commands: Joint Forces Command in Norfolk VA and Special Operations Command in Tampa FL. As this force is imagined and set in motion in these two laboratories of transformation, it must be put to test by Central Command, also located in Tampa FL. As the success of that restructured force points to new understanding of warfare and the need for new weapons, platforms, and organizational structures, the process of change will permeate the Pentagon itself. As that happens, the Intelligence Community and the Hill will be force to remake themselves in order to support and interact with that changing military. And as that entire process evolves, we will see the White House, the State Department, and the rest of the U.S. Government begin to imagine what it will take to generate the global A-to-Z rule set on processing politically-bankrupt states within the Gap.

The 9/11 Commission is a complete sidelight to this entire process. You will not read anything of importance there regarding this primary task of U.S. national security in the 21st Century. But, as Charles Hill writes in today's Wall Street Journal ("Commissionism," 23 July, p. A12), "the demand for near-perfect certainty is a deeply entrenched delusion," so expect much sturm und drang about this report in coming months. It will, just as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security itself, constitute great sound and fury that in the end will signify almost nothing.

What we are witnessing in this process is one giant, preemptive ass-covering exercise by politicians on both sides of the aisle. All these officials really want you to know is that "next time" it won't be "my fault" because "I told you so."

At this point, if you're read PNM, you gotta be tempted to accuse me of talking out of both sides of my mouth. After all, my three-pronged strategy begins with making the Core resilient in the face of, and resistance to the effects of, 9/11-like System Perturbations. Isn't that all the 9/11 Commission trying to do?

Perfectly reasonable comeback, say I.

No, I don't think it's wrong in and of itself to recommend what the Commission is recommending. I don't think it will harm anything, but neither do I think it will fix much of anything. My real fear is that this grand commission's vision becomes a substitute for further thinking, as in, "Oh yeah, we have a commission and they fixed all that! You know, something about some 'czar' and then winning hearts and minds, or something like that."

Because the Commission stuck its nose into the Iraq War question (links between Saddam and al Qaeda?), and because they've waxed vaguely about a "grand strategy" in the GWOT, I'm afraid that too many people will come to view what should be our real grand strategy through the soda-straw of these awfully narrow recommendations. A GWOT does not come anywhere near a grand strategy, because a grand strategy cannot revolve around some definition of the enemy, but must revolve around some definition of a global future worth creating. Substituting al Qaeda for the near-peer competitor or the old Soviet threat isn’t the answer; understanding the world in all its complexity is. Al Qaeda and the current situation in the Middle East simply defines the current expression of resistance to the spread of globalization. Fixating on that resistance will make us guilty of waging war solely within the context of war and not within the context of everything else. That sort of soda-straw perspective gets you the fantastically narrow answers of a Richard Clarke, an Anonymous, and this Commission, which I might sum up as kill them better, abandon our bad policies in the Middle East, and give me a g.d. intell czar!

None of those approaches will move us in the direction of the strategic goals we seek in the mid- (connecting the Middle East to the world) and long-terms (making globalization truly global). In fact, they are more than likely to be counterproductive to those ends if they constitute the bulk of our approach. In short, these are Gap-containment strategies, not Gap-shrinkage strategies.

They all disappoint me as failures not only of imagination but of empathy. At their roots, they are all America-first strategies that speak to our needs and fears while ignoring those of the Gap's—which I sure as hell don't define in terms of the terrorists and dictators there but the everybody else, or the masses there.

What the Commission does is primarily play to our fears and our natural desires to recoil from the outside world. They want us to be afraid, very afraid of the big bad world outside, over there. And they want to make us safer by increasing our ability to see bad things coming at us earlier, when what our grand strategy really needs to be about is making good things go on over there sooner as opposed to later.

You may say that the Commission is only doing what they were supposed to do, so why am I picking on them so much? Again, if the Commission had stayed in their lane and hadn't taken on Iraq and the entire GWOT as their alleged purview, I would fear the negative impact of this report far less. But because their ambition has outpaced their vision, the capacity for this report to do more harm than good is real. It's real primarily because it speaks more to bad futures to be prevented rather than good ones to be created, and because its targeted audience is the American public when it should be the entire world.

9/11 wasn’t about America, so "fixing" 9/11 has to be about so much more than just America.

July 22, 2004

PNM's multiple horizontal scenarios continue to unfold

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 22 July 2004

I wrote PNM last August and September. In January I got the final proofs on the dust jacket cover and noticed that Putnam wanted to use my old geocities site as my web address. A long-time fan from the IT sector, Critt Jarvis, says I gotta get a better site and helps me set up this one, cleverly blackmailing me into making him my webmaster. He convinces me I need to write a weblog to accompany the site. So I start one, with Critt's help, in late March. The blog becomes its own presence, and that gets me the last 24 hours:

· Journalist Mark Thompson of Time calls and asks for a quick interview regarding the findings of the 9/11 Commission. He knows I am not in favor of a cabinet-level intell czar. How did he know that? He reads the blog, after he read the book, which he really liked.

· Last night I get an email from Li Haidong, associate professor in the Institute of International Studies in China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing. He's just finished the book and has been utilizing my "excellent" website for an article he's writing about my ideas for his institute's journal. So we go back and forth about Wilsonism and how that differs from what I'm talking about.

· This morning I spend an hour on the phone with Hiroyuki Akita, Chief Correspondent of Nikkei Newspaper in Washington DC. Nikkei is the Dow Jones of Tokyo, and the paper is known in Japan as Japan Economic Journal, or Nihon Keizai Shimbun. It is the Wall Street Journal of Japan. Akita says he has become my "student" via the book and the blog, and would like to establish a long-term relationship with me for stories about how defense and national security issues in the U.S. are being transformed. His big interest is the current negotiations between the U.S. and Japan over proposed troop withdrawals there. He is amazed I am willing to go on the record. I say, it's all in the blog anyway, so what's to hide?

· Later in the afternoon I send an email to Yu Keping, Director of both the China Center for Comparative Politics & Economics (CCCPE) and Beijing University's Center for Chinese Government Innovations. Beijing University Press is publishing PNM in China. As my wife and I got our firm travel dates today regarding our adoption trip, I now know on which days Prof. Yu can schedule me at BU for a series of meetings and discussions with Chinese scholars and other officials regarding the ideas in the book and the blog. My posts are available in Mandarin via a Taiwanese website that translates all my posts involving Asia.

A year ago today I was wandering around my house, unable to sleep, eat or speak after a substantial throat surgery. In a daze from the pain killers, I knew only that my agent had just successfully landed me a book deal with G.P. Putnam's Sons. As I contemplated the year ahead, I knew that the Putnam deal was a vertical scenario that would alter my life and generate a host of horizontal scenarios whose myriad of pathways I could only dimly imagine from that vantage point.

As my wife Vonne said at the time: "See, I told you it would be a good idea to finally write a book. A year from now, who knows where this could all lead?"

Indeed.

Time to book some airline tickets!

Today's catch:

Kidnappings: a tool of choice in the Middle East

"Iraqi Insurgents Report Grabbing 6 More Hostages: Beheadings Threatened; Kidnappings Come After Philippines Yielded to an Earlier Seizure," by Ian Fisher, New York Times, 22 July, p. A1.

"For Many Iraqis, A New Daily Fear: Wave of Kidnapping; As Wealthy Pay for Guards, Gangs Target Middle Class; 'It's Only About Money,'" by Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal, 22 July, p. A1.

"Head of Gaza Police Kidnapped By Gunmen and Paraded in Streets: Chief Accused of Corruption as Palestinian Fissure Grows," by John Ward Anderson, Washington Post, 17 July, p. A12.

Osama's worse nightmare: American Muslim women with attitude

"Muslim Women Seeking a Place in the Mosque: More Are Challenging Segregated Roles in American Services," by Laurie Goodstein, NYT, 22 July, p. A1.

"Woman's Mosque Protest Brings Furor in the U.S.: Challenging rules and traditions, and paying a price," by Laurie Goodstein, NYT, 22 July, p. A16.

Henry Ford, meet Deng Xiaoping

"Carmakers Profiting From Loans Not Cars: The Action Is In Asia," by Danny Hakim, NYT, 22 July, p. C1.

"China's Buick Infatuation: The Stodgy American Auto Is a Prerevolutionary Icon For Booming Middle Class," by Peter Wonacott, WSJ, 22 July, p. B1.

The life of the party in China: how wealth gets spread

"China's 'It Couple' Builds Sleek Towers And a High Profile: Yuppie Pair Becomes Darling Of the Changing Media; Who Wore What at Party," by Kathy Chen, WSJ, 22 July, p. A1.

"Japan Almost Doubles Forecast for Economic Growth," by Todd Zaun, NYT, 22 July, p. W1.

Kidnappings: a tool of choice in the Middle East

"Iraqi Insurgents Report Grabbing 6 More Hostages: Beheadings Threatened; Kidnappings Come After Philippines Yielded to an Earlier Seizure," by Ian Fisher, New York Times, 22 July, p. A1.

"For Many Iraqis, A New Daily Fear: Wave of Kidnapping; As Wealthy Pay for Guards, Gangs Target Middle Class; 'It's Only About Money,'" by Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal, 22 July, p. A1.

"Head of Gaza Police Kidnapped By Gunmen and Paraded in Streets: Chief Accused of Corruption as Palestinian Fissure Grows," by John Ward Anderson, Washington Post, 17 July, p. A12.

No surprise what happens after Philippines so readily gives in to terrorists' demands regarding their one Filipino driver held hostage: six new truck drivers are immediately kidnapped. President Arroyo of the Philippines said she did what she did because every life is sacred. What she meant to say was, "My political career is sacred, to hell with the lives of anybody else who's not Filipino and dies as a result of my act."

The six drivers include 3 Indians, 2 Kenyans and an Egyptian. None of these three countries have troops in Iraq, so the terrorists are demanding that the companies that employ these six all leave Iraq:

"We have warned all the countries, companies, businessmen and truck drivers that those who deal with American cowboy occupiers will be targeted by the fires of the mujahedeen," read a statement given to The Associated Press. "Here you are once again transporting good, weapons and military equipment that backs the United States Army."

Our military and the Pentagon can dress this thing up as much as they want using the buzz phrase "asymmetrical warfare," but the real point of the matter is that we have failed to date in making the peacekeeping or nation-building phase work. The military calls that period following conflict "phase IV," but after the occupations of the past decade it's more like "Phase 0-for . . . " as our batting average in the back half of our recent military interventions is basically .000.

Right now too many lunatics are running the asylum called Iraq, so many in fact that it's not just Westerners who are becoming regular victims of kidnappings, but ordinary Iraqis themselves. After the looting subsided last summer because there was nothing left to steal, criminal gangs inside Iraq simply turned to an age-old form of making money in the region: kidnapping rich people for ransom. After the rich caught on and starting defending themselves, the gangs started targeting the middle class. Pretty soon the whole place starts resembling Colombia it's so bad.

When kidnapping and ransom become a national growth industry, you're probably looking at a completely lawless Gap country or a Seam State where disparities of wealth are great as development kicks in unevenly.

Then again, sometimes you get a real man-bites-dog story like when pissed-off gunmen in the Gaza strip kidnapped the head of the Palestinian Authority's police force as a protest of his alleged embezzlement of $22 million from the PA. He was paraded in the streets strictly for show and then let go:

"We gave three years to the Palestinian Authority to carry out reforms. We waited a long time. But they didn't do anything. We are doing this in our way," Abu Iyad, who was identified as a spokesman for the Jenin Martyrs Brigades, said on al-Jazeera satellite television. "Ghazi Jabali [the police chief] was kidnapped to hold him accountable for his mistakes against our people."

It's enough to almost make you happy we have Senate investigations instead, but that's life in too much of the Gap.

Osama's worse nightmare: American Muslim women with attitude

"Muslim Women Seeking a Place in the Mosque: More Are Challenging Segregated Roles in American Services," by Laurie Goodstein, New York Times, 22 July, p. A1.

"Woman's Mosque Protest Brings Furor in the U.S.: Challenging rules and traditions, and paying a price," by Laurie Goodstein, New York Times, 22 July, p. A16.

Interesting pair of stories about Muslim women inside American mosques chaffing at the traditional restrictions that require them to worship alone and too often play spectators to an all-male show of faith:

Another group of women led by a social worker in Winnipeg, Manitoba, is about to introduce a guide to making mosques more "sister friendly," proposing such measures as creating prayer space that does not exclude women, allowing women access to lectures, bulletin boards and donation boxes, and providing child care during mosque events.

Though they include college students and grandmothers, they represent a new generation of Muslim women raised and educated in North America. They include immigrants from the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere, as well as African-American and Anglo converts to the faith. Some of the younger women in their 20's and 30's, and their male supporters, identify themselves as "progressive Muslims"—a loose but growing network of activists and writers linked by books, Web sites and listservs.

As one lady put it: "This is part of the war within Islam for how it's defined in the world. Since 9/11, I've seen that if we don't assert ourselves, we're relinquishing our religion to be defined by those who speak the loudest and act the toughest."

Osama bin Laden wanted purposely to lay a system perturbation on the West with 9/11, one that would throw all our rule sets into flux. He got his wish alright, and in the end, he will regret it in more ways than he can count.

Henry Ford, meet Deng Xiaoping

"Carmakers Profiting From Loans Not Cars: The Action Is In Asia," by Danny Hakim, New York Times, 22 July, p. C1.

"China's Buick Infatuation: The Stodgy American Auto Is a Prerevolutionary Icon For Booming Middle Class," by Peter Wonacott, Wall Street Journal, 22 July, p. B1.

U.S. carmakers make more money off loans than actually selling cars, a trick they taught the Japanese automakers. Not surprisingly, where Detroit is making the most money on loans right now in terms of annual percentage growth is in Asia, where lo and behold, their products seem to appeal just fine to the rising middle class in China.

So add Detroit automakers to the list of multinational corporations whose boats are being lifted by the rising tide that is China.

But don't tell Michael Moore there might be more jobs for autoworkers in Michigan if only China is able to keep accessing Persian Gulf oil at reasonable rates because it would spoil his conspiratorial view of world history.

The life of the party in China: how wealth gets spread

"China's 'It Couple' Builds Sleek Towers And a High Profile: Yuppie Pair Becomes Darling Of the Changing Media; Who Wore What at Party," by Kathy Chen, Wall Street Journal, 22 July, p. A1.

"Japan Almost Doubles Forecast for Economic Growth," by Todd Zaun, New York Times, 22 July, p. W1.

China's "It Couple" are a pair of construction tycoons (she in her late 30's and he is his early 40's) who seem to enjoy the limelight like nobody since Donald and Ivana Trump were a pair. That's not as surprising as the fact that they've become real favorites of the masses. As one fan put it: "China has so many people with money. Why do we want to follow them? They don't just have money; they have taste."

Well, that immediately pushes Ms Zhang Xin and Mr. Pan Shiyi beyond the realm of the Donald and Ivana. In some ways, what this couple have become is more like a Martha Stewart of the middle class. As Ms. Zhang declares: "We sort of started the middle-class consciousness of lifestyle. We pay a lot of attention to decorating details."

You may laugh at such things, as though the poor, formerly socialist Chinese are pathetically aping American consumer values, but the growth of consumerism in China is more than an economic and social phenomenon, it signals a much greater potential for long-term stability both within China and around the world. A stable middle class in China bodes well for political reforms there over time, and a huge consumer class in China generates an extra pillar of stability for the global economy that has—for far too long—relied almost solely on the American consumer during hard times.

Already, China's growing consumer society is lifting Japan out of its decade-long recession. As the Times notes, most economists "expect Japan's expansion to decelerate as corporate investment slows and China's torrid economic growth continues to cool. Japan's economy is closely tied to China's, and therefore vulnerable to any slowdown there."

Some kids escape the Gap, others do not

"Close Encounters With a Home Barely Known: Children adopted abroad ask, Which land is my land? Both, the furnishings say," by Jill Brooke, New York Times, 22 July, p. D1.

"Bush Speech On Human Trafficking Target Castro: Remarks at Official Event Are Tailored for Cuban Exiles in Florida and Religious Conservatives," by Dana Milbank, Washington Post 17 July, p. A2.

The Times article is a charmer, suggesting a subtle but profound influence in America from all those kids adopted from overseas in recent years, the biggest number coming from—of course—China. The article appears in the "House & Home" section, not one I usually blog, and details how home furnishings inside households featuring children adopted from abroad are naturally tilted in the direction of the culture from which that child emerged as parents seek to respect those cultural bonds, not sever them whole.

Already, I could walk you past a host of Asian or specifically Chinese items in our house that have appeared in the months since we started the adoption process—a lamp here, a painting there. I just hung some painted tiles last night in my daughter's room, where our Vonne Mei Ling will eventually sleep once she graduates out of mom and dad's room.

I have described our adoption of Vonne Mei Ling as part of my strategy of shrinking the Gap "one child at a time." Vonne Mei hails from one of China's poorer rural areas, which constitute China's internal Non-Integrating Gap, and thanks to the amazing system that is China's orphanages and international adoption agency, Vonne Mei will escape that Gap in a rule-structured process that respects her needs and interests.

Contrast this fate to those suffered by numerous kids throughout the Gap: that of virtual slavery to sex traffickers. Who are the biggest offenders in this regard according to the U.S. State Department? Cuba, North Korea, Burma, Sudan, Venezeula—all Gap states with bad, "Big Man" leaders.

Add that crying need to the very long list of reasons of why the Core needs an A-to-Z rule set on how to process politically-bankrupt states.

July 21, 2004

The real sons of PNM

A Neat Trio of Posts

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 21 July 2004

The universe seems to be collapsing in on our family schedule as the departure date looms ever larger for our trip to China. I feel like I should be taking the kids to the beach every night between now and early August, because once we are wheels up, we won't see Second Beach until Labor Day—when actually the water is at its warmest up here.

Struggling with my allergies through this long dry spell in Rhode Island (my Monday in Manhattan was a nice respite), I glance foggily toward Beijing and then at my rapidly-filling fall calendar. If I'm not careful, I'm going to be booked for speeches every day from Labor Day through Christmas. I'm going to have to make myself a giant wall calendar so I can keep the dates straight. Staring into my Blackberry just isn't doing it any more.

As I glance over the rest of 2004's calendar, I'm more and more glad I didn't commit myself to quickly dashing off a sequel to PNM, or what I have dubbed in past posts as the "Son of PNM." Between all the speeches (meaning travel) and my editor Mark Warren's growing enthusiasm for turning my decade-old diary of our family's struggle with our firstborn's cancer (The Emily Updates), plus a few other irons in the fire, PLUS a growing advisory relationship with both CENTCOM and SOCOM . . . and I'm feeling ready to pass out simply in anticipation.

What a minute! That would be the allergies talking again. Time to hit the waves and wash off the pollen!

But the real reason why I'm glad I'm not rushing into "Son of PNM" is that I feel like there are plenty of follow-on analysts with their own analysis of PNM that are worthy, ready and engaging. In short, I myself am still learning how to read PNM for all that it's worth.

That may seem like an odd statement for an author to make, but it's been a common theme of my work throughout my career: I am always being told that I'm writing about so much more than I realize. Now, either that makes me a true visionary, or I've been sadly miscast in my own narrative (Don't you wish sometimes they got somebody more talented to play your role in the movie? You know, somebody who really "gets" the role better than you do?).

That reminds me of when my wife said that if they ever made an audio version of my book, we'd have to find somebody really good to read it. I said, "What about me?" And she replied, "I really don't think you could pull off the character."

I almost asked her about a potential porn film based on the book, but then I decided to let that one slide . . ..

Anyway, my foggy brain doesn't really have much to say today, so I've decided to turn today's blogging over to a trio of bloggers who've spent a lot of time and thought on PNM, extending the analysis further.

My short comments follow each post:

Dean Barnett (SoxBlog)

Mark, the ZenPundit

T.M. Lutas, who goes by Flit(tm)

SoxBlog: AL QAEDA VS. PARIS HILTON

1st of 3 blogs which may be The real sons of PNM: A neat trio of posts

Dean Barnett - SoxBlog @ http://dbsoxblog.blogspot.com/#109037279081302892

21 July 2004

AL QAEDA VS. PARIS HILTON

A couple of weeks ago, I wrote a review of Thomas Barnett’s brilliant “The Pentagon’s New Map.” As you might recall, PNM splits the world into two different parts. One is the Core which consists of all the countries that you might purchase a good from or take a vacation in. The other is the Gap which consists of countries that produce pretty much no goods for purchasing and that you wouldn’t visit unless you were a contestant on “Fear Factor.” PNM is all about the need, the urgent need, to integrate gap countries into the core and offers itself as something of a how-to manual for the task.

While it's highly unlikely that anyone at Al Qaeda has read PNM (although we're making progress, Kabul has yet to land a Borders), I do think that on some level Al Qaeda senses the Core/Gap dichotomy. And I think they’re aware that even though PNM has yet to officially or publicly become the government’s playbook, America is steadily and inexorably entering the Gap both with our military (Iraq, Afghanistan) and with our soft power (just about everywhere). For Al Qaeda, America’s shrinking of the Gap is a huge problem. Indeed, America’s growing prominence in the Gap threatens to move Al Qaeda’s goals completely out of reach.

To put it simply, Al Qaeda needs the Gap to remain the Gap. It’s not much of an overstatement to say that Wahabbism wants to take the Islamic world back to the 8th century and have the literal dictates of Islam be the law of the land. Obviously if the Arab world becomes economically and culturally westernized, that will be impossible. If a free market of ideas develops in that part of the world, the Fundamentalists don’t have a chance.

To be culturally balanced, Islam isn’t the only religion that has problems with some adherents that desperately want to turn back the clock. The experience of Israel is instructive in this regard. Since its birth, Israel has struggled with an Orthodox population that thinks strict adherence to all aspects of ancient Jewish law should be a defining characteristic of the Jewish state.

The Israeli Orthodox know that the modern western style world is inimical to the goal of practicing religion with 3rd Century B.C. style rigor. They understand that if free to choose, most people will opt for 21st century accoutrements over non-stop prayer and devotion. To take one example from the country’s early days, they knew that if driving on the Sabbath was permitted, eventually driving on the Sabbath would be common. They confronted one of the oldest problems known to man: How do you keep the boy on the farm after he’s seen Paris?

In spite of a half century of concessions to its Orthodox population, Israel today is and always has been a relatively normal Western style state. There’s been a free market of ideas and most Israelis follow an American type model. In other words, in spite of the occasional symbolic victories, the Israeli Orthodox have lost.

Perhaps ironically, the Wahabbis face a similar set of problems. Whether our government follows the dictates of PNM or not, America is coming into the Gap in a big way. Even if our military doesn’t set foot on Arab sand, Coca-Cola will and Microsoft will and a score of others will as well. I’m pretty sure that’s what the whole “soft power” concept is about. In spite of our government’s absence of any formal plan, America is helping develop a free market of ideas in that part of the world. What a disaster for the Wahabbis the internet promises to be! The internet will make keeping the boy on the farm after he’s seen Paris look easy compared to keeping the potential Jihadi in the madras after he’s seen Paris Hilton.

That’s why Al Qaeda feels it has to destroy the United States. Even if our government cowers as a Kerry led government might, our culture will be unstoppable. If there’s a buck to be made in that part of the world, American companies will make the trip. And even if they don’t, how will Al Qaeda prevent Western culture from entering via the internet?

To do that, they’ll have to somehow stop the dissemination of American culture. That’s not going to happen if America is still standing. And that’s why, from Al Qaeda’s perspective, war is their only choice.

As long as we’re going to be free, there will be no negotiated peace with this foe. They sense us coming into the gap. Even if to date we’re not doing it by deliberate design, our advancement is accelerating. Freedom, as ever, is on the march. In a free market of ideas, Wahabbism doesn’t have a chance. This they know.

So here’s the struggle—we’re racing to fill the Gap, they’re racing to destroy us before we do.

COMMENTARY: This is good stuff, by my measure, and it is pointing in the same direction events have been leading me in recent weeks (i.e., recent interactions with Special Operations Command and Central Command). By that I mean I've been instinctively peddling a series of competing timelines whenever I'm sitting down with decision-makers and talking about the Middle East. They are summed up as follows:

1. Globalization timeline in terms of penetrating the Middle East
2. Al Qaeda timeline in terms of hijacking the Middle East
3. U.S. timeline on transforming the Middle East, which speeds up #1
4. Al Qaeda timeline in terms of "waiting out" the oil economy
5. Israel timeline on wall versus Palestinian demographics
6. Iran timeline on WMD versus the bottom-up counterrevolution
7. Saudi timeline on reform versus birds coming home to roost
8. Iraq settling-down timeline versus rising Shiite unrest across region
9. Developing Asia oil and gas demand timeline
10. Global peaking-of-oil-demand timeline
11. Timeline on next generation cars
12. Timeline on where the fundamentalists make their next stand (post-Middle East)
13. Russia timeline on growing role in Middle East
14. India timeline on growing role in Middle East
15. China timeline on growing role in Middle East
16. And so on and so on

Not all of these are as important as others, but you get a sense of the potential scenario dynamics for what we loosely call this Global War on Terrorism. In PNM, I tried to bundle up the whole mess based on two questions (Whither Iraq? Whither Big Bang?) to get the four regional scenarios I laid out there (Black Hawk Down—the Series, Arab Yugoslavia, New Berlin Wall, Persia Engulfed). What Dean does here nicely is highlight one of the key scenario dynamics at work across the entire process.

Next up is Mark the ZenPundit with his take on the PNM's take on China.

ZenPundit: The Globalization Bull in the China Shop

2nd of 3 blogs which may be The real sons of PNM: A neat trio of posts

Mark - ZenPundit @ http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2004/07/globalization-bull-in-china-shop.html

Tuesday, July 20, 2004

THE GLOBALIZATION BULL IN THE CHINA SHOP: PROMISE AND PERIL IN THE PNM STRATEGY

Even before Deng Xiaoping defeated his hard-line Maoist opponents in the late 1970’s to set Beijing on " the capitalist road," China’s potentially bright future has been the topic of investors and statesmen. Richard Nixon foresaw China as the superpower of the 21st century. So did Brooks Adams more than a century ago. So when academics and economists are awed this year by China’s stunning, near 9% GDP growth rate, it appears the long-predicted arrival of China may be finally coming to pass.

Since we are discussing The Pentagon’s New Map it’s of no surprise that China is a critical country in Dr. Barnett’s strategy (which I discussed earlier). Rivaled only by India, China would be the most important part of the "New Core" of states that decided to join the "Old Core" by adopting their rules and engaging with the world instead of isolating themselves from it. Barnett however, quickly identifies the crux of the problem with China's progress ( p. 241):

"Of that New Core group, China is the most worrisome, while India is the most promising … China is most worrisome because the hardest rule-set still needs to be changed—the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party."

This is an aspect that clearly worries the United States government as well. Dr. Barnett has ample descriptions in his book of Pentagon war planners and defense intellectuals envisioning China in a worst-case scenario war for dominance of East Asia. To focus on military might alone—where the increasingly professional PLA is really still not all that impressive next to, say, the IDF much less the U.S. Navy—is a mistake that Dr. Barnett does not make. He's looking at the global parameters of power that an economic surplus is giving—and demanding of—China for the first time since the fall of the Q'ing dynasty:

"Paul Krugman likes to point out that China's central bank is one of the main purchasers of Treasury bills in the world, so—in effect—they finance our trade deficit." (p. 311)

and:

"China has to double its energy consumption in a generation if all that growth it is planning is going to occur. we know where the Chinese have to go for the energy: Russia, Central Asia and the Gulf. That's a lot of new friends to make and one significant past enemy to romance."(p.230)

Overall, Dr. Barnett is betting that the growing complexity of connectivity's interactions as China rewrites its rule sets to accept "the four flows" of globalization is the ultimate hedge against conflict with China, or China lapsing into the disorder that plagues the Gap states.

[ZenPundit] MY COMMENTS:

First, I am not a Sinologist by training and my knowledge of Chinese history lags considerably behind my understanding of say American diplomatic history, Soviet history and a few other topics. On the other hand, the last part of what I'm going to state about China here applies analytically to most societies that would have to make the transition to the "New Core."

While China's current growth rates are amazing we have to keep a few things in mind and try to see some of this PNM scenario through Chinese rather than western eyes.

First, China's cultural values formed during the warring states period and that China was twice unified and given stable government only by the most ruthless application of totalitarian rule. First by the Emperor Shih Huang-ti who followed the tenets of Han Fei-tzu 's Legalist-Realist school and secondly by the equally indomitable Mao Zedong, with his own particular version of Marxism-Leninism. In between the two despots dynasties rose and fell and generally tried to tie together a continent-sized nation with a natural centrifugal tendency to split into unrelated regional economies and eventually warlordism, civil war and dynastic collapse. In short, China's rulers do not take the unity of their country for granted the way the French or the British or post-bellum Americans do. Chinese leaders are crazed about Taiwan because in their minds if Taiwan is ever recognized by the world as an independent state than so can Tibet. . .and Xinjiang…and perhaps the rich coastal provinces might feel better off without their inland cousins. An authoritarian leadership of already shaky political legitimacy may choose the economically suicidal course if they believe that Taiwan's independence will bring their regime down regardless.

Secondly, in assessing China's might keep in mind the reality of per capita facts. As Brad DeLong conveniently noted the other day hundreds of millions of Chinese remain extremely poor, living on less than a dollar a day. Hundreds of millions more are better off than a generation ago but they still hover not terribly far above subsistence. These people are not, as most suppose, a danger to the regime. Peasants have starved for a millennia without ill political effect and these people are, fortunately, at least eating. What they represent instead is an enormous claim on the economic surplus that China is currently generating—a claim on roads, schools, hospitals, infrastructure, basic comforts—before providing "rich" urban Chinese with internet cafes, dance clubs, imported cars or more missile frigates for the Chinese Navy. These people need exceptionally robust economic growth for decades to see real improvement in living standards.

Thirdly, the inner circle of China's leadership have undergone an important transformation during the end of Deng Xiaoping's tenure as paramount leader. Unlike in the USSR where the Red Army was strictly subordinate to the CPSU, Mao's guerilla war left far greater cohesion between the PLA and the CCP. Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were bona fide military leaders. Zhu De and Lin Biao were also political leaders. PLA generals routinely sat in the Central Committee and higher party cadres did military work. Today, China's generals and politicians are distinct leadership classes with factional interests. The generals have become much more the military professionals and no one mistakes Jiang Zemin for a field marshal. To a certain extent, the politicians are appeasing the military elite while the latter are developing a far more narrow outlook.

Lastly, globalization brings with it to all societies a danger of raising up a countervailing power. For example, in one sense al Qaida's radicalism is merely the culmination of an ideological debate that has been going on within Islam since the Turks retreated from the gates of Vienna in 1689. But in a general sense bin Laden's violent answers only have traction among Muslims because globalization has created enough new "connections" to create economic and social upheaval in very traditional, formerly disconnected, Arab and Central Asian nations.

China's previous experience with opening up to the outside world is not a heartwarming tale. The Ming and Q'ing dynasties, like the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan, had "disconnected" from the world even as the European nations began explosive advances in science, wealth and technology. The world intruded anyway. Japan opted to reconnect via the Meiji Restoration and catch up to the West. China resisted and suffered not only external humiliation at the hands of the West, Russia and Japan but also two internal rebellions—the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxers. The former revolt, fired by half-understood western religious ideas, was warfare of a magnitude not exceeded in scale until the western front in 1914.

China's current rulers have chosen connection but the threat of countervailing power comes not from the still disconnected but from the already connected but discontented. Al Qaida and Hizb ut-Tahrir are not filled with illiterate fanatics but lawyers, engineers, doctors and businessmen who have chosen a radical political program for the goal of Islamist religious reaction. The Nazis appealed most to the lower middle class and unemployed intellectuals who had risen but feared to sink back into the ranks of the workers during the Depression. The Russian peasant who was most helped by Petr Stolypin's land reforms flocked not to support the Tsar but the Socialist-Revolutionaries in 1917. In our own history the Populists and Alliancemen who agitated for cooperative economics and against banks and monopolies in the 1880s were not workers but ex-yeomen turned tenant farmers, commercial farmers with mortgages and deflating prices.

If China's growth sags trouble will come not from the rural areas but from the tens of millions of educated, new middle-class Chinese who have had their expectations raised by cell phones, scooter bikes, refrigerators, internet access and discman players. They will not return to the countryside and nor will they abide a loss of status that Richard Hofstadter once identified as the root of paranoid politics.

That is the tightrope China will be walking for a long time to come.

COMMENTARY: Mark offers a nice rundown of several of the big pressures that China and its leadership are operating under as they seek to modernize and rejoin the world. You can say that China is experiencing several revolutions right now—all at once:

· Shift from rural to urban
· Shift from centrally-planned to market
· Shift from central power to regionalism and localism
· Shift from young society to old
· Shift from fairly immobile society to one that travels
· Shift from isolated nation to one that connects up with world at large
· Shift from overwhelming poor but egalitarian society to one that is far more developed and wealthy but also stratified
· And so on and so on.

You can't have a country undergo so many changes all at once (this is the real "great leap forward" for China) without a lot of tensions being revealed. I see the role of the U.S. and the rest of the Old Core (Japan, EU) in guiding China toward its mature expression of "great power" as the overriding task of the era—far more important than a global war on terrorism, which, quite frankly, is nothing more than dealing with the resistance to globalization's spread on the margins. That's why I keep saying, China's not the problem, it's the prize.

Last up is T.M. Lutas, or Flit(tm).

Flit(tm): Barnett's Implicit Villains

3rd of 3 blogs which may be The real sons of PNM: A neat trio of posts

T.M. Lutas - Flit(tm) @ http://www.snappingturtle.net/jmc/tmblog/archives/004646.html

July 21, 2004

Barnett's Implicit Villains

In The Pentagon's New Map something always bothered me about the disconnection of the Gap states. They are so weak that unanimous efforts by Core states could never be resisted. The Gap leadership that thrives on disconnection could never maintain that state alone. They had to have something helping them out. The Iraq sanctions regime and subsequent Coalition of the Willing invasion brings the dark secret out into the open. The disconnectors in the Gap have allies in the Core, allies that command power and respect in the highest diplomatic and economic councils.

No Gap country is entirely disconnected. After all, the Great Leader must have access to first class health care, toys and gee gaws that his own society cannot produce, and above all weapons to maintain his security against his own people and his neighbors. That requires trade and with it, connectivity.

But the connectivity threads must be kept spider web thin and must not be a path that just anyone can walk down. No, trade is done in barter, with huge bribes and outlandish commissions, or in unsavory items such as addictive drugs, banned weapons, and human flesh. The people who provide the connectivity must, as much as possible, be unsavory types that will show the worst of the outside world to those who they come in contact with, providing a justification for their country's isolation.

The power brokers who do the major deals and pocket so much money from these spider web connections also know that they are on an impressive gravy train that will continue as long as general connectivity does not come to that society. They must maintain their position in the Core and never actually admit that they are in favor of maintaining disconnectedness but they do and they are.

In Eastern Europe, when the wall came down, whoever had invested in the east bloc countries as the only western presence in their field were largely swept aside. The popular western cigarettes, the popular drinks, all of that market share swiftly disappeared in an avalanche of new competition offering better quality, lower prices, or even just variety.

The same dynamic will happen in every country that is pulled into the Core from the Gap. A certain class of politicians and traders will have their economic interests in the place devastated and they will be tempted to lobby against intervention, against reform, because they only see their short term interests and don't really care about the pathologies that spill out of the Gap.

Update: Iraq now points out how business interests that were highly invested in the old system are still causing mischief where they can.

COMMENTARY: That is a neat extension of the material that I had always wondered about how best to express, but never got around to in PNM. Hard to believe, but even at 150k, I was constantly fretting about how to get out of this G.D. paragraph without triggering another 2k in text! So the PNM's absurd ambition in trying to explain just about everything meant that even at this serious length, the book remains an outline of sorts. The "implicit villains" argument here is one I did not get to in the book, perhaps because I feared sounding too neo-Marxist and once you go down that road you can find yourself turning into Immanuel Wallerstein or worse. But I think T.M. nails the description on the head.

Now I'm waiting for the subsequent nails on the anti-globalization movement within the Core and those Gap-like ghettos that still exist within the Core. The former is what drives a lot of outright rejection of my arguments ("Barnett acts like making globalization safe for corporations to ruin the world is a good thing!"), but the latter is what gets me a lot of interesting emails from mayors, governors, and anyone who deals with inner cities, like one I just got from an academic who said PNM gave him a whole new perspective on the role of historic black colleges in "connecting" the African-American community to economic opportunity in this country.

All in all, a neat trio of posts.

Over the limit

Today’s catch from July 21, 2004

After you’ve read the neat trio of posts from Dean Barnett (SoxBlog), Mark (ZenPundit), and T.M. Lutas (Flit(tm)), here's today's catch:

Martin Wolf defines globalization as connectedness

"Too many countries? Let a splendid new book on globalization be the last for a while: it will not be bettered soon," The Economist, 20-26 July, p. 75.

Greece the Seam State, looking for a little U.S. "glue"

"Pressured by U.S., Greece Will Allow Troops at Olympics," by Raymond Bonner and Anthee Carassava, New York Times, 21 July, p. A1.

Germany's choice on rule-set reset: play down or play up

"East Germany Swallows Billions, and Still Stagnates," by Mark Landler, NYT, 21 July, p. A11.

Philippines to U.S.: "We only do windows!"

"Hostage Is Freed After Philippine Troops Are Withdrawn From Iraq," by James Glanz, NYT, 21 July, p. A12.

UN not ready to shut up or put up regarding Israel's wall

"Remove Wall, Israel Is Told By the U.N.," by Warren Hoge, NYT, 21 July, p. A10.

China backs off on SARS whistle-blower

"China Releases the SARS Whistle-Blower," by Joseph Kahn, NYT, 21 July, p. A6.

Iraq: the healing process ain't even begun on Saddam

"Iraqis Begin Confronting The Burdens of the Past: Millions Persecuted by Hussein May Seek Redress," by Doug Struck, Washington Post, 13 July, p. A11.

Africa: the inevitable final frontier in the GWOT

"Al Qaeda's Growing Sanctuary," by Douglas Farah and Richard Shultz, WP, 14 July, p. A19.

More evidence of advanced Brezhnevism in Iran

"Iranians Get the Last Laugh After Clerics Ban a Comedy," by Karl Vick, WP, 14 July, p. A12.

Another feather in the cap of Colin Powell's amazing career

"Powell Flies In the Face Of Tradition: Secretary Is Least Traveled In Years of State Records," by Glenn Kessler, WP, 14 July, p. A1.

Martin Wolf defines globalization as connectedness

"Too many countries? Let a splendid new book on globalization be the last for a while: it will not be bettered soon," The Economist, 20-26 July, p. 75.

Nice review of Wolf's well-received book, "Why Globalisation Works." Sent to me by my old mentor at the Center for Naval Analysis, stating that the following line was "pure Barnett":

The Sudans and Somalias, he argues, do bear witness to the limits to globalization—but only in the sense that globalization needs to go further. The poorest countries in the world stand mostly outside the global economic system. The challenge for development policy is to connect these countries to the rest of the world.

That does sound like my book, does it not?

Wolf's answer—unfortunately—is heavy on humanitarian aid with no serious treatment of security issues. While his book is a good one, no doubt, the idea that you can comprehensively define globalization in strictly economic terms is ignoring the "everything else" that is security.

In my mind, then, Wolf writes a great book on economic globalization but a very incomplete one on globalization as a whole.

Greece the Seam State, looking for a little U.S. "glue"

"Pressured by U.S., Greece Will Allow Troops at Olympics," by Raymond Bonner and Anthee Carassava, New York Times, 21 July, p. A1.

I know the U.S. flag in charge of overseeing U.S. military support to the Greek games, and I know how persuasive he can be. I'm very glad to see that Greece is willing to let the U.S. help out on security for the Games. To me, this is a smart example of the U.S. defining its interests beyond "homeland security" (that asinine phrase) to encompass Core-wide security as a whole.

Germany's choice on rule-set reset: play down or play up

"East Germany Swallows Billions, and Still Stagnates," by Mark Landler, New York Times, 21 July, p. A11.

Former West Germany has spent a trillion and a half on former East Germany and the latter has little development to show for it. What's the problem? Frankly, the West has asked the East to play down to its own restrictive economic rule set instead of asking the country as a whole to play up to the far more open Core economic rule-set.

Here's the key excerpt:

George Milbradt, the prime minister of Saxony, said that Bavaria was able to reverse an exodus of people during the depressed 1950's by turning Munich into a center for the automotive and computer industries. Mr. Milbradt said the east can prosper only if it shakes off Germany's stifling labor regulations. That would drive down wages here and make the region competitive with its eastern neighbors. The trouble, he concedes, is that this would require the government to overhaul not just its policy toward the east, but its entire economic program.

Milbradt goes on to say that Germany is a "sick man" who knows what the cure must be, but who fears it more than the disease.

Philippines to U.S.: "We only do windows!"

"Hostage Is Freed After Philippine Troops Are Withdrawn From Iraq," by James Glanz, New York Times, 21 July, p. A12.

Old line that a colleague of mine at college, Bradd Hayes, loved to use whenever he talked about the military's reticence to do post-conflict nation-building: the U.S. military doesn't like to "do windows," meaning all the piddling little stuff involved in post-conflict security generation. The Pentagon's line was (and for many, still is): We do smoking holes and nothing else!

