Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 30 December 2004

Finished going through blog today, organizing all the book notes I've taken, and perusing a couple of last books.

Got out the book proposal and put all the main sections out on the table, writing down each on a sticky note. Stared at it for a long time, knowing that I've long known I would rejigger once I got to this point. Tossed about 5 of the proposed 18 sections out, then added in a good dozen that came to my head. Rerationalized the whole thing to 18 again. Ordered them just so. Came up with preferred section names for about half of them, place-holders for the rest.

Then called Mark and talked him though the whole thing. "Do we have a book here?" I ask repeatedly, and he seems more and more certain the more we talk about. Enough for today. I will let it sit for a day and get back to it on Saturday, when I'll read back through all my meta-notes from the blog and various articles and books, sifting through several hundred ideas to see which could go where. I will inevitably rejigger the outline quite a bit in this process. Then Sunday I'll organize the source material, tossing all the pieces of paper into the various 18 piles (if I still have 18 at that point).

Basic set up for now is: Preface, a Chapter "zero" that does sketch of 2025 realities, a Chapter One that speaks to tools to be created and understandings to be achieved for the Core as a whole, a Chapter Two that focuses on how the Global War on Terrorism working out to some sense of a finish (obviously a Middle Eastern focus), a Chapter Three that speaks to growing the Core (obviously an Asian focus), a Chapter Four that speaks to scenario pathways for shrinking the Gap (at the system level, at the state level, and at the individual level), a Chapter Five that deals with the major obstacles (longevity, sacrifices, resources) to shrinking the Gap, and a Conclusion that sums everything up in an innovative sort of way that I don't care to reveal here (an interesting twist on scenarios that I've employed before in my work, but never for a publication).

So this is the rough plan - at least until I revisit it on Saturday.

Tomorrow I get up and pen the original essay for the first Rule Set Reset newsletter. Then it's all three Lord of the Rings (extended) movies in a row with the kids. We start at 1pm with the assumption we'll finish just before midnight.

Today I toss out both versions (original in English and edited one in Portuguese) of the email interview I gave a couple of weeks back to the Brazilian magazine Epoca:

■ First up is the edited article that actually appeared in Epoca in Portuguese. Click here for the blog post and go here for the original at .

■ Secondly, find the original email interview (in English) that I submitted to Mr. Filho back in mid-December.

Passing on the current news blog again. It's the reality of the effort on the book right now.

Posted by at 8:30 PM | Permalink

THOMAS BARNETT

O profeta do império

[NOTE: That's a picture of me standing on the Mall about a half mile from the U.S. Capitol building. It was a very foggy day.]

Consultor do Pentágono aposta que 12 países virarão Estados americanos até 2050. Entre eles estão o México e nações asiáticas

EXPEDITO FILHO, de Nova York

A globalização pode ser uma arma tão eficiente quanto os Exércitos no mundo que surgiu depois do ataque terrorista às torres gêmeas do World Trade Center. Por meio de concessões comerciais e de investimentos do setor privado em países que ainda não têm suas economias irrigadas pelo capital globalizado, o mundo do futuro será mais pacífico. As nações que continuam isoladas e compõem o chamado gap da globalização - localizadas em parte do Caribe, dos Andes, da África, dos Bálcãs, da Ásia Central, do Sudeste Asiático e do Oriente Médio - teriam suas economias ligadas ao chamado núcleo globalizado, onde já se encontram Estados Unidos, Europa, China, Japão, Rússia, Índia, Brasil, Chile e Argentina. Com a redução desse vão entre os países periféricos e os de centro, o terror estaria com seus dias contados, acredita o professor Thomas P.M. Barnett, da Escola Naval Americana. De outubro de 2001 a junho de 2003, o doutor em Ciências Políticas pela Universidade Harvard foi assessor e estrategista do secretário de Defesa, Donald H. Rumsfeld, e, hoje, presta consultoria para o Pentágono. Em entrevista a ÉPOCA, explicou as idéias que compõem o livro O Novo Mapa do Pentágono, recentemente lançado por ele nos EUA.

ÉPOCA - Qual é o novo mapa do Pentágono?

Thomas Barnett - O mapa começa por traçar os lugares para onde os Estados Unidos têm enviado tropas ao redor do mundo desde o fim da Guerra Fria. São pontos de violência maciça ao redor do globo, para os quais sentimos a necessidade de dar uma resposta. Do contrário, muita instabilidade pode resultar disso e muita gente pode morrer. O que fiz foi traçar uma linha em torno de 95% desses casos e perguntar: o que há nessas regiões para atrair intervenções militares americanas de tempos em tempos?

ÉPOCA - O que resultou dessa análise?

Barnett - Observei que essas regiões são formadas por países menos conectados com a economia global. Muitos exportam apenas uma ou duas matérias-primas e poucos produtos manufaturados. Chamo essas regiões de não-integradas - o fosso (gap, em inglês). Fazem parte dele a maior parte do Caribe, a porção andina da América do Sul, quase toda a África, os Bálcãs, a Ásia Central, o Cáucaso, o Oriente Médio e muito do Sudeste Asiático. Dentro desse fosso encontram-se todos os conflitos desde o fim da Guerra Fria: as guerras civis, a limpeza étnica, o genocídio, o estupro em massa como instrumento de terror, crianças forçadas a guerrear, os principais exportadores de drogas e os grupos terroristas que mais nos preocupam. Percebi que desconexão com o mundo globalizado implica perigo.

ÉPOCA - Em que sentido?

Barnett - Se sua economia não está conectada com a economia global, a probabilidade de seu país viver uma situação de violência em massa é muito maior. Assim como o risco de atrair uma intervenção militar do exterior, mais provavelmente dos Estados Unidos. Existe também o que chamo de núcleo funcional da globalização ou, grosso modo, onde vivem dois terços da população global. Nele estão incluídos América do Norte, Europa, Rússia, China, Índia, Japão, Coréia do Sul, Austrália, Nova Zelândia, África do Sul, Argentina, Chile e Brasil. Entre esses países há uma chance muito remota de guerra, no sentido tradicional. Portanto, a principal missão militar das nações do núcleo é trabalhar coletivamente para melhorar a segurança no fosso. E, com isso, ajudar essas regiões a se integrar na economia global de maneira mais justa.

ÉPOCA - Qual é o papel do Brasil nesse novo mapa do Pentágono?

Barnett - O Brasil é parte do núcleo funcional da globalização porque saiu da forte dependência de exportação de matérias-primas para um novo perfil econômico, que inclui produtos manufaturados como aço, uma agricultura forte em escala industrial e avanços reais em produtos médicos e de biotecnologia. O Brasil também é um país estável, sem risco real de guerra, embora como muitos países do fosso tenha alguns problemas de segurança em sua fronteira. Especificamente, na área da Floresta Amazônica.

ÉPOCA - Nesse novo desenho, há algum risco de o Brasil perder a Floresta Amazônica?

Barnett - Não vejo risco. Muito pelo contrário. O Brasil precisa - e está sendo bem-sucedido nisso - gerar transparência na Bacia Amazônica para impedir tráfico de drogas, pilhagem ambiental e que terroristas busquem refúgio na floresta. Acredito também que o Brasil precisa jogar um papel maior na segurança não apenas da América do Sul, mas de uma forma geral nos países da chamada região do fosso. Cada vez mais, a saúde econômica do Brasil vai depender de sua habilidade em se manter conectado com a economia global. É notável o crescimento dos laços econômicos entre o Brasil e a China nos últimos anos.

ÉPOCA - O senhor prevê que até 2050 mais 12 países virarão Estados americanos. Como será isso?

Barnett - Economicamente, o México já é parte dos Estados Unidos. E, até 2050, um em cada três eleitores nos Estados Unidos será hispânico. É grande a probabilidade de o México se juntar ao país de maneira pacífica para criar um novo e maior Estados Unidos da América. A nação mudaria à medida que novos Estados se juntassem, como aconteceu no passado. Não é apenas uma questão de alguém desaparecer, mas de se juntar a algo maior que todos vejam como benéfico.

ÉPOCA - A nação terá Estados também na Ásia ou no Oriente Médio?

Barnett - Os Estados Unidos são o único país no mundo fundado em torno de uma idéia, e não de um território. Nosso conceito de Estados juntos para formar uma união política e econômica maior pode se espalhar pelo mundo. Somos a união política e econômica mais antiga e bem-sucedida. Não há razão para esse modelo não crescer. Assim como ocorreu com a União Européia, espero ver uma união de Estados asiáticos nas próximas décadas. O conceito é muito maior que a nação ''América''.

ÉPOCA - Países como França e Alemanha aceitarão a hegemonia americana?

Barnett - Não vejo hegemonia. Não sei o que essa palavra significa na atual era da globalização. Essa é uma velha linguagem aplicada a uma realidade nova e muito mais complexa. Como dizer que os Estados Unidos fazem a guerra sozinhos se outros pagam para comprar a nossa dívida? Nenhum país age sozinho, porque tudo está conectado. Hegemonia é uma palavra de um tempo que não existe mais.

ÉPOCA - Que tipo de relação haverá entre a China e os Estados Unidos?

Barnett - A China e os Estados Unidos serão parceiros estratégicos porque compartilham interesses econômicos. A influência da China ao redor do mundo é baseada na adoção do capitalismo, que, por sua vez, gera enorme demanda por recursos. Isso é bom e natural. Então, não deve haver receio de nossa parte. Não vejo uma nova guerra fria. Apenas alguns idiotas em altas esferas que ainda sonham com esse nonsense.

ÉPOCA - Os Estados Unidos vão invadir a Coréia do Norte?

Barnett - A questão-chave é conseguir que a China queira que o ditador da Coréia do Norte, Kim Jong II, deixe o poder. Se os Estados Unidos e a China entrarem no palácio de Kim para falar que é hora de sair, meu palpite é que ele se submeterá, como Baby Doc, no Haiti, ou Charles Taylor, na Libéria. Se ele não aceitar pacificamente, seus subordinados vão ajudar na remoção dele. Acredito que sua base de poder está muito mais abalada do que se imagina. Então, não acredito em invasão. Vejo mais um golpe engendrado com pessoas locais. Kim conseguiu armas nucleares e não é possível confiar nele como um ser racional. Além disso, a Ásia precisa de uma aliança militar que amarre todos os grandes poderes e gere equilíbrio, como a Otan faz na Europa. A remoção de Kim é o gatilho para esse desenvolvimento positivo. A hora dele chegou.