Well, the Philippines is saying to the U.S. and the rest of the Core that while they're willing to do windows as a commuting labor force that can rapidly come into bad situations and provide lotsa "shoes on the ground," they aren't willing to do much of anything beyond those "windows." If you want to drive the Filipinos out, all you need do is take one of their people hostage and the entire country will back down immediately—pulling out all of their (admittedly puny) security contingent. And they will do this proudly, as the president rejoices in her one freed Filipino worker even as American troops die by the day keeping the rest of her workers safe there.

But, frankly, that is the realistic limit for the Philippines: while their global commuting workforce can be counted upon to provide labor at a moment's notice anywhere inside the Gap, the U.S. can't expect them to play any serious security role there. Filipinos are therefore logically considered the foot workers, but not the foot soldiers, in any Core-wide strategy to shrink the Gap.

UN not ready to shut up or put up regarding Israel's wall

"Remove Wall, Israel Is Told By the U.N.," by Warren Hoge, New York Times, 21 July, p. A10.

UN is ready and willing to condemn the wall, but isn't willing to do much of anything to secure Israel. The UN is more than happy to internationalize the situation politically, but not security-wise.

Thus left to its own defense, Israel logically puts up the wall and says—in effect—to the world: "If you're so hot to do something about Palestine, then be our guests!"

The UN will never provide security to Israel, and so Israel must forcibly internationalize the security situation by building the wall and letting the UN deal with the consequences.

After the lopsided vote condemning the wall, Israel's UN ambassador said, "Thank God that the fate of Israel and of the Jewish people is not decided in this hall."

Absolutely.

China backs off on SARS whistle-blower

"China Releases the SARS Whistle-Blower," by Joseph Kahn, New York Times, 21 July, p. A6.

Good move by the Party elite: cracking down on this guy for his comments about the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 got them nowhere in the eyes of the world.

Here's the key analysis:

While there is no evidence that senior officials are reconsidering their stance that the crackdown was justified, the decision to detain and then release Dr. Jiang suggests that leaders are conflicted when handling high-level dissent on the issue. That may stimulate hopes that the party will sooner or later apologize for the violent suppression of the Tiananmen protesters.

To me, this apology won't happen until the third-generation leadership, exemplified by Jiang Jemin, remaining head of the military, is finally escorted off the historical stage by the just-put-in-place fourth-generation of leaders, exemplified by Hu Jintao. The 3rd-gen leaders will never admit they were wrong about 1989, because it calls into question their historical legacy as rulers, something Jiang is very keen to protect (the man has a huge ego).

But when that apology does finally come, a real tipping point will have been reached, not just for the 4th-gen leadership group, but for the declining power of the PLA, which inevitably be tainted by this apology.

Iraq: the healing process ain't even begun on Saddam

"Iraqis Begin Confronting The Burdens of the Past: Millions Persecuted by Hussein May Seek Redress," by Doug Struck, Washington Post, 13 July, p. A11.

Saddam Hussein's trial will be a doozy, but only a small part of the national healing involving all his regime's many victims. In the past 14 months, Iraqi officials have generated files of state crimes from families of 200,000 people killed and 40,000 political prisoners. They estimate that these numbers represent just the tip of the iceberg—maybe one-twentieth of the actual numbers that will be inevitably uncovered.

Jesse Helms' used to publicize a list of 131 foreign companies that did business with Saddam's regime, or what he called "Iraq's Foreign Legion." T.M. Lutas' point about "collaborators" in the Core will be amply made when the full story finally emerges.

Africa: the inevitable final frontier in the GWOT

"Al Qaeda's Growing Sanctuary," by Douglas Farah and Richard Shultz, Washington Post, 14 July, p. A19.

Opening para says it all:

With the end of the brutal conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, West Africa is seldom in the news or on the policy agenda these days. Yet the region is quietly gaining recognition as what it has long been: a haven for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Weak and corrupt governments, vast, virtually stateless stretches awash in weapons, and impoverished, largely Muslim populations make the region as ideal sanctuary.

This is what I said in Rolling Stone last month:

We’re going to end up replicating the struggle again and again. Like spraying the cockroaches in one apartment and scattering them to the next—we’re driving terrorists to the next country over. Sort of like rooting out old Japanese warriors on some isolated Pacific island twenty years after World War II, we’re going to be killing off the last of these guys years from now in deepest, darkest Africa.

I say this every chance I get with military leaders: our success in the Middle East only sets the table for the next stage in Africa—get used to the idea now.

More evidence of advanced Brezhnevism in Iran

"Iranians Get the Last Laugh After Clerics Ban a Comedy," by Karl Vick, Washington Post, 14 July, p. A12.

Funny movie packs 'em in, Tehran: criminal escapes jail by dressing as cleric and then is forced into hilarious fish-outta-water situations out in the real world. "The Lizard" became a cultural phenomenon in Iran, so naturally the mullahs had to shut it down. But here's the info age problem: too many boot-leg videos are already out and about.

Here's the great analysis of the piece:

In 1979, while imposing a severe interpretation of the Koran, the mullahs shuttered every one of Tehran's 74 movie theaters. Today, visitors are directed to black-and-white snapshots of each of them in the Film Museum of Iran, a converted palace that honors the country's widely acclaimed directors, including those whose most famous works are banned here.

The contradictions reflect a shifting reality. After a seven-year effort at reform failed to wrest decisive power from unelected clerics, the population of 70 million has largely retreated, leaving politics to hard-liners yet withholding the legitimacy the conservatives crave.

That is a perfect description of the late Brezhnev period in the now-defunct Soviet Union. Waiting for Gorbachev is the name of the game now, and Khatami does not seem to be the man.

Another feather in the cap of Colin Powell's amazing career

"Powell Flies In the Face Of Tradition: Secretary Is Least Traveled In Years of State Records," by Glenn Kessler, Washington Post 14 July, p. A1.

Powell travels less than any secretary of state of the last three decades. Needs to stay in Washington so he can influence policy debates more, apparently.

And that only makes his complete failure in the interagency process all the more glaring. No successes to show internationally and none to show interagency.

This guy will go down as one of the most missing-in-action secretaries of state we ever had. He'll be the Bill Cohen of SECSTATE's.

Don't know who Bill Cohen was? That's the point.

July 20, 2004

The personal China connection grows—as does the bias?

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 20 July 2004

Yesterday was a strange sort of immersion in things Chinese. First there was my first direct encounter with the Government of China, in the form of its consulate in New York, where I obtained tourist visas for myself and my wife for our upcoming adoption trip. Second was my brother Jerome's impromptu lecture on the character-driven language of Japanese (he's writing a learner's dictionary), which he described as a "jazzed up version of Chinese" (like Romanian is a jazzed-up version of Italian, and Portuguese a jazzed-up version of Spanish). Third, there was the word from my agent that Beijing University Press has agreed to our advance number, so we've selected them as the publishing house in China for the Pentagon's New Map.

My old Russian teacher at the University of Wisconsin always said good news comes in threes, as does bad news. My good news trio from China would therefore seem to be: 1) we got the visas without a hitch; 2) PNM's to be published there; and 3) we're expecting our travel advisory later today from China regarding the exact date of our adoption appointment at the U.S. Consulate in Guangzhou in late August.

Just like that I am suddenly all connected to the Middle Kingdom, and so I find myself feeling strangely protective of it. Will such feelings ruin my ability to think about China objectively? Don't think so, otherwise I'd be irrational about Northern Ireland, which I'm not.

No, I think my new personal connections to China will just make my appreciation of what it is and what it is becoming all the more nuanced. Do I trust China per se? My answer is that I trust China to be China, in all its complexity and self-interest, just like I trust America to be America in all its complexity and self-interest.

So when I hear John Kerry bashing China on trade because it's good election-year politics ("China Is Talk of Campaigns: Kerry Seems Tougher Than Bush on Standard Election Topic," by Neil King, Jr. and Michael Schroeder, Wall Street Journal, 20 July, p. A4.), I know it's simply preaching to certain segments of the choir, and doesn't reflect any objective view of what China now represents in terms of America's strategic interests in expanding the Core and shrinking the Gap. Kerry can blow smoke now, just like Clinton did in 1992, but the reality would set in immediately once he entered office. China is simply too big and too important for that sort of partisan nonsense.

That my family has chosen to make China a big part of our lives means only that we're a microcosm of the integrating effort that the world is going through on all things Chinese. Rather than generating a bias, this process simply eliminates an absence that never made any sense anyway—except in the autarkic nonsense that was Maoism.

With the agreement pending on PNM's publication in China, I now have three of the four map categories accounted for (outside of North America, of course): publication in Japan gives me an Old Core state, China now gives me a New Core state, and Turkey gives me a Seam State. What I need next is a true Gap state, and from what I'm hearing from my agency, that may well be Lebanon—of all places. I look forward to the day when I have copies of all these PNMs on my shelf in my office.

Til then, here's today's catch:

New Core power Russia to help U.S. in Iraq?

"Russia: Putin Considers Sending Troops to Iraq," www.stratfor.com, 16 July.

States cursed by oil? Almost all are found inside the Gap—naturally

"Saving Iraq From Its Oil," by Nancy Birdsall and Arvind Subramanian, Foreign Affairs, July-Aug 2004, p. 77.

"From Pariah to Belle of the Oil Ball: For Energy Companies, Libya Is Suddenly the Hottest Date Around," by Simon Romero, New York Times, 20 July, p. C1.

What goes around, comes around on terror

"Saudis Facingb Return of Radicals: Young Iraq Veterans Join Underground," by Craig Whitlock, Washington Post, 11 July, p. A1.

"President Says U.S. to Examine Iran-Qaeda Tie: Sept. 11 Terrorists May Have Been Given Aid," by Philip Shenon, NYT, 20 July, p. A1.

No surprise: Sys Admin force is drawn from sys admin jobs back in U.S.

"Governors Tell Of War's Impact on Local Needs: Staff Shortages At Home; Citizen Soldiers Abroad Aren't Available to Aid States in Crisis," by Sarah Kershaw, NYT, 20 July, p. A1.

"Rebuilding Iraq, A Well At A Time: Tiny Projects Succeed and Win Thanks for U.S.," by James Glanz, NYT, 20 July, p. A1.

"Don't Dumb Down the Military," by Nathaniel Fick, NYT, 20 July, p. A23.

Armenia: a classic Gap state that is failing on all fronts

"Armenian Protests Falter Under Authoritarian Rule: President' Hold on Power Contrasts Sharply With 'Rose Revolution' in Neighboring Georgia," by Susan B. Glasser, WP, 11 July, p. A16.

"Exodus Is New Chapter of Loss in Armenia's Sad Story," by Susan B. Glasser, WP, 12 July, p. A1.

The focus on rural poor is an Asia-wide development

"Asia Shifts Focus to Rural Development," by Andrew Browne, WSJ, 20 July, p. A9.

New Core power Russia to help U.S. in Iraq?

"Russia: Putin Considers Sending Troops to Iraq," www.stratfor.com, 16 July.

Many said I was nuts when I proposed in the Washington Post Outlook section in April that the U.S. should seek peacekeeping troops from Russia, India (whom they asked previously) and China. When I was on NPR last month, the Atlantic Monthly's Jack Beatty described that notion as "politically impossible."

I got this reference from Capt. Ryan Boyle (a regular weblog reader) at USMC headquarters in Washington, so my thanks to him.

The gist of the article is that Moscow is seriously considering a request by the Bush Administration to send Russian troops to Iraq or Afghanistan (can you believe it?) this fall, just before the election.

Yes, much will depend on Putin's calculations of Bush's likelihood of victory, but the real point here is that it is: 1) not inconceivable that Russia would say yes and 2) the Bush Administration buys into the logic that New Core powers need to be represented in this Global War on Terrorism.

How many are we talking about? Maybe 40,000. What would that do to the Islamic notion of a "clash of civilizations" with the West? It would blow that myth out of the water. Risky for Putin? You bet, but so is sitting on the sidelines.

For me personally? This article is yet another example of why I have a very thick skin about people telling me—throughout my career—that my strategic forecasting was pie-in-the-sky nonsense. The reason why so many experts and journalists see PNM as a guide book to this administration is not because I have inside dope, it's because I've simply cracked the strategic code under which this administration—and all that follow for decades—will invariably find themselves dealing with, day-in and day-out.

Here's hoping this thing actually pans out, but either way, the logic of cooperation now seems a whole lot more plausible, despite the constant whining of nay-sayers like Beatty.

States cursed by oil? Almost all are found inside the Gap—naturally

"Saving Iraq From Its Oil," by Nancy Birdsall and Arvind Subramanian, Foreign Affairs, July-Aug 2004, p. 77.

"From Pariah to Belle of the Oil Ball: For Energy Companies, Libya Is Suddenly the Hottest Date Around," by Simon Romero, New York Times, 20 July, p. C1.

Libya's the new target of oil companies after it came out of the diplomatic cold and rejoined the land of the rule-abiding (if there was ever a case of verify first, trust later, it's Qaddafi). Good thing for the regime, which should bank a lot of money, and generally good for the population, for it should increase levels of connectivity with the outside world. But this development does not bode particularly well for the economy or society as a whole in terms of long-term development. As I've said before, relying on raw materials as the primary export to the global economy is just about the slowest way to grow an economy.

Which brings me to a great article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, which was brought to my attention by Ethan Sprang, another regular weblog reader. Read the article for all the analysis. Here's the main point that hit Ethan: 32 of the 34 countries studied by the two authors as suffering the "resource curse" are found within the Gap: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Rep, Libya, Mexico [Core], Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia [Core], Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, UAE, Venezuela and Yemen. Like with U.S. military crisis responses since the end of the Cold War, the Gap concept captures roughly 95% of the "resource curse." How did the authors generate this list? We're talking about the 34 countries for whom oil and gas represent more than 30% of their total export revenue.

What goes around, comes around on terror

"Saudis Facing Return of Radicals: Young Iraq Veterans Join Underground," by Craig Whitlock, Washington Post, 11 July, p. A1.

"President Says U.S. to Examine Iran-Qaeda Tie: Sept. 11 Terrorists May Have Been Given Aid," by Philip Shenon, New York Times, 20 July, p. A1.

More and more evidence that the young men prone to terrorism that Saudi Arabia has been exporting all these years are increasingly returning to the kingdom with violent designs on the House of Saud.

Saudi Arabia is in a tough spot, which is exactly where they should be in a long-term strategy to transform the Middle East political scene. If Iraq continues to boil, all it does is generate more opportunities for Saudis to go there and cut their teeth as terrorists. And when it settles, guess who's coming for dinner?

Like their compatriots in Iraq, cells operating in Saudi Arabia have repeatedly stated that their primary aim is to drive out all "infidels," including more than 100,000 Western expatriates who help run the country's oil industry and whose military and technical support is crucial to the Saudi government.

If the House of Saud is set to get its just desserts, then Iran is also likely to come under increasing fire—from the U.S. With Iraq out of the way, the biggest security issues in the Gulf are: 1) Iran's rather open support for terrorist networks in the region; and 2) their push for nukes. Expect to see the Bush Administration begin seeding the long-term narrative on that confrontation. If Iran pushes hard enough on the WMD and doesn't come clean enough on its long-term support for terrorists, it could easily rise to the top of the heap of either a re-elected Bush Administration or a new Kerry one, giving Kim Jong Il just that much more time for mischief as he awaits his inevitable turn.

No surprise: Sys Admin force is drawn from sys admin jobs back in U.S.

"Governors Tell Of War's Impact on Local Needs: Staff Shortages At Home; Citizen Soldiers Abroad Aren't Available to Aid States in Crisis," by Sarah Kershaw, New York Times, 20 July, p. A1.

"Rebuilding Iraq, A Well At A Time: Tiny Projects Succeed and Win Thanks for U.S.," by James Glanz, NYT, 20 July, p. A1.

"Don't Dumb Down the Military," by Nathaniel Fick, NYT, 20 July, p. A23.

Here's the first few paras of the top story:

With tens of thousands of their citizen soldiers now deployed in Iraq, many of the nation's governors complained on Sunday to senior Pentagon officials that they were facing severe manpower shortages in guarding prisoners, fighting wildfires, preparing for hurricanes and floods and policing the streets.

Concern among the governors about the war's impact at home has been rising for months, but it came into sharp focus this weekend as they gathered for their four-day annual conference here and began comparing the problems they faced from the National Guard's largest callup since World War II. On Sunday, the governors held a closed-door meeting with two top Pentagon officials and voiced their concerns about the impact both on the troops' families and on the states' ability to deal with disasters and crime.

So while the Sys Admin force digs wells throughout Iraq, winning hearts and minds as they improve the infrastructure, they are sorely missed by their erstwhile employers back home who need them to protect our far more complex infrastructure from the daily vagaries of nature.

Some "experts" and more than a few congressmen are calling for the resumption of the draft, but nobody who knows the military wants the return of that force, because both combat and nation-building have simply gotten so complex that we can't field anything less than a well-educated force.

So we're not getting out of restructuring this force into what I call the bifurcated Leviathan/Sys Admin force. We cannot draft our way out of this situation, nor can we continue to rob Peter (the reserve component) to pay Paul (the active duty force). Nothing less is needed than a rebalancing of the entire force and a re-rationalizing of it to account for the obvious bifurcation of roles and missions that this security environment demands out of the Pentagon.

Armenia: a classic Gap state that is failing on all fronts

"Armenian Protests Falter Under Authoritarian Rule: President' Hold on Power Contrasts Sharply With 'Rose Revolution' in Neighboring Georgia," by Susan B. Glasser, Washington Post 11 July, p. A16.

"Exodus Is New Chapter of Loss in Armenia's Sad Story," by Susan B. Glasser, WP, 12 July, p. A1.

Armenia is a sad story. Unlike its neighbor Georgia, where the "rose revolution" swept reformers into power peacefully, there seems no way the masses can drive their dictatorial president Robert Kocharian out of power, even after his highly disputed election last year.

So while Kocharian moves Armenia ever closer to a police state, people are simply voting with their feet—and leaving the country for good. It is estimated that as many as one million have left since Armenia became independent from Soviet rule in the early 1990s, leaving as few as 2-3 million still inside the country. That means maybe as many as one-out-of-every-three people have left in the last decade or so. Imagine if 100 million people left the U.S. over the course of a decade—that's how bad it has become for this classic Gap state.

Armenians are so desperate to connect to a better life that they are leaving their homeland in droves, many to Russia proper. It is estimated by the Russians that Armenians working inside Russia send back to Armenia in remittances a sum more than double the government's entire budget for the nation, proving yet again what a huge pressure valve release is the ability of economic refugees to flow from the Gap to the Core.

The focus on rural poor is an Asia-wide development

"Asia Shifts Focus to Rural Development," by Andrew Browne, Wall Street Journal, 20 July, p. A9.

I've blogged plenty recently about how the return of the Congress Party in India and the rise of the fourth-generation of leadership in China reflect a growing sense in both countries' elite political circles that, even as the cities boom as the countries open themselves up to the global economy, the rural poor are largely being left behind and their needs must be far more addressed in coming years if political stability is to be maintained.

What this article does is simply expand that observation to developing Asia as a whole, citing developments in Thailand, Malaysia and elsewhere, describing rural development as a "pan-Asian development and investment theme."

If you don't want a resurgence of Maoism—or worse, Pol Pot's scary stuff—then you have to bring the rural poor along for the globalization ride. As I've said before, the train can't go any faster than the caboose, no matter how hard the engine is pulling things along.

What if Bush is right? asks Tom Junod of Esquire

Dateline: Café on East 45th between 5th and Lexington, Manhattan, 19 July 2004

Got up this a.m. and caught the subway cross-town to Times Square and then walked about a mile to 12th Avenue to the Chinese Consulate, which sits right across from the Intrepid carrier museum and the Circle Line boat rides dock. The security guy at the front door at first rejected my Rhode Island driver’s license, saying he’d never seen anything like that and that it didn’t look real. I just glared at him and declared that Rhode Island was indeed the smallest state in the union but a state nonetheless and that I didn’t care if he had never seen one of its driver’s licenses before, and that I’d need a better reason than that for his trying to deny me entry.

Then another guard came up and said, “Oh yeah, Rhode Island, that’s legitimate. He can come in.”

Whew! Tough sidewalk.

Got inside and got my queue number. But there was no real waiting. Dropped off the forms and the passports and got a receipt for pick-up after 2pm. Then I walked to my brother’s office at 45th and Lex. Jerome (for whom my youngest boy is named) works as general counsel for Marubeni, an international trading arm loosely associated with the Mitsubishi keiretsu. We chat for a while and then I go kill some time at this café. At noon Jerry is going to take me to where he and a colleague of his at Marubeni’s work every noon hour on a Japanese learner’s dictionary. Apparently there is no good one for Japanese and Jerry and his friend aim to fill that gap. For those of you who’ve studied languages, you know how crucial a learner’s dictionary can be.

I have to admit, I spent some time last weekend listening to a Chinese phrase tape in my car, and Chinese is pretty intimidating compared to my past efforts in French, Romanian, German, and Russian. And yet, I think I’ll give it a go with Vonne Mei. Hell, if I can’t outperform my then 4-year-old daughter (meaning 3 or so years from now), then I might as well give up.

Today’s main blog is almost an ode to the great Esquire writer Tom Junod. I met Tom over breakfast with Mark Warren back in November 2002. Mark took me out to chat me up before I briefed the Esquire staff (this was right after the Best and Brightest December issue hit the stands) and wanted me to meet Junod, a prize-winning writer in his stable (or maybe he wanted Junod to check me out before he suggested I write for Esquire!).

Tom ended up asking me the best question I’ve ever received from an audience: “If your vision of the future pans out, what changes most?” That became my concluding slide in the brief, which I still use, and I recounted the exchange in PNM the book.

Well, Tom and his wife just adopted a baby girl from China, and so he’s been mentoring me via email on what to expect. So it seems fitting that while I’m in town getting our visas, I should blog his most excellent piece in this month’s Esquire, the same one with the letters to the editor about my June article that I blogged recently.

[break in the action: after the lunchtime tutorial on Japanese characters and dictionaries from my brother Jerome (quite fascinating), I walk back across the width of Manhattan to 12th Ave and pick up our visas; I write the rest of this mega-blog on the Amtrak train home. No time on the Nordic track tonight, cause I feel like I power walked about 4 miles today, but it was great, as navigating around Manhattan is always fascinating.]

Tom Junod’s article is entitled, “The Case For George W. Bush,” and it’s his usual scary smart. What I like about Junod so much is that he’s always willing to question himself. Some find that weak; I find it incredibly strong.

Junod’s piece starts out with a little Bush bashing, which is easy, since W. often comes off like such a lightweight frat boy in his public appearances. Comparing that man to Reagan is simply beyond me for that reason alone.

Then Junod starts burrowing in on your conscience by asking “What if he’s right?”:

As easy as it is to say that we can’t abide the president because of the gulf between what he espouses and what he actually does, what haunts me is the possibility that we can’t abide him because of us—because of the gulf between his will and our willingness. What haunts me is the possibility that we have become so accustomed to ambiguity and inaction in the face of evil that we find his call for decisive action an insult to our sense of nuance and proportion.

The people who dislike George W. Bush have convinced themselves that opposition to his presidency is the most compelling moral issue of the day. [Barnett: God! Is that man dead-on or what?] Well, it’s not. The most compelling moral issue of the day is exactly what he says it is, when he’s not saying it’s gay marriage. [Barnett: so sadly true.] The reason he will be difficult to unseat in November—no matter what his approval ratings are in the summer—is that his opponents operate out of the moral certainty that he is the bad guy and needs to be replaced, while he operates out of the moral certainty that terrorists are the bad guys and need to be defeated. The first will always sound merely convenient when compared with the second. Worse, the gulf between the two kinds of certainty lends credence to the conservative notion that liberals have settled for the conviction that Bush is distasteful as a substitute for conviction—because it’s easier than conviction.

Those are two of the most powerfully argued paragraphs I’ve read in years, because they get right to the heart of the matter, which is who are we and what do we believe in? Art Cebrowski, my old boss in the Office of the Secretary of Defense likes to say of transformation, that if a new technology makes sense for 20 years from now, then why not seek it today? I feel the same way about terrorism and the Bush Administration’s bold approach to the Middle East: if the only way terrorism is ever going to go away is for the Middle East to end its disconnectedness and join the world, then why wait through decades of terrorism? Why not pursue it now if it will eventually make sense anyway?

In the second section, Junod compares Bush to Lincoln—not in terms of intellect but actually in terms of their seemingly fruitless early years as leaders of nations at war and their relative low popular standing (Lincoln being about the most unpopular president in history until he was assassinated). Point being: Lincoln spoke eloquently about shedding lots of blood for a moral cause blessed by the Almighty, and today he’s considered our greatest president. But, as Junod points out . . .

Today, of course, those words, along with Lincoln’s appeal to the better angels of our nature, are chiseled into the wall of his memorial, on the Mall in Washington. And yet if George Bush were to speak anything like them today, we would accuse him of pandering to his evangelical base. We would accuse him of invoking divine authority for a war of his choosing . . ..

Another great riff soon follows:

We were attacked three years ago, without warning or predicate event. The attack was not a gesture of heroic resistance nor the offshoot of some bright utopian resolve, but the very flower of a movement that delights in the potential for martyrdom expressed in the squalls of the newly born. It is a movement that is about death—that honors death, that loves death, that fetishizes death, that worships death, that seeks to accomplish death wherever it can, on a scale both intimate and global—and if it does not warrant the expenditure of what the self-important have taken to calling “blood and treasure,” then what does? Slavery? Fascism? Genocide? Let’s not flatter ourselves. If we do not find it within ourselves to identify the terrorism inspired by radical Islam as an unequivocal evil—and to pronounce ourselves morally superior to it—then we have lost the ability to identify any evil at all, and our democracy is not only diminished, it dissolves into the meaninglessness of privilege.

Yeah, yeah, I know: Nobody who opposes Bush thinks that terrorism is a good thing. The issue is not whether the United States should be involved in a war on terrorism, but rather whether the war on terrorism is best served by war in Iraq. And now that the war has defied the optimism of its advocates, the issue is no longer Bush’s moral intention but rather his simple competence. He got us in when he had no idea how to get us out. He allowed himself to be blinded by ideology and blindsided by ideologues. His arrogance led him to offend the very allies whose participation would have enabled us to win not just the war but the peace. His obsession with Saddam Hussein led him to rush into a way that was unnecessary. Sure, Saddam was a bad guy. Sure, the world is a better place without him. But …

And there it is: the inevitable but. Trailed by its uncomfortable ellipsis, it sits squirming at the end of the argument against George Bush for very good reason: It can’t possibly sit at the beginning. Bush haters have to back into it because there’s nothing beyond it. The world is a better place without Saddam Hussein, but . . . but what? But he wasn’t so bad that we had to do anything about him? But he wasn’t so bad that he was worth the shedding of American blood? But there are other dictators just as bad whom we leave in place? But he provided Bush the opportunity to establish the doctrine of preemptive war, in which case the cure is worse than the disease? But we should have secured Afghanistan before invading Iraq? But we should have secured the cooperation of allies who were no more inclined to depose Saddam that they—or we, as head of an international coalition of the unwilling—were to stop the genocide in Rwanda ten years before? Sure, genocide is bad, but . . .

We might as well credit the president for his one great accomplishment: replacing but with and as a basis for foreign policy. The world is a better place without Saddam Huessin, and we got rid of him.

What Junod says here is exactly the same thing that’s always haunted me about Reagan: he was right about the Soviet Union. No, I don’t believe he killed the evil empire. Nor do I believe Star Wars or the defense build-up did that. Frankly, I think Deng Xiaoping did more to kill socialism than Reagan ever could pretend to have done—in either his movies or his real-life presidency. But the man was right. And I was wrong to base my opposition to him in my youth solely out of my personal antipathy for who he was as an individual (basically, I found the man to be a huge hypocrite on many levels—his ditching his first wife being a key one in my mind). But the man was right.

The same understanding that I now have for Reagan and for Bush is something the Far Right has never learned with Clinton. Yes, he sucked big time as an individual (pun intended), but damn it! He was right about the most important issues of his day—especially his headlong support for the spread of the global economy, which really secured the victory afforded by the end of the Cold War: the absorption of the “second world” into an expanded Functioning Core of globalization.

Bush is right on the big issue of this day: bin Laden and his types are just the latest resistance to the spread of the global economy and all it entails—both good and bad but overwhelmingly positive in the long run. To fight the bin Ladens of today is like fighting the Soviets of the Cold War: those who would keep entire societies deprived, isolated, and imprisoned with hate-filled ideologies. The Soviets were evil, and radical Islamic terrorists are evil.

Bush sees and understands this, but Kerry is too often given to parsing things out to absurd levels of ambiguity. Frankly, I’d rather be blunt and right than nuanced and wrong, and Kerry won’t win this election by being nuanced. He’ll win by painting a better happy ending and positing a quicker path to achieving it. The same bad guys will be standing in the way, and their names won’t end in Bush and Cheney.

Junod gets this, and so do I. My hats off to Tom for writing an amazing piece—one that really reminds me of who I am and what I believe in like few articles do today.

Here’s today’s catch:

Transforming Iraq and Afghanistan: all in good time

“Iraq Gives Order To Reopen Paper G.I.’s Had Closed: Gesture to Shiite Cleric: In Sign of New Tactics on Militants, Premier Lets U.S. Strike Falluja,” by Ian Fisher, New York Times, 19 July, p. A1.

“When Elections Threaten Democracy: Afghans simply won’t be ready to vote any time soon,” by Ansar Rahel, NYT, 19 July, p. A17.

“Tiny Agency’s Iraq Analysis Is Better Than Big Rivals’: Giving ‘the accepted analysis’ a ‘second, harder look,’” by Douglas Jehl, NYT, 19 July, p. A10.

Good rules in India, bad ones in the Philippines

“In Wake of Fire, Indian State Bans Thatched Roofs on Schools,” by David Rohde, NYT, 19 July, p. A7.

“Curbing Foreign Investment: Philippine Constitution Derails Development of Certain Sectors,” by James Hookway, Wall Street Journal, 19 July, p. A9.

Buy you Chinese! Buy! As if our economic lives depended on it!

“Beijing Is Able to Slow Economic Growth: Next Test for China Will Be How Easily It Can Absorb Possible Oversupply of Goods,” by Matt Pottinger, WSJ, 19 July, p. A9.

In the Gap there are two types of leaders: too weak and too strong

“Bolivians Support Gas Plan And Give President a Lift: Referendum Maintains Company Control,” by Juan Forero, NYT, 19 July, p. A6.

“Are Sanctions Evil? by Michael Judge, WSJ, 19 July, p. A11.

OEMs, meet the ODMs; the new boss isn’t the same as the old boss

“PCs Aren’t Just Made In Asia Now: Many Are Designed There,” by Lee Gomes, WSJ, 19 July, p. B1.

Anonymous’ brilliantly myopic plan to win the GWOT, or why intell weanies should never be in charge of anything important

“Q&A with ‘Anonymous,’” USA Today, 19 July, p. 13A.

More evidence that Iran is in its late Brezhnev period

“Sorry, Wrong Chador: In Tehran, ‘Reading Lolita’ Translates as Ancient History,” by Karl Vick, Washington Post, 19 July, p. C1

Transforming Iraq and Afghanistan: all in good time

“Iraq Gives Order To Reopen Paper G.I.’s Had Closed: Gesture to Shiite Cleric: In Sign of New Tactics on Militants, Premier Lets U.S. Strike Falluja,” by Ian Fisher, New York Times, 19 July, p. A1.

“When Elections Threaten Democracy: Afghans simply won’t be ready to vote any time soon,” by Ansar Rahel, NYT, 19 July, p. A17.

“Tiny Agency’s Iraq Analysis Is Better Than Big Rivals’: Giving ‘the accepted analysis’ a ‘second, harder look,’” by Douglas Jehl, NYT, 19 July, p. A10.

Iraq’s tough new PM corrects a big Bremer mistake: shutting down a newspaper that had been sympathetic to Moqtada al-Sadr’s movement. Bremer thought he was buying the CPA some peace and quiet, but all he did was drive up local anger and resistance that ended up costing a number of U.S. lives. But he also okays a U.S. strike into a Falluja stronghold believed to contain Zarqawi’s personnel.

Together, Dr. Allawi’s two actions seemed early evidence of his stated strategy for taming the deadly insurgency by making concessions to fighters who cooperate and cracking down on those who do not.

How long will it take Allawi’s good cop/bad cop routine to bring real stability to Iraq? Probably quite some time. And yes, the first election probably will be a bit of a sham in both Iraq and Afghanistan, an outcome that happens to even the most mature democracies now and then (Florida recount anyone?). But admitting that we’re in both nations for the long haul does not reduce the utility of trying our best to bring democracy to either.

Yes, we will constantly be told by the experts and academics that what we’ve gotten ourselves into is so much harder than some decision makers in the Bush Administration thought, which is why the State Department’s bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is always “right” whenever the desired results don’t meet our natural tendency toward strategic ADD. But the I-told-you-so crowd has no answers other than leave-it-alone! and for-God-sakes-don’t-do-anything-to-piss-off-the-terrorists!

Oh, wait a minute, I forgot about abstinence as a strategy—or getting off oil. Right, then we could turn the Middle East into India’s and China’s strategic security issue and that would make for a safer global security environment.

But that’s forgetting Israel and the House of Saud and . . . but let’s leave that laundry list to Anonymous—a seriously myopic visionary.

Good rules in India, bad ones in the Philippines

“In Wake of Fire, Indian State Bans Thatched Roofs on Schools,” by David Rohde, New York Times, 19 July, p. A7.

“Curbing Foreign Investment: Philippine Constitution Derails Development of Certain Sectors,” by James Hookway, Wall Street Journal, 19 July, p. A9.

India suffers a Station Nightclub-like fire in a private school and the country is aghast. With the country’s booming economy, more and more families are dishing out the rupees to put their kids in expensive private schools, which, even though they are often overcrowded, “offer a prized English education that parents believe can give their children an advantage.” Right on, say I, as ESL (English as a Second Language) is one of globalization’s great connecting tissues.

So the fire happens and the affected Indian state does exactly what little Rhode Island did after the Station Nightclub fire, it starts pushing all sorts of new fire code regulations and immediately closes all schools that have the offending thatched roofs until they’re replaced by something safer.

That is a rule-set reset of the good sort.

Here’s the bad one: after dictator Ferdinand Marcos was ousted in 1987, his opponents wrote a badly nationalistic constitution that forbade foreign direct investment in certain sectors. The result is not surprising: a serious lack of development in those sectors because foreign money cannot be tapped and the Philippines economy itself can only self-finance so much. Guess some would rather be a proud-but-poor Filipino.

So there has been no foreign-funded mining operations in the Philippines since 1968. That is why the Philippines are in the Gap, while ESL-crazed India moves into the Core: the former wants connectivity, but still too much on its own terms, while the latter accepts the notion that connectivity requires the synchronization of internal code with that of the outside world.

Buy you Chinese! Buy! As if our economic lives depended on it!

“Beijing Is Able to Slow Economic Growth: Next Test for China Will Be How Easily It Can Absorb Possible Oversupply of Goods,” by Matt Pottinger, Wall Street Journal, 19 July, p. A9.

More and more indications that China has generated the much-desired “soft landing” for its economy if . . . and here’s the kicker for the formerly centrally-planned economy . . . if the Chinese consumer base can absorb all the goods that will be generated by the investment boom of the past few years.

Already, China is moving into the rarefied territory that defines the United States’ real economic power: the power of its consumption as much or more than its production. More and more we’ll see the global economic health defined not just in terms of what America is willing to buy, but what China is willing to buy.

China will be a near-peer in diplomacy faster than we think, and a near-peer in economic faster than we think. The one thing it won’t be any time soon is our military near-peer. Thinking of China’s “threat” solely within the context of war is a mistake, because its real source of competition with the United States will come in the everything else.

In the Gap there are two types of leaders: too weak and too strong

“Bolivians Support Gas Plan And Give President a Lift: Referendum Maintains Company Control,” by Juan Forero, New York Times, 19 July, p. A6.

“Are Sanctions Evil?" by Michael Judge, Wall Street Journal, 19 July, p. A11.

Let me skip over the details of the referendum on the gas project. Bolivia is a poor country, and God knows it won’t be developed simply because it’s got some gas. Trying to grow an economy on the exportation of raw materials is just about the slowest way to go, as we’ve seen time and time again over the 20th century.

The real problem with Bolivia is the weakness of its political institutions. Here’s a pretty good guy operating as president, but here’s how a knowledgeable observer describes his ruling situation:

“Here you have a guy who has no control over the armed forces, no control over the police,” said Eduardo Gamarra, a Bolivian-born expert who oversees Latin America studies at Florida International University. “He basically controls the palace, and he has the daunting mission of trying to re-found the country.”

What define the Core are stable-enough political systems that, on average, rotate their leaders every 4-to-6 years. That’s true for 90% of the Core countries, according to my research as reported in PNM.

Inside the Gap, the situation is the opposite: 90% of the governments can’t meet that Goldilocks’ happy medium. Just under one-third of Gap states can’t keep a leader for four years, on average. And just under two-thirds can’t get rid of a leader in less than six years. Only one-in-ten Gap states rotate their leadership regularly. That yields a bad mix of too-weak and too-strong leaders. Bolivia’s got a weak one right now, whereas Burma has far too strong of one in its military junta.

The cure for both is connectivity in general, although our tendency with the latter is to throw sanctions at the problem, which basically never results in the authoritarian leadership being thrown aside but instead tends to enrich them while making the plight of the masses even worse.

Our approach is completely backasswards: we should be throwing aid at the weaker states and pursuing regime change with the harsher ones. Does that mean invading every authoritarian regime? Hardly. But it sure as hell doesn’t mean trying to wait out the Big Man through sanctions, which surely hasn’t toppled any Castros or Qaddafis around the world.

Again, if the Core were serious about shrinking the Gap, we’d develop an A-to-Z rule set on how to process politically-bankrupt states and once we successfully employed it a few times, you’d see dictators grabbing their loot and heading for the border in plenty of states further down “the list.” But until that resolve is bolstered by rule sets, this clean-up effort will remain a largely American affair, meaning something we’ll whip ourselves into doing now and then, always to recoil almost immediately from the subsequent realization that finishing the job will take time—like in Afghanistan and Iraq today.

OEMs, meet the ODMs; the new boss isn’t the same as the old boss

“PCs Aren’t Just Made In Asia Now: Many Are Designed There,” by Lee Gomes, Wall Street Journal, 19 July, p. B1.

Yet another story about rising Asia in general and the notion that today’s “dumb” manufacturers of our brilliant goods will soon be tomorrow’s “smart but cheaper” design engineers.

I cite it only for the new acronym, which I love to collect. OEM means original equipment manufacturer. You can be an OEM and not be the true brains behind the product.

ODM means original design manufacturer, meaning you both design and build the product, even if it gets sold elsewhere under someone else’s name—like Dell or Gateway or Apple or . . ..

Every once in a while an ODM steps out in the spotlight and demands the world recognize it as a brand name. Samsung was an ODM for many years, this article points out, but “now it rivals Sony as a global brand.”

Samsung may be one of the first to make this migration, but it won’t be the last.

Anonymous’ brilliantly myopic plan to win the GWOT

Why intell weanies should never be in charge of anything important

“Q&A with ‘Anonymous,’” USA Today, 19 July, p. 13A.

The basic argument you get from the CIA intell vet who directed the agency’s research on bin Laden for several years in the late 1990s (and now available in his anonymous “Imperial Hubris” book) is the same logic you’ll get from a lot of Middle East experts, terrorism experts, and diplomats familiar with the region. In effect, they’ll say it’s all America’s fault because what really drives al Qaeda is their hatred of our policies. End all those policies and al Qaeda and other terrorists will stop hating us and trying to kill us. Any other approach to the Middle East “dooms us to failure in the GWOT.”

Anonymous sums up bin Laden’s offer of conditional surrender on our part as well as any other expert I’ve interacted with recently. Here are the six demands:

1. Stop supporting Israel against the PLO and Hamas
2. Get U.S. troops out of the Arabian peninsula
3. Get out of Iraq and Afghanistan now
4. Stop supporting Russia, China and India in their suppression of Muslim extremists or separatists
5. Get off oil ASAP so we’re not always pressuring OPEC to keep oil prices low
6. Stop supporting corrupt Muslim regimes in the region.

If we do all these things, the world will be a much safer place for Americans with regard to Middle Eastern terrorists trying to kill us and harm our interests around the world.

Not too much to give up, is it? Just turn over the Jews, who shouldn’t be our problem anyway (I mean, God! We didn’t commit the Holocaust did we? We just let it happen!). Also we need to let radical fundamentalists rule the Gulf and send oil prices skyrocketing so poor countries all over the Gap are immediately priced out of that energy market or, if they choose to pay such prices, suffer huge debt crises down the road. We should also let Iraq and Afghanistan go back to what they were: dangerously disconnected states that bred both internal terrorism and external threats either through militarism or the open support of transnational terrorist networks. And it’s not too much to tell the New Core powers that we won’t stand for their efforts to keep their states whole and instead inform them that if they’re going to depend on Gulf energy in the future, then they damn well better plus-up their military budgets pronto so that they can do all the strategic heavy lifting in the region in coming decades (Isn’t China going to be our strategic enemy anyway?). And we should move America onto to hydrogen so the Middle East can turn itself into another Central Africa as quickly as possible, or—almost as worst—another Soviet-like gulag of repressive regimes whose dictators are corrupt fundamentalists as opposed to the corrupt elite dictatorships we now suffer there.

Yes, if we do all that, we’ll really be pursuing a grand strategy of “peace and justice” that will buy us coexistence with the fundamentalist radicals who dream of plunging the region into the same 7th-century paradise that the Taliban built in Afghanistan across the 1990s. Then we’ll really be safe and we’ll have the strategic stability that should have defined the post-Cold War era if only America didn’t have so many wrongheaded policies in the Middle East.

Yes, give the terrorists everything they want and they won’t be pissed off at us any more. And the global economy will be better as a result, and stability will sweep the planet.

It’s a brilliant plan, proving yet again that intell weanies make the best grand strategists.

More evidence that Iran is in its late Brezhnev period

“Sorry, Wrong Chador: In Tehran, ‘Reading Lolita’ Translates as Ancient History,” by Karl Vick, Washington Post, 19 July, p. C1.

Interesting article about the bestselling book, “Reading Lolita,” which is a very well-written account of what it was like for a literature professor to teach in Tehran during the early 1990s, or before the rise of the reformist elements represented by Mohammad Khatami’s landslide election as president in 1997. No one argues with it’s depiction of life back then, the only gripe raised by many living in Iran today is that the book is basically a historical offering that too many in the West are reading as an accurate description of current events.

In that regard, “Reading Lolita” reminds me of reading pediatric cancer studies when our first-born was undergoing her treatments in the mid-1990s. The problem with all such studies was that they represented a past treatment rule set that no longer existed. A good medical study tended to stretch over several years, meaning it looked at patients who were treated roughly a decade earlier. The analysis generated tended to be far more scary than the current reality of the treatment protocols, because frankly, things had progressed dramatically since then. So I was always wary of reading such articles, because they tended to darken one’s outlook on the future in a disproportional fashion, meaning they exaggerated the dangers your child was actually facing in the here and now.

The same seems to be true of “Reading Lolita”: it’s a great depiction of what was Iran about ten years ago but not what Iran is today. That Iran today isn’t what it was ten years ago doesn’t mean the mullahs still aren’t authoritarian and bad, or dangerous in their pursuit of WMD, but it does mean we need to understand the larger context. As society there increasingly slips out from under the mullahs’ control, it’s only logical that these repressive leaders will seek external opportunities to bolster their regime legitimacy, meaning more confrontations with the West. Understanding that longer-term dynamic helps us realize that Iran’s talk and actions will grow in aggressiveness in direct proportion to their own fears of regime collapse.

That dynamic got us the resurgent Cold War tempo of the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when the Soviets got more adventuresome and ended up getting Reagan as a result. When our push met their shove, the hollowness of their regime revealed itself. Doesn’t mean Reagan “won” the Cold War, but it does mean the guy was right to push back at that point in history.

This is something we need to remember with Iran in coming months and years as they inevitably acquire WMD.

July 19, 2004

What did Buddha say to the hot dog vendor? (reviewing ZenPundit)

Dateline: Amtrak train from Kingstown RI to New York Penn Station, 18 July

I used to employ this joke at the beginning of my mega-brief. I heard it from Phil Hartman during his last appearance on the Tonight Show with Jay Leno. He claimed to have made it up on the drive to the show, but a lot of people say it’s a much older joke than that. You just never knew with Phil . . ..

When I used the joke in the brief, I would simply throw up the question against a black background and wait and wait . . and wait . . . until the audience got a little uncomfortable. Then I’d click the remote and the screen would fill with a shot of the Earth from space (the one Al Gore liked so much) and as it would appear the sound effect from the old movie promos for Dolby Sound would blare and the punch line would materialize below:

Make me one with everything!

Cheesy I know, but it often got a big laugh. Always bigger on the Left Coast than the East Coast, and a great laugh overseas everywhere save one country—India. Gotta be careful with Buddha jokes there.

The point of the delivery was to tell the audience that I was going to cover an insane amount of ground in the brief: not just the 20th century, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War era, but also 9/11, system perturbations as a new model of crisis, a new ordering principle for DoD, a model for how globalization works, the emerging American way of war (and peace), and a grand strategy for the U.S. in the 21st century (making globalization truly global). All that in 90 minutes!

So it made sense to joke about the brief’s insanely ambitious scope.

But I liked the joke on another level. As I have said earlier, I see my material and vision as fundamentally one of peace and balance and a sense of global justice—albeit one informed with a realist’s perspective of war and the role of security in making all that happen. I purposely seek the middle ground, where both the right and the left either find themselves attracted or find me impossible to dismiss casually.

I think both sides seek that middle ground right now. The right, in many ways, needs something to be “conservative” against, meaning it needs an enemy of sorts, and just bitching about diversity, or multiculturalism seems awfully sad as an ideology (Keep the world safe from gay marriage!).

A good article in the Saturday Times looks at this trend: “Young Right Tries to Define Post-Buckley Future,” by David Kirkpatrick, New York Times, 17 July, p. A1. Many young conservatives are wary of Bush’s attempt to transform the Middle East, and yet polls show that young conservatives trust the government in general far more than their parents did a generation earlier. So they’re often meandering somewhere in between a desire to deal with global terrorism in a strong way while not trying to take too much on in terms of government intervention. One brand of logic, marketed by a group of theological conservatives, is summed up by the word “sustainability,” a phrase familiar to anyone—like myself—who worked in the development community in the 1990s, when it became the rage in foreign aid circles. At its most basic, sustainability is about seeing all the connections and having a healthy, almost conservative respect for balance over “great leaps forward.” But the overlap is even stronger than that, because both theological conservatives and the development community in general have a strong focus on community institutions or the general notion of “capacity building.” What makes the ideological approach both compassionate and conservative is that it focuses on private-sector institutions, like churches, as it believes fundamentally that minimal governmental control is the key to empowering people and their communities to look after themselves as much as possible without creating dependencies on the government, aid organizations, etc.

Internally, the conservative approach yields one type of social programs, but externally, it begins to sound an awful lot like nation-building in search of an operating theory of the world, as in, “Where do we put our nation-building dollars so as to have the biggest positive impact on the world?”

And that’s when you begin to see the tie-ins with my work on security—you begin to become “one with the world” by recognizing the imperative of making globalization truly global. You see the flows and you naturally want balance. You want no one left on the outside, noses pressed to the glass. The Global War on Terror, then, quickly starts looking like a very poor stand-in for a grand strategy, as if simply killing the most violent extremists in the way would make this outcome come about all on its own, when you know instinctively that only killing the bad guys in a GWOT is the individual-level version of the Pentagon’s Cold War tendency to think of and define war solely within the context of war, and not within the context of everything else.

Make me one with everything!

So, when I get lumped in with the neoconservatives, I don’t mind so much so long as the vision isn’t simply ghettoized by that distinction. I want my grand strategy to make sense to the neocons, because if it doesn’t, it won’t go anywhere. But I also want it to make sense to the lefties of the left—the serious anything-but-war crowd who’ve been living too long in the dreamworld that says the right mix of foreign aid and trade will bring development to regions suffering serious deficits of security and freedom.

So when the conservative journals review the book, I’m happy, but I’m even happier when the liberal end of the spectrum finds the essential truth in the material, and doesn’t simply write me off as an apologist for the Bush Administration (as I believe the Post and Times have done in not reviewing the book).

So imagine my delight when I’m turned on by my webmaster to the writings of the ZenPundit, who’s taken more than a passing interest in the book. Now remember, more than once I’ve received reviews or emails from people accusing me less of being a warmonger and more of being a closet Buddhist with a dreamy belief in the end of war as we know it (hell, I basically predict it in the book!).

Who is ZenPundit? Just a guy named Mark with a blog.

But more than that, what he does with PNM is what every writer dreams of: he sees so much more in it than other readers—so much so that he can actually elevate above the material and pull more out of it that even I had previously realized.

But enough preamble, let’s dive in with his first post:

ZENPUNDIT @ http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2004/07/pentagons-new-map-handy-guide-to-must.html

Tuesday, July 06, 2004

THE PENTAGON'S NEW MAP - A HANDY GUIDE TO THE MUST-READ FOREIGN POLICY BOOK of 2004

Tom Barnett has written an exemplary book that enunciates something you very seldom see in American public debate—a long-term strategic vision for the United States that gets beyond the crisis de jure. Moreover, it's a strikingly positive vision that can politically connect with the American public across party lines—“Shrinking the Gap" is a clarion call that can supported from liberal humanitarian interventionists to neocons to cold-hearted realists. As a paradigm, this is the Convergence of Civilizations, not the Clash.

Moreover, the PNM builds on the historic American commitment since FDR to freeing markets that every administration has supported since WWII. The Pentagon's New Map, as a concept, represents both innovation for the post-9/11 world and reassuring continuity. Ted Rall and Michael Moore are going to hate it. So will Pat Buchanan. Everyone else however will be willing to give Barnett's ideas at least a serious look.

A Quick and Dirty Guide to PNM Terminology:

The Core: The industrialized, connected to the information economy, mostly peaceful, rule of law abiding, liberal democratic world.

The Old Core: The heart of the core, the old G-7/NATO/Japan states led by the United States.

The New Core: Those modernizing states that decided to join the Core in the 1980's and 1990's - these are not always as liberal, democratic and law-abiding as the Old Core but they have more or less irreversibly committed to moving in that direction—China, India, South Korea, Mexico, Brazil and the like.

The Gap: The Third World regions mostly disconnected economically and politically from the Core. Hobbesian in character, ridden by violence, oppression, poverty and anarchy. Ruled by despots—when ruled by anyone—committed to keeping their nations disconnected as a political survival strategy.

Rule Sets: The explicit and implicit rules that provide the framework by which nations interact and function internally. There is a clash of rule sets between the Gap and the Core and within the Core between Europe which mostly cannot and will not intervene in the Gap to enforce rules and the United states which can and sometimes must.

Connectivity: The degree of acceptance of globalization's many effects and the ability of a nation's individuals to access choices for themselves. Most international hotspots are in the most disconnected parts of the Gap.

Global Transaction Strategy: Barnett's equivalent to "Containment"—a national and Core strategy to "Shrink the Gap" by connecting and integrating into the rule sets of the Core.

I am going to discuss some of Dr. Barnett's more specific observations and recommendations—and where I see caveats—in a subsequent post but overall the PNM is a book that will have an intellectual impact that will be both broad and deep.

What I liked about this initial post was that the ZenPundit actually came up with better definitions of the key terminology than I did in the book. Not different ones, just more elegant and direct. As I said to Mark in a post I left on his blog site:

That's one of the best definitions of connectivity I've ever come across. Wish I used it in the book.

I await your detailed analysis. The convergence of civilizations concept I actually covet. I can't imagine why I never came up with that, especially since Sam is an old professor of mine, and probably the first guy who ever seemed to get me at Harvard.

To say the least, I am fascinated by your review so far. What really makes me feel like I've writen a good book is when I come across something like this and realize that readers can make more of the ideas than I did myself in putting them on paper.

Keep up the good work.

Mark the ZenPundit returns the favor in a follow-on comment:

Thank you very much. I found your book to be extremely stimulating intellectually and I've recommended it to a lot of my friends and colleagues—in fact the delay in my further review is partly due to loaning out my copy of PNM to a friend. You also solved a problem for me regarding the charges of "Empire" against US policy—I knew that was incorrect but I couldn't articulate it very well in the simple way critics like Chalmers Johnson or Paul Schroeder make the accusation. You did & my hat is off to you.

Feel free to use the "Convergence " metaphor. I think cultures quite naturally tend to bleed over into one another memetically with until you get to the mutually incompatible core values—Huntington is looking at that aspect while you are looking at the merging element (Is the glass half-empty or half full?). Islam, which has "bloody borders" has a very limited set of principles but they are unfortunately currently non-negotiable in a way concepts like "democracy" are not.

In a later email exchange, Mark joked about how odd it must be for me to get a positive response from such a lefty Buddhist!

But it isn’t really. As one previous review pointed out, my effort to seek the balance of everything is very Buddhist (or, as I would point out, very Christ-like in his more Buddha-like moments). That’s how so many critical reviewers can laud me for my naïve desire to save the world while simultaneously condemning me as a war-monger and dangerous idealist. I don’t just want war, man, I want it all!

But to want it all is to see it all, which gets me to ZenPundit’s second post on the book:

ZenPundit

Saturday, July 17, 2004

THINKING ABOUT THE PENTAGON’S NEW MAP—CONNECTIVITY AND THE FOUR FLOWS OF GLOBALIZATION

Tom Barnett’s book , The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century is hip deep in concepts which makes it both an intriguing read and a difficult review. But since this is a blog I’m free to tackle the book in parts and today I’d like to look at Barnett’s key concepts of Connectivity and his four flows of globalization that "connect" societies and nation-states into an interdependent whole. If you have a copy of PNM handy I strongly recommend you take a look at Chapter 4 "The Core and the Gap.” It’s the one where Dr. Barnett lays out the war on terror in "the context of everything else"—which is the essence of strategic thinking.

Context is important because it’s what usually gets dropped in these types of discussions because most government experts and academics are by definition niche specialists. They resist moving their arguments and ideas into the realm of everything else because it messes up their crisp clean models with real-world complications in fields where they do not feel nearly so expert. This is a major reason why American national security, foreign policy and even military planning seldom rises above the level of tactical thinking…that is when we are not stuck in crisis management, ad hoc, muddle through mode. American strategic thinkers have been so few—Brooks Adams, Alfred T. Mahan, Woodrow Wilson, Walter Lippmann, George Kennan, Paul Nitze, Herman Kahn, Richard Nixon—that a book like PNM, like Kennan’s " X" article, fills a crucial intellectual gap at the policy planning level of our government.

Dr. Barnett advocates a Global Transaction Strategy to "shrink the Gap" and promote Connectivity to integrate disconnected states into the Core, advancing the process of globalization—and in so doing extending the benefits provided by the "Rule Sets" associated with liberal democratic capitalism and the rule of law, broadly defined. Barnett further refines the enormous historical phenomenon of globalization to "four flows" between the Core and the Gap (p. 192).

PNM MODEL OF GLOBALIZATION

"…four essential elements, or flows, that I believe define its basic functioning from the perspective of international stability. These four flows are (1) the movement of people from the Gap to the Core; (2) the movement of energy from the Gap to the New Core; (3) the movement of money from the Old Core to the New Core; (4) the exporting of security that only America can provide to the Gap."

In other words, Barnett is defining globalization as a dynamic exchange relationship involving migration, resources, money and power.

He further elaborates on his model with "the Ten Commandments of Globalization" (p.199-204):

1. Look for resources, and ye shall find
2. No stability, no markets
3. No growth, no stability
4. No resources, no growth
5. No infrastructure, no resources
6. No money, no infrastructure
7. No rules, no money
8. No security, no rules
9. No Leviathan, no security
10. No will, no Leviathan

"Leviathan" is the enforcer of rule sets, in all practical purposes the United States acting alone, with an ad hoc coalition or through international organizations where we have a preponderant influence.

Dr. Barnett concludes his chapter with a superbly insightful (i.e., I agree with him here 100 %) explanation that conceptually ties together rogue state dictators and non-state actor terrorists into the Gordian Knot of menace that they truly are in reality (p. 205):

" A bin Laden engineers a 9/11 with the expressed goal of forcing the Core to clamp down on it’s borders, seek its energy elsewhere, take it’s investments elsewhere and ‘ bring the boys back home". He wants all of that connectivity gone, because its absence will afford him the chance for power over those left disconnected."

… an explanation that applies equally well to Kim Jong-Il as to the erstwhile master of al Qaida. I'm just wondering why the hell the Bush administration hasn't grabbed this one since they've been struggling to convince their critics (who are invested at treating rogue states, terrorism and WMD as disparate unrelated problems in order to do little about any of them) that the dots that they know in fact to be connected, connect in a comprehensible way.

MY COMMENTS:

My first reaction to the section on the PNM Model of Globalization was that, while Barnett has described the major categorical relationships of globalization, the idea could still face some further refinement in terms of defining globalization (and what connectivity really is) as an action. What exactly is it?

Jude Wanniski once made the brilliant observation in his book, The Way The World Works, that there is and always has been only one market in existence—the global market. Wanniski’s statement implied, correctly in my view, that the term "Globalization" is really describing something other than a new connecting of markets and cultures because they have always been connected to some degree however small. Even North Korea, in its self-imposed lunatic isolation, was never an autarky. The DPRK always had foreign goods, people and ideas—starting with Communism itself—flowing across its borders—the difference was in terms of degree.

Tariffs, immigration quotas, censorship, banking regulations, propaganda, environmental rules, cultural preferences or aversions, borders, police, armies, bureaucratic paperwork and all the other man-made obstacles to Tom Barnett’s "four flows" do not stop the transactions and interactions—they slow them down and limit them to an artificially narrow, politically chosen, rate.

I would therefore define globalization as "the general acceleration of the rate and widening of the parameters of exchange." When we discuss globalization’s effects we are looking at the results of a recent global increase in the speed and the range of human interactions compared to the past, thanks to trade liberalization, the internet, the fall of Communism and the other systemic changes of the last twenty years.

"Connectivity" might be a good way to express the degree to which a nation has maximized their possible rate and range of exchange—the UK is more "connected" than Russia, which in turn is more "connected” than Kazakhstan. If I was more able at quantitative analysis I could probably bat out a reasonably valid, rough and ready 100 point scale to measure a nation’s connectivity in terms of "the four flows" (Unfortunately "…this is a job for…Brad DeLong !" or at least somebody with a Ph.D in Econ). It could be plotted out on a bell curve and at a certain tipping point a nation could be considered "disconnected," which is where you would expect to find many states of the Gap. I would also include the movement of ideas as a "fifth flow" of globalization, particularly scientific ideas but Dr. Barnett was looking at globalization the prism of strategic American and Core interests—hence the movement of people, energy, money and security.

Next post I want to examine the PNM strategy as it relates to China’s connectivity as part of "The New Core". Four years ago, on the H-Diplo listserv, in a post called "The Coming of the Global Hypereconomy," I posited some observations regarding the potentially centrifugal effects of an uneven spread of connectivity with high rates of speed in a nation of the size of China. I'm not certain if I would be as pessimistic today but the post does retain a great deal of congruence.

All I can say is, this guy’s analysis really makes me overtly jealous! Like I was taking a nap or something when I wrote the book!

Again, ZenPundit extends the material, which is enormously exciting to any writer, but especially so to me, given my ambitions. To replace containment as a grand strategy, I needed to enunciate something so all-encompassing and yet fundamentally direct to people’s understanding of how the world works in this age that it could be both readily understood by layman while retaining its coherence under the sort of microscopic analytical deconstruction of the sort that ZenPundit offers. In short, it needs to be both very robust and very flexible, which is hard, because robustness in theory is usually bought at the price of rigidity (great theory, until the crucial flaw is discovered and then it all comes tumbling down). That is why I purposely chose the language of information technology, proving yet again that PNM really began as a serious theorizing effort when I got involved with the Y2K debate (see, Star Trek didn’t teach me everything!).

Other than his fundamental sloppiness with certain aspects of punctuation, I really don’t have any critical comments to offer here on ZenPundit’s exploration of the book. It is quite thrilling to watch someone locate so much “room” inside your thinking, especially when he arrives from the left versus the usual right. Simply put, Mark made my entire weekend during a period in my life when tension is rising.

Which gets me to the reason for this trip: going to NYC to get the visas for myself and Vonne for our upcoming trip to China (so you can imagine how interested I am in ZenPundit’s next post!). The whole adoption process is really just as tense and draining as a pregnancy. I don’t offer that from a women’s perspective, because I don’t have any, but from the prospective of the dad who has lived through both methods now—biological and adoption.

I know, I know, I have a long way to go on this one still—literally. But I have to say, the process provides “both pain and delight” (another ST reference) in measures approaches even the difficult biological pregnancy (as our third one was).

So dad is off to NYC to go through the expedited, same-day visa service at the Chinese Consulate on 12th Street in Manhattan. Meanwhile, back at the ranch, Mom sweats out the final notice from our agency about our actual travel dates (so many summer camps to cancel, so little time).

Here’s the weekend catch:

Iraq: the real transformation begins

“Reporting And Surviving, Iraq’s Dangers: Only when Iraq calms down will it become clear how well its most critical moments were covered,” by Ian Fisher, New York Times, 18 July, p. WK1.

“Two Bombings Aimed at the New Government Kill at Least 6 Iraqis,” by Ian Fisher, NYT, 18 July, p. A10.

“U.S. Diplomat Starts New Job By Deferring to the Iraqis,” by Somini Sengupta, NYT, 18 July, p. A10.

“In Slow Steps, Iraqis Take Their Places in the Ranks of Security Forces,” by Somini Sengupta, NYT, 18 July, p. A11.

“An Elite Squad of Iraqi Soldiers Tests Its Newfound Autonomy,” by Ian Fisher, NYT, 18 July, p. A11.

“In Iraq War, Death Also Comes To Soldiers in Autumn of Life,” by Edward Wyatt, NYT, 18 July, p. A1.

How about a Department for the Gap?

“Never Again, No Longer? Post-9/11, humanitarian intervention has gone out of fashion, and the people of Darfur are paying the price,” by James Traub, New York Times Magazine, 18 July, p. 17.

“Despite Appeals, Chaos Still Stalks the Sudanese,” by Marc Lacey, NYT, 18 July, p. A1.

“9/11 Report Is Said to Urge New Post For Intelligence: C.I.A. and Other Agencies Likely to Fight Idea of Cabinet Job,” by Philip Shenon, NYT, 17 July, p. A1.

The great race between India and China

“A Young American Outsources Himself to India,” by Amy Waldman, NYT, 17 July, p. A4.

“How a Technology Gap Helped China Win Jobs: Beijing moves quickly to overcome India’s advantages in software development,” by William J. Holstein, NYT, 18 July, p. BU9.

“In Fire, Striving India Town Finds Dangers on Path to Modernization,” by David Rohde, NYT, 18 July, p. A1.

“Editor’s Death Raises Questions About Change in Russia,” by C. J. Chiver, Erin E. Arvedlund and Sophia Kishkovsky, NYT, 18 July, p. A3.

Nicholas Kristof at his best

“Jesus and Jihad: Massacres of non-Christians draw a crowd,” by Nicholas D. Kristof, NYT, 17 July, p. A25.

Iraq: the real transformation begins

“Reporting And Surviving, Iraq’s Dangers: Only when Iraq calms down will it become clear how well its most critical moments were covered,” by Ian Fisher, New York Times, 18 July, p. WK1.

“Two Bombings Aimed at the New Government Kill at Least 6 Iraqis,” by Ian Fisher, NYT, 18 July, p. A10.

“U.S. Diplomat Starts New Job By Deferring to the Iraqis,” by Somini Sengupta, NYT, 18 July, p. A10.

“In Slow Steps, Iraqis Take Their Places in the Ranks of Security Forces,” by Somini Sengupta, NYT, 18 July, p. A11.

“An Elite Squad of Iraqi Soldiers Tests Its Newfound Autonomy,” by Ian Fisher, NYT, 18 July, p. A11.

“In Iraq War, Death Also Comes To Soldiers in Autumn of Life,” by Edward Wyatt, NYT, 18 July, p. A1.

I’ve blogged in the recent past about how I think we’ve reached a real tipping point in Iraq with the political handover to the interim Iraqi government. Today’s Sunday NYT offers a slew of supporting arguments, I would argue.

Here’s the opening paras from the first article, an insightful piece from Ian Fisher in the Times’ Week in Review section:

We were cornered last week by a few dozen members of the Mahdi Army, the violent and unpredictable militiamen loyal to the rebel Shiite Muslim cleric Moktada al-Sadr. They were yelling at us—it seemed like all of them at once, these poor, angry young men who two months ago would have chased us away or worse. But this time, the screaming was not about the injustices of America or the glory of jihad but about . . . about . . . about their high school final exams.

“We studied!” bellowed Mahdi Kazal, 20, who wants to study communications (and whose other vision of the future included a threat to kill the new Iraqi minister of education). “There is no water. There is no electricity. But we studied!”

This is the sort of moment that a reporter dreams of stumbling upon, because it was surprising and revealing. But as the violence in Iraq spiked this spring, such scenes had become largely off-limits to Western reporters because it was just too risky to wander around watching the new era in Iraq unfold.

It turned out that many Shiite high school students in Baghdad had flunked final exams, leaving them blocked from applying to college, because of suspected cheating. They said that the accusations were trumped up: that the new government was cracking down on Mr. Sadr by punishing his young followers.

Whatever this says about the Mahdi Army, it was an instructive moment for me, as a reporter here. The young men in the slum of Sadr City were approaching us. We did not feel threatened. They wanted to talk, and not just about the evil of America. They were talking about their futures.

Scenes like this tell you that something in Iraq has shifted, even if it is unclear exactly what or for how long. In the last few weeks, since the new Iraqi government took over, the hair-trigger tension has slackened, and many Iraqis are permitting themselves the luxury of hope in the midst of a long and unpleasant occupation.

That can be the description of an important tipping point, or it can describe yet another—but far slower—descent into disconnectedness. Much will depend now on the economic largesse of the Core—never a good bet.

The other stories speak to themes I’ve raised earlier: that the violence will increasingly be directed at the Iraqi government itself, raising the uncomfortable issue—for the insurgents—of Iraqi-on-Iraqi war. You can call the government “puppets” all you want, but when you’re being egged on by foreign terrorists like Zarqawi, at some point you have to start asking yourself what is the point of Iraqis killing other Iraqis to either please or piss off foreign powers.

More and more it will become harder to justify the violence strictly in terms of the “occupiers.” Our new ambassador John Negroponte will have a profile several godheads lower than Uber-chief Paul Bremer, and as Iraqi troops start doing more and more of the patrols, they end up taking more of the bullets and making more of the kills.

The tipping points won’t all be on their side, however, as the occupation will inevitably change us as much or more than our enemies. Already, we’re seeing a fundamental shift in the tenor of our boots on the ground as this occupation pulls in more and more reservists, who tend to fit my Sys Admin description quite well: older, more educated, married with children.

When they bring grandpa home in a body bag, you know we’re waging a different sort of war this time around—both in terms of the motivation of those on the front lines and the suffering back home that their lost lives trigger.

How about a Department for the Gap?

“Never Again, No Longer? Post-9/11, humanitarian intervention has gone out of fashion, and the people of Darfur are paying the price,” by James Traub, New York Times Magazine, 18 July, p. 17.

“Despite Appeals, Chaos Still Stalks the Sudanese,” by Marc Lacey, NYT, 18 July, p. A1.

“9/11 Report Is Said to Urge New Post For Intelligence: C.I.A. and Other Agencies Likely to Fight Idea of Cabinet Job,” by Philip Shenon, NYT, 17 July, p. A1.

Every time the U.S. engages in anything resembling nation-building, there is a huge recoiling from the effort—within the Pentagon, within the U.S. political system, and within American society writ large. It happened after Vietnam and stuck with us for a couple of decades. But it also happened ever so predictably after Somalia, then Haiti, and it tinged every decision we made across the years in the Balkans.

Just as predictable as the negative reactions to the actual efforts are the non-interventions that follow: like our cut-rate Reagan Doctrine of the 1980s where we sold rebels arms and did nothing else, or our blind eye regarding the “killing fields” of Pol Pot in Cambodia, or our ignoring of the Balkans for so many years, and our general indifference to Africa in general, or our complete non-registering of that half-a-Holocaust that was the dictator-fueled famine in Kim Jong Il’s North Korea in the late 1990s.

God forbid we ever act unilaterally!

The Sudan situation today is just the latest hand-wringer for humanitarian interventionalists—or Democrats with a conscious. These debates are all the same: lots of whining about doing something, brave talk about sanctions and other diplomatic bullshit, and then stone-cold silence when the reality sets in that if you want to stop the disaster you’re going to have to send in somebody with guns to stop the bad guys from doing that voodoo that they do so well—whatever the particular incarnation is.

If we are ever going to get serious about really winning a global war on terrorism, we’ll realize that shrinking the Gap is what deserves a new cabinet-level post, not some intell weenie who can run around Richard-Clarke-like, screaming about the end of the world or the sky is falling!

Creating a cabinet-level czar for intell will solve nothing. It’ll just create someone new, right below the President, to hear a load of conflicting advice and caveats from a dysfunctional CIA and its lesser includeds. That new cabinet position will be all about making America feel good about itself, as if 9/11 and the global war on terrorism was all about us! Our feelings! Our fears! Our needs!

A new Department of Everything Else to go with our stellar Department of War would say to the rest of the world: you matter. But that would be too much of a leap of bureaucratic faith, we are told (even by someone as astute as Sebastian Mallaby writing for the Post recently). No, instead of what we really need to interact with the outside world better, we’re going to get a Chicken-Little-in-Chief.

God help us if we get that numbskull Gary Hart in the job, or even worse, our man with the white bed sheet over his head—Richard Clarke.

You think John Ashcroft is scary, Michael Moore? You ain’t seen nothing until you’ve seen Richard Clarke as the new Intell Czar.

The great race between India and China

“A Young American Outsources Himself to India,” by Amy Waldman, New York Times, 17 July, p. A4.

“How a Technology Gap Helped China Win Jobs: Beijing moves quickly to overcome India’s advantages in software development,” by William J. Holstein, NYT, 18 July, p. BU9.

“In Fire, Striving India Town Finds Dangers on Path to Modernization,” by David Rohde, NYT, 18 July, p. A1.

“Editor’s Death Raises Questions About Change in Russia,” by C. J. Chiver, Erin E. Arvedlund and Sophia Kishkovsky, NYT, 18 July, p. A3.

Neat story about the native American who goes to India looking for a career. You can really tell when a country joins the Core, because then you see fresh young graduates heading there from America itself, in a sort of reverse “new world” phenomenon.

But if India is starting to attract that reverse flow today, China has been doing it for a while, as we’ve seen in previous stories about mid-career types leaving their staid U.S. surroundings for the rough-and-tumble world of China. Heck, remember all those stories about the “wild west” Russia attracting all sorts of adventurers across the 1990s.

The difference with India, though, is telling. This guy isn’t going back to carve out some new industry or sector amidst a “wild west” atmosphere of tectonic shifts. He’s going there for a sense of long-term career opportunity. In Russia, the right sort of questioning attitude in business can still get you a bullet in the head, whereas in India, if enough people ask the same question, you’ll get a peaceful shift in ruling parties (something that’s still hard to imagine in either Russia or China).

So yes, Putin’s got things under control in Moscow and the fourth-generation of Party leaders seem firmly entrenched in red-hot China that is poised to supplant India as THE great back office to the Old Core any day now, but India’s got a rule set that the other two emerging pillars of the New Core do not: they can rotate not just leaders but entire ruling parties, and that speaks to a stability for long-term business that suggests that India’s future may be far brighter than either Russia’s or China’s.

And yes, I see that brighter future at work whenever I read some Triangle-Fire-like story like the one about the private school in India, where almost 100 kids were killed in a disaster that any well-functioning fire code would have prevented. In a situation like that, it’s better to see rules rolling in rather than heads rolling off, as we’d be more likely to see in a China or Russia. In China, the old doc who blew the whistle on the government’s SARS cover-up is getting his mind “reeducated”—one painful day at a time. In Russia, Forbes is looking for a new editor brave enough to write about corruption while wearing a flak jacket.

In India, you’ll see an explosion of government regulations regarding fire codes. Rules will hold sway, not reeducation nor revenge killings.

That’s not to say India doesn’t have its own set of problems, just that it’s farther along in synching its internal rule sets with the emerging global rule sets associated with globalization than either Russia or China is. India rarely gets much credit for that, but frankly, its why India was never seriously mentioned inside the Pentagon since the end of the Cold War as a potential “near-peer competitor” of the U.S., whereas both “resurgent Russia” (in the early 1990s) and “rising China” (since the Taiwan Straits crises of the mid-1990s) frequently were/are.

Good rules, good neighbors—inside this growing Core of the global economy.

Security types now like to crow that America has a “border” with Iraq. Well, we’ve had one with India for a lot longer. We just didn’t notice.

Nicholas Kristof at his best

“Jesus and Jihad: Massacres of non-Christians draw a crowd,” by Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times, 17 July, p. A25.

Brilliant piece from Nick Kristof, who is just hitting his stride as an op-ed columnist, which means he’s about five years from deteriorating into the painful predictability of a Tom Friedman who’s increasingly trapped by his own mega-celebrity.

But for now, I say just enjoy him for all he’s worth.

This piece is about the “Left Behind” series of apocalyptic novels that have sold like hotcakes for years now, even though the entire phenomenon is largely ignored by the establishment press like the Times.

Kristof’s point is a simple one: imagine how America would interpret a publishing phenomenon in the Middle East in which a bestselling series of fictional novels exploring a religious-inspired “end times” theme—say, based in the Koran vice the Bible—culminates in a final book whereby Mohammed comes back to earth and makes every non-Muslim “infidel” explode in flames at the very sound of his voice. Do ya think we might find such a social phenom more than a bit scary?

Well, imagine how the rest of the world might interpret America in light of the unprecedented popularity of the “Left Behind” books.

And then ask yourself if President Bush doesn’t simply give (some of ) us what we really want whenever he lets slip the “C” word.

July 16, 2004

Notes on the Atrocities: dissecting the Gap concept

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 16 July 2004

Yesterday was the tonic required from travel. Picked up two oldest at track camp in Providence and noticed white caps in Hope Bay on way home, so we immediately suited up and rushed to Second Beach in Middletown. We were not disappointed. For the first time this year, just getting to the wave-crest zone was a workout in itself, because you had to plow through or jump over a very vigorous crash zone. This was a day to ride waves, and it did us all some good to do so. We go to the beach about 3X per week (typically just for about an hour or so at dinner time), but this was one of those rare days that happen only about 10X per season, and we caught it right at high tide.

Got the following from Jeff Alworth, who writes at the site "Notes on the Atrocities and other minor indiscretions." He was apparently sent a review copy by Putnam, and here he offers not so much a review of the book as an exploration of the Gap concept spread across two posts. My commentary follows:

Into the Gap (posted 7/14/04)

In the documentary Fog of War, Errol Morris' discussion with former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, McNamara makes an observation about perspective. "The Vietnamese saw us as replacements for the French. They thought we were fighting a colonial war, which was absurd. We saw the Vietnam conflict as an aspect of the Cold War, but they saw it as a civil war." If we had understood the motivation of the enemy, the war might have followed a radically different script. The lesson is that accurately diagnosing the situation is critical to understanding how to address it.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, US foreign policy has been in disarray, in large part because we have failed to diagnose the world situation. This failure is all the more serious following 9/11. In the past 15 years, two models have tried, and both have proven disastrous. Cold-war dead-enders dominated Pentagon strategy following the Soviet collapse, arguing that the emergent threat would be a Soviet analogue--an enormously powerful state; China, for example. Not recognizing the threat of non-state terrorists, this left us blind to the approach of al Qaeda. The shift in policy to the neocon interventionist model, wherein cancer is cut out before it spreads, has proven--if possible--a greater failure.

These failures are the result of faulty diagnosis. What is the threat? What are the intentions of those who threaten us? Thomas Barnett, currently a professor at the Naval War College, may have the answers. This April, he published The Pentagon's New Map (Putnam, $26.95), wherein he describes two worlds the "functioning core," and the "non-integrated gap." As with many astute theories, it's clean and simple. It's a theory he worked on for years, and a rough draft was published in Esquire.

I'll spend the rest of this post describing the diagnosis. Of course, he also has theories about what we should do with the diagnosis, and here I think he's off the mark. I'll discuss that tomorrow.

Rule Sets

Rather than describe the world through ideology or alliances, while working on his theory, Barnett enlarged his field of vision and took a look at globalism. He saw an interesting pattern.

"If we map out U.S. military responses since the end of the cold war, we find an overwhelming concentration of activity in the regions of the world that are excluded from globalization’s growing Core--namely the Caribbean Rim, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast Asia."

--Esquire, March 2003

The resulting map contains countries with absolutely nothing in common with each other. So what about the other half, the part where violence is rare?

Once again, these countries look quite different politically. What they had in common was a de facto "rule set." They all accepted the freedoms and limitations that come with interconnectivity--economic and otherwise. India is a democracy, but it has a caste system that offends equality-minded Americans. Likewise, our loose morals and libertine ways offend Indians. But a larger rule set is in place that allows us to interact. We accept that the interconnectivity of markets, the effects of satellite broadcasts, the internet and so on will bring us challenges to our cultural norm. The rule set allows us to interact even if we don't perfectly agree. (And the result is we both become more like the other--another consequence we're willing to accept.)

But in the violent regions of the world, countries reject these rule sets. They function by different rules and demand that any integration is done on the terms of their own rule set.

The Non-Integrating Gap

According to Barnett, the principal characteristic of the non-integrating Gap (hereafter Gap) is not religion or politics, but disconnectedness.

"To be disconnected in this world is to be kept isolated, deprived, repressed, and uneducated. For young women, it means being kept--quite literally in many instances--barefoot and pregnant. For young men, it means being kept ignorant and bored and malleable. For the masses, being disconnected means a lack of choice and scarce access to ideas, capital, travel, entertainment, and love ones overseas."

--The Pentagon's New Map

As a result of this disconnectivity, life in the Gap is characterized by a number of conditions. Poverty - of 118 countries with incomes less than $3,000, 109 are in the Gap. Poor leadership and oppression - of 48 countries listed by Freedom House as "not free," 45 are in the Gap. Only one in ten Gap states has a stable rotation of leaders. Violence and disease - all of the countries with median ages of less than 20 are located in the Gap; all countries with median ages of 35 or more are in the functioning Core. Life expectancy is low, and crime and war high. Disconnection - communications within the Gap (independent media, internet) are far lower than in the Core.

I think Barnett has hit on a killer app here. It doesn't address individual conflicts or offer guidance on a case-by-case level. Viewing the Israel-Palestine conflict through the lens of the Gap doesn't suggest a course of action. But it is useful in pulling it out of the quagmire of culture, history, and religion--the blinders that have prevented solutions for 50 years. In fact, looking around the globe, using this lens has the same effect of changing the discussion from explosive political rhetoric and directing it toward larger and less volatile possibilities.

The real test is, having diagnosed the problem, can we come up with effective, long-term solutions? Tune in tomorrow for a discussion.

Out of the Gap (posted 7/15/04

Yesterday I began discussing Thomas Barnett's The Pentagon's New Map, wherein he described a model for interpreting global security threat. In the post-9/11 world, as people cast around for theories about what the threats are, where they're coming from, and what to do about them, Barnett is the first person to come up with a credible suggestion to the first two questions.

He believes that the world can be divided between a "functioning core" and a "non-integrated gap" (Gap and Core). What characterizes the Core is implicit agreement about the free flow of goods and information, even though these will challenge cultural, religious, and economic norms. The Gap, by contrast, does not accept this rule set. Instead, volatile leadership enforces a rigid cultural rule set, cutting off the free flow of information and goods, plunging the country into poverty, violence, and disease. It matters little if the rule set is defined by the ruthless secular beliefs of Kim Jong-il or the theocratic dictates of Iranian Ayatollahs. It's not the dogma that distinguishes the Gap, but the disconnection.

As far as diagnoses go, I think Barnett's is the most useful I've encountered. But even if we accept it on the face, then the third question of foreign policy becomes paramount: what do we do about the threats? And here a successful diagnosis of the problem isn't sufficient. In his book, Barnett praised the Iraqi invasion, arguing that it would successfully bring Iraq out of the darkness of Hussein and into the Core. Oops.

In order to begin to bring the Gap into the functioning core, we need to look at things on three levels: broad policy toward the Gap; political institutions to confront states and terrorists in the Gap; and political strategies for specific conflicts within the Gap.

Broad Policy

If the larger issue is not country-specific but a disconnection from the functioning core, the remedy is integration into the world community--using Barnett's language, slowly shifting the rule sets of countries within the Gap. The current approach is a patchwork of NGOs and the UN, operating under the old rule sets of Gap countries as they try to provide basic services to the masses. While this may alleviate suffering individually, it's not going to bring countries out of the Gap. Instead, we need a more radical solution.

What Barnett essentially describes with his "functioning core" rule set is a crude democracy. In democracies, we agree to give up some control to secure other control. We agree to allow non-malicious behavior, no matter whether we agree with it or not, in order to 1) secure the freedom to conduct our own activities, and 2) make larger flows of goods and ideas available. The notion of the UN was a good first effort, but there's neither carrot nor stick there. A more interesting way of providing a stick is an EU-style body. In order to join, you must agree to certain rule sets--and actually, the EU is a great example. But once you join, there are many benefits--the carrot. Such a body could create funds that member nations could access for education, infrastructure, start-up money and so on. The US would spend far less in the long run and accomplish far, far more with these funds than it would building up a massive invasion force.