ÉPOCA - Por que o senhor pensa que o mundo de seus filhos depois do 11 de setembro está mais seguro que o de seus pais durante a Guerra Fria?

Barnett - Meus pais viveram a ameaça de guerra nuclear global, que hoje não é sequer cogitada. Dizer que os terroristas podem conseguir a bomba nuclear não é o mesmo que duas superpotências nucleares entrarem em guerra. Não há comparação entre os dois períodos. O que enfrentamos hoje é a violência entre Estados e terroristas transnacionais. Isso é mais complexo, mas os problemas são menores.

ÉPOCA - O senhor considera George W. Bush preparado para liderar essa transformação?

Barnett - Bush foi perfeito no período pós-11 de setembro. Acredito que respondeu à altura. Nisso, ele foi como o ex-presidente Harry Truman depois da Segunda Guerra Mundial. A questão agora é: a política de Bush será aceita pelo mundo? Se não for aceita, as vitórias dele podem ser temporárias e custar mais caro do que valem. A longo prazo, penso que fará um bom segundo governo. Sua reeleição foi a confirmação de que os Estados Unidos estão levando a sério a guerra contra o terrorismo. A possibilidade de o mundo se ajustar nessa direção é maior que a de Bush mudar seu ponto de vista, embora ache que ele adotará um estilo mais suave com os aliados.

ÉPOCA - O Pentágono subestimou a Al Qaeda?

Barnett - Sim. Subestimamos o papel dos terroristas no mundo pós-Guerra Fria porque falhamos em reconhecer a profundidade de nossa vitória. Não há mais nenhum perigo de guerra entre as grandes potências. A guerra entre Estados está desaparecendo porque o poder militar americano é incomparável. Quando esses assuntos estão fora da mesa, o que sobra é o terrorismo. O Pentágono não se sente confortável lidando com o terrorismo porque essa guerra é muito assimétrica. Mas o 11 de setembro requer que lidemos com essa ameaça agora. Isso significa mudar o nosso Exército dramaticamente nos próximos anos.

ÉPOCA - A Al Qaeda ainda desafia os Estados Unidos. O mundo ficou mais seguro depois da invasão do Iraque?

Barnett - O mundo ficou mais seguro. Só não está ainda mais porque a ocupação foi mal conduzida. Os Estados Unidos precisam de dois tipos de força militar: uma especializada em guerras como essa que derrubou o odiado regime de Saddam Hussein. Outra capaz de efetivamente manter a paz e os esforços de construir uma nação. Os Estados Unidos precisavam manter ambas as forças por algum tempo. Se a ocupação malfeita provocar o surgimento dessa força focada na manutenção da paz, terá servido a algum propósito.

ÉPOCA - Algo mudou na organização dos grupos terroristas?

Barnett - Depois da invasão do Iraque, a Al Qaeda e outros grupos terroristas do Oriente Médio em geral estão de volta ao padrão geográfico que vimos nos anos 70 e 80. Ou seja, eles podem atacar em todo o Oriente Médio e em partes do sul da Europa e da Rússia. Mas não parecem capazes de voltar a atacar os Estados Unidos. Então, é melhor que a violência ocorra no lugar ao qual ela pertence do que nas ruas de Nova York. Não se vence uma guerra global contra o terror até que o Oriente Médio se junte ao núcleo funcional da globalização, oferecendo mais que apenas petróleo e terrorismo. Precisamos conectar aquela região com o mundo exterior mais rapidamente do que os Bins Ladens possam desconectá-la.

ÉPOCA - Por que o senhor acredita que o Oriente Médio sofrerá grandes transformações nas próximas duas décadas?

Barnett - São três fatores. A juventude entrará na meia-idade e isso criará uma sociedade impaciente por mudanças políticas. Além disso, o tempo está se esgotando para a economia baseada no petróleo. A demanda global por petróleo atingirá o pico em 2025. Em terceiro lugar, os Estados Unidos estão no Oriente Médio para ficar, porque se saírem o terrorismo internacional fará algo até pior que o 11 de setembro.

ÉPOCA - Outros países seguirão os passos dos Estados Unidos na região?

Barnett - A expectativa é de que os países poderosos da Ásia entrem no Oriente Médio por causa de seus interesses econômicos. É bom lembrar que a Ásia já consome a maior parte do petróleo que sai do Golfo. Essas necessidades vão dobrar nas próximas duas décadas. O Iraque de hoje é só um palito de fósforo. O fogo vai ser aceso, se não pelos Estados Unidos, por outro país. É só uma questão de tempo.

ÉPOCA - O senhor é o sonhador de um novo mundo conectado ou o filósofo da hegemonia americana no século XXI?

Barnett - De novo essa palavra. Hegemonia nega conexão e a América é a conexão personificada. Acreditamos em certas premissas para gerar riqueza e desenvolvimento, enquanto alguns outros países geram conflitos e insegurança. Seria ótimo se os governos do mal, localizados no fosso, pudessem desaparecer sem esforço militar do centro, mas isso não é plausível. Países isolados representam sempre um grande risco de violência. O mundo é pequeno e está ficando menor ainda. O conflito está desaparecendo na região do centro do planeta e permanecendo apenas no fosso. Reduzi-lo é acabar com a guerra. O fim dos conflitos iguala hegemonias, e aí eu não sei o que essa palavra significará.

Formação Doutor em Ciências Políticas pela Universidade Harvard e professor da Escola Naval Americana

Trajetória
Assessor e estrategista do secretário de Defesa americano, Donald H. Rumsfeld, até junho de 2003

Ocupação atual
Consultor do Pentágono e autor do livro O Novo Mapa do Pentágono, lançado nos Estados Unidos

Posted by at 8:29 PM | Permalink

Epoca -- What is the new Pentagon's map?

Thomas Barnett -- The map begins by plotting where the U.S. has sent its military forces around the world since the end of the Cold War. These are not places, in effect, where we were—as we did in the Cold War—hoping to counter any Soviet influence, so these were the natural "hot spots" of mass violence around the world, to which we felt a need to respond, otherwise too many people might die and too much instability might result.

Epoca -- How did you find that?

Barnett -- What I did with this map was simply draw a line around 95% of those cases and ask, What is it about these regions that seems to attract U.S. military interventions time and time again? I came to the observation that these regions were, by most definitions, made up of those countries that are least connected to the global economy. Typically, many of them export one or two raw materials but very little manufactured goods, for example. I called these regions the Non-Integrating Gap. These regions include much of the Caribbean Rim, the Andes portion of South America, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Middle East, and much of Southeast Asia.

Inside this Non-Integrating Gap one finds, since the end of the Cold War, all the wars, all the civil wars, all the ethnic cleansing, all the genocide, all the instances of mass rape as a tool of terror, all the children forced into combat units, all the UN peacekeeping missions, and virtually all the major narcotics exporters and terrorist groups that we worry most about. So my motto became, disconnectedness defines danger. If your economy is not well connected to the global economy, odds are you are far more likely to experience mass violence and thus attract some military intervention from the outside—most likely from America.

Epoca -- How this new map is divided?

Barnett -- Counter to this image is what I call the Functioning Core of globalization, or roughly two-thirds of the global population. In the Core is included North America, Europe and Russia, China, India, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, Argentina, Chile and Brazil. Among these countries, I maintain, there is little chance for war in any traditional sense. Therefore I argue that the main military mission of these Core states is to collectively work together to improve the security situation across the Gap and—by doing so—shrink that Gap over time by helping those regions integrate themselves with the global economy in a fair and just manner. That integration, while facilitated by security provided by the Core, is ultimately a private-sector-driven process by which the Core sends foreign direct investment into the Gap and helps those countries move up the production chain toward real economic development.

Also, by shrinking the Gap, I believe you end the disconnectedness that fuels not only conflicts and wars, but also generates the seeds of international terrorism. So, in my view, America and the Core win the Global War on Terrorism by shrinking the Gap and—by doing so—making globalization truly global in a far and just (but also secure) manner.

Epoca -- What is the role of Brazil in this map?

Barnett -- Brazil is part of the Functioning Core of globalization because it has moved off of a strong dependence on exporting mostly raw materials to a new economic profile that includes manufactured goods like steel, industrial agriculture (Brazil is, I believe, the number one meat exporter in the world), and real breakthroughs in medical and biotechnology sciences. It is also a stable country with no real risk of war, although it, like many states ringing the Gap, suffers some security issues with its borders—namely the Amazon forest area.

Epoca -- Do you think there is risk of Brazil losing the Amazon?

Barnett -- I see no risk of Brazil losing the Amazon. Quite the contrary, I see Brazil needing to, and succeeding in, generating greater transparency throughout the Amazon basin so as to preclude negative activities there involving narcotics trafficking, environmental pillaging, and rebels/terrorists seeking sanctuary. If anything, I believe Brazil needs to play a bigger security role not just in South America but elsewhere in the Gap. Increasingly, Brazil's economic health will depend on its ability to maintain its connectivity to the global economy. Look at how much Brazil's economic ties have, for instance, grown with China in recent years.

Epoca -- After the Middle East crisis, Brazil and South America lost relevance. Why do you think that the free trade area of the Americas is going to be a reality in 2015?

Barnett -- I think there are strong economic reasons for this FTAA to develop, but such negotiations typically slow down dramatically in harder economic times. The notion was proposed in the very prosperous 1990s, and now seems less realistic. But as the global economy once again picks up speed, I expect progress to continue either on a FTAA, or such progress on things like a Central American FTAA or bilateral agreements between the U.S. and other Latin American states that the group of involved nations as a whole will once again push far harder to make FTAA a concrete possibility. For now, however, America is rightfully accused of paying too much attention to a global war on terrorism and not enough on fostering more Core-Gap economic and trade connectivity. I believe America must also end much of its protectionism on agriculture in the current Doha Development Round of the WTO. A more balanced mix of security and trade issues in the second Bush administration would go much farther in winning a global war on terrorism than focusing too much just on security issues.

Epoca -- The violence in Iraq is increasing; the terrorist organization al Qaeda continues to defy the USA. Do you think the world is safer now after the Iraq occupation? Why?

Barnett -- I think the world is safer after the Iraq war, but less so because of how badly we have conducted the Iraq occupation. I think America needs two types of forces: one that specializes in wars of the sort that toppled the hated Saddam Hussein regime and one that specializes in effective peacekeeping and nation-building efforts. I have thought America needed both forces for quite some time, and if it takes the botched Iraq occupation to bring such a second (i.e., peacekeeping-focused) force into being, then it at least serves that purpose. As for Al Qaeda and Middle East terror groups in general: after the invasion they are all back to the same geographic pattern we saw in the 1970s and 1980s, meaning they can strike at will throughout the Middle East and reach into the southern portions of Europe and Russia. They do not seem able, anymore, to reach all the way into the United States, so obviously this is a real improvement—from our perspective—when compared to 9/11. Does the Middle East feel more secure after the removal of Saddam from power? I think not, but I truly believe that the grievances of virtually all transnational terrorism lie in the Middle East itself, so better for the violence to occur there, where it belongs, than on the streets of New York. People criticize this current administration for trying to transform the Middle East, but I ask you, do you think that terrorism emanating from that region will end simply if the world pulls out of those countries and stops buying that oil? Or do you think it only ends if Bin Laden and others have their way and turn the region into a giant version of Taliban Afghanistan? If that occurs, do we have a safer then? Or a more dangerous one?

People want simple answers to complex issues, but there are none. You cannot win a global war on terrorism until the Middle East joins the Functioning Core of globalization offering more than just oil and terrorism. The countries there need broad economic connectivity to the outside world that allows their young people a chance to make their own economic way rather than relying on "trust fund" governments who control too much of the wealth generated by all that oil Until that happens, we will continue to suffer from authoritarian regimes in the region, and those regimes will continue to attract the attention of desperate terrorists who want to topple them. If I though that just killing all the terrorists would work, I would advocate that, but I do not. I think we need to connect the Middle East to the outside world faster than the Bin Ladens and Zarqawis of that region can disconnect it. To me, that's the real global war on terrorism.

Epoca -- Do you think the world of your children (after 9/11) is safer than the world at the time of your parents during the Cold War?

Barnett -- Yes. My parents faced global nuclear war, which is not a danger today. To say that terrorists are far more likely to use a nuclear bomb is not the same as two nuclear superpowers going to war. To me, there is no comparison between the two ages. Since we've invented nuclear weapons, no two great powers have ever gone to war, despite the long rivalry between us and the Soviets during the Cold War, and since the end of the Cold War, inter-state wars have largely disappeared. Now we face mostly subnational violence within states and transnational terrorists. More complex on many levels, yes, but far smaller problems. Big wars between big states are a thing of the past, and now we're getting down to the truly harder security issues to tame—like terrorism. But you have to keep some historical perspective on it all.

Epoca -- After the end of the Cold War, do you think that the Pentagon underestimated the role of terrorist groups like al Qaeda as a result of clash of civilizations or culture?

Barnett -- Yes, we did underestimate the role of terrorists in the post-Cold War world, but we did so because we failed to recognize how profound our victory had been in the Cold War. There is no significant danger of war among great powers anymore, and inter-state war is disappearing because America's military prowess is unmatched. When those big issues are off the table, what you are left with is terrorism. The Pentagon is uncomfortable dealing with terrorism because that sort of warfare is so asymmetrical, but 9/11 requires that we deal with that threat now, and that means changing our military fairly dramatically in coming years.

Epoca -- You said that the Middle East will be transformed over the next two decades. How will this transformation happen?

Barnett -- Three trends will push it. First, the "middle-aging" of the population, as the current youth bulge moves into its thirties and forties. That demographic aging of the population will make societies more impatient for political change. Second, time is running out on the oil economy. Global oil demand probably peaks around 2025. As soon as that happens, the Middle East's hold on everyone attention begins to drop precipitously. As that reality draws near, expect to see governments there try to change themselves in terms of being more receptive to populations they can no longer bribe with oil wealth. Third, the U.S. is in the Middle East to stay, because if we pull out, transnational terrorism will simply pull us back in by doing something even worse than 9/11 to draw out attention back. Beyond the U.S., expect basically all of the powers of Asia to come to the Middle East militarily in coming years out of their growing economic interests. Asia already takes the majority of the oil coming out of the Gulf, and it's requirements double in the next two decades, so you do the math and tell me Asia's interest in, and presence with regard to, security in the Persian Gulf won't skyrocket in coming years. Put those three trends together and the Middle East of today will inevitably change radically over the next two decades. Iraq of today is just the match, but that fire was going to be lit by someone if not the U.S. It was just a matter of time.

Epoca -- In your book you anticipate that Kim Jong-Il must be removed from power and Korea must be reunited during the second term of Bush administration. How can Kim Jong-Il be removed?

Barnett -- Key here is to get China to want Kim gone. If U.S. and China can walk into Kim's palace and say that the time has come for him to go, my guess is he might take the package if enough if offered, like a Baby Doc in Haiti or a Charles Taylor in Liberia. If he won't go peacefully, then I target his subordinates to aid you in his removal. I think his power base is far more shaky than is popularly believed. He isn't the all-powerful leader. So in the end, I don't see any invasion, more an engineered coup either with locals or operations focused specifically on him. Kim's list of crimes against his own people is a long one, including a self-induced famine that killed at least two million. He's next because he's got nukes and he can't be trusted to be rational, and because East Asia needs a NATO-like military alliance that binds all the major powers there and rules out great power war for all time, like it has in Europe. Kim's removal is the trigger for that positive development. He's a very evil man whose time has come.

Epoca -- In this new map, what kind of relationship will have China and United States?

Barnett -- The U.S. and China must be and will be strategic partners out of shared economic interests. China's influence around the world is based on its adoption of capitalism which in turn generates huge demands for resources. This is both natural and good, so no fear on our part should be involved. I don't see a new cold war, only some idiots in high places who still dream of this nonsense. They are growing very few in number.

Epoca -- Would countries like France and Germany accept the American hegemony? How the America would work in this scenario?

Barnett -- I don't see hegemony. I don't even know what that word means in today's era of globalization. Again, I think that is old language applied to new, far more complex realities. Does America wage war unilaterally if others pay for it by buying our debt? There is no such thing as "free riders," as everything it too connected for that simple model of power-hoarding. Same with "hegemony." It is a word from a time that no longer exists.

Posted by at 8:28 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 28 December 2004

Quiet day going through rest of past blog posts (October through now), cataloguing ideas for the sequel. Tomorrow is the Big Think that puts it all in order, or at least creates the plan for what unfolds over three-dozen days.

Or nothing comes to me and I freak out completely because the contract just arrived in the mail from Putnam . . ..

I keep struggling with the notion that this book isn't going to be a compilation of future trends, predictions, etc., nor a tour d'horizon in terms of country-by-country descriptions, nor a giant reply to PNM critiques, nor a literary tour of the host of other foreign policy books recently written. Other people do all those sorts of books better than I could, so I have to keep reminding myself what it is I'm really trying to do here, and that is simply take the logic of PNM and extend deep into the future. I have the power of the approach, and now I'm going to really use it.

So the book is at once a description of how positive we could make the international security environment in the year . . . say 2025, plus a description of the tasks we'd need to complete and the institutions and rule sets we'd need to construct to get to that future worth creating, along with plenty of descriptors and sign posts for the journey foreseen.

That's what I'm trying to lay out. So it won't be a book that's written along the lines of, "If I can't find some other book or article that already said this, then I won't either!" Like the upcoming Esquire article (and even the one in Wired, I'm not interested in limiting the logic to that which people today find realistic, but extending it to that which people of tomorrow can find feasible (plus I want to write at something approaching that mix of density and speed). So it will be a book written not to impress the senior realists, but the upcoming idealists. It should fire the imagination without straining credulity.

Why I'm saying all this is that, in going through the huge number of references in the blog and reading a dozen or so books, I keep fighting the notion that I'm collecting data or "proof" per se, as though anyone is going to buy this logic extended into a future vision because I've got good endnotes or something. Instead, the book needs to read like a how-to description of getting from A to Z, if I were forced to plot it all out in a defensible, practical fashion.

You can't write that like some future history, as quaint as that approach is, but you can scenario-ize it here and there, present-tensing the account as you move through time. But you need to stay on top of it; you need to own it—as Mark Warren likes to say. In effect, you're writing it out exactly as you'd do it—if given the chance.

Sure, you can write a book about how nothing works out and there's loads of future conflict. The store shelves are full of those. But a realistic roadmap toward an ideal outcome, now that's different, not one full of caveats, and could-be's, but full of optimism and a sense of purpose in explaining itself.

That kind of book isn't a long one, so shooting for roughly half the length of PNM (actually, PNM's original target) makes sense. Keep it lean and tight, running almost at essay speed throughout, and then I'll let Mark demand that I fill in the gaps as he defines them in the editing process (he keeps predicting it will be roughly 100,000 words, no matter what I say).

So if PNM was mostly history and diagnostics, with a big dollop of prescriptions and rule-set enunciations, then the sequel is going to be one big exploration of one grand horizontal scenario—an unfolding future worth creating.

In short, all the fumbling through articles and the assembling of putative footnotes is—by and large—an exercise in training more than serious preparation. I need to write what I need to write, and then go back and slip in references as they make sense, not build this piece around references per se. The narrative will drive this, not the data points.

Today I toss out two recent reviews, one a group one in The National Interest and the other by Mark Safranski (yes, that man with clearly too much time on his hands!) for the History New Network.

I was going to run through two interviews I recently gave to Nihon Keizai Shimbun (in Japanese) and Epoca (in Portuguese), but I can't locate my original English text for either and I don't want to post without those. I have sent emails to both journalists looking for help. So those will go out hopefully tomorrow and Friday.