Political Institutions

Of course, it wouldn't address the North Koreas of the world. The Core, in whatever configuration it chooses, must have a multilateral approach to the most incorrigible states. As we've seen, the UN is an ineffective way of managing these problems. But if the UN is too broad to be useful, US unilateralism is too narrow. To use the language of Barnett, neither one has the credibility to enforce rule sets. The US has no credibility because it appears to be acting in an effort to benefit itself, or at least acting arbitrarily. (Never mind what the intentions of the US actually are--they could be perfectly guileless, but most of the world thinks otherwise. Rule sets depend on agreement.) The UN also lacks credibility because it supports no rule sets--witness the selection of Sierra Leone and the Sudan to the Human Rights Commission. Instead, a credible coalition from the Core must form that can handle the worst abusers. NATO was once a comparable organization, but it's function as a counter to the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact makes it nearly obsolete in the al Qaeda age. It's time for a new institution.

Political Strategies for Specific Conflicts

I'm constantly amazed that when a Rwanda or a Sudan disaster unfolds, the world has no plan to address it. Nations seem insensitive to the danger such disasters represent to their own well-being, never mind the moral imperatives. In bi-or multi-state conflicts like Iraq generally a single country drives the process for its own purposes, not in the interest of the larger Core. The Afghani invasion is a case in point. While the US put together a respectable coalition for the invasion, it was essentially a US project. There was no thought of integration into a larger community, and the larger community abandoned Afghanistan after the invasion as a US reconstruction. Now it has fallen mostly back to the warlords and its danger as a threat to the Core has spiked back up again.

While I would suggest strategies for particular conflicts, the work of creating these strategies needs to be multilateral from the start. Is there any person alive who doesn't comprehend the danger the Israeli-Palestinian conflict represents to the Core? This kind of instability is a global problem as much as it is a national problem. It is clear that the Israelis and Palestinians are incapable of resolving the problem. The US shouldn't be the only country to try to arbitrate--mainly because we've already lost our credibility there. Our intervention isn't designed to enforce a rule set, but the result of confused national politics going back a century.

A new NATO of Core counties needs to develop specific strategies for how it will handle emergent hot spots. In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, it may make more sense to establish interim Core governments to conduct Germany and Japan-style reconstructions. (I don't want to get to focused on the details--the point here is that rule sets should be the foundation of predictable interventions by such a body.)

*

Current US foreign policy is a confused stew of competing agendas. If Bush is re-elected, that confusion will deepen, as neocons and cold war dead-enders battle it out--neither one able to see that the enemies aren't arrayed against us because "they hate our freedom." John Kerry's election may be a step in the right direction. He appears to understand that the global security situation does not hinge on ideology (an "axis of evil"), but arises from instability. He's had the courage to suggest that "America to engage diplomatically in creating alliances that enhance collective security." Working with the Core is a great start. Building supports for long-term projects to integrate countries in the Gap is the next step.

COMMENTARY: I won't quibble with the analysis of the diagnosis in the first post, but in the second post, I come away with the feeling that he hasn't really read the book, but perhaps just skimmed the opening chapters. It's odd, because he suggests that he likes the diagnosis in the first post, but then promises to explore the shortcomings of the prescriptions in the second, only to come up with ideas very similar to my own (suggesting he didn't get all the way through the book). What that tells me is that I've created something akin to a reproducible strategic concept, meaning: if you accept or come up with the same diagnosis of the security environment, then you'll come up with similar solution sets. Saying the EU is a good model is basically saying the US is a good model, because the EU is a slow-motion version of our own integration approach. In effect, the rise of the EU is the franchising of the US globalization model, which is—I believe going to be replicated in China, India, Russia, Brazil, and elsewhere in coming years (internally at first, and then it will network externally). As I say in the book, we need to look at the world as consisting of two types of situations, where people live already in states united, and where they someday will.

To deal with security situations inside the Gap, Alworth wants something not quite US and not quite UN, or what I call the A-to-Z Core-wide rule set on how to process politically-bankrupt states, something I put out on the table in the last chapter.

His last section on specific strategies for particular conflicts calls for a Core-wide NATO, as do I in my "Ten Steps for a Future Worth Creating" in Chapter 8. The concept goes all the way back to the early 1990s for me, as back then I called it a Northern Hemispheric Security Alliance, building off the Baker-Shevardnadze concept of an alliance that stretched from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

So to sum up, this quasi-review works pretty well for me in that it seems to validate the reproducibility of the prescriptions stemming from the diagnosis. Given my strong suspicion that Alworth really hasn't read the book in full, this was sort of blind test.

Here's today's catch:

The misadministration of Iraq

"In Iraq, the Most Coveted Item Now Is a Passport," by Somini Sengupta, New York Times, 16 July, p. A1.

"Iraqi, Not U.S., Cash Spent on Rebuilding," by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, 4 July, p. A1.

"Engines of Industry Sputtering in Iraq: Lack of Market, Materials Bars Progress," by Doug Struck, WP, 10 July, p. A14.

"U.S. Army Changed by Iraq, but for Better or Worse? Some Military Experts See Value in Lessons Learned; Others Cite Toll on Personnel, Equipment," by Thomas E. Ricks, WP, 6 July, p. A10.

Scaring off the global commuters in Iraq

"Philippines Viewed as Being Forced to Yield on Hostage," by Carlos H. Conde, NYT, 16 July, p. A12.

Jiang Zemin's long goodbye in China

"Former Leader Is Still a Power In China's Life: Repressive Effect Seen in Jiang's Long Reign," by Joseph Kahn, NYT, 16 July, p. A1.

"The New Weapon In China's Arsenal: Private Contractors: Once-Lethargic PLA Becomes Stronger Force With Help Of Modern Defense Sector: A Bigger Threat to Taiwan?" by Charles Hutzler, Wall Street Journal, 16 July, p. A1.

The misadministration of Iraq

"In Iraq, the Most Coveted Item Now Is a Passport," by Somini Sengupta, New York Times, 16 July, p. A1.

"Iraqi, Not U.S., Cash Spent on Rebuilding," by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, 4 July, p. A1.

"Engines of Industry Sputtering in Iraq: Lack of Market, Materials Bars Progress," by Doug Struck, WP, 10 July, p. A14.

"U.S. Army Changed by Iraq, but for Better or Worse? Some Military Experts See Value in Lessons Learned; Others Cite Toll on Personnel, Equipment," by Thomas E. Ricks, WP, 6 July, p. A10.

The hottest service provided by the newly sovereign state of Iraq to its citizens is the issuing of passports. Given a choice of staying to rebuild a new Iraq or escaping, a good portion of the population simply want out.

Some of this demand is the logical build-up of being trapped under Saddam's repressive rule for so long, when traveling abroad was basically forbidden or made prohibitively expensive, but a lot of it is simply people wanting a peaceful place to raise their kids. Sound familiar?

Of course, a lot of the demand is from businessmen who want the right to travel around the region for business purposes, and they've basically been stranded throughout the 15-month reign of the CPA, when no passports were issued. But the economic issue driving the demand most is simply the lack of work inside Iraq. As one Iraqi was quoted saying, "If we found work here, we wouldn't be leaving." Or, as another put it, "I am really looking forward to it, I want to make something of my future."

Why are so many ordinary Iraqis not seeing such a future at home? The CPA basically bungled the reconstruction effort. Last year Congress approved $18.4 billion in aid to Iraq for immediate use. At the point of the handover in late June, the CPA had managed to spend only 2% of it. What does this sound like? It sounds like the usual speed at which the last truly centrally-planned economy, otherwise known as the Pentagon, has long operated at in terms of contracting and acquisition.

So no surprise, we took down a regime that basically controlled the entire economy and then dawdled for more than a year in getting new, non-state economic activity flowing in its place. The result was completely predictable: the economy came to a standstill. The only businesses prospering are those who are supplying goods and services in the security realm, such as generating uniforms for the new Iraqi military. Again, the CPA, dominated by a Department of Defense mentality, did mostly that which it knew best: it focused on security generation but ignored the "everything else" of the occupation process, or the restarting of the economy.

Will the Pentagon learn from this? A big question, but I think yes. So much will depend on how the Army interprets the failure of the occupation. If they believe it was all a failure of tactics in dealing with the insurgency, then no. But if the Army understands that what the occupation really lacked was a far more comprehensive understanding of what is really involved in standing back up a devastated economy and society, then yes.

The problem for the Army is, they hate the notion of ever becoming an occupational force, because they fear it saps their warfighting spirit. But the reality for the U.S. military as a whole is, if the Army does not accept that challenge, the warfighting capacity of the entire force will be far more damaged. The transformed Leviathan force we now possess does not really need the Army for much of what it does. What it needs from the Army is the ability to do the "back half" workload a whole lot more. Army does not want to hear this, but until they do, we will not be any more prepared for the next Iraq-style intervention.

Scaring off the global commuters in Iraq

"Philippines Viewed as Being Forced to Yield on Hostage," by Carlos H. Conde, New York Times, 16 July, p. A12.

The Philippines pulls its puny military contingent out of Iraq because insurgents there threaten to executive a civilian Filipino truck driver held hostage there. Did we lose a military ally? No. That presence was strictly for show.

What we really lose is access to the Filipino mobile workforce that came to Iraq in the thousands, filling a slew of crucial job slots.

Why did the Phillipines' PM Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo stop that flow of workers? Here's the correct analysis:

The crisis could also alienate the millions of overseas Filipino workers whose dollar remittance had been propping up the economy for decades but who contended that the government had not done enough to protect them, said Maita Santiago, secretary-general of Migrante, a group of Filipino migrant workers.

This is the real way in which the insurgents' "anti-access asymmetrical strategy" is damaging our occupation effort in Iraq: they grab one Filipino hostage and de-access one of the U.S. military's crucial private-sector labor inputs.

Jiang Zemin's long goodbye in China

"Former Leader Is Still a Power In China's Life: Repressive Effect Seen in Jiang's Long Reign," by Joseph Kahn, New York Times, 16 July, p. A1.

"The New Weapon In China's Arsenal: Private Contractors: Once-Lethargic PLA Becomes Stronger Force With Help Of Modern Defense Sector: A Bigger Threat to Taiwan?" by Charles Hutzler, Wall Street Journal, 16 July, p. A1.

Jiang Zemin, great leader of the 3rd generation of Chinese leadership, gave up his posts as party chairman and president of China to Hu Jintao in 2002, but he kept control of the military as sort of a Secretary of Defense-plus. This has given him a lasting power in all matters of foreign and national security policy. His continuing focus on the need to prepare for war with the U.S. over Taiwan is a dangerous one that not only introduces unnecessary uncertainty in what should be an emerging strategic partnership with the United States, but likewise keeps the People's Liberation Army shielded from the budgetary pressures it should logically face as the newly installed fourth generation of leadership seeks to deal with the stubborn reality of rural poverty in booming China. Also, Jiang is a constant influence against further transparency emerging in China, as evidenced by his hard-line cover-up approach to the SARS epidemic.

Of course, many security experts in the West will cite his lasting influence as further evidence of the looming strategic danger posed by the PLA, but that's a bit of a stretch. Jiang is more about cementing his "grand legacy" that truly seeking a military clash with the U.S. over Taiwan, and he's simply leveraging his position as head of the military to remain a power within China's ruling elite.

As for the great evidence of China's "leapfrogging" thanks to private contractors, I wouldn't read as much into that as Defense Department China watchers will. The PLA was forced to get out of the business of self-financing through the production of consumer goods a while back, and so they're logically moving toward greater reliance on commercial technology to modernize their forces because they have to be smarter now with their money. Watching this "leapfrogging" process in the military is a lot like watching their space program emerge: it's largely a catching-up phenomenon, not a great leap forward. So China finally got a man in space. Whoopy-do! They also just got encrypted emails for the PLA. Holy cow!

So yeah, the PLA is seeking to modernize, and yeah, they're relying on commercial-off-the-shelf more and more, but that just means they're following the example of the U.S. military, whose R&D budget alone is roughly equivalent to the entirety of the PLA budget. So again, a little perspective is in order here.

July 15, 2004

Catching my breath and gearing up for China

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 15 July

One of those weeks when you've past the 50-hour mark and it's only Wednesday.

Good to be back home, as invigorating as the meetings at Central Command and Special Operations Command were the past few days. Time to get the car tuned, pick my kids up at camp, hit the waves with them and score some ice cream.

But also more plans and preparations for our upcoming trip to pick up adopted daughter and child #4 Vonne Mei Ling. Waiting for exact dates of travel from our agency, and then a slew of preparations get kicked in very quickly, including a quick trip to NYC to the Chinese consulate to get the visas.

Other good news from China in the making: three major publishing houses make offers on PNM and we're zeroing in on a decision. To go to China knowing that my book is being translated for publication there even as I walk its streets will be pretty cool.

Short-haul run today:

Exactly how Iraq fades away

"10 In Baghdad Die As Suicide Blast Shatters a Calm: Assassination In North; Iraq Chief Calls Bombing Insurgents' Response to New Crackdown," by Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, 15 July, p. A1.

Gap cliché is the leader who can't lead but won't leave

"Mubarek the Pharaoh: Egyptians want an elected president—with term limits," by Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Wall Street Journal, 15 July, p. A10.

K.I.S.S. works in A.I.D.S.

"Fixed-Dose Mixtures of Generic AIDS Drugs Prove Effective: Results of the first large study in poor nations hold promise of simpler therapy," by Lawrence K. Altman, NYT, 15 July, p. A3.

Science matters across all Four Flows of globalization

"Bush Faces Challenge From Scientists: Administration Is Criticized for Its Use of Information in Divisive Issues: Republicans note the president supports research on hydrogen fuels, nanotechnology," by Antonio Regalado, WSJ, 15 July, p. A4.

Marriage amendment: it's the thought that counts

"Winning While Losing: Bush Refines Position on Gay Marriage," by Richard W. Stevenson, NYT, 15 July, p. A19.

Siemens to competitors: My Chinese are better than your Chinese

"Vaunted German Engineers Face Competition From China: Siemens Taps Beijing for Help In Designing New Phone; Wanted: Flashier Models: 'Leopard' Leaps Into Fray," by Matthew Karnitschnig, WSJ, 15 July, p. A1.

Exactly how Iraq fades away

"10 In Baghdad Die As Suicide Blast Shatters a Calm: Assassination In North; Iraq Chief Calls Bombing Insurgents' Response to New Crackdown," by Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, 15 July, p. A1.

How Iraq becomes another Afghanistan in the popular imagination of the American public is captured in this article: "naked aggression against Iraqi innocents" with American troops increasingly on the sidelines, behind base security fences. Our troops will continue to kill Iraqi insurgents, but we'll be operating more and more from defensive positions over time. For example:

In western Iraq on Wednesday, American marines killed more than 20 guerrillas near Ramadi, Lt. Col T.V. Johnson, a Marine spokesman, said the guerrillas struck at the marines with rocket-propelled grenades and homemade explosives. The marines suffered no casualties. Colonel Johnson called the engagement "a failed complex attack."

Yes, we will continue to lose people regularly (3 deaths were confirmed yesterday, two in a traffic accident), and yes, the terrorist will drive out the weaker coalition members like a Philippines, but it will mostly be Iraqis killing Iraqis and the U.S. keeping it from getting out of hand while the Allawi government slowly reestablishes control over the countryside. Not pretty, but increasingly not the election driver that the Democrats and Michael Moore were hoping for.

This is why Kerry and Edwards as the "sunshine boys" is important: I maintain that the most optimistic (as perceived by the voters) candidate always wins. Of course, Bush is going to play that game with great gusto as well, so it will be interesting to watch this careful dance unfold between the two camps over the coming weeks.

Gap cliché is the leader who can't lead but won't leave

"Mubarek the Pharaoh: Egyptians want an elected president—with term limits," by Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Wall Street Journal, 15 July, p. A10.

Hosni Mubarek is now the third-longest serving ruler in Egypt's 4,000 years of recorded history, and what does this country have to show for it?

Well, it is a quiet place among Middle Eastern states, without any significant militants threat, but it's also a largely stagnate society that is poorly connected to the global economy. No free media really exists, as everyone there turns to the BBC and al Jazeera for news about their own country, a sure sign of strong disconnectedness. Instead, what Egyptians enjoy is their 23rd year in a row of a government-declared "state of emergency."

Here's the best bit in the op-ed:

In May, Egyptians had experienced another jolt when the minister of youth and spot assured the nation that Egypt had sewn up enough votes on the FIFA Executive Board to host the 2010 soccer World Cup. When the vote was finally cast, South Africa was first with 14 votes, followed by Morocco with 10. Egypt was last—with zero votes. To many Egyptians, this was as serious a calamity as the 1967 military defeat at the hands of Israel. The World Cup debacle, ironically, has become a rallying cry for the Egyptian opposition, not for dumping this or that minister but for a total "regime change."

Remember my story in PNM about Nigeria's attempt to host the Miss World competition? This is very similar and equally as embarrassing for the regime: it's basically the world saying Egypt couldn’t be trusted with something as important as the World Cup, and who can blame FIFA? Would you pick a country under its 23rd year of a "state of emergency"?

Mubarek is a classic "Big Man" who needs to go, not so much because he's a bad leader but because having a leader for that long is—in itself—very bad for the political, social, economic, and security evolution of the country. It simply deadens the soul, and scares off the rest of the world from pursuing the connectivity it otherwise might desire to enable. Ultimately, Egyptians themselves lose out the most.

K.I.S.S. works in A.I.D.S.

"Fixed-Dose Mixtures of Generic AIDS Drugs Prove Effective: Results of the first large study in poor nations hold promise of simpler therapy," by Lawrence K. Altman, New York Times, 15 July, p. A3.

So now we're getting ever more solid evidence that the three-in-one pills that employ generic brands work just as well as the brand name drugs taken individually according to far more complex schedules and at much higher cost. The date comes from Doctors Without Borders. The combo tested by the docs was the same one advocated by the World Health Organization, which to me signals a solid emergence of a new global rule set on the treatment of AIDS. For the Bush Administration to fight against this emerging conventional wisdom on behalf of Big Pharma simply won't work in coming years, no matter how much those giant pharmaceuticals support its campaign.

Expect some serious backtracking by this White House if reelected, and expect Big Pharma to get pissed off as a result, but the writing is on the wall.

Science matters across all Four Flows of globalization

"Bush Faces Challenge From Scientists: Administration Is Criticized for Its Use of Information in Divisive Issues: Republicans note the president supports research on hydrogen fuels, nanotechnology," by Antonio Regalado, Wall Street Journal, 15 July, p. A4.

I'll skip the contents and the debate and focus on just one quote from Kerry economic adviser Jason Furman: "If you look at the four core issues—jobs, health care, energy and security—science plays a really important role in all."

I get asked a lot about why technology isn't one of my Four Flows in the globalization model (admittedly reductionist) that I offer in PNM. My stock answer is that I can't track a coherent flow in this regard, because technology seems to be everywhere and in everything. If I match FDI to jobs creation in the global economy (very solid link), migrations to health care issues (we're learning that link more and more with AIDS, SARS, etc), and then take energy and security at face value, I basically find my Four Flows in this guy's analysis, which I think is dead on.

Marriage amendment: it's the thought that counts

"Winning While Losing: Bush Refines Position on Gay Marriage," by Richard W. Stevenson, New York Times, 15 July, p. A19.

The effort to shove the anti-gay marriage amendment through the Senate never had a chance, but that was never the point for the Bush White House—simply making clear the President's election-year stance was the real point of the entire endeavor.

Bush goes out of his way to say he's against laws restricting same-sex relations, but that he's unwilling to let traditional marriage be redefined. It's not a position much different from Kerry's, to be honest, just a whole lot more forcefully stated, which is why we witnessed the Senate effort this week, doomed as it was from the start.

Polls show most people in the country are not in favor of gay marriage, but that it’s not a hot election-year issue for most, except the fundamentalist far-right. So Bush loses the vote in the Senate, but energizes the base, and gains yet another chance to pin Kerry on his careful both-sides-of-the-fence language.

I think we're going to watch this dynamic again and again in this election. Not really dirty or unfair, but awfully consistent and fairly damaging. Why? Bush has solid ranks in both houses of Congress willing to push issues like this on his behalf in various venues, while the Democrats tend to be far more scattered all over the dial. This strategy is going to be hard for Kerry to overcome, leaving the conclusion that this race, like most reelection campaigns, is strictly a Bush-vs-Bush affair. In that regard, "Fahrenheit 9/11" is a pretty good microcosm of the whole thing: Kerry's not even mentioned in it.

Siemens to competitors: My Chinese are better than your Chinese!

"Vaunted German Engineers Face Competition From China: Siemens Taps Beijing for Help In Designing New Phone; Wanted: Flashier Models: 'Leopard' Leaps Into Fray," by Matthew Karnitschnig, Wall Street Journal, 15 July, p. A1.

During the Cold War the old joke went that the U.S. got ahead of the Soviets on nuclear bombs because "our Germans were better than their Germans," meaning we captured the pick of the litter from the collapsed Nazi regime that had worked pretty hard on the bomb, missile technology and the like.

What's so amazing about this story of Siemens AG, the classic German technology giant, turning to a slew of young engineers in Beijing to design their next generation cell phone, is that we could all be making similar jokes about the Chinese.

Li Tao, a 33-year-old engineer for Siemens AG, unfolded a silver, clamshell-shaped mobile phone and broke into a grin as the orange lights in its frame began flashing.

"It's unique," he said with an excited laugh.

What's more remarkable about the handset, nicknamed "Leopard," is its birthplace. It was developed not at Siemens' headquarters in Munich, but in a white six-story building on the outskirts of Beijing, by Mr. Li and a crew of young Chinese engineers.

Siemens' decision to turn east for engineering know-how represented a big gamble for a company that has relied on the ingenuity of its German engineers for more than 150 years. It also reflected one of Germany's biggest economic challenges ever: The erosion of its dominance in engineering, long the lifeblood of the world's third-largest industrialized economy and a source of cultural pride.

For years, Germany, like many other countries, lost manufacturing jobs to China and other low-wage countries in Asia and Eastern Europe. But its engineering sector remained a safe haven, one of the few areas where the country could hold its own globally. Highly paid German engineers proved their worth with a steady stream of innovations, including the world's fastest train, designed by Siemens and ThyseenKrupp AG.

Now engineering jobs are beginning to move abroad as well.

The U.S. has the most researchers and spends the most in R&D, with the EU second in both categories, but China is now # 3 in researchers (with Japan fourth) and is closing in on Japan in terms of R&D. When broken out alone, Germany is nowhere near the totals of either China or Japan in researchers, and has already been eclipsed in R&D spending by China.

That, my friends, signals the emergence of a new rule set in science and technology.

At the center of the universe in Tampa

Dateline: SWA flights from Tampa through BWI to Providence, 14 July 2004

Last of four days with Special Operations Command, where our “experts” group briefs out our first workshop’s worth of ideas on strategy in the Global War on Terrorism to the command. Not a bad start, and the senior leadership seems happy with the broader perspective we’ve brought to the problem set. We leave with a set of questions to work on over coming months and a promise to reconvene again back down in Tampa sometime before the end of the year. I don’t think we did any harm, and I think we opened up a few minds—including all of our own as we encountered one another in this diverse array of expertise.

It was sort of odd, because I had as much or more experience of working with the military than anyone else in the group save one, and that’s not usually how it works for me. Typically, I’m more the idea hamster in a fairly military audience, whereas here I was more the voice of reason and practicality from the military perspective. Over the course of the four days, I said my peace but didn’t exactly push my agenda because I knew I was the only person there who actually had a grand strategic package of ideas for the future of U.S. military power already sitting in the staff’s hands in the form of the book.

Of course, with a distinguished crew like this, we’re talking about everyone having a book (or books) or some series of reports/studies, but I was the only one with a comprehensive approach looking at the world from the Pentagon out, meaning something that talked structure of forces and command, operational and strategic applications, and the enunciation of a grand strategy, within which the Global War on Terrorism is but a minor subset. So for me, at least, the discussion of how to wage and win a GWOT was awfully narrow, because I don’t see the world revolving around al Qaeda, or the number one strategic goal of the United States being either the killing of terrorists or the prevention of more terrorists from joining the fight. To me, those are tactical realities and operational guidelines—not a serious component of a grand strategy.

That’s not to say I didn’t learn a ton about terrorists, terrorism, and the Middle East in this workshop, because I did. I also learned a lot about the GWOT’s parameters and potential pathways, but not to the extent that I came away from the experience consumed by its vision. There will always be terrorists, and we will always be fighting them (as we have in the past). At some points in this conflict those struggles will appear to take center stage, operationally speaking, but never strategically speaking. The strategic agenda is really one of shrinking the Gap and making globalization truly whole, and eliminating those who stand—ready to employ violence—in the path of that historical unfolding does not constitute the bulk of that strategy nor define it in any meaningful way. It is merely a crucial task. The progressive integration of the Gap is far more ambitious and complex a series of tasks than the GWOT will ever become, even as we casually employ that phrase as a poor descriptor of the overarching goal we truly seek.

My personal inputs to the final outbrief were all ones I’ve used in mass media appearances on in this weblog, with the exception being my specific advice on the institutional challenges that inevitably lie ahead for Special Operations Command as the GWOT unfolds.

I may get back and give the brief to select people in SOCOM prior to the end-of-year second workshop, but I’m sure I’ll be doing it for Central Command sometime this fall. Right after the outbrief to the Deputy Commander of SOCOM, I was whisked away to CENTCOM’s headquarters, also at MacDill AFB, for a quick meeting with quartet of senior officers in the policy and planning division. To say the least, that was a fascinating discussion. Almost immediately I find myself deep into the material I know will constitute the Son of PNM, and I can’t wait to get back there for more conversations and—hopefully—the right briefing audience. Of course, if anyone in the U.S. military has their hair on fire 24/7, it’s these guys, what with both Afghanistan and Iraq in their area of responsibility, plus Egypt, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel-PA, Iran, and Pakistan. If that’s not the center of the pol-mil universe right now, I don’t know what is.

Coming out of a series of meetings like that is pretty heady stuff. I’ve never met such senior people into two commands like that all in one trip, much less one morning. All I can say is two things: 1) PNM is finding an audience in all the right places in MacDill; and 2) these are some of the best people you’ll ever meet in this business—sharp as tacks, honest about what they know and don’t know, and as self-aware of the world around them as you could ask for. We really do have the best military leadership in the history of the world.

Notice I don’t say political leadership, not that that’s my main point . . ..

But a day like today makes me think it simply will never be possible for me to ever get out of this business entirely—or at least for any great length of time. The work is too important, the people are too good, and the historical stakes are simply too high to ignore. At this point I really should never again complain that my career didn’t get a chance to unfold at an important juncture of world history.

Long delays on my flights home mean I have time to explore plenty of articles today.

Here’s the catch:

Targeting the at-risk-of-terrorism population

“Saudi militant on video gives up: Bin Laden aide may help track him down,” by Barbara Slavin, USA Today, 14 July, p. 1A.

The back half of regime change: not easy for UN either

“Kosovo Report Criticizes Rights Progress by U.N. and Local Leaders,” by Nicholas Wood, New York Times, 14 July, p. A5.

Helping a country of AIDS-orientation

“Early Tests for U.S. in Its Global Fight on AIDS,” by Deborah Sontag, Sharon Lafraniere and Michael Wines, NYT, 14 July, p. A1.

Billionaire’s trial: Russia both jittery and settling down

“Billionaire’s trial unsettles Russian’s economy: Investors, business leaders have serious case of jitters,” by Bill Nichols, USA, 14 July, p. 10B.

Europe exporting some rule sets of its own?

“European gay-union trends influence U.S. debate: Lawmakers look to other nations,” by Noelle Knox, USA, 14 July, p. 5A.

That time of year for the long-term survivor

“Efforts Mount to Make Cancer Treatment Less Toxic: New Drugs Aim to Reduce Side Effects of Chemotherapy; Protecting a Child’s Hearing,” by Amy Dockser Marcus, Wall Street Journal, 14 July, p. D1.

Targeting the at-risk-of-terrorism population

“Saudi militant on video gives up: Bin Laden aide may help track him down,” by Barbara Slavin, USA Today, 14 July, p. 1A.

The Saudis offer a month-long amnesty period for terrorists to turn themselves in. So far three have done it, but the one who came in from the cold yesterday outta Iran was somebody special: the very same guy who is seen celebrating 9/11 with Osama bin Laden in the famous post-tragedy tape.

This guy is both pretty beat up and pretty much out of the mix, and yet the Saudi program speaks to something I learned at the workshop at SOCOM: we’re not probably going to convert any terrorists, but we can prevent the at-risk population from succumbing to the group peer pressure that drives these collective acts of self-sacrifice. Offering amnesties and having guys come in from the cold is a powerful example to that at-risk population: it says that it’s a rough life with little reward and that given the chance to give it up, some will with little regret and more than a little desire for redemption.

Terrorists really fight and die for each other as much or more than for the cause. It is a supremely communal environment, much like the military itself, where guys fight for each other and not abstract ideals. The weak links in both processes are the larger circles of friends and family who must tacitly support the choices made by such warriors. Discredit the act and it becomes hard to recruit terrorists.

On the other hand, you might say the same about Michael Moore’s “Fahrenheit 9/11” and it’s impact on the U.S. military.

So I guess both sides have their at-risk populations, leaving us to judge which side has the better cause.

The back half of regime change: not easy for UN either

“Kosovo Report Criticizes Rights Progress by U.N. and Local Leaders,” by Nicholas Wood, New York Times, 14 July, p. A5.

A report from the Ombudsman Institution in Kosovo, a branch of the UN mission there, says that both NATO and the UN have failed miserably to create a stable and secure situation there. This is the fourth annual report, and it cites the inability of the occupation force (dare I call it that?) to “achieve even a minimal level of protection of rights and freedoms, in particular for the province’s Serbian minority.”

Yes, they’ve done many good things, like create a police service, courts, a parliament and local councils, and power has definitely flowed to lower-level politicians in the formerly authoritarian system, but without basic security, none of that matters as much as you might think. When rampaging mobs of ethnic Albanians attack Serbian villages, you’re right back in the 1990s in the Balkans, just with different people suffering this time.

So before either NATO or the UN criticize the U.S.-led coalition’s efforts in Iraq too much, or before Americans get too excited by the notion that the UN will eventually take over certain aspects of the situation there, let’s be clear that the “second half” is a hard game to play anywhere inside the Gap.

Helping a country of AIDS-orientation

“Early Tests for U.S. in Its Global Fight on AIDS,” by Deborah Sontag, Sharon Lafraniere and Michael Wines, New York Times, 14 July, p. A1.

This is a good article on a very complex subject, meaning the causality behind this story isn’t easy to capture. People like to criticize the Bush Administration roundly on their AIDS policies, and there is plenty to criticize, but the true picture is always a complex one.

Here’s a couple of long excerpts from this great story:

The Bush administration did not consult with Mozambique last year before designating the country as a beneficiary of its emergency AIDS plan. Mozambique was simply informed that it would be one of the 12 African nations, and 15 countries overall, awarded substantial financial assistance.

The pledge of big money was certainly welcome, said Francisco Songane, the Mozambican health minister; AIDS has lowered life expectancy in Mozambique to 38. But the approach, perceived by many Mozambicans as arrogant and neocolonial, was not.

Mozambique, in southeastern Africa, had spent considerable time developing a national strategy to combat its high rate of H.I.V. infection. Other international donors had agreed to pool their contributions and let the Mozambicans control their own health programs. Thus, Mozambican officials recoiled when the Americans said earlier this year, “We want to move quickly, and we know that your government doesn’t have the capacity,” Mr. Songane said.

The Bush administration wanted the bulk of its funding to go toward more costly brand-name antiretroviral drugs for treatment programs run by nongovernmental organizations. But Mozambique had already decided to treat its people with 3-in-1 generic pills, which were cheaper and simpler to take. Also, Mozambique did not want an American program dependent on costly foreign consultants, NGO’s, and the largesse of foreign political leaders, that would run parallel to its own.

There were confrontational meetings in Washington and in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. And in the end, to the surprise of many, the Bush administration agreed to give Mozambique the kind of help it really wanted, by strengthening its laboratories, blood-transfusion centers and the Health Ministry itself—albeit indirectly, through a grant to Columbia University.

“What I witnessed in Mozambique was a disaster averted,” said Dr. Steven Gloyd, an international health specialist at the University of Washington who works with Mozambique. “So, for countries like Mozambique, this may turn out to be a positive intervention even though it could be a lot more.”

Seventeen months after President Bush announced his five-year, $15 billion emergency AIDS initiative, the program is belatedly getting under way, and surprising some critics of what is seen as its go-it-alone approach. In some cases, the plan is proving to be more adaptive and collaborative than had been expected, especially when countries are strong enough to stand their ground.

The plan is already directing considerable money into health clinics, laboratories, testing centers and hospices, AIDS treatment, prevention of H.I.V. and care of orphans.

For every Mozambique, however, where Washington has altered its plans to meet local objections, there is a Zambia, where local officials are in the dark.

[break]

After decades when the pandemic in Africa spread unchecked, billions in anti-AIDS money is suddenly pledged to assist the continent, and questions about how to channel that outpouring have taken center stage. The administration’s ADIS effort is under sharp scrutiny because it is so big, so unabashedly Washington-dominated and tinged by the administration’s political ideology.

Many critics see big pharmaceutical companies behind the Bush administration’s preference for costlier brand-name drugs, conservative Christians behind its heavy promotion of abstinence, and hard-line unilateralists behind its decision to bypass the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in creating its own plan.

Not perfect, typically American, but somehow adapting and working when the government involved can stand up for itself. Mozambique was a Soviet client state in the early 1980s, and thus a target of the Reagan Doctrine of supporting anti-communist rebels in Central America, Africa, and Southwest Asia. We never did dislodge the authoritarian regime; it just moderated somewhat on its own, largely in response—I believe—to the demonstration effect of South Africa’s peaceful transition to post-apartheid rule. Now this former “country of socialist orientation” is a country with a major AIDS orientation, and guess who’s there to help? The Americans, who sometimes display their penchant for short memories in the best of ways.

Billionaire’s trial: Russia both jittery and settling down

“Billionaire’s trial unsettles Russian’s economy: Investors, business leaders have serious case of jitters,” by Bill Nichols, USA, 14 July, p. 10B.

The news from Russia is both bad and good: bad in the short-term but good over the longer haul. Bad news first:

Financial analysts warned after the arrest of oil billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky on tax charges last fall that the appearance of a government vendetta against Russia’s richest man could chill foreign investment and choke Russia’s revitalized economy.

As Khodorkovsky’s trial resumed this week and his company, Yukos Oil, faces possible bankruptcy, Western business leaders in Moscow say those fears have not yet been realized. But that doesn’t mean Russia’s business class doesn’t continue to suffer from a persistent case of the jitters—a state of nervousness that has only increased in recent weeks.

“Day to day, we’re fine. Everyone is happy, and we think it’s a relatively stable place to do business,” says Heidi McCormick, general director of General Motors in Russia. “We’ve never been picked out or picked on …. but there’s no doubt that that kind of capricious behavior remains possible.

More potential storm clouds have crept onto the Russian economic horizon in recent weeks, as Yukos has been pressed to pay a $3.4 billion back-tax bill that could force it into bankruptcy. Bailiffs began work last week to freeze Yukos accounts in Siberia after the firm missed a dealine to pay the 2000 tax bill. A claim for $3.3 billion for 2001 has also been made.

The twin spectacles of Khodorkovsky’s continuing legal peril and the potential demise of a company that accounts for 20% of Russia’s foreign oil sales and nearly 4% of its gross domestic product may be having an effect on investors.”

Meanwhile, Russia’s overall economic statistics look great. GDP growth was 3.2% in 1999, and it’s 7.3% last year. The percentage of the population in poverty was 40% in 1999, but drops to 25% by 2003, which is a huge shift. Inflation was 86% in 1999, but only 12% last year. Unemployment was 12.4% in 1999, but down to 8.4% in 2003. Exports are up by roughly 2/3rds and imports are up by almost double. Finally, the average monthly wage was $62 in 1999, but has roughly tripled to $!80 as of last year.

With that sort of recovery, you can see why business trusts Putin even as this scary trial unfolds: As one Caterpillar exec puts it: “Things have improved enormously. Putin may not be doing things the way the West wants it done, but he’s done a lot to bring the system back in line.”

So we keep some perspective on Russia as this legal drama continues to unfold.

Europe exporting some rule sets of its own?

“European gay-union trends influence U.S. debate: Lawmakers look to other nations,” by Noelle Knox, USA, 14 July, p. 5A.

One way that new rules begin and then spread throughout our union is that one state invents them, tries them out some, and then copycatting begins by others. Eventually, enough experience is accumulated that more and more states adopt the new rules, and then the courts do the rest, smoothing out the differences, rough spots and the like. Of course, loads of new rules get shot down along the way, either by state courts or federal ones, but some go all the way to the top and gain constitutional protection under one of the existing amendments, like the right to privacy or the pursuit of happiness.

This process has begun with gay marriages in the U.S., but it began much earlier in Europe, another great collection of “member states” with a tendency for copycatting each other’s new rule sets. The fact that Europe has a significant body of experience on gay marriages is having a serious influence over the unfolding of the rule-set clash that’s now becoming a political football during this national election.

For example, the Netherlands and Belgium have recognized gay marriage for a total of 4 years between them. Then there’s a host of others (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, Iceland, Hungary, Spain, France, Germany, Portugal, Switzerland, Finland, Croatia, Poland and Scotland) that have recognized civil unions for a total of 83 country-years among them.

This experience pool is not to be sneezed at, so expect to hear more about it as this debate unfolds—from both sides in this debate.

That time of year for the long-term survivor

“Efforts Mount to Make Cancer Treatment Less Toxic: New Drugs Aim to Reduce Side Effects of Chemotherapy; Protecting a Child’s Hearing,” by Amy Dockser Marcus, Wall Street Journal, 14 July, p. D1.

My daughter Emily was diagnosed with cancer ten years ago last week—8 July 1994 to be exact. Found the strange lump circling her abdomen like a shark fin on 3 July back in Boscobel WI, my home town. Next day flew her back to Washington, saw our pediatrician on the 5th and did the abdominal ultrasound on the morning of the 8th. Got the call than noon and we were rushing to Georgetown University Hospital within minutes. One kidney came out the following morning and the fight was on.

About 500 days later and it was basically over, but then the next phase began—survivorship. Emily is now a ten-year survivor post-diagnosis and eight-and-a-half years post treatment. She is what the pediatric oncology field calls a long-term survivor, one of roughly 250,000 in the U.S.

Back in the mid-1990s, we were pioneers of those procedures and treatments that were just coming online at that time, the biggies being new forms to reduce the side-effects of radiation treatments (special fractionated doses that were almost “beamed” into the body using lasers targeting off of specially-place tattoos on her body) and the rise of newer nausea-treatments (delivered around the clock in new portable spring pumps), plus the whole idea of doing the vast majority of chemotherapy treatments in the home versus the hospital (we had a homecare nurse that administered roughly 80% of the chemo in our living room, and Vonne and I actually administered the nausea and blood-growth hormone shots ourselves—along with performing most of her blood draws via her permanent catheter).

When Em was getting her treatment in those days, we knew that she was receiving far more calibrated—meaning actually smaller—doses of key chemo therapies than those who went before her. The unintended “over-dosing” of previous generations of peds onc kids were subsequently found to have created lasting “late effects” that led to secondary cancers and other difficulties.

“Late effects” is such a great phrase, as if the complication that emerges is sort of apologetic: “Oh, I’m sorry, I would have been here on time but I’m afraid I’m running late. I hope you don’t mind if I greatly diminish the quality of your child’s life.”

Of course, when chemo really took off in the 1950s, docs were simply happy to be able to kill cancers and keep kids alive. It wasn’t until they started to keep great numbers alive and those children grew up that the field began to question the dosage rates, meaning they started experimenting with how little chemo they could get away with and still eradicate the cancer. I mean, hell, a five-year-survival rate doesn’t exactly mean a lot when you’re diagnosed at age two, as Emily was.

Well, we knew Em was benefiting from all the kids who OD’d—so to speak—before her. But we didn’t kid ourselves: we knew that years from then we might find out that Em herself had been exposed to certain drugs or certain levels of drugs that later would be found to be excessive. That’s just the way it is: the docs calibrate and calibrate and analyze and analyze, and it gets better and safer and more successful for each generation of survivors.

Em received adriamycin-D, also known as doxorubicin, along with two other chemo therapies. Adriamycin was the scariest drug she received because it had the biggest capacity to kill her on the spot through an overloading toxic reaction. It also had the biggest chance of rapidly degrading a key organ—her heart. It did neither during the chemotherapy protocol of 65 weeks (completed over 67 weeks with two, one-week suspensions—an amazing record as any peds onc doc will tell you).

And yet, Vonne and I remain haunted by that drug. It has shown the capacity to kill long-term survivors many years later, usually under conditions of great heart strain—like the labor associated with the birth of a child (as nasty as that sounds). So even as 5-year-survivor rates for all cancer patients rises to 64% today from 59% in the early 1990s when Em was diagnosed, none of that really matters to a 12-year-old who wants to live forever. Emily could conceivably hit the century mark as a cancer survivor, and I’d love to see her do it—in person.

So it’s once again that time of year for us: the annual work-up that always reminds us how fateful July once felt to this family. Em’s diagnostics this year are significantly dialed down from last year’s version, and this is a huge step for us. But frankly, eventually everyone moves into the territory where you stop having the maximum set of tests every 12 months, because all those tests themselves can be a problem (who exactly wants 100 chest X-rays in their life?).