No news blog today. Head too full of book and news too sad from Asia. Good time to just listen and learn.

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Issue Date: Winter 2004/05, Posted On: 12/22/2004

Dreaming Europe in a Wide-Awake World

By: James C. Bennett

The world today is a vastly different place from what it was thirty years ago. Then the picture was dominated by the stark contrast between the generally prosperous and free First World, the economically stagnant and drably totalitarian Second World, and the seemingly hopeless Third World. Today, that disturbing but fairly simple tripartite classification has been replaced by a much more complex picture. What stands out in this new picture is the way winners and losers are emerging within each of the former categories. Within the former Third World, erstwhile basket cases such as China and India have become awakened giants, economically dynamic and increasingly more assertive on the international stage, while other Third World locations have become more of a Fourth World, sinking into a Conradian heart of darkness, breeding a seemingly endless mess of massacre and terrorism. The bright lights of Prague, Budapest and Warsaw signal a reborn eastern Europe, while Belarus and Ukraine struggle, and Russia wavers in between. Even in the First World, more and more is heard of Atlantic Divides and a growing feeling that America and a uniting Europe have less in common with each other and more in common with other parts of the world. Making sense of this complexity and illuminating a path forward is the intellectual task of today, one which becomes a metric for judging all international trends and policy analysis.

One of the most interesting analytical problems is that presented by the divergent paths taken by the developed nations of the First World, and their respective degrees of success. These are sometimes segmented out as Europe, America and Japan, but the more useful division is probably one of Japan, Continental Europe and what are variously called the "Anglo-Saxon" economies or, increasingly, the Anglosphere. In the early 1970s, all three of these regions were seen to be facing roughly the same set of problems: first, stagnation of a modified market economy defined by substantial economic regulation, high marginal tax rates, and a fairly high percentage of GDP captured by the public sector, as well as high wage levels and inelastic industrial structures reinforced by strong unionism; second, a declining birthrate, which promised trouble downstream for pay-as-you-go pension and benefits programs; and third, a weakening of the old sources of social cohesion, particularly religion, patriotic narratives in education and the media, and (in some countries) ethnic homogeneity.

From the end of World War II to the early 1970s, all three sectors of the developed world enjoyed a general economic expansion. Continental Europe and Japan in fact each experienced more rapid growth and development than the English-speaking nations, mainly from the spur of postwar reconstruction. However, as more and more of the Third World began adopting aggressive, export-driven industrialization strategies, the old cozy collaboration of government protection and passing wage increases on to the consumer began to fall apart.

The Anglosphere nations, led by the United States and Britain, reacted by reducing marginal tax rates, privatizing and deregulating markets, and refusing to subsidize declining smokestack industries. High levels of immigration were accepted, reversing the demographic patterns of decline. Continental European nations responded by increasing European integration, thus expanding internal market opportunities but retaining and even reinforcing the "social market economy"--legislated job protection and generous social benefits, particularly for the unemployed.

A wave of European Union-mandated privatizations ended the most egregious boondoggles, and small, protected national companies were absorbed into a smaller number of EU-wide champions, which were protected more subtly by disguised subsidies and ingenious non-tariff barriers. Meanwhile, most European nations accepted "guest workers", increasingly from North Africa and Turkey. But their assimilation into European national cultures was never aggressively pursued.

Finally, Japan addressed essentially the same set of problems through aggressive use of automation and offshore production, honing their competitive capabilities, and continuing a rather blatant policy of domestic protection. Japan also employed other labor-saving strategies and a minimal number of temporary foreign workers, though making clear that they were expected not to become permanent residents.

So the world economy must today be considered as one vast experiment. The object of this experiment is to determine whether the developed nations might continue to enjoy at least their current levels of prosperity, while the large developing nations of India and China become major economic players and a host of smaller, newly industrialized countries acquire the capability to offer almost every sort of manufactured good and advanced service at the same quality and lower price.

Author Neal Stephenson once famously described this process ending with a global standard of living stuck at "what a Pakistani brickmaker would consider to be prosperity." The challenge for the developed world is to avoid this fate, while not retarding the emergence of these major new players. At the same time, we must deal with those parts of the world that, for whatever reasons, are not climbing the ladder to prosperity. Engagement with these disadvantaged areas is less a matter of philanthropy than of the acute security challenges presented by the current anarchy. These areas, instead of exporting trade goods, are supplying large numbers of desperate immigrants, legal and illegal, and smaller but highly troublesome numbers of criminals and terrorists.

It is in this global and historical context that we must examine Europe's present and future, and what they may mean for the United States. Any static view of Europe today, or one that merely contrasts Europe and the United States in a less-than-global context, is worse than useless. Whatever the relative standings of Europe and the United States may be today, they will be different tomorrow. For anyone seeking to understand Euro-American differences in this context, Jeremy Rifkin's and Olaf Gersemann's respective treatments of Europe relative to America provide examples of two dramatically contrasting approaches encountered in this debate.

One holds that the American approach is dynamic and responsive to competition, and thus it is progressive, and therefore good. The other holds that the European Union, by increasing the scale of its market beyond that of the United States, will overcome whatever inefficiencies remain from its social market capitalism and overtake the United States, and thus that it is progressive, and therefore good.

Gersemann's treatment is closest to the first position. Its particular distinction lies in addressing the "yes, but. . ." arguments made by Europeans and their admirers when addressing the visible GDP gaps between America and Continental Europe. These run "Yes, America has a substantially lower unemployment rate . . . but that's because so many Americans are in prison", or "America makes more jobs, but they are low-wage, service-sector 'McJobs.'" (Gersemann characterizes the latter argument as "We can't actually make any jobs, but if we did, they would be good ones.") Gersemann systematically and persuasively rebuts such arguments.

Rifkin's book is a strange duck. It initially seems to offer a conventional example of the second Europeanist position. And in fact, it does include the standard Euro-critiques of the American socio-economic approach: prisons, McJobs, consumerism and so on. As usual, these arguments are used to fill in the argumentative gaps created by the shortcomings of actual, existing Europe, as opposed to the theoretically ever-more-efficient Europe beloved of the Wall Street Journal and the Economist.

Layered underneath these fairly standard approaches, however, is a deeper and more philosophical level of argument than Europeanists usually present. Rifkin argues that the European approach (The European Dream of his title) is precisely the abnegation of traditional progressivism in its most fundamental sense: the belief in the desirability of material and scientific progress, and the individual identity and freedom that accompany it. Thus, Rifkin's is a two-level critique of America contrasted with virtuous Europe. First, he asserts that Europe is surpassing America on the conventional criteria of prosperity. But he then adds that where economic success is absent in Europe, that's okay too, because progress is bad for you anyway.

Rifkin, therefore, requires critiquing on both levels. Gersemann, in debunking the general Europeanist criticism of America, (his book was written prior to the release of The European Dream) provides an excellent analysis of Rifkin's surface level. The case for the coming European triumph over America is quickly refuted. Gersemann, himself a German financial journalist (currently Washington correspondent for Wirtschaftwoche), convincingly refutes all of the prevailing Euro-legends about America, from the supposedly collapsing middle class to medical care to income inequality. He likewise documents the growing structural and demographic crisis of a Europe that has created more unfunded obligations than it can fulfill--while producing too few children to pay the bills their parents are racking up.

Immigration, which is now hoped to be able to fill the demographic gap, remains problematic. It is exactly the postmodernist multicultural narrative so praised by Rifkin that has created an unassimilated immigrant underclass. This underclass is a poor candidate for stepping up to the greater taxes needed to fund the lavish pensions now coming due. Young, mostly Muslim families struggling under ever-increasing payroll taxes will hear calls from ethnic-based politicians to repudiate the checks that old rich white Europeans had written to themselves. To the extent that Rifkin holds up Europe as a model for Americans to emulate, he is in effect urging the purchase of a ticket on the Titanic.

At this point one must turn to the underlying level of Rifkin's critique, that of the entire complex of ideas of autonomous individuals with enforceable constitutional rights. In essence, Rifkin is saying "Okay, perhaps United Europe will after all be poor and strife-ridden. But at least you will lose your freedom and individualism in the bargain." Rifkin presents a distillation of the positions of a number of European intellectuals over the past decade or two (but with roots in a Europeanist tradition going back much further). This argument states, roughly, that the entire idea of progress--of autonomous individuals possessing stated constitutional rights in a contract-based market society--is a historical aberration, and an unfortunate one. Rifkin traces it to the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution and certain precursor events, including the introduction of scheduled time by the Benedictine order.

In Rifkin's narrative, medieval people lived a collective lifestyle, in which individuals were embedded in a web of connections and did not think of themselves as apart from their colleagues. It was only the introduction of the proto-capitalist mentality that shattered this comfortable universe of family, congregation and community and transformed mankind into alienated individuals. The coup de grace was provided by extreme Protestant sects in the English Civil War, who used the new invention of printing to shatter the last stands of community by preaching the direct link, via the Bible, between man and God. These individuals went on to develop capitalism and technology, destroy the environment, subdue the Third World, and create our current world of SUVs, beef eating, obesity, and excessive punctuality (to give some idea of the bêtes noires inhabiting Rifkin's earlier works critiquing the American way of life). America is of course the ultimate example of this alienated world, while Europe is on the path back to connectedness, mostly by creating vast, unaccountable bureaucracies and substituting positive rights (things the state must do for you) for negative rights (things the state cannot do to you).

What Rifkin is talking about is familiar to anyone who has studied the historiography of the Industrial Revolution: Marx and Engels on alienation, T”nnies' distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft societies (the former Rifkin's medieval, status-based, "connected" societies, the latter modern, contract-based individualist societies), and Max Weber's famous "Protestant Work Ethic" thesis.

All these theorists posited a world characterized by universal laws of cultural evolution: Everyone was once tribal, then agricultural, then feudal, then modern (or is destined eventually to become so). The Marxists posited subsequent stages of socialism and communism, and others debated how, when and why peoples moved from one stage to another. Rifkin's novel contribution is to identify the emerging European postmodernist society as the next stage. Instead of a proletarian revolution ushering in central planning, we are to have a centralized bureaucratic revolution that will plan proletarian immobilization.

But what if there are no inevitable stages of social evolution? What if some people have never displayed the characteristics of Gemeinschaft society, but have been individualists from as far back as records could show? This in fact seems to be the case. It is the English (and their cultural descendants throughout the Anglosphere) who for many centuries have been the exception. Over the past thirty years, an intellectual revolution has been taking place in historical sociology, led in particular by Alan Macfarlane (whose works deserve a more substantial treatment in this regard than is possible here).

Macfarlane and his associates have demonstrated very convincingly that English society back to Anglo-Saxon days has been characterized by individual rather than familial landholding; by voluntary contract relationships rather than by inherited status; and by nuclear rather than extended families. Individuals were free of parental authority from age 21 on, and daughters could not be denied their choice of husband (unlike on the Continent). The English nobility, regularly churned by elevation of commoners and marriage of younger sons to non-titled families, tended to mix freely with the rest of society, rather than being a separate caste, again as on the Continent. Rather than the English Reformation being the event that caused this change, it seems to have been (for the majority of the population) the event that brought formal theology and church government more in line with the pre-existing customs of the country. So the English "peasant" that Hollywood is fond of depicting turns out to be the figment of a 19th-century Marxist's imagination.

Macfarlane's body of work represents a momentous intellectual revolution. The implications of this revolution have not yet been fully realized, or even generally understood. It suggests that modernity and its consequences came particularly easily for the already-individualistic English. Conversely, it came particularly hard for the Continental Europeans, whose societies were characterized by all the non-individualistic features England lacked. It was to these Continentals that the intrusion of individualist, market-oriented relations was particularly disruptive and shocking. With medieval traditions of representative government moribund or long vanished, it is not surprising that Continental states had a particularly difficult time adjusting to parliamentary government, experiencing instead frequent coups, revolutions and periods of authoritarian rule, spiraling down to the abyss of fascism and communism.

It has been usual to write the history of the past two centuries of Continental Europe as one of modernity and democracy punctuated by periods of exception, but it may be more accurate to see the period from 1789 until the very recent past (France's current political arrangement dating back to 1958, Spain's to 1976) as a long, difficult and perhaps incomplete period of adjustment to modernity. Although certainly the majority of most Continental populations made a perfectly successful transition to modernist life, a significant minority never fully bought in to the psychology or assumptions of liberal society, and thus were easily recruited into the darker visions of fascism. That may explain why Anglosphere nations never developed significant fascist movements, despite experiencing the same traumas of postwar disillusionment and economic depression.

In this light, Rifkin's European dream becomes just one more chapter of what economist Brink Lindsey has aptly dubbed the Industrial Counter-Revolution--a diversion from the path to modernity rather than an effective alternative to it. Fortunately, this version of it lacks the fascination with violence and the cult of leadership that characterized the previous rejection of modernity in Europe (not to mention the effective military organization). Still, the Europeanist dream as articulated not just by Rifkin but by many intellectuals incorporates so many of the tropes of the authoritarian anti-Americanists from the Europe of 1921-45 that the current "Atlantic divide" (which in reality is still more of a Channel divide) may not be easily or quickly resolved.

One must then ask, if the divide between les Anglo-Saxons and the Continentals is genuinely deep rooted, why have Atlantic relations over most of the past fifty years been so relatively tranquil? It may be because the Cold War years, with their combination of Soviet threat and open American markets for recovering Continental industries, and with the Third World economically invisible, provided a period of unique military-political stability and economic opportunities that provided uniquely strong incentives to smooth over problems. With the end of the Cold War, the first incentive has disappeared. With the rise of the newly industrialized countries, the European share of the American export market continues to shrink. Japan now competes for the luxury markets Europe used to dominate, India targets software, while China and the East Asian Tigers take the low-cost manufactured-goods slot from Japan. The Anglosphere nations have navigated this tightrope with a combination of maintaining the high-technology pioneer slot, aggressively combining offshore, low-cost labor with their managerial and financial talents (a strategy followed by Japan as well), and growing their domestic services sector, primarily by entrepreneurism. Continental Europe has so far proven too slow and inflexible to follow this pattern. In this environment, the Anglosphere-Eurosphere divide promises to widen, not shrink.

Rifkin's analysis either ignores or trivializes this problem, despite his frequent invocation of the term "globalization", which in his eyes becomes primarily a justification for European-style multiculturalism. Fortunately, this global context is becoming more widely recognized. Two new books coming from the opposite sides of the British debate on Euro-Atlantic relations, Timothy Garton Ash's Free World and Christopher Booker's and Richard North's The Great Deception, provide a much more illuminating discussion, and one rooted much more soundly in current realities.

The British debate is particularly interesting, because Britain is a sort of canary in the mine for Euro-Atlantic relations. Any perturbation in those relations is usually foreshadowed by a perturbation in British politics over the same issues. This debate thus cannot be resolved without finding a consensus on exactly what "Europe" and "America", or increasingly, "the Anglosphere" mean, and where and how Britain fits into each. This debate has been continuing unresolved for decades. As issues such as the Single Currency and the current European constitution have begun to present Britain with the prospect of an irreversible commitment to the EU, the debate has become increasingly acute and shrill.

Timothy Garton Ash, a British historical scholar of high reputation and a convinced Europeanist, has produced a work that promises to help move the debate toward a consensus on at least the underlying questions, if not necessarily the right answers to them. He imaginatively casts Britain as a four-faced Janus, looking simultaneously in four directions, each of which represents an aspect of British reality, and each of which calls Britain down a particular path. These four directions he identifies as Europe, the Anglosphere, the wider globalized world, and finally the inward-looking focus on the traditional Britain. The Europeanists call for the whole-hearted involvement of Britain in the European Union, the Anglospherists call for the rebuilding of institutional ties to the United States and the Commonwealth, the globalists emphasize the UN and other fully international or transnational bodies, and the Little-Englanders emphasize the recovery of traditional Britain with an unaligned, self-interested foreign policy. Resolving this "Janus dilemma" is both Britain's problem and a wider problem of the Euro-Atlantic West.

Ash's formulation is a welcome advance for the Euro-Atlantic debate. One of the principal obstacles to a useful discussion of Euro-Atlantic issues and Britain's options therein has been the insistence by the Europeanist side that Britain is entirely a European power and that its Anglospherist side is either defunct or irrelevant. Ash states forthrightly that "the Anglosphere is an economic reality", both in the sense that the economies of the English-speaking nations share a recognizable and distinct profile compared to others, and that they do a very substantial amount of business with each other. He cites also the "Inglehart Human Values and Beliefs" study, which found that English-speaking nations form a separate and distinct cluster from other world cultures. So for Ash, the question becomes, "what formulation of interests balances Britain's European, Anglosphere, global and inward sides?"

His question is useful because it proceeds primarily from his awareness of the new global situation: one in which the need for the poorest of the Earth to catch up, the need for the newer developed nations to prosper, and the need for the old developed nations to preserve their prosperity each gets due attention. His answer is, basically, for the developed nations, and particularly the Euro-Atlantic West, to set aside whatever differences they have, renew the mutually advantageous working relationships they enjoyed between 1945 and 1989, and focus on creating a genuinely global prosperity.

In pursuit of this goal he makes a remarkable plea for mutual understanding, reaching out to Americaphobes in Europe and Europhobes in America. His attempt at explaining the actions of the United States since September 11, 2001 from the American point of view for the benefit of Europeans is fascinating to read. If it had been written by any literate American other than a convinced internationalist, it would seem like an unremarkable statement of reality. In fact, it represents a stupendous feat of imaginative reconstruction on Ash's part, comparable to Anthony Burgess's writing a first-person novel-length narrative from a homosexual viewpoint in Earthly Powers.

Given this recognition of the genuine case for an Anglosphere identity and dimension, two questions for Britain regarding Europe arise. First, is Britain a European nation with a special relationship to the United States, or is it an Anglosphere nation with a special relationship to Europe? Second, given that it must interact with both spheres, what should the exact nature of the institutional ties with each be? Ash does not really answer the first question, although his presentation gives plenty of evidence for the idea that its Anglosphere identity is primary, while his stated conclusions imply that the European predominates. Ash's answer to the second question is essentially that Britain must fulfill its destiny by participating fully in the European Union and embracing further integration. But it must also attend to its Anglosphere side by pursuing larger Euro-Atlantic integrative structures, such as a trans-Atlantic free-trade area and a revived NATO integration.

Laudable as such structures are, Ash at the last minute weakens his argument by shying away from the difficult points. His diagnosis is convincing, his prescription less so. The question comes back to this: Are the structures of the EU the best vehicle for resolving Britain's need to maintain both cross-Channel and intra-Anglosphere ties? And are the structures of the European Union adequate to the task of maintaining the integration of Europe in the wider Euro-Atlantic world, and in the world in general?

Before attempting to answer this question, it would be highly advisable to read Booker's and North's The Great Deception. These authors, experienced journalists and committed British Euroskeptics, have written a history of how the EU came to be and what the consequences of its peculiar genesis have been. The book is a substantial achievement. It meticulously documents the origins and development of the Union, and in the process destroys a number of common myths, including ones beloved of Euroskeptics and Europhiles alike. For example, although they write from a Euroskeptic perspective, the authors dispel the charges made by many Euroskeptics, including historian John Laughland, that the EU derives primarily from wartime Nazi plans for a Europaische Wirtschaftgemeinschaft (European Economic Community, also the original name of the EU). They demonstrate that such plans were never much more than a propaganda exercise to permit collaborationists to rally local support in occupied countries, and that there was no significant continuity between this planning and postwar Europeanist activity.

On the other hand, they re-examine the myth that the EU was the product of gallant anti-Nazi resistance fighters who wished to make sure that war and tyranny would never trouble Europe again. In fact, Booker and North demonstrate that the Europeanist idea dates back to the experience of Jean Monnet and a handful of European bureaucrats in the First World War. They first glimpsed that the way to achieve intra-European economic (and ultimately political) integration was through the same kind of unelected international technical organizations, such as the World War One Inter-Allied Maritime Transportation Board, in which they routinely made decisions that affected the economies of a third of the globe.