But letting go of that maximum set of tests isn’t easy either. Going through that drill gave us a certain sense of comfort, especially since Em always aced all her exams, so to speak. Plus, it’s pretty scary right now because she’s slipping into a period of intense growth associated with puberty and a lot of theoreticals are either going to evaporate and start demonstrating why our fears were legitimate all these years.

Late effects of note are hearing loss, heart damage, infertility, and cognitive loss. We’ve pretty much ruled out hearing problems and cognitive loss for Em, leaving us fretting over hidden heart damage as she grows rapidly in the next few years and we cross our fingers that her heart grows commensurately with her frame.

As for infertility . . . I’ll feel like this beast is finally licked when I hold her first child in my arms.

I just hope that whatever “unnecessary” suffering Em went through (e.g., doxorubicin is no longer used for patients like her) makes it all the more better for those who come behind. I’ve always said that Emily’s cure was built on the bones of thousands and thousands of kids who never made it. So we do our best to make sure she pays them all back by living the best life she can.

July 14, 2004

Esquire’s The Sound and the Fury on “Mr. President . . .”

Dateline: SOCOM conference on the GWOT, Wyndham Hotel, Tampa FL, 13 July

The second day of the workshop was a lot more fun. As is typical when you get nine such towering egos around table, the first day was a lot of “no, no, no, I don’t think you understand the problem at all!” And the inevitable, “If you had read my book/speech/article, then you’d realize that I’ve already figured this whole thing out.” Plus the always great, “As my good friend Lee Kwan Yew told me last week . . .”

Okay, the last one was indeed Peter Schwartz of “Art of the Long View” fame.

So I was reduced to things like, “As Phil, the contractor who did my basement once said . . ..” And you know, Phil goes over pretty well actually.

So once we all came to the conclusion that each of us had something important to say but that none of us could explain it all (the Global War on Terrorism), things lightened up and we actually got a lot done today. Tomorrow we brief out to the Deputy Commander of SOCOM, Vice Admiral Eric Olson—a SEAL who looks every damn inch of it still in his mid-50s.

But enough about those people and their ideas, if blogging is mostly about talking about yourself, then really grand blogging is talking about what other people say about you. So let me run you through the three letters published by Esquire in the August issue, the one with The Donald (Trump) on the cover wearing all the bling-bling. This issue also features an article by the great Tom Junod called, “The Case for Bush,” which I may blog tomorrow on the plane home after I read it tonight. But I’ll need a couple of Budweisers to wash that one down—even as good as Tom is.

But enough about that Tom and his article, on to the letters about my piece in the June issue of Esquire (August, p. 24):

The Sound and the Fury

WITH HELP FROM a mischievous canine, the beautiful Carmen Electra welcomed readers to our June issue, packed with all things summer, from great food roads (“Drivn’ & Eatin’”) to fishing advice (“The Skills of Summer”). Inside, contributing editor Charles P. Pierce sized up the Democratic presidential hopeful (“The Misunderestimation of John Kerry”), and Naval War College professor Thomas P.M. Barnett concluded that for the sake of the world security, the boys will never be coming home (“Mr. President, Here’s How to Make Sense of Our Iraq Strategy”).

I must congratulate Barnett on writing what could be the best piece of advice to the president of the United States in many years. Barnett clearly spells out an appropriate course of action that would support the U.S.’s desires for security and attract the support of the rest of the modern world. I can only hope Kerry follows it.

ALEXANDER MAIR TORONTO, ONT.

Barnett’s article gave me a moment’s pause. Here at last, I thought, is someone making an arguably coherent case for the broader strategic underpinnings of George Bush’s inarguably incoherent war in Iraq. To those who ask, “What’s it got to do with the war on terror?” Barnett answers: It’s the opening salvo in the greater war between the Core and the Gap, the Connected and the Disconnectors.

But after the pause, I got my head back on straight. Barnett’s vision suffers from the wrongheaded assumption that those connected to globalization (the Core) and those disconnected from it (the Gap) are entire nations, together with their whole populations en masse, rather than heterogeneous population groups within those nations. In other words, if there’s a Gap, it’s the gulf between those who reap the wealth of globalization (whom I call the Rich) and those who are exploited, impoverished, or simply bypassed by it (the Poor). That Gap is the true threat, and it’s getting worse.

In shaping a new paradigm for identifying our enemies, Barnett does not consider that the true meaning of the post-cold-war era is that perhaps it’s finally time to tackle the common enemies of humanity—hunger, disease, corruption, social and economic injustive, and, yes, war.

Like the president, Barnett would rather see enemies than make friends, pursue war when we can have peace, and secure unilateral U.S. dominance at a time when the needs of humanity cry out for interdependent and multilateral solutions. I reject his call to arms.

In saying so, I am not so naïve as to believe there are not real enemies out there plotting dire harm against this country, its allies, and their innocents. Rather, I am saying that the alternative to Barnett’s bellicose, neo-conservative vision is a world peacefully united around a common agenda of social, political, environmental, and economic justice.

We’ve tried it Barnett’s way. It’s called Iraq, and it’s a train wreck. If we follow his map, the road ahead will lead us to a thousand burning Fallujahs. There is another path. It’s called peace.

PAUL ROSSMAN
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

Why is Barnett writing articles for magazines when he should be helping Rumsfeld pull his head out of his ass? Great article. Barnett should be in a double-top-secret talking to bigwigs about all this, not in a naval classroom and on the phone with editors during office hours. Then again, maybe he is in a secret room. I’ve never met anyone who’s taken his “class.” Hmm.

BILL ARGERSINGER
PORTLAND, OREG.

COMMENTARY: In order of appearance:

MAIR: Gotta love that one, since it comes off so bipartisan: great advice to POTUS and he hopes Kerry puts it to good use. I gotta admit, despite Putnam sending a slew of copies to the campaign and Teresa Heinz herself, we have not heard a peep out of that crowd. Now, they certainly are some busy beavers over there, what with running for president and all, but I am curious. Bottom line on this one is: I’m happy the piece can be interpreted as being easily accessible to Kerry’s potential administration—and from Canada no less!

ROSSMAN: Ooow! The old bait-and-switch! Thought I had him there, but when I got to the end and heard he was from San Francisco, all the peace-love-and-understanding stuff (I know, I know, I’m legitimately viewed only as a philosopher of war) seemed less surprising. The thing that bugs me, of course, is that if this guy read the book, I truly believe he’d be hard-pressed to say I don’t advocate all those things in spades. But as the only negative one of the trio, I have to admit, this one went down pretty easy.

ARGERSINGER: This one is the letter I referred to yesterday in my blog. Funny to me because the guy who gave me the Xerox of the letters page was none other than the Combatant Commander of Special Operations Command himself! Yeah, the guy actually running the Global War on Terrorism for the uniformed military! Only shame was, I wasn’t in a “double-top-secret room,” but merely a nice conference room at the Tampa Wyndham hotel just off the bay. But damned if the room wasn’t full of Special Operations Command senior officers writing down damn near every word I said. So hey, I’m strategizing here! I’m straaaategizing here! But no, I have no plans to pull Don Rumsfeld’s head out of anything, much less his ass. Beyond my pay grade—pure and simple.

And yes, if Bill of Portland really wants to know, I can give him the names of 14 people who have taken my class at the college. Strangely enough though, they’ve all disappeared from Newport in the months since—never to be heard from again (okay, a couple of e-mails here and there).

I have to say that overall, getting two very nice and only one sort of rough one seemed like I got off easy. I guess it really pays to have the Executive Editor of Esquire with a financial stake in your book. Some might call it conflict of interest, Mark Warren calls it . . . what’s that word again? Oh yeah—synergy!

Hmmm. Don’t go there. . ..

Today’s catch:

Terrorism does postpone an election . . . in Afghanistan

“Taliban, Militias Stand in the Way Of Afghan Ballot: Parliament Election Delayed Amid Security Concerns; Mr. Razek’s Difficult Sell; ‘Infidel Working for Infidels,’” by Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 13 July, p A1.

“Jalal Jousts Karzai, Status Quo: Afghan Woman Campaigns to Lead Country Past Taliban Legacy,” by Yaroslav Trofimov, WSJ, 13 July, p. A12.

‘Fahrenheit’ does not cross divide, but merely reflects it

“Two Americas of ‘Fahrenheit’ and ‘Passion’: Urban Moviegoers for Anti-Bush Documentary, Suburban Audience for Religious Epic,” by Sharon Waxman, New York Times, 13 July, p. B1.

Brain drain may leave Gap brain dead on AIDS

“Lack of AIDS Doctors in Poor Countries Stalls Treatment,” by Marilyn Chase and Amir Efrati, WSJ, 13 July, p. B1.

“Rights Group Seeks to Halt Africa’s Losses In Health Care,” by Celia Dugger, NYT, 13 July, p. A7.

China’s treasure fleet plies the waves yet again!

“The Ultimate Luxury Item Is Now Made in China,” by Keith Bradsher, NYT, 13 July, p. A1.

Terrorism does postpone an election . . . in Afghanistan

“Taliban, Militias Stand in the Way Of Afghan Ballot: Parliament Election Delayed Amid Security Concerns; Mr. Razek’s Difficult Sell; ‘Infidel Working for Infidels,’” by Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, 13 July, p A1.

“Jalal Jousts Karzai, Status Quo: Afghan Woman Campaigns to Lead Country Past Taliban Legacy,” by Yaroslav Trofimov, WSJ, 13 July, p. A12.

The countryside of Afghanistan is still so under the control of the Taliban that there are significant swaths where no one has yet dared register for the upcoming national elections—people are simply scared to death. You carry a voter-registration card in these parts and the Taliban catch you, it’s an instant death sentence.

When I read about stuff like that, the first words that come into my mind are, “Yea though I walk through the valley of death, I will fear no evil: for Thou art with me; Thy rod and Thy staff they comfort me."

Why? Because whenever I imagine that sort of ending, I know those are the words I’d reach for.

Who’s sporting the rod and staff on this one? That would be U.S. Army helicopters that subsequently “lobbed missiles into a mountainside” where, just a few days earlier, the Taliban executed 16 Afghanis whose only crime was that they registered to vote. Call them martyrs for democracy.

The Taliban and their bloody terror still rule much of the countryside in Afghanistan, and they base their violence on the myth that they’re resisting a U.S.-led “crusade” to dominate the Islamic world. Yeah, and the price of submission is the promise to take your life in your hands by registering to vote.

Some f--kin’ empire.

Last week, the joint U.N.-Afghan body running the elections announced that because of security problems voting for parliament, planned for September, will be postponed until next April or May. Voting for president, initially planned for June, will take place on Oct. 9. The U.S.-based incumbent, Hamid Karzai, is expected to win, but it’s unclear whether enough people will vote to provide him with democratic legitimacy.

The October vote is considered a harbinger of what may come in America’s highest-stakes experiment in transplanting Western democracy: Iraq, an even more violence-plagued national where elections are expected early next year.”

With “night letters” being slipped under doors threatening electoral workers with death, it’s no surprise that voter-registration teams have penetrated only 18 of south Afghanistan’s 50 administrative districts. International observers are expected to be housed in a “handful of safe zones on election day.”

You can call it crazy or naïve, but I really believe this is God’s work—whatever you want to call him. If wanting to simply vote is enough to get you killed, then there can be no doubt that we’re on the right side of whatever clash of civilizations you want to call this. Don’t give a rat’s ass who they vote for, just that they actually get the chance to vote.

Meanwhile, a lone woman is running a Quixotic campaign against Karzai:

Mr. Karzai, who has secured the support of Afghanistan’s most powerful warlords as well as American backing, looks unlikely to lose at the polls. Yet, in her relentless campaigning, Ms. Jalal, a 41-year-old pediatrician, already has become an idol for many urbane young Afghans who are unhappy both with the status quo and the misogynist Taliban theocracy that preceded Mr. Karzai’s regime.

“Reform has not taken place. We see no safety or security. The life of the ordinary people has not changed much because all that money was not spent on them,” Ms. Jalal says in her bare apartment in a Soviet-built housing block here, as dozens of starry-eyed university students eager to help wait for an audience. For Ms. Jalal, who wears a veil and conservative dress—but not the all-covering burka that was once mandatory—it isn’t her first time running against Mr. Karzai. In June 2002, she was his primary challenger at the loya jirga, the traditional Afghan grand council that elected the transitional government.

Back then, she received 12% of the loya jirga votes after refusing to withdraw her candidacy in exchange for a senior government position. The most prominent warlord, Tajik Northern Alliance commander Marshall Mohammed Fahim—who is now Afghanistan’s vice president and minister of defense—was so angry that he publicly upbraided Ms. Jalal’s husband for allowing what he considered extreme impudence.

Ms. Jalal, whose popularity stems from years of helping victims of conflicts between warlords, such as Mr. Fahim, wasn’t intimidated. These days, she is focusing her campaign on tapping ordinary Afghans’ resentment with the warlords’ continuing power. Her harshest criticism of Mr. Karzai zeroes in on his alleged deal with the leading warlords this spring. In that meeting, the commanders of Afghanistan’s biggest militias told Mr. Karzai that they won’t field rival presidential candidates, and in exchange asked for senior positions in Afghanistan’s future government—a rerun of the deal-making at the 2002 loya jirga.

“He’s the candidate of warlords. This is a big disgrace,” Ms. Jalal charges, dismissing Mr. Karzai’s insistence that he had made no formal trade-off for the militias’ support.

Unlike Mr. Karzai, who belongs to the Pashtun ethnic group, the biggest and traditionally dominant in Afghanistan, Ms. Jalal hails from the more cosmopolitan and less tribal Tajik community—a fact that is likely to make her chances slim outside northern Afghanistan and Kabul. Unlike the Pashtuns, whose traditional code of honor holds that women should never leave their husband’s house, Afghan Tajiks are more open to the idea of women’s rights.”

That, my friends, is some real courage.

‘Fahrenheit’ does not cross divide, but merely reflects it

“Two Americas of ‘Fahrenheit’ and ‘Passion’: Urban Moviegoers for Anti-Bush Documentary, Suburban Audience for Religious Epic,” by Sharon Waxman, New York Times, 13 July, p. B1.

Seems like Michael Moore’s movie really is doing well only in the so-called blue states, despite his claim that it was a “red-state movie,”

The top theaters for “Fahrenheit” have been in urban, traditionally Democratic strongholds, including Manhattan, Los Angeles, San Francisco and the Bay Area, Chicago and Boston.

The highest grossing theaters for “Passion” were typically more suburban and far more widely dispersed, from Texas and New Mexico to Ohio, Florida and Orange County, Calif.

For the “Passion,” the ranking reflects the film’s full run. For “Fahrenheit,” the data include only the first two weeks of ticket receipts. Nielsen experts said that there was little difference in the theater rankings for “Passion” between the first two weeks of release and the full run.

Naturally, fitting my status as a Democrat willing to work for both sides, I saw both films. I saw “Fahrenheit” in Washington DC, bastion of the Democrats, and I saw “Passion of the Christ” in suburban Northern Virginia, a Republic stronghold full of military families.

I really loved the “Passion,” and thought “Fahrenheit” was brilliant but dishonest in its skewed perspective—primarily because it’s being touted as a :”documentary” when it’s basically a political commercial for defeating Bush.

So I guess “Fahrenheit’s” big numbers show that the blue states really hate Bush all the more after four years, but that it hardly serves as harbinger for Bush’s landslide loss in November.

Brain drain may leave Gap brain dead on AIDS

“Lack of AIDS Doctors in Poor Countries Stalls Treatment,” by Marilyn Chase and Amir Efrati, Wall Street Journal, 13 July, p. B1.

“Rights Group Seeks to Halt Africa’s Losses In Health Care,” by Celia Dugger, New York Times, 13 July, p. A7.

Two more scary articles about how the brain drain of docs and nurses from Gap countries suffering high rates of AIDS infections puts those populations at even higher risk of segueing into outright humanitarian disasters that may someday attract humanitarian interventions from the U.S. military—believe it.

The shortage of health-care professional in developing countries has deep roots. Huge portions of the population are illiterate or badly educated, making these countries unable to produce a large pool of potential doctors. Poverty and famine make many people more concerned with putting food on the table than higher education career development.

Those who do study medicine tend to leave rural areas in favor of practicing in more cosmopolitan cities. Among HIV-trained doctors in developing countries, there’s a steady exodus to more prosperous places like Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia. Doctors in some parts of South Africa are “HIV doctors by default, which is a specialty . . . in death. It’s extremely depressing,” says Krista Dong, a 42-year-old infectious-disease fellow at Massachusetts General Hospital., Harvard University’s main teaching hospital, in Boston. Ms. Dong returned last week from three and a half years of treating patients near Durban, South Africa.

Global health officials say that despite many efforts to get HIV-trained doctors like Dr. Dong into developing countries, there is still a serious lack of coordination—and funding.

One global nonprofit, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning Physicians for Human Rights, proposes an array of measures to “slow the migration of health professionals to rich countries, bolster staffing in African hospitals and clinics and avert what it calls ‘this deepening disaster.’”

Simply put, this is one flow of people from the Gap to the Core that we need to slow down as much as possible. The solution seems simple enough: aid that pays docs and nurses far larger salaries to stay where they are.

China’s treasure fleet plies the waves yet again!

“The Ultimate Luxury Item Is Now Made in China,” by Keith Bradsher, New York Times, 13 July, p. A1.

China’s latest export story is luxury yachts. Yes, I said luxury yachts.

In 1405, the 300-ship fleet of Admiral Zhang, a Muslim eunuch who was easily China’s most adventurous explorer, left the shores of the Middle Kingdom, launching that civilization into its temporary status as a 15th-century superpower.

When Zhang’s “treasure fleet” retired from its tribute-collecting travels roughly three decades later, China’s strategic attention subsequently turned inward for a period of isolation from the outside world that last more than half a millennium.

Now, as China once again opens up to the outside world, regaining its status as a superpower—albeit one primarily defined by its manufacturing industrial base—its 21st-century version of a tribute-collecting force is once again accurately described as a “treasure fleet.”

Half a millennium later and they still basically just want our money.

July 13, 2004

No borders . . . no boundaries . . . in a GWOT

Dateline: Strategists’ workshop, SOCOM, Wyndham Hotel, Tampa FLA, 12 July

No borders, no boundaries—the motto of SOCOM in the GWOT.

An interesting morning of receiving command briefs from the seniors at SOCOM, plus getting several hours with the Combatant Commander himself, one very impressive Army 4-star by the rather bland name of Doug Brown. I was also fortunate to spend a lot of off-line time with the deputy 3-star commander, Vice Admiral Eric Olson—another very impressive individual.

The first day of discussions were typically very high altitude, what with all these great minds and egos around the table. I got mine stroked by the famous futurist Peter Schwartz (he of advising-Steven-Spielberg-on-Minority-Report fame—among many other things, I just think that’s one of the coolest), who was nice enough to say he had read PNM and really enjoyed it—especially the splitting of the force stuff.

Other than that nice stroke, though, pretty much a day of mega-egos telling one another how they really didn’t understand the true nature of whatever problem we were discussing that moment. As someone who spends a lot of time doing facilitation at events like this, I was less than happy with the laid-back attitude of our West Point-provided discussion herder, but the problem was a good one: having the 4-star in the room meant everyone spent their time speaking as much as possible to him. Makes sense, but 9 people all trying to impress the hell out of one principal gets a bit grubby for my tastes—like a bad reality show where all the prospective spouses are trying to land the attention of Joe Zillionaire.

Still, despite the inefficiency, a pretty good interaction, and a real privilege to spend that many hours with the Combatant Commander of the Global War on Terrorism—talk about a guy with the weight of the world on his shoulders! But Brown is one of those guys whom you meet and then you walk away feeling pretty darn good that someone that impressive is in such a difficult job—ditto with the deputy Olson. This military produces great leader after great leader like no other public institution on the planet.

Plus I got my second command medallion from the head of SOCOM. Got my first from Peter Schoomaker in 1999 (he’s now the Chief of Staff, Army), so proving my utility to such an important player yet again feels like getting back to the Super Bowl--hell, you’re just proud to be asked.

Vice Admiral Olson was kind enough to bring me a copy of the letters-to-the-editor page from his own subscription copy of Esquire (August edition). I hadn’t seen them yet, and was dreading them, knowing how much Mark Warren delights in putting the nastiest ones down in print. Well, there’s one letter in there that’s pretty darn hilarious, given where I am right now and what I did today, but I’ll leave the blogging on that one for later. 12-hour day is at an end. Gotta be bright-eyed for the next one tomorrow.

Here’s today’s catch:

Pre-emptive is not the problem, but post-emptive is the solution

“Bush’s Pre-emptive Strategy Meets Some Untidy Reality: After Iraq, the standard of proof gets higher,” by David E. Sanger, New York Times, 12 July, p. A6.

“Afghan President Describes Militia As The Top Threat: Worse Than the Taliban; Karzai Says ‘the Stick Has to Be Used,’ but Offers No Details on Plans,” by Carlotta Gall and David Rohde, NYT, 12 July, p. A1.

The biggest question is, Who will vote that otherwise might not?

“Kerry TV ads outpace Bush’s: Gap upsets political experts’ predictions,” by Mark Memmott, USA Today, 12 July, p. A1.

“Gay issues on ballots add twist to election: Marriage ban initiatives could draw GOP voters,” by Kathy Kiely, USA, 12 July, p. A1.

“Urged by Right, Bush Takes On Gay Marriages,” by Adam Nagourney and David D. Kirkpatrick, NYT, 12 July p. A1.

“’Fahrenheit 9/11’ Has Recruited Unlikely Audience: U.S. Soldiers,” by Shailagh Murray, Wall Street Journal, 12 July, p. A4.

U.S. Dollar, the $800-pound gorilla in the global economy

“As Fear of Deficits Falls, Some See a Larger Threat: Though Worries of 1980s Never Materialized, Budget Faces New Stresses Today,” by Greg Ip, WSJ, 12 July, p. A1.

“Dollar Could Buy Trouble: If Currency Weakens, Asian Central Banks Risk Sparking Inflation,” by Phillip Day, WSJ, 12 July, p. A15.

“China Trades Its Way to Power,” by Jason T. Shaplen and James Laney, NYT, 12 July, p. A23.

Just in time: a remake of Manchurian Candidate

“U.S. Tries to Divine al Qaeda’s Next Move: As Concern Mounts Over Election-Disrupting Plots, Officials Look Back to Predict the Future,” by Robert Block and Glenn R. Simpson, WSJ, 12 July, p. A4.

AIDS: India needs its Ryan White, Africa needs its nurses

“In India, Stigma Of AIDS Curbs Control of HIV,” by Joanna Slater, WSJ, 12 July, p. B1.

“An Exodus of African Nurses Puts Infants and the Ill in Peril,” by Celia W. Dugger, New York Times, 12 July, p. A1.

Pre-emptive is not the problem, but post-emptive is the solution

“Bush’s Pre-emptive Strategy Meets Some Untidy Reality: After Iraq, the standard of proof gets higher,” by David E. Sanger, New York Times, 12 July, p. A6.

“Afghan President Describes Militia As The Top Threat: Worse Than the Taliban; Karzai Says ‘the Stick Has to Be Used,’ but Offers No Details on Plans,” by Carlotta Gall and David Rohde, NYT, 12 July, p. A1.

Here the debate still doesn’t work, meaning we’re still not discussing the real problem in Iraq: not the war but the occupation. Bush’s pre-emptive war isn’t the problem, but the ad hoc-ery of the follow-on occupation. We’re not contemplating pre-emptions against anyone who isn’t a bad regime on many levels, so the notion that their leadership has to park a nuclear missile with rockets flaring on the front lawn of the ruling palace, otherwise there are no circumstances under which we’ll act, is really ridiculous. Now, all of a sudden we have this rigid definition of acceptable proof, as if we’re ever going to get it, when what the world and our public—I believe—would really rather see us develop and prove a capability for the second-half effort that would lessen the fears about the going-in decision. If we had nailed the occupation, no one would care about the WMD issue, because we’d all simply be happy to have rid the world of a such a murderous tyrant (just wait for the trial) while liberating that grateful (remember all the way back to May 2003?) population. What really pisses off people, not to mention many troops on the ground in Iraq, is the notion that we’re suffering our way through this hellish occupation AND there wasn’t any WMD. Remove that flaming irritant (the sense of quagmire) and the sense of injustice disappears, because removing Saddam was a very good thing.

Karzai’s diagnosis on Afghanistan points out the fundamental insecurity that still dominates the political, social and economic scenes there—signaling that we haven’t really finished off the task in either Afghanistan or Iraq. That’s 2-0 in pre-emptive wars and 0-2 in post-emptive rehab jobs.

In the end, just about everyone in the Core wants certain Gap regimes gone. If it can be done well and at low risk of post-conflict quagmire, then the system for processing these corrupt and politically-bankrupt regimes will not only emerge, but when applied selectively, this collective power’s demonstration effect will invariably “scare straight” many marginally bad dictators.

We’re not talking about wasting great numbers of lives nor spending vast sums of money, but about improving the security situations that keep hundreds of millions of people at a disadvantaged position development-wise—in effect on the outside of the global economy, noses pressed to the glass.

The biggest question is, Who will vote that otherwise might not?

“Kerry TV ads outpace Bush’s: Gap upsets political experts’ predictions,” by Mark Memmott, USA Today, 12 July, p. A1.

“Gay issues on ballots add twist to election: Marriage ban initiatives could draw GOP voters,” by Kathy Kiely, USA, 12 July, p. A1.

“Urged by Right, Bush Takes On Gay Marriages,” by Adam Nagourney and David D. Kirkpatrick, NYT, 12 July p. A1.

“’Fahrenheit 9/11’ Has Recruited Unlikely Audience: U.S. Soldiers,” by Shailagh Murray, Wall Street Journal, 12 July, p. A4.

I gotta tell you, I am surprised to see Kerry’s fundraising and now ads outpace that of Bush’s. People vote once officially in early November, but vote many times prior in terms of contributions which rebound back at all of us in terms of ads.

But there are so many new features to this campaign in terms of issues: foreign policy for the first time in a long time, issues of war and peace, relationships with allies and the world at large. Then there’s the usual on the economy and budget deficits.

But in such a tight race, I really feel that social issues still have the potential to be the big swing influence, even more than Iraq. Here, gay marriages loom large.

People tend to underestimate the willingness of the military to take in critical reviews and still keep the faith, but likewise also underestimate what a stoking sort of issue anything having to do with definitions of family, marriage, and sexual relations can be—meaning something that really drives people to vote. [Hell, it drives people to violence in the Middle East, you’d think it’d drive some lazy citizens here to at least vote!]

Michael Moore likes to talk about America as a 50/50/50 nation: 50 percent left and 50 percent right and 50 percent who don’t vote. That which drives those non-voters to the polls this time, in whatever amount they actually muster, may well end up being more about gay marriages than an Iraq occupation that could easily settle down dramatically by the start of November.

U.S. Dollar, the $800-pound gorilla in the global economy

“As Fear of Deficits Falls, Some See a Larger Threat: Though Worries of 1980s Never Materialized, Budget Faces New Stresses Today,” by Greg Ip, Wall Street Journal, 12 July, p. A1.

“Dollar Could Buy Trouble: If Currency Weakens, Asian Central Banks Risk Sparking Inflation,” by Phillip Day, WSJ, 12 July, p. A15.

“China Trades Its Way to Power,” by Jason T. Shaplen and James Laney, New York Times, 12 July, p. A23.

A couple of interesting articles from the Journal on the growing connectivity between the U.S. economy and the rest of the world.

In the first, we’re told that the federal budget deficit of today presents a very different potential for “calamity” than the one generated by Reagan’s administrations in the 1980s. Back then, the fear was that all that federal borrowing would consume too much scarce savings and thus crowd out necessary investments in infrastructure, new factories and R&D. By most accounts, that danger never materialized.

Today, it is being increasingly argued, a new danger emerges. Because so much more of our T-bills are being bought by foreigners, there is the growing fear that at some point they “will question our ability to repay them, and balk at lending more—triggering a big drop in the dollar and much higher interest rates.”

In PNM, I described this potential as the way the rest of the Core could effectively limit and ultimately counteract our alleged “unilateral” capacity to wage war across the Gap. In effect, our exporting of security to the Gap is financed by the rest of the Core, meaning it is effectively a service that we provide them. This transaction, I maintain, is real, whether or not it is an explicit act or even one engaged in by our partners willingly—meaning they have a choice and aren’t simply following economic logic. If these countries feel trapped by economic circumstances, then the connectivity is that much more profound, because sharing fates by choice is one thing, while the no-choice of sharing of fates is . . . .well . . . marriage is a good example (at least for someone for whom divorce is not an option).

I’m not being facetious here, because the sort of co-dependent relationships one finds in a marriage are a good approximation of that sort of deep, long-term economic dependency—the sort we have with Europe or with a Japan. Yeah, we might bitch a lot, but divorce is really out of the question. How we get China, India or Russia to that point is obviously a whole lot more complicated than just jacking up trade levels, signing a few deals, and investing heavily in each other. It’s a pretty profound coming together of nations into a relationship of shared vulnerabilities.

The second article suggests that Japan and China, for example, have little choice but to buy dollars and our public debt in order to prevent their own currencies from appreciating against a falling dollar. If either country’s currency were to “strengthen” too much against the dollar, their ability to export goods would suffer, as would, say, China’s ability to control inflation in their super-heated economy.

So the U.S. goes on a public spending binge after 9/11, with defense leading the way, and the Chinese and South Koreans and Japanese may feel, given their levels of interdependency with the U.S. economy, that they have no choice but to buy up dollars to keep the cost of their exports reasonable. You can call that no choice, but I call it effectively buying a couple of wars—the price of doing business in the Core when the Leviathan decides that there’s work to be done in the Gap.

Over time, China, Japan and South Korea better not start feeling like that’s a bum deal, because as the Euro rises in stature as a reserve currency and China’s domestic market itself begins to reorient South Korea and Japan back toward Asia in terms of exports, there will less and less capacity afforded by the system for such “shotgun wars”—meaning ones we can impose on our allies financially, seemingly against their better judgment.

But if we play our cards right, that day never really comes, because the service we provide the rest of the Core, along with all the other perks of being such a huge consumer market and such an efficient financial marketplace, will remain enough of a good deal in the eyes of our creditors that everyone will feel they get what they need from the sum of the transactions.

Just in time: a remake of Manchurian Candidate

“U.S. Tries to Divine al Qaeda’s Next Move: As Concern Mounts Over Election-Disrupting Plots, Officials Look Back to Predict the Future,” by Robert Block and Glenn R. Simpson, Wall Street Journal, 12 July, p. A4.

The FBI and everyone else connected with Homeland Security are racking their minds and pouring over old reports of previous al Qaeda attacks to guesstimate where the next strike will come. After the Madrid bombings of 3/11, there are huge fears that terrorists will seek to disrupt the U.S. election process, with the favorite bets being—no surprise—the conventions themselves.

I have no idea of how the new Denzel Washington version of Manchurian Candidate was updated, but I gotta believe it could pose—if it’s the scenario I imagine it should be—as incendiary as the original one was (that one with Frank Sinatra in the lead was quietly shelved due to JFK’s assassination and not resurrected until more than two decades later—it’s his best role ever, sad to say).

Hmm, another JFK running for the Democrats . . . Hmm, another Massachusetts senator . . . Good God! Now my mind is racing!

Suffice it to say, several fans of my book have already sent me numerous documents detailing their own personal theories as to how these “inevitable strikes” will inevitably go down.

All I can say is, people are working the problem. Doesn’t mean we’ll stop everything dead in its tracks (a purposeful phrase), but it does mean it won’t take anyone by surprise if such a thing were actually attempted.

We are learning. Remember the bomber and missile “gaps” from early in the Cold War? Well, we’re slowly but surely moving beyond the equivalent of those days in this GWOT. It’ll take some time, but we’re getting there.

AIDS: India needs its Ryan White, Africa needs its nurses

“In India, Stigma Of AIDS Curbs Control of HIV,” by Joanna Slater, Wall Street Journal, 12 July, p. B1.

“An Exodus of African Nurses Puts Infants and the Ill in Peril,” by Celia W. Dugger, New York Times, 12 July, p. A1.

In my yet-unpublished diary of my daughter Emily’s struggle with cancer back in 1994-96, I wrote about how, whenever we were at a playground and her covering hat would fall off, revealing her bald pate covered by only a few strands of hair, whatever crowd of kids and parents had been there up to that moment would almost immediately disappear. In short, Emily would clear the room just by revealing her illness. If we wanted to be alone, all I needed to do was knock off her hat and voila! We had the place to ourselves.

Why did we get that sort of response? I mean, anyone with half a brain knows cancer isn’t contagious. But that was it. People saw Emily’s translucent skin and bald head and thought they were looking at an AIDS patient. Back then, you have to remember, that AIDS awareness was still breaking into the mainstream, meaning beyond gays and into the general population. A huge factor in that broadening of understanding across society was the role played by the kid AIDS patient Ryan White, who demonstrated to America that you didn’t need to be a gay man in San Francisco to contract and die from the disease. What I learned with those episodes with Emily on the playground was that the social stigma connected with disease is almost harder to handle the actual disease itself. The disease disconnects you from normal life, but the stigma can disconnect you from so much more—almost your sense of identity. Parents of kids—especially small kids—live through their progeny: accept them and you accept me, so reject them and you reject me. So, in effect, I experienced the stigma by proxy, and frankly, when you’re talking a two-year-old, it sure as hell hurts you more than the kid, who simply doesn’t know any better.

Right now, India is desperately in need of a Ryan White, or someone whose essential nobility in the face of this deadly disease creates a prism of understanding and acceptance for the society as a whole. Tall order, yes, and God knows Ryan White didn’t change everyone’s opinion overnight, but he did start the process in a big way, like Ronald Reagan put Alzheimer’s in a new light, or Bette Ford did for rehab, etc.

In India right now, the stigma of AIDS is so bad, that when a family loses someone to it, they’ll go to great lengths to hide it, saying it was TB or something like that. I mean, we’re talking mid-1980s America where Roy Cohn sure as hell didn’t die from any gay man’s disease, but from “liver cancer.” There is death, and there is dishonor, and until AIDS loses the stigma, lives will be needlessly cut short because people won’t seek treatment and prevention methods won’t find the same purchase in society.

This article talks about little kids in India who were kicked out of schools just because their dad died of AIDS, which is stigma-plus (or guilt by association—sort of contagious stigma). But that gives you a sense of how far India has to travel.

Meanwhile in Africa, the situation has gotten so bad that we’re to the point where nurses are simply abandoning their posts out of desperation for the low pay and excruciating work conditions. Where are those nurses going? They’re coming to the Core, because there we’re talking about pay scales in the $35-50k range, so guess how hard that choice is for some below-minimum wage nurse in central Africa trying to care for 50 AIDS terminal patients all by her lonesome.

People talk about a brain drain from Gap to Core, but this is a heart-and-soul drain. You want to shrink the Gap? You better plan on paying a whole lot more to deal with AIDS there.

July 12, 2004

A Chinese translation of PNM—author and vision

Dateline: SWA flight from Providence to Tampa, FLA, 11 July 2004

Flying down on a Sunday afternoon to Special Operations Command in Tampa to participate in a multiday workshop on the future of the global war on terrorism. No, I’m not being asked for my opinion on how best to kill terrorists, or anything operational for that matter, because that’s not what I know. I’m an expert on the “everything else,” or how that activity relates to the world at large in terms of diplomacy, politics, economics, social change, etc.—which isn’t where “the rubber meets the road” but instead asks the biggest questions of “where does this road lead to?”

Should be an interesting time, not the least of which will involve meeting the other experts assembled, to include Peter Schwartz of Global Business Network (the one person here I have met—during Y2K at a Highland Forum), sci-fi writer Orson Scott Card, Caleb Carr (author of “The Alienist”), and several other notables from a weird variety of disciplines.

I last interacted at this level with SOCOM when I briefed all the senior leadership there (and around the world via video teleconferencing) in 1999 regarding the upcoming Millennial Date Change Event, otherwise known by the acronym Y2K.

That brief was very funny (Y2K naturally lent itself to humor), and what I remember is that whenever I glanced at the view screens that showed VTC audiences, I could see them shaking now and then. At first, I though there was something wrong with the picture, but then I noted that everyone in the room with me was also shaking on and off—just enough so I could barely perceive it unless I actively stared at them. I finally realized these guys had perfected the art of the silent-but-jiggling guffaw—chief among them then-CINCSOC (Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command) Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the guy pulled out of retirement by Rumsfeld to serve now as Chief of Staff for the Army. The general almost looked like he was going to fall off his chair at one point, he was shaking so much—but never the slightest sound emerged. Other than my voice and the sound effects, you could have heard a pin drop.

Yes, yes, the silent service they. As I will be on the content of the next three days (pretty sure).

So the meat of today’s blog will be an abstract of the quasi-review article that appeared about a month ago in the big Chinese newspaper “Nanfang Daily.” “Abstract” here simply means that my new friend at Beijing University, Professor Niu Ke, was kind enough to have someone generate this rough summary of what was said in the piece, as opposed to a word-for-word translation.

I edited the following for spelling and grammar in order to make the meaning clear. I also put the items into bullets rather than running them altogether in thick paragraphs broken up by semi-colons. I don’t know what the actual title of the article was, but I’m assuming it was the title of my book. The author’s name was Xue Yong. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in history at Yale. Here’s the abstract as rendered by Prof. Niu:

Editor’s Note:

· The plight in Iraq forces U.S. military to reflect on its war ideas/strategy since the Gulf War
· Thomas Barnett becomes a dramatic figure in this process
· Will his new ideas become the framework for future US global security strategy?

Foreword:

· Heated debates have arisen regarding Barnett and his newly published book, The Pentagon’s New Map
· If lucky enough, Barnett’s ideas will probably not only become a blueprint for future U.S. global security strategy, but also reshape the relationships of the United States and the rest of the world
· What attracts Chinese attention most will be his strong arguments in favor of a Sino-U.S. alliance in the 21st century.

The Conceiver of Future U.S. Armed Forces (secondary title)

· Barnett has worked for a military transformation office led by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski
· Barnett’s brief resume
· Barnett successfully foretells the booming of terrorism
· Brief comparison with Andrew Marshall
· Barnett becomes more and more influential in national security community, giving lectures and briefings at the Pentagon
· Hot debate about him
· Rumsfield reportedly shows interest
· It is said that Barnett is a most influential figure in military reshaping.

Two roles for U.S. Army (secondary title):

· Two types of countries in world: “gap” and “core”
· Two branches of military force: Leviathan and the System Administrator Force, with fairly detailed description of both
· Lessons from Iraq experiences
· Barnett briefs at Joint Staff: “You can manage to win two or three Iraq-type wars easily, but you are not able to operate an occupation”
· Barnett’s critical views on Bush Administration and the “neocons”
· Barnett’s viewpoints on war on terrorism, and his criticism of Bush strategy: too much armed force, not enough diplomacy.

World’s New Core:

· A beyond-the-military view of war
· Barnett’s positive views on China’s role, as well as it leadership
· Also included are India, Russia, Europe, NATO allies
· Author’s remarks: Barnett is open-minded compared to Andrew Marshall

o Desires less secrecy and more transparency
o Transcending the narrow military perspectives and Realpolitik of great powers
o Sees overlapping interests among great powers
o Seeks to educate citizens on how to understand the world after 9/11.

Concluding Remarks:

· Barnett’s ideas have been on a journey from periphery to mainstream, facing strong opposition from the military but supporters are growing (example of Republican House member Mac Thornberry’s remarks: Barnett’s vision is helpful in building bipartisan consensus
· Barnett also deliberately tries to reduce any perception of his political bias, criticizing both G.W. Bush and John F. Kerry
· Barnett voted for Gore in 2000
· A Democratic administration is expected to be even more receptive to Barnett’s ideas
· Author’s personal suggestions:

o Most importantly, Barnett’s multilateral strategy needs more international responses in order to gain more legitimacy inside the U.S.
o China’s “Peaceful Rising” theory should be weaved with Barnett’s ideas, in order to build a more solid basis for Sino-U.S. relations in 21st century
o As for Iraq, China should take the role of “a friend of the U.S. who gives forthright admonitions,” promoting the UN to internationalize the Iraqi situation while continuing to press the U.S. to cease its unilateralism
o Military cooperation with the U.S. in Iraq is necessary and reasonable, so China should considering deploying troops to Iraq.

COMMENTARY: The article strikes me as sort of a review of the book and sort of a recap of Greg Jaffe’s Wall Street Journal profile, meaning the author is leveraging Jaffe’s analysis regarding the vision’s growing acceptance within the U.S. military community. I will confess that I changed the line “It is said that Tom is the most influential figure in military reshaping” to “It is said that Tom is a most influential figure in military reshaping,” because I honestly believe that my natural humility was being lost in translation (which, of course, is why I draw attention to it here).

Clearly, the analyst likes me and the book because I see an overlap of strategic interests between China and the U.S. (isn’t it weird to read about a “Sino-U.S. alliance” as opposed to a “U.S.-Sino alliance”?). What really struck me—not to mention made me feel good—was the author’s suggestions at the end regarding China stepping up to a more responsible worldwide partnering relationship with the U.S.: not just some silent junior partner, mind you, but a “friend” who isn’t afraid to speak harsh truths.