It was these experiences that led Monnet and a few partners to set up a series of economic bodies during the chaos of postwar reconstruction, beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community. Having once established them, they relentlessly expanded their reach. The underlying pretense--that the move toward European integration was primarily an economic rather than political exercise--is the "Great Deception" of the book's title. Like a miser hoarding his coins, Europeanists never missed an opportunity to shift power away from nation-states. This strategy led to the European Union, but also became its Achilles' heel. For in gathering power by stealth and exercising it without effective accountability, a substantial "democracy gap" arose--alas, not entirely to the creators' dissatisfaction.

Populations in many European countries repeatedly found their governments making decisions that went against their explicit wishes, and finding, like the Irish, that when they voted the "wrong" way on European matters in referenda, they were told in effect to "vote again until you get it right." This democratic deficit, inherent in this model of transnational governance, threatens to weaken support for European solutions just when the pressures of demography demand they be strengthened and reformed. For the British, who have an escape hatch in the form of their Anglosphere and global connections, this may not be fatal. But for the Continental Europeans, their pressing problems require a realistic assessment of their global situation.

Draw a circle on the map of a thousand miles radius, centered on Brussels. Within that circle the states are free and democratic, and military conflict is virtually unthinkable. Now draw a similar thousand-mile circle centered on Tokyo. Within that circle or very near lie a half-dozen states. Three of them have nuclear weapons and the rest are close. These states are rising economic, technological and industrial powers. In contrast to Europe, it is highly conceivable that such weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, could be used at any time. The transnational institutions and agreements that preclude war in democratic Europe have little purchase in this region.

Europeanists have maintained that Europe's model is the world's future, but while Europeans were combining nation-states into a wider entity after World War II, northeast Asians were taking an existing single-market area (pre-war Japan, which integrated Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria) and turning it into separate nation-states, with equally prosperous results. Even today there is no visible movement to a Northeast Asian Union, although many writers automatically assume that other regions will imitate European structural models. Both Free World and The Great Deception suggest the conclusion that the EU is probably a one-off happenstance from unique historical circumstances. Once one leaves the immediate neighborhood of Brussels, transnationalism does not seem so inevitable.

America faces both Brussels and Tokyo, and must act in both of these universes. It deploys troops and nuclear weapons in both theaters. Is it any wonder that America cannot wholeheartedly adopt the Europeanist outlook?

Yet it is this global environment that we must consider as we contemplate Thomas P. M. Barnett's The Pentagon's New Map. Barnett describes a world in which the historically industrialized nations are the Old Core, the new industrial powers are the New Core, and the bulk of the old Third World that has not achieved takeoff is the Gap. He sees the task of the 21st century as stabilizing the Gap enough for it to adhere to the Core through "connectivity"--flows of capital, people and trade goods. In order to sustain these flows in a stable world, he would combat anti-globalization jihadis (not all of them radical Muslims) with a combination of hard military power, "soft" economic-political power, and a new synthesis of the two: a "nation-building" capability which he calls the "System Administrator." This last would have been called a colonial constabulary and colonial civil service in the 19th century. Its mandate today, however, would not be an imperial one, but would emanate from the web of transnational institutions that have sprung up, and the bulk of its power would be provided by the United States.

Many of Barnett's basic assumptions--the generally beneficial effects of globalization, the utility of connectedness in fighting the anti-globalization jihadis, and the stake that the Core nations, old and new, have in seeing globalization defeat the jihadis--will meet with general agreement. He is also to be commended for realizing that the entry of India and China as first-rank players is a major development of our era, and for constructing a worldview that integrates this fact fully rather than treating it as an afterthought. But his worldview and analytical framework still deserve closer scrutiny.

It makes sense to focus on connectivity as a factor in Gap-state failure, for instance. But Barnett goes further, maintaining that lack of connectivity is the most useful predictor of Gap-state failure and violence inviting outside military intervention. He originally defined the Gap by observing the clusters of U.S. military interventions during the 1990s and then trying to define what these areas had in common. One of these four clusters was the Balkans, specifically the former Yugoslavia and Albania. Yet although Yugoslavia was less "connected" by Barnett's criteria than, say, Austria or Italy, it was certainly far better connected by almost any definition than Bulgaria or Romania, both now candidate countries for EU accession. It seems his "connectivity" metrics might actually be markers for something else. Perhaps the "strength of civil society" is a more reliable underlying predictor of a state's ability to lift itself out of the Gap than connectivity per se.

A much more significant weakness is that Barnett's focus on the Core-Gap dichotomy leads him to minimize the importance of the existing links that connect particular Gap countries with particular Core nations. Given cheap air transport and telecommunications rapidly moving to a worldwide flat rate, the old paths of empire and emigration have given rise to a series of fluid, overlapping worldwide network civilizations. In the place of the British Empire there is now a demotic Anglosphere of Birmingham curry houses and Indo-American software engineers, a son of Jamaican emigres becoming Secretary of State, and Filipino immigrants commanding British, Australian and American troops together. The cocked hats and pith helmets these days are only seen over the faces of hometown boys made good and appointed Governor-General in Kingston or Belmopan. In much the same way, the former realm of the conquistadors is now a demotic Hispanosphere, the old French empire is now a Francophone network, and so on.

The key point here is that these new constructs all cut across Core-Gap lines, yet they are almost always the most effective lines along which the money, people, goods and services will flow to bring connectivity from the Core to the Gap. Rather than striving for universality of approaches, we would do better to work with the grain and maximize the use of these existing channels.

This applies also in matters of grand strategy. Bismarck famously remarked that the most important reality of the 20th century would be the fact that the United States spoke English. The most important fact of the 21st century may be the fact that the educated and ambitious of India have made of English not merely a useful foreign tongue, as have the Chinese, but a language they have taken into their homes and their literature, and into their heads and hearts by creating their own version of it. The new rising generation of well-educated, tech-savvy Indians increasingly regards this intertwining of India and the Anglosphere not as a colonial relic, but as a valuable card that history has dealt to their country, and one that should be played. Evidence that it is being played can be seen in both the quietly accelerating Indo-American military cooperation and the rapidly accelerating economic interpenetration between India and America.

The all-Core alliance against the anti-connectivity actors in the Gap that Barnett and Ash in effect advocate has the nature of a grand coalition--that is, one that enlists all significant actors. Typically, however, grand coalitions do not last. Sooner or later, one or more players decide that they can do better outside the system, and a new oppositional alignment emerges. Some Core nations are already in the business of pimping their Core status to Gap states to achieve narrow national goals--the role of France in providing militarily useful technologies to Gap states being a particular example. So even if the grand coalition can be assembled, we must consider who might be tempted to bolt.

Continental Europe in general, but especially "Old Europe", has tended to see this emerging world as a game in which they are dealt a progressively worsening hand with every shuffle of the cards. Thus they have concentrated on cashing in chips for short-term gain, while trying to trip up stronger players when the opportunity strikes. At present, the costs of being in the coalition would probably include making major and painful structural adjustments to their economies. Domestic European electorates might therefore be tempted by the alternative of a Euro-Islamic alliance, in which Middle Eastern oil states would prop up unreformed European economies in return for international support, high-tech weaponry and open access to Europe for Islamic economic migrants. The growing "Eurabian" bloc of Islamic voters would thus combine with anti-reform pensioners to veto any other political alignment, driving politics in the direction of the Euro-Islamic solution.

This alignment might then attempt to pick off one other major player from the grand coalition. Russia would probably find this unattractive, given their problem with radical Islamic separatists, and Japan would gain little from it. China might be tempted by access to energy, European weapons technology and the European market, so long as their access to the American market was not entirely precluded. China might not be so much a partner as a semi-detached fellow-traveler, careful never to fully alienate either side. Russia might well try to play a similar semi-detached role to the Anglosphere-India-Japan group.

Under this scenario, we might see the world gradually align into several loose competing politico-economic alliances whose elbow-jostling would not rise to the level of war, or even cold war. The above scenario may in fact be emerging now, with an Anglosphere-plus-India-plus-Japan-plus-Russia team contending with a Euro-Islamic-Chinese bloc. Within such a framework there would still be a need for high-level international agreements and organizations to bind the major players together within a limited framework--to facilitate world trade and prevent any major conflagration among the major powers. But a new world order it would not be, and the transnational elements in it would probably wield about the same amount of influence as during the Cold War.

All in all, the European model is unlikely to be replicated on the world stage--and it may be scaled back and even dismantled in Europe itself when the evidence that India and China are overtaking it becomes too embarrassingly clear. As for the really big picture, instead of problematic schemes for transnational governance on the European model, we are likely to see the gradual rise of associated commonwealths, achieving more modest goals more effectively on a basis of cultural, legal and linguistic affinity. Rifkin's "European Dream" is likely to remain exactly that.

James C. Bennett is president of The Anglosphere Institute and author of The Anglosphere Challenge.

COMMENTARY: I will admit, that the first time I read this I read only the parts about PNM and felt Bennett was a complete ass. Then my fellow bloggers told me to chill and read the whole thing more closely, thin-skinned fellow that I am. Realizing Bennett's bent, as it were, I get his arguments a whole lot better, and realize his complaints about the vision all amount to interesting observations that I could easily plug into the PNM sequel.

More specifically: Bennett's bit about "connectivity" being a poor predictor of conflict is a bit narrow, because I view connectivity both in terms of the internal civil society that he cites, and the external connectivity to the world. In other words, it's hard to get the latter without having a good portion of the former. But I learned something by his critique, and that is, I didn't explain that point enough.

The bit about the old colonial ties as a methodology to shrink the Gap is something that I have considered often, and plan to use in the sequel. I just ran out of gas in PNM, frankly.

On the possible bunching across the pillars of the Core, I buy his analysis, and agree that creating the new institutions to deal with that possibility is crucial in the years ahead. To me, though, such avoidance of a split within the Core is—in itself—a new world order worth achieving.

All in all, a lot of effort from one guy to cover all those books, and in terms of his treatment of my book, awfully respectful given the competition.

So I walk away feeling a bit smarter but not unduly challenged, and that's nice after a critique.

Posted by at 5:21 PM | Permalink

Find the original here @ http://hnn.us/articles/9212.html.

12-27-04: News Abroad

Why Some Are Calling Thomas P.M. Barnett Our Age's George F. Kennan

By Mark Safranski

Mr. Safranski is an educational consultant to secondary schools. He frequently writes about the military.

Americans tend to be a practical people. When faced with a problem we experiment, improvise and muddle through until we succeed or we move on to more fruitful endeavors. De Tocqueville wrote, “The spirit of the Americans is averse to general ideas and does not seek theoretical discoveries.” A truism evidenced even in our greatest politicians – Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt – who during a crisis, broke from tradition but did so without any grand design. As a result America has often suffered from the early results of “muddling through” until we found a Ulysses S. Grant or a George Kennan who could provide not merely a tactic but a strategy.

The War on Terror sharpened and embittered a debate over national strategy that has plagued America’s elite since 1991 when the Soviet collapse eviscerated the need for containment. Globalization, the unification of Europe and the rise of the new economy badly shook all of the assumptions upon which the old, bipolar, Cold War world rested. America may have been--in Madeleine Albright’s phrase--the “indispensable nation,” but it was also a hyperpower without a role. A reluctant policeman at best, babysitting Saddam, cutting and running in Somalia, dithering in Haiti and gamely whistling through the graveyards of the Balkans and Rwanda.

Then came the morning of September 11. Swiftly followed by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Today, in the Sunni Triangle, signs of “muddling through” can be discerned.

Into this breach strides Thomas P.M. Barnett, a Naval War College professor and DoD strategist who seems to have written not an “X article" but the “X book” of the decade, still riding high on Foreign Affairs bestseller list, a briefer to both Rumsfeld’s senior staff and John Kerry’s campaign advisers. Barnett, whose overarching paradigm in The Pentagon’s New Map is really the Convergence of Civilizations, not the Clash – seems poised to join George Kennan on the short list of American grand strategists who like Alfred T. Mahan or Herman Kahn, stimulated policy changes that were broad and deep.

The Pentagon’s New Map (PNM) argues that military strategy can work only in the context of everything else and that a major part of the context that the Pentagon must recognize are the geopolitical tectonic shifts wrought by Globalization, which he describes using the following PNM terminology:

The Core: The industrialized, connected to the information economy, mostly peaceful, rule of law abiding, liberal democratic world.

The Old Core: The heart of the core, the old G-7/NATO/Japan states led by the United States.

The New Core: Those modernizing states that joined the Core in the 1980's and 1990's – not as liberal, democratic or law-abiding as the Old Core but they have more or less irreversibly committed to moving in that direction - China, India, South Korea, Mexico, Brazil and the like.

The Gap: The Third World regions mostly disconnected economically and politically from the Core. Hobbesian in character, ridden by violence, oppression, poverty and anarchy. Ruled by despots--if ruled by anyone--committed to keeping their nations disconnected as a political survival strategy.

Rule-Sets: The explicit and implicit rules that provide the framework by which nations interact and function internally. There is a clash of rule sets between the Gap and the Core and within the Core between Europe, which mostly cannot and will not intervene in the Gap to enforce rules, and the United States, which can – if it chooses..

Connectivity: The degree of acceptance of globalization's many effects and the ability of a nation's individuals to access choices for themselves. Most international hotspots are in the most disconnected parts of the Gap.

Global Transaction Strategy: Barnett's equivalent to "containment" - a national and Core strategy to "Shrink the Gap" by connecting and integrating into the rule sets of the Core.

System Perturbation: The ultimate shock to a system that by “turning the world upside down” forces a response and a re-ordering or Rule-Sets. 9/11 is the most recent example.

Barnett argues that Globalization is a dynamic exchange relationship defined by “four flows” between the Core and the Gap that affect international stability:

■ Migration of people from the Gap to the Core

■ Movement of energy from the Gap to the Core.

■ Movement of money from the Old Core to the New Core

■ The export of security from the Core to the Gap – that only America can provide.

The unity of the Core is maintained, in Barnett’s view, by the common adherence to Rule-Sets that promote peace, transparency, markets, liberal values. This Rule-Set is what prevented wars among members of the Core since 1945. Rule-Sets are enforced in the Core but can be exported to the Gap in two forms: “Leviathan” – a massive, crushing, military sledgehammer -- think D-Day-- or by "System Administration” – the nation-building, humanitarian intervention operations typified by the UN in East Timor.

The two forms of military power are almost symbiotic. Without a Leviathan force in Bosnia, lightly armed UN blue helmets could not prevent Serb paramilitaries from committing mass atrocities. In Iraq, without a Systems Administration force, the United States has not been able to rebuild the country or restore order. The Pentagon, geared up to fight the Next Big Enemy, is now poorly positioned, Barnett argues, for System Administration missions, which account for the majority of U.S. military deployments. Afghanistan and the Iraq Wars are exceptions. Even the Terror War against al Qaida depends, ultimately, on the nation-building expertise that the Europeans have and the Pentagon needs to acquire.

What the United States and Core requires, according to Barnett, to deal with the terrorism, rogue states, WMD proliferation, anarchy and pandemics is a Global Transaction Strategy to “shrink the Gap” by fostering “connectivity” to the Core. Calling for a new vision of “war in the context of everything else,” PNM strategy cannot be conceived in traditional military terms but as full-spectrum intervention to foster the flows of globalization. Soft power here is equally important, as is access to technology, humanitarian programs by NGO’s and the exchange of ideas that could potentially strengthen fragile civil societies. As a Leviathan, present circumstances make the United States truly indispensable but removing tyrants alone is not enough. The rest of the Core is needed along with international organizations to help dysfunctional nations make the jump from Gap State to a newly industrializing member of the Core.

As a doctrinal possibility, Barnett’s ideas are currently being very serious attention by CENTCOM, Special Operations Command (which already conceived of “warfighting” as only one small part of their mission arc) and the Joint Forces Command and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Comparisons to containment are frequent but there are some significant differences between containment and Shrinking the Gap.

George Kennan’s prescription was essentially to “hold the line” by walling off or “containing” the Soviet menace from the West until monolithic totalitarian Communism began to mellow as a system or collapsed. The stakes of failure were extremely high during the Cold War for the United States but the tasks to implement containment were familiar and relatively easy ones. The Truman administration established on a global scale the old “Cordon Sanitaire” that the French had tried without success in Europe after Versailles: vigilant, defensive military and diplomatic alliances, deterrence and measured responses to Soviet provocations over time.

Thomas Barnett is really proposing “integration” instead of containment. The economic and political conditions that generate terrorism, genocide, WMD proliferation, dictatorship and anarchy in the Gap are to be ameliorated by a comprehensive civil-military engagement by the Core to “connect –up” to functional rather than dysfunctional Rule-Sets in priority problem states. This is a more complex agenda diplomatically than containment, which had the advantage of a truly malevolent enemy in Josef Stalin. Chaos does not have a human face – though Osama bin Laden vied for that title – and the problems of today’s world are intersecting and interconnected in a Gordian knot of diverse security threats.

The advantage Barnett has in having his ideas become the sword to cut this Gordian knot is that unlike the preemption strategy of the Neocons, PNM is a non-zero sum game. The United States gets to wear the White Hat again in allied eyes by pushing a strategy that stresses mutual interests instead of just unilateral survival. China, which is not even an ally, has already accorded The Pentagon’s New Map a respectful hearing by senior academic advisors to the Chinese government. PNM strategy, unlike the National Security Strategy of the United States, does not scare the hell out of the rest of the world.

Instead The Pentagon’s New Map offers a hopeful ending, “a future worth creating.” When skeptical leaders of foreign states ask American ambassadors and Generals “Yes, but what are you fighting for? What is in it for us to help you?” – we’d better have an answer.

COMMENTARY: What do you say when you get what you want? You say, thank you, and leave it at that. Few people get PNM like Mark does. I feel like he is a true fellow traveler on this intellectual journey of mine, and I say that even though I've never met the man and know almost nothing about him other than he's much more polite and intelligent in emails than I tend to be. What's clear is that Safranski has a gift for history, and when I say gift, I mean that when he opens his mouth, everything gets clearer instead of more complex (naturally, he's a teacher). That's a real talent, and I'm very happy that PNM has received the benefit of that insight, because it seems like such a better book whenever he talks about it. PNM was built to be like that, meaning something that pushed people to new heights. So Mark's heightened understanding means a lot to an author who's never made it through a day yet without wondering if he's completely full of shit.

Posted by at 5:21 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 29 December 2004

Got this email this morning when I woke up:

Mr. Barnett,

After reading your book (twice), and since religiously following your blog, I decided to view your CSPAN show last week. Well, being both bandwidth and Cable-challenged (I'm in the Gap of information technology, I swear ;) ), I sked a friend to tape it for me. Of course, Murphy's Law, he forgot, so I set off this AM to buy the DVD from CSpan. When I went to Google to find the URL for CSpan's store, I discovered something. . ..

Thought you might be interested to see what you get if you type in the phrase. . . cspan store . . .into Google.

Look at the first result. Remember, Google ranks based largely on popularity. What's it feel like to be king of the world???? Ride the wave!