You know, I walked through the Providence airport’s main bookstore on my way to the plane this afternoon, as always looking to see if my book was still there on display. It was, in what looks to be a brand new section against one wall labeled simply “WAR.”

I was a little taken aback by the designation, since most stores will stick me under “Military Affairs.” Throughout my entire career I have always been known as the guy who argued far more for peace than for war, so the notion that I am a “philosopher of war” like a Mahan or Clausewitz is something I simply recoil from. To me, such strategists were all about war and very little—if at all—about peace. Deep down I consider myself a peace strategist, which is why I don’t consider my lack of military experience to be a detriment to my legitimacy.

Because I work for the military, and because I speak forcefully and at length about the certain types of wars as a way to achieve lasting peace, I am necessarily labeled a “war strategist.” Go figure! I work in the Warfare Analysis and Research Department at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College.

But remember this (he says confidently, especially since the subtitle was completely Neil Nyren’s idea): the PNM is about war and peace in the 21st century. The key concept of the book is the need to think about and conduct war within the context of everything else. That’s why the book and the vision attracts such attention both here and in China: it puts this global war on terrorism into a larger context, something everyone desperately wants.

That is why I’m flying on a plane this afternoon down to Special Operations Command. There is nothing in my experience that allows me to tell the Combatant Commander there how he should lead this Global War on Terrorism.

No, I’ve been brought down to explain the everything else—you know, the happy ending. That happy ending has little to do with victory in the classic sense (order) but everything to do with a truly durable peace (justice).

And so I will represent that which I both know and believe over the next few days . . ..

Today’s catch:

You want a fair fight? Then do it yourself!

“Panel Describes Long Weakening of Hussein Army: White House Saw Threat; Senate Cites C.I.A.’s Data That Found More Risk in Erratic Regime,” by John H. Cushman, Jr., New York Times, 11 July, p. A1.

“Bad Iraq Intelligence Cost Lives, Democrats Say,” by Adam Nagourney and Jodi Wilgoren, NYT, 11 July, p. A1.

The coming reform of intell: everybody hold your breath!

“Despite Terror Risk, Washington Is Unlikely to Press Reform of C.I.A. This Year: Congressional reports see a need to alter a culture and a ‘group think’ dynamic,” by David E. Singer, NYT, 11 July, p. A10.

Iraqis: it takes one to control one

“Iraq’s Rebellion Develops Signs Of Internal Rift: Tactics and Goals Split Iraqis and Foreigners,” by Ian Fisher and Edward Wong, NYT, 11 July, p. A1.

“A Tough Guy Tries to Tame Iraq,” by Dexter Filkins, NYT, 11 July, p. WK1.

Saddam’s trial: exhibit A in the case of the missing A-to-Z global rule set

“Who V. Saddam? The U.S. has spend years preparing for Saddam Hussein’s trial. But it is not all that certain who will try him or when—or whose ends that trial will ultimately serve,” by Peter Landesman, New York Times Magazine, 11 July, p. 34.

You want a fair fight? Then do it yourself!

As one Marine colonel once told me: F--k fair fights!

“Panel Describes Long Weakening of Hussein Army: White House Saw Threat; Senate Cites C.I.A.’s Data That Found More Risk in Erratic Regime,” by John H. Cushman, Jr., New York Times, 11 July, p. A1.

“Bad Iraq Intelligence Cost Lives, Democrats Say,” by Adam Nagourney and Jodi Wilgoren, NYT, 11 July, p. A1.

The latest story on the “stunning” Senate report! It seems that Saddam’s army was actually getting weaker across the 1990s from all that enforced isolation and daily bombings from U.S. aircraft operating the northern and southern no-fly-zones. Imagine that? Twelve years of constant bombing actually softened them up quite a bit!

Good God! Was even the Senate that dimly aware of what was going on since the end of Desert Storm?

And yet, this judgment discredits yet another huge contention of the Bush White House regarding the Saddam takedown: his military still posed a regional security threat.

Not true! We now know.

So I guess we simply waltzed into that country and took down his military in what can only be described as a completely unfair contest.

You know, I had a Marine colonel pull me aside one day when both of us were participating in the “best and brightest” effort that eventually wrote the historic post-Cold War Department of Navy white paper entitled “…From the Sea.” It was during a rather heated debate about under what conditions America should be willing to go to war in the future (this was 1992), and he complained that it sometimes seemed that if some people had their way, we’d only send in the military under the most dire circumstances, meaning when the enemy’s threat capacity was at its highest. “It’s almost as if they want to level the playing field—you know, make it a fair fight or something. Well, let me tell you something: I say f--k fair fights! You want a fair fight? Then do it yourself!”

Of course, Saddam’s military was weakened by all those years of “keeping him in the box.” But it’s equally true that Saddam would have certainly gone back to doing more massively bad things to his own people (say, the Kurds in the north), and threatening his neighbors, and seeking WMD, and supporting transnational terrorism—if not for the U.S. military pressure constantly employed across all those years.

The fact that it took us 12 years and one war to get him to that weakened condition was why we could win the war so easily, but it also meant what we’d find there once we got in was going to end up being a whole lot worse than we imagined (remember what my civil affairs officer friends told me in NC last month).

My point is this: the Senate report is rehashing the wrong arguments and focusing on the wrong stuff. Everyone wanted Saddam gone. Rehashing the intell on our decision to go in is an exercise in pointlessness. If we had achieved the great occupation/settling down of Iraq within a year as planned, none of that decision making would be questioned now, because we’d probably still be way under 500 combat deaths and it wouldn’t appear to anyone like a Vietnam redux.

What prewar intell we should be looking into is our huge misjudgments on how to organize and carry out an effective occupation/nation-building exercise. So it wasn’t a fair fight in the war! It wasn’t supposed to be! But we should have had a much more reasonable chance of success in the occupation than we ended up having, and intell and planning failures played THE HUGE ROLE in that strategic snafu. That’s where Congress’ investigatory focus should be.

The Senate report will go down as most Senate reports go down: as a huge exercise in navel gazing.

Focusing on the planning failure that was the occupation is what Kerry and Edwards should be harping about, not insinuating that lives were wasted in this war. We lost around 150 in the war, and none of those lives were wasted. We’ve lost more than four times that amount in this occupation (and counting) and many of those lives were wasted.

Neither Congress nor the Democrats should focus on the pre-war intell failure, but rather the pre-occupation intell failure. Give credit where credit is due: this military won a fantastic war. But also give blame where blame is due: this Pentagon planned a very poor occupation.

As for Kerry and Edwards peddling that “the war makes domestic terrorist attacks even more likely,” they shouldn’t be. The Middle East is a hornet’s nest of bad regimes, failed regimes, rigid regimes. By taking down Saddam we set some nasty stuff in motion, but that nasty stuff will be overwhelmingly over there. Yes, we will inevitably suffer another domestic terrorist strike, but it won’t be because of what we do or did over there. It’ll be because globalization is creeping into the traditional cultures of the Middle East and “they” want it out and believe that attacking the U.S. is the best way to do that.

Simply put, we do absolutely nothing and we’ll still raise the likelihood of a domestic terrorist attack. Globalization isn’t ours to control, but to manage. It doesn’t come with a ruler, but with rules.

The coming reform of intell: everybody hold your breath!

“Despite Terror Risk, Washington Is Unlikely to Press Reform of C.I.A. This Year: Congressional reports see a need to alter a culture and a ‘group think’ dynamic,” by David E. Singer, NYT, 11 July, p. A10.

Let’s see: can’t do anything this year because it’s a political year. So wait until deep into 2005 and . . . finally create that intell czar everyone has been dreaming of.

Yes, yes, that will kill the intelligence community’s tendency for group think: an all-powerful and all-singular czar up on top. Yep, that’ll do it.

Groupthink is caused primarily by secrecy and distance from the real world. Bring the CIA out of its classified cocoon and you’ll end the groupthink. I’m not talking the clandestine agents, but the analysts. That’s the problem-set we’re really talking about here.

But don’t hold your breath on that one. All good intell weanies know that it’s the secrecy that keeps us safe—like it did in the months leading up to 9/11.

Iraqis: it takes one to control one

“Iraq’s Rebellion Develops Signs Of Internal Rift: Tactics and Goals Split Iraqis and Foreigners,” by Ian Fisher and Edward Wong, New York Times, 11 July, p. A1.

“A Tough Guy Tries to Tame Iraq,” by Dexter Filkins, NYT, 11 July, p. WK1.

The front-page article is a longer bit of analysis on the notion that Iraqi insurgents are starting to turn on the foreign fighters with whom up to now they’ve enjoyed common cause, but not common methods (the large-scale killing of civilians by Zarqawi and company being the crucial tipping point—it seems). The big question, as one U of Baghdad professor points out [Whoa! Isn’t it amazing to even see a Baghdad prof being quoted on the front page of the Times!], is whether the split is real or just a period of—as he believes—“reconstruction and reevaluation in order to push the operations out of the cities” so as “not to have innocent people killed.”

Allawi is openly pursuing a divide-and-conquer strategy:

“To that end, Mr. Allawi and other government officials say, he has been meeting with former Baath Party members in the resistance and tribal leaders to convince them that their interests and those of foreign fighters are not the same.

‘We’re negotiating with what I call the noncriminals, those who never really were the hard core like Zarqawi and his aides and the Al-Qaeda-style people,’ Mr. Allawi said in an interview. ‘And on the other hand, be very firm with the criminals and the assassins and the killers and the terrorists.”

Will the Sunnis ultimately channel their resistance into political action in a state where—speaking of voting blocs—they ’ll be a smallish minority? Prime Minister Allawi, the former tough-guy Baathist, will win some over, but the Sunni president Sheik Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar, according to U.S. military officials, may play an even more important role. In the end, the Sunnis’ position in a democratic Iraq seems as vulnerable as that of the Kurds, which of course makes Shiite Iran to the East look like a looming kingpin . . ..

Probably a good thing that Allawi is shaping up to be the truly tough guy (from the second article):

“Mr. Allawi is known for his decade of work in trying to topple Mr. Hussein, but he is a former Baathist himself, with suggestion among those who regard him with suspicion that he once engaged in thuggish work on the party’s behalf. That tough-guy past, even his former association with the Central Intelligence Agency, seems to warm the hearts of many Iraqis who miss Mr. Hussein’s iron-fisted ways.

‘That Allawi worked for the C.I.A. may be a problem for Americans,’ an Iraqi journalist said in conversation recently, ‘but it is not a problem for Iraqis.’”

What does that tell you about what the C.I.A. is really good for? Not the analysis but the rough stuff, which is why the analysts should be liberated from Langley and returned to the land of the living.

Allawi doesn’t just know how to walk the walk, he knows how to talk the talk. Listen to him describe his meetings with insurgent leaders:

“’I spoke to some of them myself,’ Mr. Allawi continued. ‘I told them: What are you trying to achieve? Let us know. Do you want to bring Saddam back to rule Iraq? Do you want to bring bin Laden to rule Iraq? We will fight you. You can’t do this.’

‘You want to be part of the political process?’ he said, posing the crucial question. ‘You are welcome to be part of the political process, provided that you sever your relations to the hard-core criminals and the terrorists.’”

Anyone miss Paul Bremer right now?

Better yet, anyone want to see the U.S. State Department trying to run anything in Iraq right now?

We are lucky we ended up with Allawi. Count your stars.

Saddam’s trial: exhibit A in the case of the missing A-to-Z global rule set

“Who V. Saddam? The U.S. has spend years preparing for Saddam Hussein’s trial. But it is not all that certain who will try him or when—or whose ends that trial will ultimately serve,” by Peter Landesman, New York Times Magazine, 11 July, p. 34.

This whole article is simply brilliant and very well written, pointing up how hard and yet necessary it has been for the U.S. to try and play the role of judicial Leviathan in addition to military Leviathan. In the end, we can play a necessary role, but never a sufficient one, as this analysis makes clear. In my mind, this article resonates with the implied understanding that what this era truly lacks is an A-to-Z global rule set on how to effectively process and rehabilitate politically-bankrupt states. If we did, we’d know the answer to the question posed by the article’s title.

I provide some serious excerpts here, cause it’s that good:

On Dec. 14 of last year, just hours after being hauled out of a hole in the ground by American forces, Saddam Hussein received his first visitors as a prisoner of war: two Americans, L. Paul Bremer III, at the time the top United States administrator in Iraq, and Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, then the commander of the American-led forces in Iraq; and four prominent Iraqis -- Mowaffak al-Rubaie, then a member of the Iraqi Governing Council and now Iraq's national security adviser; Adnan Pachachi, the foreign minister of Iraq before Hussein's reign; Adel Abdul Mahdi, a Shiite representative; and Ahmad Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress. As the men entered the small holding cell, Hussein was sitting cross-legged on the edge of a cot in a white gown and navy blue jacket, his eyes cast down. The visitors were solemn and confrontational. They did not greet him as Mr. President or former president or as anything at all. They stood around him in silence. Then the Iraqis sat in front of him, while Bremer and Sanchez remained standing. Occasionally Hussein lifted his eyes and looked around.

One by one the visitors began asking him to explain some of the heinous acts committed by his regime -- not whether he'd given the orders that turned Iraq into one of the world's worst atrocity zones, but why had he done so. ''I asked him the names of people I knew he'd had executed,'' al-Rubaie recalled recently. ''Saddam was disgustingly sarcastic. He was waving his hands. I asked him, 'Why did you commit these mass graves?' He said, 'Where are these mass graves?' I asked him: 'Have you seen any other ruler in history who has used gas against his own people, like you did in Halabja?' He said the Iranians did it. 'Why did you do Anfal, where a hundred thousand people died?' He turned his face away.''

After about 30 minutes, Hussein's visitors stood to go. It was at this point, according to the accounts of two people in the room, that Hussein's mood shifted: he seemed less defiant, maybe a little afraid. He looked up and said: ''Is that it? Finished? Nothing else?''

Al-Rubaie told me, ''He expected to be tortured, to be hanged, or he expected Sanchez to pull out his pistol and empty three or four bullets in his head.'' That was Hussein's idea of justice. And that's how it would have gone down if he had still been running things.

At the time, summary execution wasn't an option. Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (C.P.A.), had suspended court-ordered executions in Iraq to head off a wave of revenge killings of deposed Baathists, and also because Britain, Washington's most important coalition partner, outlawed capital punishment in 1965. But now, with Hussein in their legal custody, there seems to be little doubt that Iraq's new government will reverse the order and that eventually Hussein will be executed -- shot if he is tried as a military officer, hanged if tried as a civilian. First, however, he is to stand trial in what is likely to be one of the most riveting, complex and potentially controversial legal proceedings ever carried out on the world stage.

[break]

Washington has devoted years to preparing the case against him. And in invading Iraq, the United States has suffered the loss of hundreds of American soldiers and a great deal of political capital to topple Hussein and bring him to justice. With the failure, to date, to find weapons of mass destruction, and the ties between Iraq's Baathists and Al Qaeda apparently not what the administration led Americans to believe they were, the architects of the invasion are looking to the trials of Hussein and his lieutenants to vindicate the war and fulfill their vision of the taking of Baghdad as a transformative event in the region's history.

''It goes without saying Saddam's trial is going to be one of the most important trials of the last hundred years, including Eichmann,'' Paul D. Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, told me in mid-June. ''This will finally convince Iraqis that his regime has really been brought to an end.'' Even more important, Wolfowitz said, will be the mere fact of the trial. ''I'm struck at how often Arabs I talk to who believe in what we're doing -- democratic reform in the Middle East -- say that the cardinal criterion isn't elections or freedom but equal justice under the law.''

Much of what Wolfowitz and other proponents of the war anticipated has not turned out as planned, however, and there are American and Iraqi officials who admit that their carefully orchestrated arrangements for Hussein's trial might never come to pass. Lacking the security for even a public handover of power, when might it be possible to hold a public trial for Hussein? Might Hussein's claim of an ''invader's laws'' find more believers in the Arab world than the equal justice under the law that Wolfowitz speaks of? And is an American-style, due-process trial really what the Iraqis want anyway?

''Iraqis have their own goals for this tribunal, not that it brings justice but that it punishes people,'' said Salem Chalabi, the Iraqi exile, nephew of Ahmad Chalabi and general director of the Iraqi Special Tribunal since April. ''I'm treading a thin line between what Iraqis want, which is a quick process to judge Saddam guilty and just kill him, and what the international community desires, which is due process, a fair trial. All this will end up being thrown aside if you let Iraqis take over. They may just want to go ahead and create a new kind of process and just kill everybody, which is a realistic alternative.'' He added, ''A lot can go wrong.''

Salem Chalabi says that Hussein probably will not have his day in court before the fall of 2005, after the evidence against the former president has been gathered and he has watched the trials of other senior Baathists.

[break]

Human rights groups, experts in international law and numerous United Nations and government officials around the world greeted the Bush administration's choice of an Iraqi-led tribunal over an international court with derision. They say the tribunal is less the cornerstone of Iraqi autonomy than an attempt by the administration to prove there is no need for an international system of justice. ''The Bush administration pursued this route out of its antipathy to internationalized forms of justice,'' said Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch, which has been compiling evidence of atrocities in Iraq since the gulf war in anticipation of an international war-crimes tribunal. ''This was going to be evidence that the world didn't need big international courts. 'Look, we've done it on the local level in Baghdad, and it works.'''

Some of the human rights advocates also contend that the administration wants to maintain control of the trials because it is concerned that the trials might turn up evidence of American complicity in some of Hussein's atrocities. The United States, which considered Iran the greater regional threat after the ascent of the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, did tacitly support Hussein's regime until the invasion of Kuwait, in part by authorizing the sale to Iraq of pathogens like anthrax and botulinum that were used to manufacture biological weapons. This is one reason the United States was so insistent on keeping Hussein's trial out of an international court, argues Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch. ''It's to protect their own dirty laundry,'' he told me. ''The U.S. wants to keep the trial focused on Saddam's crimes and not their acquiescence.''

These critics of the Iraqi Special Tribunal resent too that they and their expertise and investment of time and money in international justice have been pushed to the sidelines. What many of them had hoped for was something like the United Nations' Sierra Leone war crimes court -- a ''hybrid'' proceeding that would be set in Iraq and staffed mostly with international attorneys and judges, along with as many local jurists as possible. Expertise and financing would come via the United Nations, and so, ultimately, would the control.

Iraqis themselves are quite clear about what they want, though, and it's not a United Nations-led tribunal. ''Iraqis don't want to be imposed upon by a huge U.N. tribunal bureaucracy,'' said Sermid Al-Sarraf, an Iraqi exile who took part in the State Department's planning for postwar Iraqi justice. ''The U.N. had 15 years to call for a tribunal. . . . If the international community had done its job, we wouldn't need a tribunal now.''

[break]

Are the Iraqis up to the task? Here opinions differ. The view of the Iraqi legal system from the White House, not surprisingly, is quite rosy. Administration officials stress that while Hussein's political rivals were being assailed in secret tribunals, a court system for nonpolitical crime, full of capable judges and lawyers, operated with relatively little intervention from Baathist leaders.

But others, including Salem Chalabi, are less sanguine in their assessment. ''Twenty-eight thousand lawyers in Iraq, and most of them do nothing,'' he lamented with an audible groan. ''Most register companies, and they take three months rather than the two hours it would take in the West.'' There's going to be a steep learning curve, he warned. ''When we first started talking about the Iraqi Special Tribunal, one of the judges produced a two- or three-page statute that was embarrassingly basic. The C.P.A. realized that if the tribunal was left to Iraqis, what would emerge would be something out of whack with the rest of the international community.''

Even Prosper concedes the limitations: ''In Baghdad in January, I asked prospective Iraqi Special Tribunal judges how many people they intended to try. They said 5,000. I thought 50 was going to be tough. When I was a prosecutor in L.A. during the Rodney King riots, overnight we were given thousands of cases. This was obviously a fully operational first-world judicial system with federal, state and local courts. And the entire system was paralyzed.'' Meaning, of course, that the Iraqis have no idea what it takes to try these kinds of cases.

The solution, according to the Bush administration, is to pour in as much American personnel, advice, physical support and money as the Iraqi Special Tribunal needs. To which detractors nod and say, Exactly: that's the problem.

I read this story and it says to me: the world needs a rule set here that’s very much like that of America’s and the world certainly needs America’s support in making it happen, but in the end it cannot be solely from America. Again, our participation is necessary but not sufficient.

It’s not our aid that’s the problem, it’s the lack of a global rule set into which we can pour that support without our efforts themselves becoming labeled as part of the problem. Ultimately, we need to give up some power to a global rule set in order to wield more global power within that accepted structure of rules.

But one more thing also seems clear: that firm understanding of an emerging A-to-Z global rule set on how to process politically bankrupt regimes will not emanate from the United Nations. It has to be to grow out of the Core itself—or basically what is known today as the G-20. Build the understanding there, and then get the buy-in from the rest of the world.

All of the world’s great powers are basically on the same historical page now and have been since at least 9/11. It’s time to start making some use of that historic alignment of stars.

July 11, 2004

PNM: America’s #1 Foreign Policy Strategic Vision!

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 10 July 2004

I celebrate month #3 on the new (started in March) Foreign Affairs best seller list (posted 1 July on their site). Who knows how long it will last, so milk it while you can.

But more than that, I feel like I’m sitting on top in terms of strategic vision. I mean, you know how movie advertisements will take any opportunity to declare their film ”America’s number one thriller/comedy/drama-about-the-French-Revolution!” Well, I feel like I can legitimately claim that PNM is “America’s #1 Foreign Policy Strategic Vision” right now. Take a look at the list below and tell me I’m wrong.

Number one if Woodward’s Plan of Attack—pretty much a journalistic recreation of the run-up to the Iraq war and no further. Clarke’s Against All Enemies is his personal bitch list about everything that’s gone wrong in the war against terrorism for the past decade plus, but a comprehensive vision of where U.S. foreign policy needs to go? Hardly. Unless you think counter-terrorism is all you need for a grand strategy.

Numbers 3 and 4 (The Connection and House of Bush, House of Saud) are both exercises in conspiratorial connect-the-dots (the first between al Qaeda and Saddam, and the second between the Bushes and the Saudi royal family). Finger-pointing to be sure, but nothing close to a foreign policy vision.

Number 5, Bamford’s A Pretext for War is basically a hybrid between Woodward’s and Clarke’s books—backward looking and full of accusations.

Then PNM comes in at number 6, or #1 as a volume that truly tries to present a way ahead for U.S. foreign and national security policies as a whole.

Of the remaining nine books, Ferguson’s Colossus comes close to the same ambition, except it’s mostly an exercise in history, not a forward projection. Johnson’s book (The Sorrows of Empire) is also close, except it’s vision by negation (he mostly knows what he dislikes—this administration). Endgame is narrowband application: winning the GWOT is part of our foreign policy grand strategy, but cannot possibly constitute its bulk. Mann’s book (The Rise of the Vulcans) is broadband, but backward looking.

So looking over the top 15 as a whole, there’s really only the PNM that purports to generate a broadband, forward-looking definition of U.S. foreign policy. In terms of straight content, PNM’s closest competitors would be Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Choice and the Walter Russell Mead volume (Power, Terror, Something, Something—I can never remember the laundry-list title). Zbig’s book sold well, but Mead’s hasn’t even cracked the FA list, which must smart some for him, being the Henry Kissinger chair at the Council on Foreign Relations.

But hey, it’s an incredibly crowded field and it’s getting more crowded by the minute (a whole new slew of big political books are coming out in the next few weeks), so don’t think for a minute I don’t feel blessed by the market response PNM has received. Frankly, in the weeks leading up to its release, I was scared witless over the prospects of going up head to head with Mead, Brzezinski, Woodward, Huntington, Fukuyama, Ferguson et. al. All these guys have sold books and won awards galore, whereas my first book (basically my PhD diss spruced up), sold a whopping 400 or so copies. Since I figure I’ve already sold about 100 times that much with PNM, I’ve done my best to enjoy this while it lasts. Every time I walk through an airport and see my book on some store shelf, I realize what a privilege it is to have your stuff out there, even as the emails and Amazon reviews seem so divided (Genius! Nutcase! Brilliant! Nonsense! Prophet! Demagogue! Five stars! One star! You gotta read this! Read anything but this!).

But hey, the only thing that really hurts when you publish a book is indifference.

Here’s the list in full (with last month’s rank in parentheses):

1 Plan of Attack, Bob Woodward, Simon & Schuster (1)
2 Against All Enemies, Richard A. Clarke, Free Press (2)
3 The Connection, Stephen F. Hayes, HarperCollins (new)
4 House of Bush, House of Saud, Craig Unger, Scribner, (3)
5 A Pretext for War, James Bamford, Random House (new)
6 The Pentagon's New Map, Thomas P.M. Barnett, Putnam (4)
7 Who Are We? Samuel P. Huntington, Simon & Schuster (6)
8 Ghost Wars, Steve Coll, Penguin Press (7)
9 From Babel to Dragomans, Bernard Lewis, Oxford University Press (8)
10 Secret History of the Iraq War, Yossef Bodansky, HarperCollins (new)
11 The End of Oil, Paul Roberts, Houghton Mifflin (9)
12 Colossus, Niall Ferguson, Penguin Press (5)
13 Endgame, Thomas McInerney & Paul E. Vallely, (10)
14 The Sorrows of Empire, Chalmers Johnson, Metropolitan Books, (13)
15 Rise of the Vulcans, James Mann, Viking (12)

Today’s catch (with some old Post articles):

Pointing fingers after the fact: everyone BUT Congress is to blame

“Senators Assail C.I.A. Judgments On Iraq’s Arms As Deeply Flawed: Panel Unanimous: ‘Group Think’ Backed Prewar Assumptions, Report Concludes,” by Douglas Jehl, NYT, 10 July, p. A1.

Israel’s fence is simply “never again” for this era’s warfare

“In the Ancient Streets of Najaf, Pledges of Martyrdom for Cleric,” by Somini Sengupta, NYT, 10 July, p. A1.

“Major Portion of Israeli Fence Is Ruled Illegal: Decision by World Court: Palestinians Hail Verdict, Though Not Binding, on West Bank Wall,” by Gregory Crouch and Grey Myre, New York Times, 10 July, p. A1.

A very valid measure of our failed occupation of Iraq

“Filipino, 2 Bulgarians taken hostage in Iraq,” Associated Press, located in my local Newport Daily News, 9 July, p. A3.

“Underclass of Workers Created in Iraq: Many Foreign Laborers Receive Inferior Pay, Food and Shelter,” by Ariana Eunjung Cha, Washington Post, 1 July, p. A1.

Ethnic cleansing the old-fashioned way

“’We Want to Make a Light Baby’: Arab Militiamen in Sudan Said to Use Rape as Weapon of Ethnic Cleansing,” by Emily Wax, WP, 30 June, p. A1.

From LDC to LCC: how one word changes the concept of development

“Implored to ‘Offshore’ More: U.S. Firms Are Too Reluctant to Outsource Jobs, Report Says,” by Paul Blustein, WP, 2 July, p. A1.

Pointing fingers after the fact: everyone BUT Congress is to blame

“Senators Assail C.I.A. Judgments On Iraq’s Arms As Deeply Flawed: Panel Unanimous: ‘Group Think’ Backed Prewar Assumptions, Report Concludes,” by Douglas Jehl, New York Times, 10 July, p. A1.

The Senate report is completely predictable: “America’s intelligence sucks as always, which is why our 20/20 hindsight is so valuable to the American public. We’ll take our usual approach to ‘reforming intelligence’ and five years from now, when the next big intell failure is—yet again—uncovered by yours truly, rest assured, everyone but Congress will be forced to shoulder the blame.”

Why, never in all my years of public service . . . [huff] . . . have I ever seen such a [puff] . . . why I oughta . . . [#*@!#$&?!].

Oh, do us all a favor and go blow your own house down.

Congress never gets sold anything they don’t want to buy—deep down. Yes, sometimes they get buyer’s remorse on the far side, and we get brilliant reports like this one, but frankly they gave Bush the hunting license he wanted on Saddam because he had enough political momentum at the time and plenty of solidity in his party’s ranks. They bought all his various rationales hook, line and sinker because, in the end, everyone wanted Saddam gone after more than a dozen years of bombing him—almost daily.

Of course, everyone reserves the right to change their mind and start pointing fingers once things get tough, but don’t kid yourself, if the occupation had gone as well as some had hoped (and sold publicly in effusive statements), this whole WMD thing would have gone by the wayside.

Knowing that Congress won’t do anything real or comprehensive to reform the Intell Community as a result of this report, I see it as nothing more than payback for a job poorly done (the occupation). Fair enough in a political season, but it doesn’t answer the mail for next time.

But don’t worry, that mail is already being answered throughout the military: the lessons learned from OIF (second half) are being explored as I type. None of this will be in vain, because there is no institution that learns better from its mistakes than the military.

As for the IC, expect more bitchy tell-alls and I-told-ys-so’s like Clarke’s and the new one by Anonymous, but they’ll do little to change things for the better. In the end, you can file them right next to this Senate report.

Israel’s fence is simply “never again” for this era’s warfare

“In the Ancient Streets of Najaf, Pledges of Martyrdom for Cleric,” by Somini Sengupta, New York Times, 10 July, p. A1.

“Major Portion of Israeli Fence Is Ruled Illegal: Decision by World Court: Palestinians Hail Verdict, Though Not Binding, on West Bank Wall,” by Gregory Crouch and Grey Myre, New York Times, 10 July, p. A1.

Here’s a great bit from the first article:

“At 23, with no more than a primary school education and a short stint as a soldier in Saddam Hussein’s army, Mustafa Jabbar says he and his wife stand ready to be martyrs for Mr. Sadr’s movement. If need be, he said, they will volunteer their first born as well, a baby boy, now 45 days old. ‘I will mines in the baby and blow him up,’ Mr. Jabbar said. He has named the baby Moqtada.”

When that is what you face on the other side of the street, you build a wall—pure and simple. You wait them out, cause it’ll take years and years before that hatred burns itself out. Meanwhile, you just keep saying to yourself, “never again, never again.”

We live in an era where the threats are based at the level of the individual, not the state and not some system-level superpowers. To deter armies, you deploy armies, and to deter global nuclear war, you field a survivable second-strike force. But to deter people willing to load up their children with explosives, you simply throw up walls.

A very valid measure of our failed occupation of Iraq

“Filipino, 2 Bulgarians taken hostage in Iraq,” Associated Press, located in my local Newport Daily News, 9 July, p. A3.

“Underclass of Workers Created in Iraq: Many Foreign Laborers Receive Inferior Pay, Food and Shelter,” by Ariana Eunjung Cha, Washington Post, 1 July, p. A1.

In PNM, I hold up the great mobile workforce of the Philippines as the classic example of a global commute. I predicted that we’d see lotsa Filipinos in postwar Iraq, and we have, because they go anywhere and do damn near anything—reliably and with a great work ethic.

When the Philippines bars its contract workers, described as “the backbone of the U.S. military support staff in Iraq,” from entering the country after insurgents there released a videotape threatening to kill a Filipino hostage, you know we have suffered a serious loss in this ally-denial, anti-access asymmetrical challenge from the militants.

But it’s worse than that. The way this occupation has been run has been nothing short of foul in terms of skewed compensation for all the boots on the ground. At the very bottom of the ladder are the underclass of workers brought in by the contractors to do the shit work. They get paid close to nothing and have been treated very badly. Then there are the U.S. troops, which have been asked to mutate into an occupation force despite years and years of the Pentagon’s underprioritizing of that function. Then above them are the contracting firms which appear to be making money hand over fist in this endeavor. Yes, everyone’s risking their lives on some level, but the extreme disparity in pay levels across this total labor force shows just how far we have to go in rethinking what must become the Defense Department’s far more robust Sys Admin roles and missions.

This ad hoc approach simply has to stop. Too much waste, too much fraud, too much prisoner abuse.

And if I didn’t have the confidence I have that this military is moving smartly to correct these mistakes, I would have walked out of Michael Moore’s movie feeling a whole lot more depressed by his cynical take on the whole shebang.

Ethnic cleansing the old-fashioned way

“’We Want to Make a Light Baby’: Arab Militiamen in Sudan Said to Use Rape as Weapon of Ethnic Cleansing,” by Emily Wax, Washington Post, 30 June, p. A1.

This brown-on-black war of Arab militiamen raping African women en masse in Sudan certainly rivals anything seen in the Balkans in the 1990s. You can dress it up as a “clash of civilizations” all you want, but this is strictly an “olive tree” war, to use Tom Friedman’s classic vernacular. In short, this is all about driving one people off some land and replacing them with another.

When I get emails from people trying to shame me on my belief that globalization is a good thing because it creates connectivity that engenders binding rules sets and ultimately peace, instead offering the view that globalization is nothing more than economic slavery, I always try to keep places like Sudan in mind when I curb my tongue and let the mindless criticism pass. Until you get connectivity, you don’t even begin the conversation on what fair rule sets are. Instead, you get isolated societies like Sudan and medieval warfare like the sort we’re witnessing today within its borders. Would I trade some environmental degradation and exploitation of workers so I could Sudan to the point of being able to protest WTO trade regulations or IMF interest policies? You bet. Because it would sure beat the hell out of what we’re watching in Sudan right now—a disconnected economy, society, and state feeding on itself in an amazing display of humanity’s endless capacity for cruelty (oh, and indifference—meaning ours).

From LDC to LCC: how one word changes the concept of development

“Implored to ‘Offshore’ More: U.S. Firms Are Too Reluctant to Outsource Jobs, Report Says,” by Paul Blustein, Washington Post 2 July, p. A1.

I cite this article simply for the phrase that the consulting firm uses in its report: Low Cost Countries. What’s a Low Cost Country? It’s what we used to call a Less Developed Country back in the 1970s and 1980s, or an LDC. Better put, an LCC is an LDC with a decent enough rule set on foreign investment, education, and infrastructure development to attract “outsourcing” from the Core.

LDC to LCC: imagine that, all it took was that one word and suddenly you’re invited to the party.

July 9, 2004

On PNM's practical application: a view from Indonesia

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 9 July 2004

I mentioned the Jakarta Post op-ed (" U.S. interests in Malacca Straits") published on the 7th in a previous blog. It was reposted today (9 July) on the International Herald Tribune site at http://www.iht.com/articles/528548.html (the IHT is the international "combined" version of the New York Times and the Washington Post).

The article was written by one Barrett Bingley, a Visiting Fellow at the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies working on security in the Straits of Malacca. When I saw the original text and byline on my Blackberry during my recent DC trip, I figured this guy was from the CSIS in Washington DC, where I briefed just last week, but he's actually based in Indonesia, at a center of the same name that's funded by the private sector (it's part of a far larger consortium of ASEAN state research centers).

Here's the piece in full, with my commentary (and today's catch) to follow:

Meetings between the U.S., Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore over the last ten days appear to have laid a path for security cooperation in the Straits of Malacca. However, the recent agreements are only the first step in ensuring maritime security in the Straits.

A lack of effective implementation by the littoral states would almost certainly result in a renewed push by the U.S. to allow its forces to patrol the Straits.

The first key meeting took place in Putrajaya on June 20th between Admiral Fargo, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command and Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak.

The outcome of the meeting established that the United States was not intending to deploy its own forces to patrol the Straits. Instead, Fargo indicated the U.S. would support increased information and intelligence exchange with the littoral states.

In Jakarta, a second important meeting took place on June 30th and resulted in a joint declaration by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to initiate stepped-up coordinated patrols. These patrols are to be the backbone of a viable security strategy in the Malacca Straits, sans U.S. forces. Operational planning is meant to commence this following week.

These meetings have laid a strong groundwork for fighting piracy and terrorism in the Malacca Straits while maintaining the maritime sovereignty of the three states. The statements made by the littoral state's defense officials must now result in a robust implementation of a maritime security regime in the Malacca Straits.

Should intent not be translated into increased security in the Straits, the U.S. will surely apply renewed pressure on Indonesia and Malaysia to allow U.S. forces to begin patrols in the area.

Whether or not this is proper international behavior is the subject of a different debate. The fact is, this course of action is an attractive one to the U.S and will likely be pursued.

The Malacca Strait is an area of continuing economic, strategic and grand strategic interest to the United States.

The U.S. will closely monitor the security situation there and is likely to intervene if it feels its interests are in danger. It will be up to Indonesia to see that this danger does not emanate from its territorial waters, lest it risk foreign intervention.

The United States, along with its strongest regional supporter Singapore, considers the threat of a catastrophic terrorist strike in the Malacca Straits unacceptably high.

The U.S. and Singapore focus on worst-case scenarios, such as closure of the Straits by the sinking of a tanker at its narrowest, shallowest point (only 1.5 km across and 25 meters deep), or the use of a Liquefied Natural Gas tanker as a floating bomb against a port facility.

Both the United States and Singapore would like to see security in the Straits become the responsibility of more than just the littoral states.

Indonesians may deny the risk of catastrophic terrorism exists as, Adm. Sondakh did on April 12 when he called U.S. concerns 'baseless' and this may even be correct, but this does not mean the concerns of the world's most powerful state can easily be ignored.

The U.S. economic interests in keeping the Straits open are enormous, given that 30 percent of world trade passes through the Straits annually. Perhaps just as important is the U.S. interest in ensuring the free-flow of oil to Japan and South Korea, its strongest East Asian allies. Japan alone receives 80 percent of its oil from ships transiting the Straits.

There are also important strategic and operational considerations for the U.S. and Singapore. Warship freedom of movement and port security is a high priority for both countries following the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole and the revelation of numerous Al-Qaeda plots to attack other U.S. warships, including those in transiting the Malacca Straits.

Now that Singapore has opened the aircraft carrier docking facility at Changi Naval Base U.S. warship traffic in the Strait will be higher than ever before, presenting numerous tempting targets for terrorists.

One somewhat overlooked reason for the recent U.S. interest in the Malacca Straits is the role it plays in the newest incarnation of U.S. grand strategy.

Thomas Barnett, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, has written a persuasive book called The Pentagon's New Map that has received substantial interest in U.S. policy-making circles. While by no means official U.S. policy, its main arguments appear to parallel the latest U.S. geo-strategic actions.

Barnett argues that, from a U.S. security point of view, the world can be divided into the Functioning Core which has embraced globalization and is thick with connectivity, and the Non-Integrating Gap where globalization is thinning or just plain absent.

The keys to U.S. security are shrinking the Gap and stopping terrorist networks from accessing the Core via 'seam states' that lie along the Gap's boundaries. Barnett identifies Indonesia and Malaysia as two notable 'seam states'.

The newly inaugurated Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) can be seen as the U.S. Navy's contribution to shrinking the Gap. The interest in counter-terrorism in the Malacca Straits, which falls under the mandate of the RMSI, can be understood as an effort to harden a key waterway against terrorist forays originating from the 'seam states'.

Therefore, U.S. interest in the Malacca Straits is part of an ambitious plan to improve security worldwide and that interest is thus unlikely to diminish.

Given the strong and multi-layered interests of the U.S. in the Malacca Straits the littoral states must prove they can provide sufficient security against terrorism in order to avoid provoking the U.S. into using its own forces in the waterway.

Meetings and agreements are not enough; the key to maintaining maritime sovereignty for Indonesia and Malaysia is in their implementation of these agreements.

COMMENTARY: It's a nice piece of analysis. That the author chooses to frame it as an example of what's being pursued in the field that fits within the model of the world put forth in PNM is gratifying, because it clearly indicates that the book and the material works for him on that level. Like a Greg Jaffe with the Wall Street Journal, Bingley believes he's found the Rosetta Stone in PNM, a phenomenon that I like to encourage not because it suggests the rise of my personal influence with the military (always overblown by observers), but because it suggests that PNM's view of the world is highly accurate.

How do I know this to be true? When Pacific Command's long-range planning/strategic presentations refer—without explanation—to "Barnett's Gap" as a key descriptor of the 21st-century security environment. When Central Command officers plug key concepts from the book into their new long-range strategic plan for the region. When Special Operations Command invites me, along with a handful of other strategists, to sit down with them and think through the "everything else" associated with a long-term waging of a Global War on Terrorism. Or when Joint Forces Command asks me to keynote their first big conference designed to explore—in effect—what a Sys Admin force should look and act like in the field.

So when reviews are published that cite the book as being "more useful as an intellectual exercise than as the guide to policy described in the book's promotional literature" (Publisher's Weekly), I'm able to shake off such criticism with a sly smile. PNM doesn't let the Pentagon in on some fantastic new definition of international relations theory, it lets the world in on where this Pentagon is going—whether you, they, me, or the world want it to go that direction or not. That's what I aimed for in the book: a deep exploration and analysis of that which must be accepted.

All these invitations from military commands and citations in media articles are nice, but I don't kid myself: it's the ideas that open doors and garner invitations, not the analyst. The ideas attract attention when they match up with emerging lessons learned from the field; they do not drive thinking per se but merely reflect and organize—in a coherent fashion—emerging thought (hence my frequent joke that I am a "stand-up philosopher"—see the Providence Journal profile of me at http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/projects/newrulesset/Providence%20Journal%20profile%20of%20Thomas%20Barnett.htm). Again, this has never been about influence or authority (I have some of the latter, and zero of the former), but about accuracy. I may regularly get a chance to strut my stuff at "Caesar's palace," but I never forget who "Caesar" really is (now I am really testing you Mel Brooks trivia knowledge!).

Real strategic vision isn't something you pull out of your ass and then convince the world to follow you like some Pied Piper. Real strategic vision simply helps decision makers see the world for what it is. Why this op-ed is so neat for me is that it demonstrates—yet again—its absolutely real-word utility as a guide for understanding not just the emergent strategic security environment but the logical responses being mounted by both the U.S. military and militaries around the world to deal with and shape that strategic security environment.

In short, the ideas and the book itself will stick around for as long as they offer the most accurate guide to the U.S. grand strategy logically derived from this bifurcated security world—by my estimation, for the next several decades.

Here's today's catch:

More useless warnings on next al Qaeda attack against U.S.

"Bin Laden Is Said To Be Organizing For a U.S. Attack: Time Frame Is This Year: White House Says Qaeda at Work From Hideouts on Afghan Border," by David Johnston and David Stout, New York Times, 9 July, p. A1.

The Sys Admin force is borrowing a few good men

"Army Looks For Airmen And Sailors," by Eric Scmitt, NYT, 9 July, p. A1.

China: infrastructure requires money, money requires rules . . .

"China Paradox: Short on Power, Long on Pollution; As Brownouts Multiply, Manufacturers Scramble To Keep Factories Humming," by Matt Pottinger, WSJ, 9 July, p. A8.

"Chinese Banks Slowly Learn To Walk on Own: As Government Eases Restraints, Financial Sector Makes a Shift To Lending for Profit, Not for Party," by Henny Sender, Wall Street Journal, 9 July, p. C1.

The yin and yang on New Core pillars India and China

"India Budget Raises Taxes to Finance Aid to Poor," by Saritha Rai, NYT, 9 July, p. W1.

"Expose of Peasants' Plight Is Suppressed by China: In a best seller, the good earth meets bad officials; Beijing tries to silence the authors," by Joseph Kahn, NYT, 9 July, p. A3.

"China Cedes to U.S. Complaint On Tax Rebate for Chip Makers,"by Neil King Jr. and Michael Schroeder, WSJ, 9 July, p. A2.

"India Lifts Foreign-Investment Caps,"by Jay Solomon, WSJ, 9 July, p. A8.

Firewalling off the Core from Gap's pandemics: avian flu

"As Bird Flu Persists, Global Leaders Prepare for the Worst," by Keith Bradsher and Lawrence K. Altman, NYT, 9 July, p. A6.

Failed states are always forced to find rule-set workarounds

"Sightseeing in Oman? You Mustn't Miss the Smugglers,” by Otto Pohl, New York Times, July, p. A4.

Pakistan: the failing Seam State of note

"Pakistan Without Illusions," editorial, NYT, 9 July, p. A18.

More useless warnings on next al Qaeda attack against U.S.

"Bin Laden Is Said To Be Organizing For a U.S. Attack: Time Frame Is This Year: White House Says Qaeda at Work From Hideouts on Afghan Border," by David Johnston and David Stout, New York Times, 9 July, p. A1.

Here is where I thought Michael Moore's critique of the Bush Administration was best: the mindless scaring of the public when there's nothing anyone can really do in response.

This is ass-covering—preemptive style—nothing more, nothing less, as we get closer to the election and everyone logically fears some attempt by al Qaeda to pull off a Madrid-style attack here.

The Sys Admin force is borrowing a few good men

"Army Looks For Airmen And Sailors," by Eric Scmitt, New York Times, 9 July, p. A1.

Yet another sign that the most Sys Admin of the services—the Army—is suffering the most as the Iraq occupation drags on. The story is about the Army actively recruiting Marines, sailors, and airmen as they leave the other services.

Talk about robbing Peter to pay Paul!

The transformation of transformation hurls past yet another tipping point—thanks to the Iraq occupation.

China: infrastructure requires money, money requires rules . . .

"China Paradox: Short on Power, Long on Pollution; As Brownouts Multiply, Manufacturers Scramble To Keep Factories Humming," by Matt Pottinger, Wall strett Journal, 9 July, p. A8.

"Chinese Banks Slowly Learn To Walk on Own: As Government Eases Restraints, Financial Sector Makes a Shift To Lending for Profit, Not for Party," by Henny Sender, Wall Street Journal, 9 July, p. C1.

China's short on power and yet choking on pollution. This was the basic paradox we explored in our Asian Energy Futures workshop with Cantor Fitzgerald in the NewRuleSets.Project atop World Trade Center One in May of 2000. What we decided back then still holds: China has to decarbonize its energy profile faster than any country in human history (a phrase you should get used to in stories about China).

But how to get off all that dirty but cheap coal? It's called natural gas and—in corollary—more natural gas as the transportation shifts from oil to hydrogen and you access that hydrogen first and foremost from natural gas.

But all that natural gas (basically more than tripling for developing Asia in the next two decades) requires a massive investment in infrastructure, and that means a lot of money. Money can't flow unless the rule sets are in place, which is why the banking reform movement in China is so desperately crucial.

But let me stop there before I once again lapse into reciting the Decalogue.

The yin and yang on New Core pillars India and China

"India Budget Raises Taxes to Finance Aid to Poor," by Saritha Rai, New York Times, 9 July, p. W1.

"Expose of Peasants' Plight Is Suppressed by China: In a best seller, the good earth meets bad officials; Beijing tries to silence the authors," by Joseph Kahn, NYT, 9 July, p. A3.

"China Cedes to U.S. Complaint On Tax Rebate for Chip Makers," by Neil King Jr. and Michael Schroeder, Wall Street Journal, 9 July, p. A2.

"India Lifts Foreign-Investment Caps," by Jay Solomon, WSJ, 9 July, p. A8.

First two stories are less scary than they sound: both indicate that political leaderships in New Delhi and Beijing are growing ever more sensitive about the plight of the rural poor as their booming economies open up to the outside world. Better to be too sensitive than not sensitive enough. So India will raise some taxes and redistribute that wealth to the rural poor, while the fourth generation of leadership in Beijing will simultaneously harp on the plight of the rural poor and let others do it as well, but only so long as party leadership (the real culprit in the rural areas) isn't criticized openly for its vast corruption.

Meanwhile, though, the opening up to the outside world continues unabated: China submits to the WTO on chips and ends the first-ever case brought against it by another state (the U.S. naturally); and India's new Congress government signals yet again it is committed to upping India's intake of foreign direct investment.

Firewalling off the Core from Gap's pandemics: avian flu

"As Bird Flu Persists, Global Leaders Prepare for the Worst," by Keith Bradsher and Lawrence K. Altman, New York Times, 9 July, p. A6.

Vietnam and Thailand, two southeast Asia Gap states, are the key sources of the possible global pandemic known as the avian flu. This "bird flu" has killed 23 of the 34 people who contracted it so far this year in those two countries. So far, the disease has not mutated to the point of spreading from human to human, just from bird to human and among birds themselves. But the WHO is taking no chances, developing stockpiles of medicines and "racing to develop a vaccine."

Neighboring China gets caught up in this situation as well, reminding us of its Seam State status. As we saw with SARS, something gets into China and it can easily start spreading all over the Core thanks to the business connectivity generated by the booming economy there.

So basic definitions re: health can be: Gap—source of pandemics, Core—fears them like crazy but with the resources to contain, Seam—the states the Core worries about most because they're transmitters.

Failed states are always forced to find rule-set workarounds

"Sightseeing in Oman? You Mustn't Miss the Smugglers," by Otto Pohl, New York Times, 9 July, p. A4.

Nice story on all the smuggling that goes on with Iran, making a lot of Persian Gulf pirates happy. When an authoritarian regime like the one that took over Iran in 1979 comes to power, inevitably there springs up a huge smuggling industry to help the disconnected population gain access to goods they can't otherwise access. Every once in a while Iran actually signs a legitimate trade-opening deal with the outside world that decimates the smugglers' trade, like the one it signed with international cigarette companies in 2002. But by and large the mullahs try their best to regulate the population's access to damn near everything—lest too much connectivity emerge with the corrupt global economy. Meanwhile, the pirates and smugglers thrive.

When you choose to live outside the global economic rule set, you necessarily survive by relying extensively on those who likewise ignore the rules. Pretty simple really: live down with dogs and get up with fleas.

Pakistan: the failing Seam State of note

"Pakistan Without Illusions," editorial, New York Times, 9 July, p. A18. No comment required on this one. It's just a great but very sobering NYT editorial that follows in full:

Pakistan Without Illusions

Pakistan's military dictator, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, has done such a good job of repackaging himself as a vital American ally against radical Islamic terrorism that it is easy to forget how alarming Washington rightly found so many of General Musharraf's policies not very long ago. He crushed Pakistani democracy, was, at the least, recklessly indifferent to safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and supported the Taliban and the terrorist groups active in Indian-ruled areas of Kashmir.

General Musharraf publicly broke with the Taliban almost three years ago, but there has been inadequate progress on many of the other issues, and Pakistan has recently appeared to be backsliding on the Taliban.

Many of the biggest dangers America faces over the next few decades are present in General Musharraf's Pakistan, starting with the way arbitrary dictatorships like his have become dangerous pressure cookers of discontent across the Muslim world. Ever since he seized power in a 1999 coup, General Musharraf has promised an early return to electoral democracy. Almost five years later, he still shows no inclination to share or yield power eventually, and he still derives his authority solely from control of the Army. Leading civilian politicians remain banned. Even the powerless prime minister named to add a veneer of electoral legitimacy to military rule was fired last month for proving insufficiently docile.

The spread of nuclear weapons to a lengthening list of erratic and belligerent countries rightly terrifies Americans. Now we know that the man who helped develop nuclear weapons for Pakistan, Abdul Qadeer Khan, was the international godfather of rogue nuclear programs, helping countries like Iran, Libya and North Korea acquire nuclear bomb technology and materials. Earlier this year, under strong American pressure, Pakistan questioned and then pardoned Dr. Khan. This questioning yielded important clues about several countries' secret nuclear efforts. But there is no way of knowing for sure how high Dr. Khan's protection went and whether his nuclear arms bazaar is now truly closed.

Pakistan's relationship to radical Islamic terrorism remains dangerously ambiguous. Historically, military leaders, including General Musharraf, openly used the Taliban and terrorist groups in Kashmir to advance Pakistan's strategic objectives. That is now supposed to have stopped. After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, General Musharraf broke ties with the Taliban government and let Washington use bases on Pakistani soil to support the invasion of Afghanistan. Recently, he sent Pakistan's Army into the tribal territories bordering Afghanistan, in a not tremendously successful effort to hunt down Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. But General Musharraf still lets Taliban leaders operate and recruit elsewhere on that border.

This year, General Musharraf promised to end the infiltration of insurgents from Pakistani territory into the Indian-ruled part of Kashmir. He seems to be keeping his word, but he has not taken on the groups that train and arm these militants.

General Musharraf is not an apocalyptic zealot like Osama bin Laden, an erratic recluse like North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, or a public vilifier of America, like Iran's ruling clerics. But neither is he a convinced or convincing ally in the struggle against radical Islamic terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation and destructive dictatorship.

You can call Musharraf a good man in a tough spot and live with the illusion that Pakistan is somehow logically counted among our allies in a global war on terrorism, or you can look at the country without illusions and see a failed state ruling over a failing society. Pakistan is a Seam State in geography only; otherwise one should logically count it among those states deeply lost to the Gap.

July 8, 2004

Reviewing the Reviews (Proceedings of U.S. Naval Institute)

Dateline: SWA flight from BWI back to Providence, 8 July

Rare travel day for me: got up at hotel after good night’s sleep and nothing to do but travel home. So did some work at the room before driving to Baltimore-Washington International at a time I knew would find little traffic in my path.

Good day to reflect on another review. This one comes from the Naval Institute’s flagship journal, Proceedings, which is the premier journal of the naval community. I’ve written about ten articles for them over the years, and was chosen their Author of the Year in 2001, so there’s a pretty special relationship there, especially between myself and the editor-in-chief Fred Rainbow. Fred published a lot of my early articles when I couldn’t find anyone else to take them, so in many ways he starts the publication pathway that eventually becomes the PNM.

Does that mean I expect a good review from Proceedings? Not on your life. Frankly, the Navy and the Army like my material least, whereas the Marines, Air Force and Special Ops guys warm up to it the fastest, so I had little expectations of a good review here. The guy who wrote it holds the Chief of Naval Operations Chair at the National War College, a navy captain by the name of Robert B. Brannon. I don’t know the guy, but I can’t be sure he hasn’t seen the brief.

Here’s the review with my commentary to follow (plus today’s catch of articles):

The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century

Thomas P.M. Barnett, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004; 392 pp. Maps. Index. Notes. Bib. $26.95

Reviewed by Captain Robert B. Brannon, U.S. Navy

Thomas Barnett is a masterful storyteller and insightful futurist. In this book, he transports his readers from the relative comfort zones of traditional security into a world of new dimensions. Using devices such as scenario planning and systems integration, Barnett describes conditions that dominate the post-2001 security environment. The Pentagon’s “new map” looks similar to the old one in that it reflects the same images of nations, states, and geographic borders—but that is where the similarities ends. The new world, as Barnett sees it, is one best described by what he calls the “Functioning Core” and the “Non-Integrating Gap.”

The core is the part of the world that is connected and “wired” through collective security, integrated economics, and the positive aspects of globalization. The gap is everything else, nonintegrated and disfranchised from the rest. The two regions are related through four flows: the movement of people from the gap to the core; the movement of energy from the gap to the core; the movement of money from the old core to the new core; and the exporting of security that only the United States can provide to the gap. These four flows (people, energy, investments, and security) become crucial not merely to preserving the core, but also to bridging the two in such a way that the core is made larger while the gap is reduced in size. Barnett’s central thesis is aimed at shrinking the gap.

In the connected world, there is less reason to make war or threaten the economic well-being of any other core nation in a substantive way because of the associated negative consequences. In the gap, there is constant cause for alarm because these nations are left out, forced to compete on a playing field that is decidedly not level, and made to fight for every advantage. Barnett’s prescription for security centers on making the gap more integrated with the core. Because rules govern international relations and influence relationships, “rule-sets” help to explain the various factors that have an impact on rebalancing the world as we know it. He suggests that new ordering principles are needed in favor of a better sense of balance. In a world defined by chaotic influences, especially between the core and the gap, sometime flows can become so imbalanced that new threats are created.

Barnett concludes by suggesting a new strategy for the United States as the de facto Leviathan in this new world. There are three basic goals: nurture security relations across the core by maintaining and expanding alliances; work bilaterally with states located at the seams between the core and multilaterally with the core as a whole, while discretely protecting the core from the gap’s most destabilizing flows (terrorism, drugs, and pandemic diseases); and make a commitment to reduce the gap by continuing to export security to its greatest trouble spots, while integrating countries that are economic success stories as quickly as possible. The author suggests a ten-step program for accomplishing this strategy. Replete with inspired ideas about how to make the world safer, this list alone is reason enough to read the book.

The Pentagon’s New Map is highly readable. Barnett does not waste time debunking old myths and theoretical constructs that no longer serve to explain international relations and current events. He simply spins a narrative that draws the reader ever closer into a kind of literary vortex devoid of familiar handholds and safety nets. Almost immediately, the reader feels slightly off balance. It may be that the author wants his readers in precisely that position of disequilibria, the better to appreciate his perspective.

The real value of this work lies not so much in the author’s out-of-the-box style, or because it suggest a very new and different way of looking at the world. Its value lies in what the author’s thesis says about the future of warfare. Whether or not you agree with Thomas Barnett’s ideas, his book likely will change the way you think about security in the modern world—especially if you are a warrior.

Captain Brannon is the Chief of Naval Operations Chair and instructor of national security strategy at the National War College.

COMMENTARY: It’s hard to complain about much in this review. As a rule, I don’t like regurgitation reviews (mostly full of recitations of the book’s main ideas), but Brannon writes very well, so he covers an amazing amount of territory with swift assurance. That leaves him plenty of space to make his main analytic points, which I feel frame the book exactly as I would want a military reader to appreciate it. It is a little strange he doesn’t explore the Leviathan-Sys Admin split, because that is what really grabs most military and expert readers, but that may be the navy in him. Probably, it’s more the national security strategy instructor in him, because this is the first review—I believe—to really nail both the four flows and the three prongs of the grand strategy so dead on. So the review is, in many ways, the best of both worlds for me: it truly presents the overarching vision as so much more than just the application of military power but likewise makes the case that the book’s main strength is its description of a new era of warfare. If the guy had sent it to me in advance and asked me to edit it, I wouldn’t have touched a word.

Here’s today’s catch:

Falluja returns to the forefront in Iraq

“Falluja Pullout Left Haven Of Insurgents, Officials Say: But U.S. and Iraqis Are Reluctant to Send G.I.’s Back, Fearing a New Uprising,” by Dexter Filkins, New York Times, 8 July, p. A1.

“Stability coming back to streets of capital: But some say bureaucracy heavy-handed,” by Paul Wiseman, USA Today, 8 July, p. 8A.

“U.S. Starts Drawing Plans To Cut Its Troops In Iraq,” by Eric Schmitt, NYT, 8 July. P. A11.

“Lawmakers: Troop call-ups pose ‘alarm’; Guard, reserves being strained,” by Tom Squitieri and Dave Moniz, USA, 8 July, p. 9A.

Bush on Edward’s inexperience: Don’t go there!

“Bush Questions Edwards’s Qualifications for Top Job,” by Mike Allen, Washington Post, 8 July, p. A2.

Homeland Security: the silent revolution triggered by 9/11

“Northrop Grumman Gets $175 Million Pact: Project Is Homeland Security’s Personnel System,” by Christopher Lee, WP, 8 July, p. A15.

Fantastic headlines for Cold War babies!

“Vietnam, China Accuse U.S. of Protectionism,” by Margot Cohen et. al, Wall Street Journal, 8 July, p. A12.

“New Faces of Farming in Russia’s Far East: Rich Land Draws Reverse Migration,” by James Brooke, NYT, 8 July, p. W1.

WHO as real mover and shaker in global rule sets

“WHO Wants to Start Drug Trial Registry: Proposal to Be Made in November,” by Shankar Vedantam, WP, 8 July, p. A3.

Where is Bill Cosby on Mugabe and Zimbabwe?

“African Leaders Failing Zimbabwe, Prelate Says,” by Michael Wines, NYT, 8 July, p. A3.

EU integration: a road to nowhere

“Roadblocks to EU Integration: Germany’s Autobahns Hit Bumps at Every Attempt to Expand,” by Matthew Karnitschnig, WSJ, 8 July, p. A12.

“European City Wins Jobs—and Looks Over Its Shoulder: Timisoara, Romania, Struggles to Keep Outsourcing Boom; Engineers Seek Higher Pay; Joining EU Could Blunt Edge,” by Dan Bilefsky, WSJ, 8 July, p. A1.

Movie Review: Fahrenheit 9/11

[snipped from: PNM’s called to the global stage; I’m called to the Pentagon]

Michael Moore’s movie “Fahrenheit 9/11.”

Moore’s movie is very funny and it does show Bush in a very bad light, but of course, it’s totally designed to do so. It’s not a documentary by any stretch, but pure propaganda, essentially shaped to prove—yet again—that all political leaders are either dupes (Democrats) or evil money-grubbers (Republicans). Meanwhile, anybody who serves with or works with the military is similarly a dupe (all soldiers are fodder) or evil money-grubbers (all contractors are in it simply to rip off the government). The cynicism of the movie is disturbing and very Marxist: the U.S. military is essentially a tool of the capitalist war machine, and no real good comes from its use overseas.

As someone who’s studied Soviet propaganda for years, it was fairly nostalgic to see America and its government depicted in this manner. Moore is a very skillful propagandist, so the movie was essentially a two-hour political attack commercial designed to get the audience to vote against Bush. Fine and dandy. Free country and you can say what you want. Just don’t call this a documentary and don’t tell me that Moore isn’t abusing that perception he’s fostering that he’s telling the “whole truth.” It is a very skewed (as he admits) rendition of history—basically a classic Marxist conspiratorial view of the post-Cold War era.

It’s sad that so many people will sop this up as the “real story,” like Oliver Stone’s worst movie “JFK” (though I admire him deeply as a filmmaker), because it simply fuels that sort of everyone-connected-to-the-government-is-bad mentality that was so prevalent in the mid-1990s. I believe this is Moore’s real intent, which makes him a decade-later version of Rush Limbaugh. That’s certainly his right to pursue such a career path and meld it with his political beliefs, as Rush so ably did. I just don’t care for that sort of political approach.

I think it was incredibly wrong for the right wing to go after Clinton his entire eight years, so full of personal hatred for the man and so desirous to paint his legacy as completely one defined by his worst characteristics. It maddened me deeply as a Democrat. But I don’t really care for Moore and others trying to do the same with Bush and the Republicans now. If it was wrong to do to Clinton then, it can’t be right to do it with Bush now, even if my personal political beliefs basically agree with the underlying criticisms of how Bush sold this war to the American public and the world.

So I left the theater depressed that this is the level of political discourse today: a wildly skewed conspiratorial rant designed to depict our president as thoroughly corrupt. Gosh, where have I seen this before? And is this all I have to look forward to now with administration after administration?

Falluja returns to the forefront in Iraq

“Falluja Pullout Left Haven Of Insurgents, Officials Say: But U.S. and Iraqis Are Reluctant to Send G.I.’s Back, Fearing a New Uprising,” by Dexter Filkins, New York Times, 8 July, p. A1 .

“Stability coming back to streets of capital: But some say bureaucracy heavy-handed,” by Paul Wiseman, USA Today, 8 July, p. 8A.

“U.S. Starts Drawing Plans To Cut Its Troops In Iraq,” by Eric Schmitt, NYT, 8 July. P. A11.

“Lawmakers: Troop call-ups pose ‘alarm’; Guard, reserves being strained,” by Tom Squitieri and Dave Moniz, USA, 8 July, p. 9A.

Falluja shapes up as the great sanctuary of all key elements of the insurgency: Iraqi Islamic radicals, foreign fighters like those led by Zarqawi, and Baathists plotting their return to power. The interim government’s rule does not extend there, and the U.S. military doesn’t want to go back, knowing it will inevitably kill hundreds to take the city, possibly creating more problems than it’s worth. Eventually, either Iraqi forces go in there or those inside Falluja settle some of these matters on their own and reduce the problem set greatly for the government and associated U.S. forces.

That’s why yesterday’s news about Iraqi Islamic extremists calling for Zarqawi’s death or capture was so meaningful. Ideally the U.S. military bodyguards the government while the emerging Iraqi military and police do the peace-keeping and insurgency squashing as much as is feasible, given their meager resources/skills/etc. That approach seems to be bearing some fruit in Baghdad, but Falluja will be the acid test.

Meanwhile, back home it looks like the military is coming apart at the seams in terms of personnel and rotations into and out of Iraq. Announcements are being issued in all directions: more troops, fewer troops, not enough troops, no draft, etc. Nothing drives transformation like personnel issues, so watch for big changes in coming months with the Army and Reserve Component. The breaking points are being reached, so new rule sets will rapidly emerge. The occupation continues to transform transformation.

The good news for the troops in Iraq is that, with the political handover now complete, their disposition should hopefully be driven now by real events and milestones and not political expediency. No more big decisions built on fumes.

As our general in northern Iraq, BGEN Ham puts it, “There were, not unexpectedly, a few minor hiccups. But every day we are closer to the day when Iraqi Security Forces will have the capability to manage their own security matters.”

Things may look surprising bright by early November, meaning Kerry and Edwards better not plan on winning over Iraq but instead on the economy and the state of our alliances and our standing in the world community—and they better come with a message of optimism, not just Bush failures.

Bush on Edward’s inexperience: Don’t go there!

“Bush Questions Edwards’s Qualifications for Top Job,” by Mike Allen, Washington Post, 8 July, p. A2.

I think it’s a real mistake for Bush to go after Edwards as unfit for the top job, because all he can offer in return is the image of Dick Cheney as president, which I don’t think would go over too well with just about anyone—Democrat or Republican.

Attacking Edwards is a loser for Republicans. No one votes on the VP, they vote on the top of the ticket. Veeps can only hurt, not really help, and right now I’d be careful to keep Cheney in the shadows of this election if I were Bush. Have him speak strictly to the faithful, but do not invite comparisons to Edwards. If the big ticket with Cheney is foreign policy experience, then his record in this administration should be kept quiet by the Bush campaign.

Homeland Security: the silent revolution triggered by 9/11

“Northrop Grumman Gets $175 Million Pact: Project Is Homeland Security’s Personnel System,” by Christopher Lee, Washington Post 8 July, p. A15.

Northrop wins a novel contract to run personnel for the Department of Homeland Security, and God knows it’ll be hard-pressed to do as badly as the current system, which sucks from stem to stern. Sometimes I think the only real reason—beyond the immediately politically expedient—why this administration created DHS was to use it as a laboratory to remake government bureaucratic practices. As a goal, not a bad one, and in the end, it may be DHS’s real contribution to government, because I predict it’ll end up being the Department of Agriculture of the 21st century: in ten years we’ll have more DHS bureaucrats than transnational terrorists, just like we now have more Ag bureaucrats than actual farmers.

Fantastic headlines for Cold War babies!

“Vietnam, China Accuse U.S. of Protectionism,” by Margot Cohen et. al, Wall Street Journal, 8 July, p. A12.

“New Faces of Farming in Russia’s Far East: Rich Land Draws Reverse Migration,” by James Brooke, New York Times, 8 July, p. W1.

China and Vietnam accuse the U.S. of protectionism in trade? No additional comment required. That’s just too queer for words for this child of the sixties.

The other story busts a great security myth that’s been around for ages: China’s huge starving population must inevitably invade Siberia to take all that land!

Oh well, so they just migrate there for a few months every spring to rent land and grow vegetables.

Damn those tricky Chinese communists for thwarting our Cold War fantasies again!

WHO as real mover and shaker in global rule sets

“WHO Wants to Start Drug Trial Registry: Proposal to Be Made in November,” by Shankar Vedantam, Washington Post, 8 July, p. A3.

It doesn’t always take a SARS or avian flu outbreak in Asia to remind us that the World Health Organization is rapidly becoming a preeminent source of new global rule sets that both shape and extend globalization’s reach around the planet.

This idea is a good one: creating a global registry of drug trials modeled on the one currently in use in the U.S. When I say the U.S. is the source code for the this era’s version of globalization, as opposed to the 19th-century, European-derived colonialism-fueled version that Niall Ferguson keeps speaking dreamily of, this is one of those great examples where our need to synchronize rule sets across our member states forced the U.S. to generate rule sets that later find expression on a global scale. Why? They are tried and true and they just work.

Yet another example of how America drives globalization’s spread in the best sort of ways—in addition to some of the shabbier ones that the anti-globalization forces always choose to highlight.

Where is Bill Cosby on Mugabe and Zimbabwe?

“African Leaders Failing Zimbabwe, Prelate Says,” by Michael Wines, New York Times, 8 July, p. A3.

Luckily, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Zimbabwe , Pius Ncube, is one brave soul. Lately he’s been berating the rest of Africa’s political leaders to stop tolerating the dictatorship that is Robert Mugabe’s increasingly brutal and irrational rule.

African-American politicians put up a huge effort on apartheid in South Africa. It would be nice to see someone stand up on this issue like Cosby has on the breakdown of African-American values and family structure.

EU integration: a road to nowhere?

“Roadblocks to EU Integration: Germany’s Autobahns Hit Bumps at Every Attempt to Expand,” by Matthew Karnitschnig, WSJ, 8 July, p. A12.

“European City Wins Jobs—and Looks Over Its Shoulder: Timisoara, Romania, Struggles to Keep Outsourcing Boom; Engineers Seek Higher Pay; Joining EU Could Blunt Edge,” by Dan Bilefsky, WSJ, 8 July, p. A1.

Same old same old: it’s almost always about infrastructure when it comes to integration, with transportation infrastructure being the most immediately crucial. Interesting WSJ story on how Germany is trying to promote economic integration eastward but keeps running into roadblocks—literally. Gotta have the infrastructure if you want prosperity. Gotta have the money to get the infrastructure. Money needs rules. Rules need security. Security needs a Leviathan (hmm, that would be V-E Day and then NATO for 45 years . . ..).

Someone stop me before I decalogue again!

Basic point is this: you want to move goods and services, Eastern Europe? You better hope the autobahn comes your way. I grew up in a depressed agricultural section of Wisconsin during my childhood. What was our greatest sin? We were nowhere near any interstates.

Good hunting and fishing though. Guess it’s a real guns-vs-butter choice in terms of development.

PNM’s called to the global stage; I’m called to the Pentagon

Dateline: Crowne Plaza Hamilton, Washington DC 7 July 2004

Got a call late last week from the actual office of the Secretary of Defense (not the huge bureaucracy known collectively as OSD but his actual office): a request to fly in today to brief someone special.

I get to the Pentagon a couple of hours earlier than my scheduled brief so I can meet with a colonel just back from Central Command in Baghdad. He’s set to do a big lessons learned document on acquisitions and logistics, and he’s a big fan of the Sys Admin concept. So we grab an empty office and chat our way through his take on the big issues coming out of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This guy’s been to basically all of the shows going back to Panama in ’89, so he’s a wealth of information and experience. I give him my impressions of the big changes exemplified by the advent of the Sys Admin function, and we separate promising to exchange products in the future, plus set up some good opportunities for me to brief in his community. It’s an exciting exchange; I feel like we’re plotting a revolution from within.

But the time is so right. There’s no denying we should have done so much better—frankly, going all the way back to Panama—on the “back half” stuff of peacekeeping, nation-building and sys admin following a regime take-down or significant military intervention to restore peace. Now I’m talking to colonels whose entire careers have been replete with this Military Operations Other Than War stuff (Panama, Desert Storm, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, OIF), and when they look ahead, they can’t imagine future interventions where we don’t need to get a whole lot better. Above them, we now basically have a crew of senior flags (right up to the four-stars) whose entire senior command history has covered the same territory. That means there is almost nobody left on top of the military command structure who hasn’t had the bulk of their careers demonstration that MOOTW is here and it’s never going away. In other words, we’ve reached the leadership tipping point, and the Iraq occupation has just pushed this generation of leadership’s strategic understanding right over the peak of the mountain top.

Once done with the colonel, it’s off to the nearby Office of Secretary of Defense conference facility suite deep inside the Pentagon to brief my singular principal. I never mind the one-person brief. It’s actually easiest to deliver because you can keep it fairly conversational and fast-paced, because all you need to do is read the one pair of eyes and zip right along. I got to give the brief in one of those inner-sanctum rooms that actually comes close to capturing the Pentagon as displayed in movies (the real building is almost always such a drab disappointment—so 1940s).

Plus, getting this request from SECDEF’s people says something nice about how PNM has been received on the “third deck” in the Pentagon: apparently, I haven’t burned any bridges with its publication.

Why should I care? Again, if the vision can’t appeal to both parties, it won’t have legs—historically speaking. Plus, my gut feeling is that these guys could well be in power another four years. Call me a pessimist on that one, but like Will Rogers used to say, “I don’t belong to an organized political party. I’m a Democrat.”

The brief goes well, the principal is a very intelligent guy who likes to explore a lot of the concepts as we go through the brief. Plus there’s a second senior who’s sitting in who has heard about the brief for years and finally wants to see it. That guy interrupts even more, but since he’s been through so many high-level decisions in the past 4 years, his interruptions are quite fascinating. In all, an amazing interaction that demonstrates to me once again how well the vision mirrors the strategic reality that the Pentagon is facing and that—contrary to some reviews which insist my constructs and prescriptions are far too “theoretical” and “impractical” to apply—these ideas are not only finding acceptance but real action with senior leadership. They aren’t moving in these directions because it does or does not fit some particular Bush Administration agenda. They argue, just like I do, that this grand strategic approach is simply inevitable—not something particularly Republican or Democratic.

Upshot of all this is that my two-hour brief deep in the bowels of the Pentagon quickly turns into a three-plus hour brief, which is a lot of attention to get from two senior officials starting at 3pm in the afternoon. I give the principal a copy of the book, signed, and I’m out the door. As usual, I get lost 3 or 4 times trying to navigate the Pentagon, which is getting to be so difficult with the renovations changing things seemingly every time you show up. But I eventually hit the metro exit and I’m on the blue line to DC.

Now, on to the international portion of today’s program. I head over to the DC offices of BBC International to tape a segment for broadcast tonight. It’s located on M Street right next door to CBS Radio, which was my very first stop on my Premeditated Media Tour of late March. It’s basically after hours here (7pm), so I have to get a guard to open the door for me. Then it’s upstairs into the Beeb and I’m quickly escorted into a radio booth for a solo stint with someone on the other end of my headphones.

My interviewer gives me some basic questions about the book, which tend to run along the lines of “Isn’t this vision of the future role of U.S. military forces simply too much to ask in terms of resources and will?” So I give my usual replies designed to make clear the boundable nature of the security problem-sets inside the Gap, and how I believe the U.S. military has the resources to pull off the Leviathan-Sys Admin split, if only they choose to get off certain predominate thinking still around from the Cold War (the Big One).

The whole thing goes about 7-8 minutes, and I’m talking fairly low-key and smoothly throughout. My interviewer doesn’t interrupt except to ask new questions, so I get the material out as I want, by and large. Of course, the BBC will simply sample what bits they like, so I’ll be interested to get the taped sequence from them eventually. If anyone out there heard the segment, please email me with your impressions.

Overall, though, I was pretty happy with how it went, especially since it was at the end of a long day and I had just got done giving a three-hour brief. First, I’ve never been on the BBC per se, so that was cool. Second, it built a bit off the profile established by the Daily Telegraph story of last week, which can only help sales in the UK. Third, it comes at a time when international interest in the book seems to be growing by leaps and bounds.

As I’ve mentioned before, we’ve already sold the rights in Japan and Turkey, and there’s plenty of interest and offers mounting in China. This week I also got a number of offers out of the blue from South Korea, which means something triggered the interest there all of a sudden.

Then today the War College’s Public Affairs Office sends me a link to an op-ed in the Jakarta Post where I’m mentioned, along with the book, signaling even greater reach. How do I get such a prominent mention in the Jakarta Post? Turns out it’s an op-ed written by a regional expert who is currently a visiting fellow at Center for Strategic and International Studies in DC—where I briefed last week.

Aha, now you see the outlines of the power conspiracy to spread my ideas. But more on that tomorrow. I’m not staying at my usual Crowne Plaza “somewhere in northern Virginia,” meaning the one with the simply high-speed Internet access by room. So I’ll leave the blog on the Jakarta piece to tomorrow’s effort because it’s too hard to try and replicate it off my Blackberry.

After the BBC, I go out to dinner with my old mentor Hank Gaffney, where we catch up on things, especially his summary analysis of the National Intelligence Council workshop on the future of war that he put together at the end of May, and at which I presented a paper/brief plus did a few media things on the side (Blitzer on CNN, the interview with the Daily Telegraph of London).

By the time we’re done with dinner, I have just enough time to quick change at the hotel and then walk over to the E Street Cinema just east of the White House, so I catch the 9:45 showing of Michael Moore’s movie “Fahrenheit 9/11.”

Moore’s movie is very funny and it does show Bush in a very bad light, but of course, it’s totally designed to do so. It’s not a documentary by any stretch, but pure propaganda, essentially shaped to prove—yet again—that all political leaders are either dupes (Democrats) or evil money-grubbers (Republicans). Meanwhile, anybody who serves with or works with the military is similarly a dupe (all soldiers are fodder) or evil money-grubbers (all contractors are in it simply to rip off the government). The cynicism of the movie is disturbing and very Marxist: the U.S. military is essentially a tool of the capitalist war machine, and no real good comes from its use overseas.

As someone who’s studied Soviet propaganda for years, it was fairly nostalgic to see America and its government depicted in this manner. Moore is a very skillful propagandist, so the movie was essentially a two-hour political attack commercial designed to get the audience to vote against Bush. Fine and dandy. Free country and you can say what you want. Just don’t call this a documentary and don’t tell me that Moore isn’t abusing that perception he’s fostering that he’s telling the “whole truth.” It is a very skewed (as he admits) rendition of history—basically a classic Marxist conspiratorial view of the post-Cold War era.

It’s sad that so many people will sop this up as the “real story,” like Oliver Stone’s worst movie “JFK” (though I admire him deeply as a filmmaker), because it simply fuels that sort of everyone-connected-to-the-government-is-bad mentality that was so prevalent in the mid-1990s. I believe this is Moore’s real intent, which makes him a decade-later version of Rush Limbaugh. That’s certainly his right to pursue such a career path and meld it with his political beliefs, as Rush so ably did. I just don’t care for that sort of political approach.

I think it was incredibly wrong for the right wing to go after Clinton his entire eight years, so full of personal hatred for the man and so desirous to paint his legacy as completely one defined by his worst characteristics. It maddened me deeply as a Democrat. But I don’t really care for Moore and others trying to do the same with Bush and the Republicans now. If it was wrong to do to Clinton then, it can’t be right to do it with Bush now, even if my personal political beliefs basically agree with the underlying criticisms of how Bush sold this war to the American public and the world.

So I left the theater depressed that this is the level of political discourse today: a wildly skewed conspiratorial rant designed to depict our president as thoroughly corrupt. Gosh, where have I seen this before? And is this all I have to look forward to now with administration after administration?

It makes me sad to think what they’re going to do to Hillary when she finally runs . . ..

Enough said on that, here’s today’s catch:

The Edwards factor—a good choice for Kerry

“Behind Kerry Choice of Edwards: Clear Bet on Middle-Class Angst: North Carolina Senator Brings Strong Political Skills, Focus on the Little Guy: Questions About Experience,” by Jacob M. Schlesinger and David Rogers, Wall Street Journal, 7 July, p. A1.

“Kerry Chooses Edwards, Citing Former Rival’s Political Skill: 4-Day Tour Is Set: Relative Newcomer, 51, Humbled by Offer, Is Thrilled to Accept,” by David M. Halbfinger, New York Times, 7 July, p. A1.

The sense of the mission is everything in the military

“With Fort’s Rising Toll, Its Neighbor Suffers, Too,” by Monica Davey, New York Times, 7 July, p. A1.

The occupation: now it gets nasty between the Iraqis

“New Law in Iraq Gives Premier Martial Powers to Fight Uprising,” by Edward Wong, New York Times, 7 July, p. A1.

“In a New Twist, the Family of a Marine Says Iraqi Captors Have Released Him: Militants vow to kill a Jordanian as outrage builds over the killings of civilians,” by Ian Fisher and Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times, 7 July, p. A11.

Army finally to get some civilian leadership

“White House to Nominate Army Secretary: With the Army facing difficult issues, strong leadership is seen as urgently needed,” by Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 7 July, p. A11.

New Core powers learn to live under the power of markets

“Pondering China’s Rates Through a Central Prism: An Economy Runs on Both Growth and Pessimism,” by Keith Bradsher, New York Times, 7 July, p. C1.

“Cleanup Roils Russian Banks: New Regulatory Efforts Put Depositors on Edge, Dent Confidence,”by Guy Chazan, Wall Street Journal, 7 July, p. A8.

“India’s Government Confronts New Budget—And a Political Test,” by Jay Solomon, WSJ, 7 July, p. A8.

The biggest security threat to the New Core
“U.N. Report Shows Concern Over Rise of H.I.V. in Asia: Epidemic Has Exceeded Effort to Stop It,” by Lawrence K. Altman, NYT, 7 July, p. A5.

The Edwards factor—a good choice for Kerry

“Behind Kerry Choice of Edwards: Clear Bet on Middle-Class Angst: North Carolina Senator Brings Strong Political Skills, Focus on the Little Guy: Questions About Experience,” by Jacob M. Schlesinger and David Rogers, Wall Street Journal, 7 July, p. A1.

“Kerry Chooses Edwards, Citing Former Rival’s Political Skill: 4-Day Tour Is Set: Relative Newcomer, 51, Humbled by Offer, Is Thrilled to Accept,”by David M. Halbfinger, New York Times, 7 July, p. A1.

I think John Edwards was a good choice for Kerry. Of the four guys in the race now, frankly I like him the best and empathize with him with most. Edwards’ life is closest to my own, probably because he’s the youngest and because he’s experienced some tragedy with a child of his.

But most of all Edwards appeals to me in terms of his personal optimism about the country and what we’re capable of. Kerry always seems so mournful (so Lincoln-like, really), Bush so belligerent, and Cheney so downright scary in his view of human nature. Meanwhile, Edwards seems to believe in ordinary people in a very strong way, and seems so happy being a politician, which is weird, seeing that he really did enter the arena in direct response to losing his son. Of the quartet, this is the guy who should be most twisted in his desires, and yet he seems the most relaxed being himself and encouraging America to do the same—be ambitious, generous, and committed to making things better.

I think Edwards will help Kerry a lot in terms of sizzle, appeal to African-Americans (a key voting bloc for the Democrats that Clinton always tapped), and in the South in general, where Kerry is weakest—let’s face it. I also think he’ll let Kerry be more the centrist, since Edwards will be perceived as holding down the faithful on the farther left. All in all, a great choice.

The sense of the mission is everything in the military

“With Fort’s Rising Toll, Its Neighbor Suffers, Too,” by Monica Davey, New York Times, 7 July, p. A1.

One of the main reasons why the Powell Doctrine came into being at the end of the Cold War was the military’s desire to avoid going into overseas interventions where the mission would mutate from its original goal and become something far less clear. Losing focus on the mission is a morale killer, and that’s what is happening far too much inside Iraq today.

Don’t get me wrong, plenty of our people serving over there know well what they’re trying to do and they’re doing it well, but there is a strong sense of disconnect between how this war was sold to the American public and the world and the way it’s ending up unfolding for the long term. This administration never really got it straight with the public, or our allies, about the long-term reality of what an occupation would involve, and now with the election driving events over there far more than the underlying reality of success and/or failure in mission objectives, there can’t help but be a rising sense of strategic disorientation among the ranks, which inevitably filters back home.

This good NYT article captures much of that angst and uncertainty from the perspective of a military base town in Kansas. The key quote comes from the guy who runs the local Radio Shack:

“A lot of the problem this year has been not knowing what’s about to come next with this whole thing. Will they be back soon? Will they not? Who will go next? No one knows.”
That pretty much sums up the failure of this administration to define clearly what this war in Iraq was ultimately going to be all about (transforming the Middle East over the long haul—not simply a WMD hunt), as well as the Pentagon’s failure in planning for the occupation (not just in the months prior, but in the years prior as MOOTW was treated as a step-child and the Powell Doctrine perverted force structure to the point where we simply are not well-equipped or well trained to conduct peacekeeping).

The occupation: now it gets nasty between the Iraqis

“New Law in Iraq Gives Premier Martial Powers to Fight Uprising,” by Edward Wong, New York Times, 7 July, p. A1.

“In a New Twist, the Family of a Marine Says Iraqi Captors Have Released Him: Militants vow to kill a Jordanian as outrage builds over the killings of civilians,” by Ian Fisher and Neil MacFarquhar, NYT, 7 July, p. A11.

Martial law comes to Iraq because that’s what is needed to deal with this insurgency, which is fueled to a significant degree by outside forces determined to hijack Iraq’s future from one of connectivity to the outside world and drive it back toward one of extreme disconnectedness from the “corrupt” influences of the Western-derived globalization. And yes, it makes a huge difference when that power is executed by a government—however interim and propped up by U.S. military power—that is headed by and operated by Iraqis themselves.

Eventually, Iraqis themselves will have to step up and decide that they themselves can prove to be masters of their own country, but that won’t happen until people there decide they’ve had enough of being a battleground between the forces of connectedness (us) and disconnectedness (them), and choose us as the lesser of two evils.

Here’s where the hope begins:

“Bombings in which civilians are killed and wounded have outraged many Iraqis, and what may be a dramatic sign of that anger emerged Tuesday when a militant group issued a video threatening to kill Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian militant who has claimed responsibility for many deadly attacks and beheadings of captives here.

The video, release to Al Arabiya television, had all the trappings of similar taped threats against Western targets in Iraq, but seemed slightly more elaborate: four armed men, their faces wrapped in Arab headscarves, appeared before an Iraqi flag, as one of the men, with an Iraqi accent, read off a statement threatening to kill Mr. Zarqawi unless he left Iraq, and anyone who hid him here. A pistol and a rocket-propelled grenade lay next to a Koran on a table from which the man delivered the statement.

‘We have prepared ourselves,’ he said, identifying himself as part of a previously unknown group, the Salvation Movement. ‘We swear we will track him down wherever he is and arrest him and his followers or kill them. This is the last warning for those who shelter him.’

Iraqi and American officials have contended in recent days that a split has been growing between Iraqi insurgents and fighters who have come from other Muslim countries over the issue of killing innocent civilians. They have offered no hard proof of the claim, and the prime minister of the new interim government, Iyad Allawi, has said his strategy for taming the violence in Iraq is to try to appeal to Iraqis’ sense of nationalism to reject the presence of foreign fighters like Mr. Zarqawi.”

Of course, it is just as easy to describe U.S. troops in Iraq similarly, but the key difference again is one of which side is encouraging connectivity to the outside world and which seeks to reestablish disconnectedness. Ultimately, Iraqis have to choose which path appeals most to them, and I’m betting on connectedness, because therein lies real freedom.

Army finally to get some civilian leadership

“White House to Nominate Army Secretary: With the Army facing difficult issues, strong leadership is seen as urgently needed,” by Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 7 July, p. A11.

Bush White House tries the difficult step of getting a new Army secretary confirmed during an election year when the biggest roadblock is none other that Senator John McCain, who has held up such nominations out of his anger over a leasing deal with Boeing. Fine to be angry over that and to show it, but the Army is in desperate need of strong leadership right now.

The Sys Admin function begins with a transformation of the Army, which in many ways has been the slowest service to transform itself from its Cold War roots. Being without a service secretary for roughly a year since Thomas White resigned is simply no good, so this is a daring but correct move by the White House.

Hmmm, this guy probably really needs to see my brief . . ..

New Core powers learn to live under the power of markets

“Pondering China’s Rates Through a Central Prism: An Economy Runs on Both Growth and Pessimism,” by Keith Bradsher, New York Times, 7 July, p. C1.

“Cleanup Roils Russian Banks: New Regulatory Efforts Put Depositors on Edge, Dent Confidence,” by Guy Chazan, Wall Street Journal, 7 July, p. A8.

“India’s Government Confronts New Budget—And a Political Test,” by Jay Solomon, WSJ, 7 July, p. A8.

China ponders the scary step of finally raising interest rates. It has tried to slow down its red-hot economy with new building regulations, corruption campaigns, raising deposit requirements in banks—everything but raising interest rates (the classic way the Fed does it here in the U.S.). But push may be coming to shove, as new economic data comes out showing that stronger steps must be taken.

That’s the amazing part of this first story: Chinese political leadership forced to do difficult things because they’re subject to the power of markets. As one Western financial analyst put it, the decision “is a hostage to the data.”

China—hostage to economic data. I love it.

But the same is increasingly true for Russia and India, my other two favorite New Core pillars. Increasingly, their governments are submitting to the logic of the international marketplace—not keeping the world at bay, but letting it in and accepting the consequences.

In the end, we are all hostage to the data.

The biggest security threat to the New Core

“U.N. Report Shows Concern Over Rise of H.I.V. in Asia: Epidemic Has Exceeded Effort to Stop It,” by Lawrence K. Altman, New York Times, 7 July, p. A5.

I said it repeatedly in the original Esquire article—“and then there’s AIDS.” This is the biggest security danger in a Russia, India, and China right now. And when the U.S. government doesn’t do everything it can to encourage stronger and cheaper efforts to combat this global security issue, we just buy ourselves insecurity on the installment plan.

July 7, 2004

Going on BBC International tonight

Dateline: the Pentagon, 7 July (via Blackberry)

In the Building to brief someone at SECDEF's request, but wanted to pass on this notice on radio appearance tonight.

Taping in DC facility of BBC at 1900 EST for broadcast--I am told--this evening. Check your local NPR stations for when shows air, if interested. Not sure how long the segment will be.

July 6, 2004

PNM translated for campaign by Philly Inquirer

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 6 July 2004

A while back I gave an interview to Kevin Ferris of the Philadelphia Inquirer, who had read the book prior to calling me. He said he wanted to write an op-ed pivoting off the book toward the presidential campaign. Here is what he said, with my commentary to follow:

Posted on Tue, Jun. 29, 2004

In campaign, where are the plans to deal with rogue states, terrorists?

Kevin Ferris
is a member of The Inquirer Editorial Board

What's after Iraq?

Say, after yesterday's handover, the Iraqis pull it off: A one-time rogue state becomes a democratic, rights-respecting regime.

How does the war on terror proceed? And how will we know when we've won?

An election year would seem to be a good time to look ahead—if it weren't for the politics and the finger-pointing.

Enter Thomas P.M. Barnett, a strategic researcher at the U.S. Naval War College who has spent years studying defense and globalization, taking note of the relative peace and stability among countries most connected to the global economic system. His book The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century offers a grand strategy, in turns disturbing and hopeful. Here's a summary:

We can win a war on terror, just as we won the Cold War. Our measure of success will not be the number of terrorists killed or countries liberated—though terrorists will be killed and countries liberated—but the number of people we connect with the globalized world. After World War II, we connected Europe and Japan to our economy and the international institutions designed to ensure a flow of people, energy, investments and security. By the end of the Cold War, what Barnett calls the interconnected "functioning core" had expanded to Eastern Europe, Russia, China, India, and much of South America.

What was left? The same countries that we've had to be involved with militarily over the last decade. They are ideal places to promote anti-globalization and use as bases to attack the core. Barnett says the goal is to get the two billion people living in this gap connected, denying these countries to the forces of "disconnection."

But connecting would take more than fast-food franchises and international aid. It would mean a two-pronged military, one force that takes down regimes, and a second that, supplemented by allies, helps a society rebuild and connect. It would mean securing ties to allies in the core, and developing new ones, including a NATO for the Pacific rim. It would mean tactical flexibility: In the core, deterrence and multilateralism prevail, but in the states whose dysfunctions threaten others, preemption or unilateralism.

Agree or not, at least Barnett offers something to debate: Here's the difference between us and them, here's how we've won wars in the past, and how we can build on that success to win now, using a revamped military as the cornerstone for success.

The Bush team has a grand strategy. The liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq, troop redeployments, the focus on spreading democracy, all point to a superpower adjusting to the post-9/11 world.

But what Bush hasn't done well or consistently enough is take us through the steps: Here's how this danger relates to 9/11. Here's why it's important that we act now. Here's where we think that action will take us. And here's how we win.

That's why, in part, there's a debate in one corner about WMDs in Iraq. In another corner, questions about Iraq-al-Qaeda links. Without the bigger picture, individual events can overwhelm, the connection between issues is lost. Sure, some of this is politics, but there are real fears, too.

No single strategy answers all questions or erases all fears. But a common purpose keeps a people grounded. It's something to cling to when war's inevitable setbacks strike. President Bush has the strategy. If he wants four more years, he should do a better job of explaining it.

COMMENTARY: Not a bad little summary of the book, remembering the guy only had 500 or so words to work with. He doesn't render a judgment of the vision (agree or disagree), but clearly he likes it, otherwise he wouldn't be bringing it up as an example of what's legitimately put up for debate in terms of a grand strategy in the global war on terrorism. Better yet, he doesn't use my book to beat on the current administration so much as to prod them into a better, more complete explanation. Best, he suggests that such an explanation is supremely required if Bush expects another four years from the American public. Implicitly, he throws down the gauntlet to Kerry as well in terms of the campaign vision he offers, but by not naming him the piece comes off a little bit like advice to the Bush-Cheney camp: use a vision like that of Barnett's book and you'll win my vote.

I get that sort of thing a lot from people who've read the book—from both camps. It would have been nicer if Ferris had framed the question a bit more broadly—not just Bush, or just Bush and Kerry, but the election as a whole. But I'm complaining over nits here. It was a nice presentation of the book that linked the material to the campaign, which was a key hope of Putnam. Ferris probably sold more than a few books for me by rendering my stuff in such an intelligent fashion. So hats off to him.

Here's today's catch:

"Waterworld" to replace "Mad Max" as favorite Pentagon sci-fi movie

"15 Miles Offshore, Safeguarding Iraq's Oil Lifeline," by James Glanz, New York Times, 6 July, p. A1.

MS&T = Military Simulation and Training

"Virtual Camp Trains Soldiers in Arabic, and More," by Margaret Wertheim, NYT, 6 July, p. D3.

In Core, politics of boredom, in Gap, politics of life and death

"Voters in Much of Europe Seem to Want the Ins Out," by Richard Bernstein, NYT, 6 July, p. A3.

"Former General Wins Most Votes in Indonesia Election: A runoff election with second-place finisher is set for September," by Jane Perlez, NYT, 6 July, p. A6.

Bush White House backtracking on generic drugs in Gap

"In New Trade Pacts, U.S. Seeks To Limit Reach of Generic Drugs," by Marilyn Chase and Sarah Lueck, Wall Street Journal, 6 July, p. A1.

China's demand reshaping global mining industry

"Mining Companies Are Poised to Reap Profits: Strong Demand for Steel in China Increases Raw-Materials Prices; Analysts Expect Yet More Growth," by Paul Glader, WSJ, 6 July, p. C1.

"Waterworld" to replace "Mad Max" as favorite Pentagon sci-fi movie

"15 Miles Offshore, Safeguarding Iraq's Oil Lifeline," by James Glanz, New York Times, 6 July, p. A1.

This story is such a repeat of the front-page one Chip Cummins did for the Journal on 30 June that you almost wonder why the Times bothered to run it. Glanz is a great writer, but he should almost list Cummins as his second on the piece.

I cite simply for the inevitable:

"A visit to the Khor al Amaya terminal begins with a 50-foot climb up from the water on an old rope ladder that is missing one of its wooden rungs.

Up top is a scene that could have come from the movie 'Waterworld': misshapen catwalks with pieces of scrap metal tossed over gaping holes, heaps of parts from broken pumps and cranes; bullet holes and shell damage from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war; a row of big pressure gauges on a series of pipes that read dead zero. A humbled Manitowoc 3900 crane looks as if it has not been pained in 30 years. It was once red.

The southern section of the platform is not used at all, because it was heavily damaged in one conflict or another. But elsewhere a black and red Indian tanker called the Gandhar is riding high in the water, taking on oil, patrolled by a lone man in a blue hard hat way up on the deck."

That's it. Inside the Pentagon Waterworld knocks Mad Mad and Blade Runner off the top of the heap of movie-inspired alternative global futurescapes. I don't expect to see any naval intell briefs in the future that do not include that phrase.

Waterworld has just such a neat Gap feel to it.

MS&T = Military Simulation and Training

"Virtual Camp Trains Soldiers in Arabic, and More," by Margaret Wertheim, New York Times, 6 July, p. D3.

A DARPA-funded video game created by U.S.C. lab in conjunction with Special Operations Command, the Tactical Language Project allows users to train up their Arabic language skills by playing "Sergeant Smith" in a world of virtual constructs. Neatest part is how the program seeks to impart nonverbal skills to trainees, like common gestures of respect used to end a conversation with someone.

Last week Tom Slear of the magazine MS&T asked if there were any ways in which military sim and training could be used in support of the Sys Admin force concept, and I cited video training tools and massive, multiplayer online games as good possibilities. Then boom! This article lands in my lap a week later, showing how little ahead of the real-world transformation I really am—thus my eternal optimism that the U.S. military learns from defeat better than any large organization on the planet.

In Core, politics of boredom, in Gap, politics of life and death

"Voters in Much of Europe Seem to Want the Ins Out," by Richard Bernstein, New York TimesYT, 6 July, p. A3.

"Former General Wins Most Votes in Indonesia Election: A runoff election with second-place finisher is set for September," by Jane Perlez, NYT, 6 July, p. A6.

Two articles cited mostly to counterpose them: first one about how bored most voters in Europe are, so protest votes as considered cool (simply throw them out because you can). That's how Minnesota ended up with Jesse the Body Ventura—a complete disaster as governor (I know, because I have several relatives living there).

Meanwhile, Indonesia is living through a very tense election where it looks like two former Suharto generals may face off in the September run-off election. There, the vote seems incredibly important to the future of Indonesia, and whether or not it moves toward the Core or remains caught in the Gap.

You read the two articles and you can't help get the feeling: to be safely inside the Core is to be largely free from politics, whereas inside the Gap it is still a deadly serious business.

Bush White House backtracking on generic drugs in Gap

"In New Trade Pacts, U.S. Seeks To Limit Reach of Generic Drugs," by Marilyn Chase and Sarah Lueck, Wall Street Journal, 6 July, p. A1.

A sad sort of backtracking by the Bush Administration: instead of pushing for widespread availability of generic drugs inside the Gap, the US spends too much time trying to protect the markets of brand-name drugs which are far costlier. This administration had done the right thing on generic AIDS drugs to help seal the international deal that launched the WTO's Doha Development round back in late 2001, following 9/11, but it's been slowly backtracking on key aspects ever since.

This is shortsighted and foolish. It buys us long-term security issues inside the Gap so as to secure the profits of a few big drug companies in the meantime. This sort of approach only fuels the AIDS epidemic inside the Gap, and—by doing so—threatens the Core status of such states as Russia, India, China and Brazil, all of which are suffering burgeoning rates of cases.

China's demand reshaping global mining industry

"Mining Companies Are Poised to Reap Profits: Strong Demand for Steel in China Increases Raw-Materials Prices; Analysts Expect Yet More Growth," by Paul Glader, Wall Street Journal, 6 July, p. C1.

Yet another story on how China is—all by itself—reshaping the global marketplace for key raw materials. This is how a manufacturing superpower rules the world. All those companies are linked to political donations and votes. Over time, their voices will be added to those who argue that the U.S. needs to move beyond its tendency to view China more as a strategic competitor/threat and toward treating it as a strategic partner of the highest order.

In answer to your question, no comment

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 6 July 2004

Tired of the site getting knocked down? So am I.

In order to simplify things I've decided to kill the comment function in the
blog. People can still email me at will with comments and feedback, which I
enjoy immensely (and which I'll continue to post now and then), but
maintaining the comments function in addition to the blog has simply seemed
to tax our meager web resources too much. Simply put, I and my webmaster
are tired of recreating the website every month when our software seems to
screw up.

For those of you with lots to say in response to what I write, I encourage
you to set up your own blogs.

July 5, 2004

Thinking as I write—I hope

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 5 July 2004

Had relatives in town for the holiday weekend, so I let the news processing falter for three whole days, my biggest online gap since I began in March.

I must say, though, it felt good.

I have assumed that by writing every day I am forced to process a lot of thinking that would otherwise go un-thought. But three days off makes me wonder if I'm not simply "spilling my seed" every day by writing a blog, when I'd be better off letting the build-up of intellectual juices reach some critical mass that would force me to pen some article for publication.

I could also cite the problem of hair on my knuckles, but frankly, that's one of the few places guys my age don't seem to get extra hair growth . . ..

Ah well, rather than jerk you around any more on that notion, here's the catch from the long holiday weekend (remembering I get my Post in the snail mail):

Sudan: time to abrogate parental rights to privacy

"Powell and Annan See Hints of Disaster in Sudan: Government Is Warned but Still Plays Down Refugee Crisis," by Christophere Marquis and Marc Lacey, New York Times, 1 July, p. A1.

Why Israel sets the standard in the Middle East

"High Court Tells Israelis To Shift Part of Barrier: Harmful to Palestinians: Judges Do See Security as Crucial but Rule Fence Cannot Hurt Arabs," by Joseph Berger, NYT, 1 July, p. A1.

"Much at Stake In an Iraq Trial: Hussein's Case Holds Both Peril and Promise," by Somini Sengupta and John F. Burns, NYT, 1 July, p. A1.

"Al-Sadr calls for resistance; 2 Iranians arrested in thwarted attack," by Associated Press, MSNBC.com, 5 July, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5322157/.

The extent of the system perturbation caused by the Iraq war (I)

"U.S. Authorizes Families to Leave Bahrain," by James Glanz, NYT, 5 July, p. A7.

The extent of the system perturbation caused by the Iraq war (II)

"Military Draft? Official Denials Leave Skeptics," by Carl Hulse, NYT, 3 July, p. A1.

"Changes Urged As Need Grows For Reservists," by Thom Shanker, NYT, 4 July, p. A1.

The extent of the system perturbation caused by the Iraq war (III)

"Backing Bush's Mideast Vision: There is a constituency for regional democracy extending well beyond this White House,” by Jackson Diehl, Washington Post, 21 June, p. A19.

"NATO Chief Says Iraq and Afghanistan Are Doomed Without World Cooperation: Sharp criticism for the Bush administration's stance toward the Atlantic alliance," by Elaine Sciolino, NYT, 3 July, p. A8.

Continued reverberations from 9/11 alter life in the Core

"Rebirth Marked By Cornerstone At Ground Zero," by David W. Dunlap, NYT, 5 July, p. A1.

"Fears Of Attack At Conventions Drive New Plans: Qaeda Warnings Persist: Local Security Is Tightened—U.S. Efforts Include Closer Visa Scrutiny," by David Johnston, NYT, 5 July, p. A1.

"Delays in Athens Raise Concern On Olympic Security Readiness," by Raymond Bonner and Anthee Carassava, NYT, 3 July, p. A1.

The military-market nexus centers on energy

"Harvard and Russian Oil Company Clash Over Shareholder Dividends," by Simon Romero, NYT, 3 July, p. B1.

"China's Boom Brings Fear of an Electricity Breakdown: Cloud-seeding, higher thermostats and dimmed neon may lie ahead for China," by Howard W. French, NYT, 5 July, p. A4.

India and Pakistan resettle into the "normalcy" of MAD

"India, Pakistan to Set Up Hotline: Talks End With Agreement to Maintain Moratorium on Nuclear Testing," by John Lancaster, WP, 21 June, p. A12.

"India and Pakistan: Good Fences Make Good Neighbors," by Amy Waldman, NYT, 4 July, p. A3.

Today's yin and yang on China

"Engineering More Sons Than Daughters: Will It Tip the Scales Toward War? (Scholars see danger in a generation with a surplus of males now coming of age)," by Felicia R. Lee, NYT, 3 July, p. A17.

"China Is Filtering Phone Text Messages to Regular Criticism," by Joseph Kahn, NYT, 3 July, p. A3.

Sudan: time to abrogate parental rights to privacy

"Powell and Annan See Hints of Disaster in Sudan: Government Is Warned but Still Plays Down Refugee Crisis," by Christophere Marquis and Marc Lacey, New York Times, 1 July, p. A1.

At some point in the domestic abuse case the state decides that the rights of the parents are necessarily abrogated to preserve the rights of the children to a decent life away from abuse. When the process reaches this point of state intervention, most people typically side with the kids, believing it's just plain wrong to stand by and let something truly heinous happen to innocents. They don't talk about the "sovereignty" of the household.

That's where we are with Sudan. Its state has failed to provide for its people in the worst way: the ruling government is letting genocide unfold in slow motion because it seems to fit its model of maintaining its authoritarian grip on power.

Here's what one guy whispers to Colin Powell as he rushes up to his touring entourage visting a refugee camp of 40,000 in northern Darfur:

"'We want this government out,' whispered one man, who said he had lost 14 relatives to the violence. 'They kill our families.' He disappeared as quickly as he had surfaced saying, 'They watch me,' before melting into the crowd."
When and if the U.S. finally intervenes because no one else will, tell me this one is all about establishing "American empire."

Ah yes, Sudan's "vast" oil reserves are going to draw us in against our will . . ..

Why Israel sets the standard in the Middle East

"High Court Tells Israelis To Shift Part of Barrier: Harmful to Palestinians: Judges Do See Security as Crucial but Rule Fence Cannot Hurt Arabs," by Joseph Berger, New York Times, 1 July, p. A1.

"Much at Stake In an Iraq Trial: Hussein's Case Holds Both Peril and Promise," by Somini Sengupta and John F. Burns, NYT, 1 July, p. A1.

"Al-Sadr calls for resistance; 2 Iranians arrested in thwarted attack," by Associated Press, MSNBC.com, 5 July, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5322157/

Notice how Israel actually has a supreme court that doesn’t draw its authority from religion?

That's how Israel's highest court can issue a ruling that puts ordinary citizens at higher risk simply "for the sake of humanitarian considerations."

Ever remember Saddam Hussein being overridden by Iraq's supreme court? Or any other authoritarian regime in the Middle East?

That's why Saddam's trial will be so amazing. Can you ever think of a time when any government in the region (other than Israel) held its own officials accountable for any misdeeds they ever committed?

Here's a story Paul Bremer likes to tell:

"He recounted a dinner conversation with an Iraqi woman. In tears, the woman told him her younger brother had been taken away from his school by secret police agents after a 'prank' in which he had mildly criticized Mr. Hussein. The boy was never seen again, and the woman told Mr. Bremer she was so fearful of betrayal by her own family that she waited more than 20 years, until Mr. Hussein's capture by American troops last December, before telling her own children that she had a brother who was lost."
The Times article says that "Many Iraqis say that having a court composed of fellow Iraqis try the former dictator could provide a kind of catharsis that an international tribunal could not."

Let's hope they can find citizens willing to "collaborate" with the interim government, because they'll surely be risking their lives in the worst way, with rising rulers like Moqtada al-Sadr yet again issuing death warnings to any who cooperate with the "infidel government."

Success is a long way off in this endeavor to create something approaching democracy across the Middle East. When I had to make decisions about my firstborn's cancer treatments with my wife, I tried to hold in my head the image of my two-year-old daughter all grown up holding her newborn child in her arms. That, to me, signaled a real sign of success—returning her to a life she should have had. We face a similarly long road in Iraq. A good sign of when we reach that promised land will be the first time Iraq's supreme court overrules the government's harsh treatment of some rebel like al-Sadr, citing "humanitarian concerns."

That's the sort of patience we need.

The extent of the system perturbation caused by the Iraq war (I)

"U.S. Authorizes Families to Leave Bahrain," by James Glanz, New York Times, 5 July, p. A7.

Two weeks ago I almost went to Bahrain to sub for an ill colleague in a planning conference the college conducted for Central Command. He got better, so my participation in the effort was not needed. I have to admit, though, it would have felt a little odd to be traveling to the Middle East right now with Americans being beheaded simply for the sin of being American.

Yet I would have gone with a certain amount of confidence. Why? Certainly Bahrain, one of the most stable PG countries, wasn't getting caught up in the sort of violence against Westerners that the Iraq War seems to have unleashed across the region.

That was last week, this is now. The move by U.S. authorities to move out all non-emergency personnel shows how unstable things are getting across the region as a whole. This may feel like failure to many, but in reality it simply shows how truly big the perturbation of the Iraq War has become for regimes throughout the Middle East.

The extent of the system perturbation caused by the Iraq war (II)

"Military Draft? Official Denials Leave Skeptics," by Carl Hulse, New York Times, 3 July, p. A1.

"Changes Urged As Need Grows For Reservists," by Thom Shanker, NYT, 4 July, p. A1.

More evidence that the Iraq occupation—like all occupations—will end up changing the occupiers as much as the occupied. For the Pentagon, the occupation ends up transforming transformation, shifting its focus from the warfighting side of the ledger to the peacekeeping side.

Why? Because you cannot technologize your way out of that problem set: it simply requires significant numbers of well-trained troops. The fact that the U.S. military is so imbalanced in this regard (able to wage wars with little recourse to reserves but quickly overwhelmed by the lack of needed reserves once the peacekeeping begins) is what is fueling the speculation that the draft must inevitably return.

That notion alone will push the Pentagon toward some amazing reforms. Why? No one in this military wants to go back to the nightmares of the draft. Not because of the politics, but because of the sheer impracticality of trying to field a professional force using just anybody pulled off the street. The U.S. military has been running away from that sort of force for roughly three decades, and when push comes to shove on reservists, it'll bite the bullet on big changes before it'll ever give in to what just about everyone in its senior leadership considers a crazy idea that would ruin this military they've spent their entire careers resurrecting from the ashes of Vietnam.

The extent of the system perturbation caused by the Iraq war (III)

"Backing Bush's Mideast Vision: There is a constituency for regional democracy extending well beyond this White House," by Jackson Diehl, Washington Post, 21 June, p. A19.

"NATO Chief Says Iraq and Afghanistan Are Doomed Without World Cooperation: Sharp criticism for the Bush administration's stance toward the Atlantic alliance," by Elaine Sciolino, NYT, 3 July, p. A8.

A great op-ed from Jackson Diehl puts a larger perspective on Bush's effort to bring democracy to the Middle East:

"The Bush administration's initiative on Middle East democracy has been widely portrayed as ending with a whimper at a trio of international summits this month. Opposition from France and other European skeptics forced a watering down of the democracy initiatives by the Group of Eight and NATO; several big Arab governments, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, spurned what was left. In Washington, foreign policy 'realism' is back in fashion, thanks to the trouble in Iraq: Both the Democrats around John F. Kerry and a number of powerful Republicans are saying Bush's vision of spreading democracy is a naïve and even dangerous illusion.

All true—but there's more to the story. Though Bush's mismanagement of Iraq has put his democracy advocates on the defensive, there nevertheless now exists the beginning of a broad pro-reform coalition in and outside the region. It includes a handful of people in Arab governments, but many more outside, in rapidly growing civic and human rights movements. There are European parliamentarians and policymakers in expanding numbers, especially in Germany. And in Washington, there are not only Bush's neocons but an important group of Democrats.

A lot of these people don't think much of George Bush, which is one reason why the coalition hasn't entirely coalesced. But almost all of them say that Bush's preaching on democracy over the past year, and the modest action that has come with it, has changed the terms of debate about the future of the Middle East, both in and outside the region. Bush's campaign 'frightened people,' King Abdullah of Jordan said in an interview here last week. 'But it also allowed some of us to say that if we don't come up with our own initiative, something will be forced on us. And once you say you are going to reform, you trigger a process that you can't turn back.'

Diehl goes on to say that "The next step is unlikely to come from an administration preoccupied with Iraq and the upcoming election or from Arab governments. Progress on Middle East democracy will depend on independent movements seizing on the space Bush has opened and widening it."

Will it be easy? Absolutely not. As Diehl admits, "Taken together, the voices of these pro-democracy networks are still drowned out by the nay-sayers and skeptics, in the region and even in Washington. But time, and history, are probably on their side."

But none of that "space" will remain if we do not secure the victory in Iraq by generating enough security inside its borders that a successor government can function with broadband legitimacy—meaning it isn't fighting for its life every day. To do that we'll need help, which is why Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's tough words regarding the Bush administration should be listened to. In effect, the NATO Secretary General is outlining the parameters of the hard deals that must be cut between American and Europe to garner a significantly larger effort in the security realm by our oldest allies.

Those deals should and will eventually be made. But we cannot stop there. More deals must also be made with India, Russia, China and other New Core pillars. This cannot be a West-only attempt to integrate the Middle East with the larger world. Truly global cooperation would necessarily include the entirety of the Core in this grand historical effort.

Continued reverberations from 9/11 alter life in the Core

"Rebirth Marked By Cornerstone At Ground Zero," by David W. Dunlap, New York Times, 5 July, p. A1.

"Fears Of Attack At Conventions Drive New Plans: Qaeda Warnings Persist: Local Security Is Tightened—U.S. Efforts Include Closer Visa Scrutiny," by David Johnston, NYT, 5 July, p. A1.

"Delays in Athens Raise Concern On Olympic Security Readiness," by Raymond Bonner and Anthee Carassava, New York Times, 3 July, p. A1.

Yes, we've just about completely packaged up the experience that was 9/11. Hell, even the commemorative t-shirts are starting to look faded.

But the knowledge of the altered security rule set never quite goes away. So we conduct all big events differently now, like the upcoming political conventions or the Greek Olympics. To go back to "the way things were" would be tragically naïve, and it simply will not happen. So get ready for a summer of heightened nerves not just inside the Gap, but inside the Core as well. These two parts of the world are now understood by most to be inherently inseparable: their insecurity is now ours, our economic fate is tied up with theirs. There is no standoff worth pursuing, no containment strategy that makes sense. To truly secure the Core is to eliminate the Gap.

The military-market nexus centers on energy

"Harvard and Russian Oil Company Clash Over Shareholder Dividends," by Simon Romero, New York Times, 3 July, p. B1.

"China's Boom Brings Fear of an Electricity Breakdown: Cloud-seeding, higher thermostats and dimmed neon may lie ahead for China," by Howard W. French, New York Times, 5 July, p. A4.

Money may make the world go around, but energy fuels it. Many security analysts will look at such headlines and see only the potential for conflict, but I see far more the imperative for cooperation.

Russian needs foreign sources of capital for its energy industry to thrive, and so it has to accept new levels of transparency. It isn't easy or pursued willingly, but money needs rules to feel comfortable traveling, so if you want money to visit your neck of the woods, you have to put out the welcome wagon as defined by the market.

China's infrastructural requirements on electricity alone are enormous, numbering in the trillions of investment dollars. Expect many such articles forecasting inevitable doom in, or conflict from, China on this issue. The fear-mongering on China will never cease, but to demand a better world-historical pathway is not naïve in the least: it simply requires that we spot the obvious overlaps between China's long-term strategic needs for stability and our own long-term strategic needs for stability. Both center around the Middle East, which is where globalization's military-market nexus is rightfully located for the next couple of decades—or until the global marketplace moves beyond oil to something else.

India and Pakistan resettle into the "normalcy" of MAD

"India, Pakistan to Set Up Hotline: Talks End With Agreement to Maintain Moratorium on Nuclear Testing," by John Lancaster, Washington Post, 21 June, p. A12.

"India and Pakistan: Good Fences Make Good Neighbors," by Amy Waldman, New York Times, 4 July, p. A3.

Mutual-assured destruction is an inescapable logic, one that has secured the Core from great power war for six decades and counting. More and more, it secures the peace between India and Pakistan, which haven't gone to war since 1971, notwithstanding all the lobbed shells and tough talk of the past three-plus decades.

Any surprise that India is putting up its own "security fence" in the disputed Kashmir regions? No. Like the one going up between Israel and Palestine, this tried-and-true method makes just as much sense there as it did in Berlin all those decades (call it the "Line of Self-Control"). It's a crude form of risk management, but in the crudest circumstances it can work wonders, buying time for the long-term growth of economic connectivity that ultimately secures the peace.

Today's yin and yang on China

"Engineering More Sons Than Daughters: Will It Tip the Scales Toward War? (Scholars see danger in a generation with a surplus of males now coming of age)," by Felicia R. Lee, New York Times, 3 July, p. A17.

"China Is Filtering Phone Text Messages to Regular Criticism," by Joseph Kahn, NYT, 3 July, p. A3.

China must inevitably wage war on the world to rid itself of all those young men who cannot find wives thanks to years upon years of the one-child policy, so sayeth the number-crunching political scientists in their new fear-mongering book published—as one in my profession would expect—by MIT Press (no real political scientists there, but some amazing number crunchers). The verdict includes India as well, another country with a vast history of aggressive wars with its neighbors (let me see, that would be the India that let both Pakistan and Bangladesh actually leave their country . . ..).

No, unmarried young men in both India and China will be unable to find jobs, despite all the outsourcing of the West's manufacturing and service sectors to their economies. Nor will they emigrate to other countries. God only knows how few Indian professionals there are in America, or how few young Chinese men become desperate enough to join the swelling global ranks of illegal economic refugees crossing borders at will. No, all of them will simply wait around for the wars of aggression to begin.

But if that sarcasm doesn't do it for you, consider this: no society in human history has ever aged as rapidly as China is going to age in the coming 30 years. The one-child policy eliminated 300 million from China's population (it should be 1.6 billion today, not 1.3 billion), and that missing America-sized chunk of Chinese humanity means more than simply not enough wives to go around. It means not enough mothers to go around as well. China will not only get old before it gets rich, it will get old before it gets aggressive.

Yes, the demographic fix is in, but not in the way these fear-mongers would have you believe.

Meanwhile, yet another humorous example of China's government trying to keep millions upon millions under "mouse arrest." Here, instead of the usual story about the government's 30,000 Internet cops, we get a bit about how the government is trying to censor upwards of 300 million cell-phone users.

Why the effort? Text messages about the SARS epidemic last year went a long way to uncovering the national cover-up of mistakes made by officials. Text messages are also becoming a huge source of public expression of anger over corruption and government abuse cases. If the official media won't cover these issues well enough, Chinese people simply discuss it among themselves, thanks to the new technology.

So the government is launching a new filtering campaign, which it claims is all about stopping the flow of spam and pornography—sound familiar to anyone with email?

But, of course, even though the all-powerful Microsoft can't keep my Hotmail account from being flooded with such nonsense, those crafty Chinese bureaucrats are sure to succeed!

Yet another example of connectivity trumping political efforts at suppressing free speech—even the crappy stuff.

July 1, 2004

Reviewing the Reviews (Soxblog)

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 1 July

The following review was posted by Dean Barnett (no relation) under his online pseudonym at Soxblog.com. He wrote a review after reading the book, then didn't think it was good enough, so he wrote a second one—presumably stronger in tone.

My commentary follows:

Posted at Soxblog.com

Wednesday, June 30, 2004

"THE PENTAGON'S NEW MAP" - THE BOOK YOU MUST READ

I have a theory about great theories: They’re characterized by a simple elegance and are usually more the result of a “eureka” moment than a rough slog through mountains of data. In other words, Thomas Edison’s mantra about it being 90% perspiration and 10% inspiration? Bunk.

Take John Rawls’ “Theory of Justice.” For centuries, philosophers had been philosophizing on how societies should be put together. In the middle of the last century Rawls came up with a simply elegant theory that can be summarized on the back of a match book. Rawls argued that a society is only as well off as its least fortunate members. Of course he went on for several hundred pages (and in countless astonishingly tedious lectures to hapless Harvard undergrads) refining that notion and dealing with its subtleties, but there you have it. A simply elegant statement that, whether you agree with it or not, it’s almost amazing that no one else thought of it before him.

Thomas P.M. Barnett’s book, “The Pentagon’s New Map,” is a similarly ground breaking tract. Barnett unveils a theory, or actually a couple of theories, so simply elegant and so obviously true once you hear them, it’s amazing that no one had thought of them before. “The Pentagon’s New Map” (PNM) attempts to do nothing less than offer a prescription for re-shaping the world for both increased prosperity and safety for all its inhabitant but especially for Americans. The subtitle of the book is “War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century” but I think a far more fitting subtitle would have been “A Future Worth Fighting For.”

Barnett’s theory essentially has two components which I will over-simplify only a little in the next two paragraphs. The first is that the world is divided into two parts, the Core which has all the economically functioning places and the Gap which has all the economic, cultural and political basket cases. The Core includes all the places where you might vacation or buy a good from; the Gap is comprised of the places you wouldn’t visit unless you were a contestant on Fear Factor. Barnett argues that in this era of increased global connectivity and more widely available weapons of mass destruction, an unstable and disconnected country/government anywhere poses a threat to the United States and our interests. Witness the way internal Afghanistan politics had a profound effect on our soil. The only way to mitigate this threat is to, over time, integrate these Gap countries into the Core.

But how do you this when those Gap countries are often run by people like Saddam Hussein who don’t want to play well with others in the global sandbox? That’s going to involve military action and that’s where the second part of Barnett’s theory comes in. Barnett suggests that the military should be broken up into two distinct pieces. One he calls the Leviathan which will basically kick the ass of the Saddam types; the other will be called the System Administrator which will build the country back up after the asses have been kicked.

Like I said up top, obvious isn’t it? Two distinct jobs, two distinct forces to do those jobs. Thinking of the situation in Iraq, you can see how this part of the theory would have an obvious impact.

Indeed, the theories are already having an impact in Iraq. Before becoming a best-selling author, Barnett was a highly rated Pentagon briefer and his ideas have come before all the big shots like Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld. The domestic Iraqi forces are already being designed with the Leviathan/System Administrator distinction in mind.

But integrating the entire Gap, isn’t that a huge task? Barnett doesn’t shrink from that question. He candidly acknowledges that this will be a decades long process and that there will be no “exit strategies.” But his goal is an ambitious one: Once the entire Gap is integrated into the Core, large scale poverty will be eliminated. Along with it several other things will also be eliminated like famine and war.

Which brings me to what I love most about PNM: It’s suffused with a can-do American optimism that has been the mark of this country since its birth. Although Barnett eschews jingoism, I don’t, so indulge me a bit. Virtually every person in this country is descended from someone who decided to risk all by getting on a boat or a plane and traveling a great distance to seek out a better life. Taking great risks to accomplish great things is part of our national DNA. Many of our politicians are by nature cautious people who have spent their lives trying to avoid mistakes so that they can continue their climb to higher office. But they are not representative of the American soul. I’m convinced that if someone would bring Barnett’s positive vision before the American public, America would indeed decide that PNM’s future is worth fighting for and make the necessary sacrifices.

In his recent book “Colossus,” British historian Niall Ferguson takes a different and quite dim view of the American character in arguing why America will have difficulty being an effective player on the world stage in the years to come. Ferguson writes, “The United States has acquired an empire, but Americans themselves lack the imperial cast of mind. They would rather consume than conquer. They would rather build shopping malls than nations…It is quite conceivable that their empire could unravel as swiftly as the Soviet Union(‘s).” Ferguson thinks he knows America, but he doesn’t.

Barnett doesn’t see things Ferguson’s way. You should read this book. You should talk it up. Karl Rove should read this book and so should President Bush. And they, too, should talk it up. Americans have been desperate for a positive vision of the future. Here it is.

Responses? Thoughts? Please email them to me at soxblog@aol.com

James Frederick Dwight 6/30/2004 08:56:21 AM

COMMENTARY: Obviously I like simply because he likes the book so much. But what I really like about it is the elegance of the recitation: he describes the book both simply and accurately. Actually, it's good enough to employ as a sound bite in a media appearance. I also like the Ferguson comparison, which I think is dead-on but have never been able to come up with on my own (even as I admit that I enjoy Ferguson on TV, I find his writing a bit tedious and obvious—the guy should write more like he talks). I also like the focus on the positive vision, and the—again—elegant addressing of feasibility. All in all, as my webmaster said, it comes off as the "most authentic" review yet—meaning he seems to get inside the work to its very essence. What's so neat about this is that undeniable sense of being completely understood by the reader, and man, that feels good!