- John, from Connecticut, who still wants to know if you're speaking near me and who's citing you in his essay to the USNI

So here's the resulting capture, top six hits:

#1) C-SPAN Store -- The Pentagon's New Map: PowerPoint Presentation The Pentagon's New Map: PowerPoint Presentation. Program ID: 182105-1 Format: Speech Event Date: 6-2-2004 Location: Washington, District . . . www.c-spanstore.org/cgi-bin/cspanstore/182105-1.html - 21k - Dec 27, 2004 - Cached - Similar pages

#2) Booknotes
. . . and journalists. Only $20.95, including shipping Buy Videotapes. Visit
the C-SPAN Store to buy Booknotes videotapes. [ Learn More . . .
www.booknotes.org/ - 18k - Dec 27, 2004 - Cached - Similar pages

#3) Books & Films
. . . via their website at: http://www.cspan.org Please access program #174127, titled "Vietnam Adoptee Experience from the AMNH" for CSPAN store ordering details. . . . www.vietnambabylift.org/Books&Films.html - 24k - Cached - Similar pages

#4) Book TV.org
. . . Encore Booknotes David Halberstam, The Fifties. Book TV Coffee Mug Own an 11 ounce ceramic Book TV mug, from the C-SPAN On-Line Store. . . . www.booktv.org/ - 12k - Dec 27, 2004 - Cached - Similar pages

#5) Compare Prices and Read Reviews on CSPAN at Epinions.com
. . . Subscribe to reviews on this product. Marketplaces, Store, Rating, eBay, . . . Search "Buy it Now" for CSPAN, . . . www.epinions.com/tele-TV_Channels-All-CSPAN - 35k - Cached - Similar pages

#6) Ohio Casts its Electoral College Vote LIVE-CSPAN 12ET
. . . line is longer than I thought - I might need to go back to the store!! . . . I cant wait for the mootbats 'hearings' on CSPAN at 4:30 Eastern, another 500,000 GOP . . . www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1300388/posts - 43k - Cached - Similar pages

Meaningful? Would mean more to me personally if I got a DIME!

But yes, it's nice. . .

Posted by at 10:11 AM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 28 December 2004

Blur of a day: started by getting up at 4am and jumping into limo that I find waiting for me out in the dark on my snow-drifty driveway. Then a 90-minute drive to Boston while I peruse two books I'm wanted to read in anticipation of starting work on the sequel to PNM.

Arrive at local video remote facility in Watertown around 6am and surf the web for about 30 minutes, until the tech says Fox wants me in the seat NLT 0640. I'm wearing what one usually puts on in the dark at 4am: black slacks, navy blue mock-turtle and tan shoes. So I slip on blue dress shirt, jacket from navy blue suit and nice dark blue tie and voila! I'm just fine for a chest-and-up remote shot.

The interview goes well enough. Two hosts of "Fox & Friends" are energetic (Brian Kilmeade and E.D. Hill), which is good because I'm not even after two large mugs of coffee. I make the mistake of taking the tech up on his offer to watch the show in my camera lens, which is helpful because I can then check my position and I know when I'm on-screen. But even just the distance between Boston and NY creates a weird time lag, meaning if I move my head a bit I see it on camera a second or two later, and once you start noticing that, it's a short distance to slurring your words in order to re-synch that which can never be "sunch."

Still, despite one word drop, it looks fine at home later at 8am, after the driver drops me off at home (I give him a signed copy cause he says he loves to read books of people he's driven) and I can check out the tape that Video Link is always so kind to provide instantly after each performance.

After I drop Jerry off at pre-school I'm into my office for a day of organizing stuff and catching up on sundry details (planning to move, you know!), but I find time to appear with Brian Kilmeade at 1140 am EST as he subs on Tony Snow's radio show (that goes better, I feel, because we have more time), plus I do a quick interview with a newsletter editor from the Center for Defense Information regarding China (that article should be out in day or two) and I quick Q&A with a Pittsburgh-based journalist for a Saturday edition feature he does for the local paper. That's four interviews in roughly ten hours, which feels kind of weird for the 28th of December, but I think I'm enjoying the bumps from Ignatius and the C-SPAN broadcasts, so I answer the mail as it comes in.

And yes, I still call myself a Naval War College professor for now, because it takes too long to explain my upcoming departure.

Spent the night reading May through October blogs. Cataloguing before the grand reset of table of contents on Thursday. My brain is cooking right now, so much so that I often feel like I'm coming down with something. I can tell I am really close to the big creative tear that will be about 40 days of writing.

In addition to all those interviews, let me cite a trio of recent articles that highlight PNM and/or quote me with regard to it:

■ First up is Jonathan Gurwitz with his op-ed entitled, "Internet, knowledge light the path to victory for open societies." That story ran on 26 December in the San Antonio Express-News and on 28 December in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer (as "Internet a Beacon for Open Societies").

■ Second piece is a Foreign Broadcast Information Service (or FBIS) translation of an August article written in Slovene for the Slovakia daily paper Delo, which in Russian means "stuff" or "business" or "affairs" (and I assume the root is same in Slovene). The title is "The Pentagon's New Map," a commentary by Barbara Kremzar. The FBIS notation was "Slovene Commentary Says Success of US Troop Redeployment 'Difficult To Assess.'" The pub date is 17 August 2004.

Was going to give you third piece from Nihon Keizai Shimbun in which I was quoted by journalist Hiroyuki Akita in an 18 December story on intelligence reform, but he sent it to me only in Japanese and I can't make the font work here, so I'll post a PDF of his full interview article with me from 15 December (tomorrow, I promise) and provide the transcript of our phone interview for reference. I speak so slowly in Japanese anyway . . .

First off, a quick spin of the news dial (a slimmer version that I will favor between now and end of book writing).

Posted by at 11:00 PM | Permalink

■"Toll In Undersea Earthquake Passes 25,000; A Third Of The Dead Are Said To Be Children: Fear of Disease; Thousands Are Missing—Many Tourists Are Killed," by Seth Mydans, New York Times, 28 December 2004, p. A1.

■"Aid Agencies Go to Work as Tasks Continue to Mount," by Eric Lipton, New York Times, 28 December 2004, p. A10.

Question of whether this will be System Perturbation has little to do with trigger, since that one is impossible to be traced back to any human causality, like global warming or something. Also unlikely to change living near shore in those areas, cause this is a one-in-gajillions shot.

Where it can trigger massive new rule set flow would be in public's sense of bad recovery, meaning either too long/inefficient or too imbalanced (either inside states or when various states are compared). It's those differentials that anger people the most, act of God or no.

Quiet story to all this, buried in second story, are the US Air Force C-130s, Navy P-3s and Pacific Command's consideration of sending "several thousand American troops to the effort." Nothing unusual about that. It happens all the time. And it usually gets even less notice in the press.

■"Venezuela Agrees to Export Oil and Gas to China," by Chris Buckley, New York Times, December 2004, p. A1.

Analysts in DC and especially the Pentagon will squirm and vent mightily on this one, but it's no more surprising than Iran or Sudan or anybody else. This is simply "get it where they (the West) ain't" for China, meaning those oil sources we may shun or underplay are natural targets for a very needy China.

■"Supermarket Giants Crush Central American Farmers: The Food Chain (Survival of the Biggest)," by Celia W. Dugger, New York Times, 28 December 2004, p. A1.

Watching this is like watching small farmers where I grew up in Wisconsin in the 1970s, except there it was the mega-farmers who crowded in far earlier than the Cub Foods grocery behemoths. By the time Windward Farms was done, almost half the farms kids I knew from 1st grade were living in town by 6th grade. It was stunning, but unstoppable.

The alternative was a local economy based on low levels of ag production, and that just wasn't going to last. Sad for small farmers, yes. But frankly, there's nothing sacred about them, any more than coal miners or any other hard-scrabble lifestyle. They last until they can't last, and then they're gone almost overnight. People get nostalgic, and wax poetic about the life lost, but time moves on.

Real tragedy for Central America is lack of alternative employment, I would imagine (and confirmed, I see, about 20 paras into the text). What saved area where I lived was rise of Land's End and other manufacturers. But you can't fight consumers wanting cheaper food. That doesn't work. Rather than fighting this as rear-guard action, governments there need to attract foreign direct investment that triggers alternative jobs. Job loss is a tragedy. Job transition is a fact of life in globalization.

■"Al Qaeda Shifts Its Strategy in Saudi Arabia: Focus Placed on U.S. and Other Western Target in Bid to Bolster Network, Officials Say," by Craig Whitlock, Washington Post, 19 December 2004, p. A28.

This is Osama backtracking at his real Ground Zero. Going after the House of Saud and other symbols of authority is creating a backlash, as in uncool. So recruiting is down and the network is weakening.

So the backtrack is to resume targeting the evil West. Gets Osama close to nowhere, but it keeps the faith alive.

Good sign for the Global War on Terror, but bad sign in terms of reform in the kingdom. As always, the House of Saud temporizes with great mastery.

They are survivors, that lot. Crappy rulers in so many ways, but survivors.

■"Yushchenko Wins 52% of Vote; Rival Vows a Challenge: A clear victory in Ukraine, but a daunting task ahead for the victor," by C.J. Chivers, New York Times, 28 December 2004, p. A3.

You have to like that outcome, and the Kremlin is swallowing hard, but swallowing. It's like the head ref just pulled his head out of the instant replay tent and reversed the call!

Posted by at 10:56 PM | Permalink

Web Posted: 12/26/2004 12:00 AM CST, San Antonio Express-News

The origins of the Internet lie two generations in the past in Cold War fears of nuclear destruction.

The original concept, spelled out by RAND Corp. scientist Paul Baran in a 1962 study, called for a decentralized communications network that would allow the military to maintain command and control of its forces in case of Soviet attack.

The proposed network would contain multiple nodes and connections so that if some locations — and the data they possessed — were destroyed, surviving locations would retain the ability to communicate and possess the database of the entire network.

This conceptual framework reveals much about the differences that underlie free and unfree societies. Knowledge is power. Fascism, communism and socialism — political philosophies that rest on the concentration of power — could never have conceived of an Internet. The protection of knowledge, which is to say the protection of the totalitarian regime, requires centralization not dissemination.

In ways that could not have been foreseen four decades ago when the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects began work on ARPANET, the decentralization of knowledge is generating historic revolutions. In science and medicine, researchers collaborate across continents and marshal decades of accumulated knowledge at their fingertips.

In politics, the Internet combines the historic impact of every technological innovation that preceded it: the printing press, radio, television, the photocopier, the fax machine, the VCR and the cell phone.

The rulers of closed societies are fighting a losing battle against a technology that no weapon, no censor and no physical or digital barrier can ultimately impede. China's attempt earlier this year to block 1,000 words — including "democracy," "freedom" and "liberty" — from the nation's most popular instant messaging service is emblematic of this futile effort.

The most important book on the reading list of policy-makers and military strategists right now is "The Pentagon's New Map." In it, Thomas P.M. Barnett, a professor at the Naval War College, suggests that the great fault line in international relations is not along religious or cultural divides. Rather, it is between a functioning core of nations and what Barnett calls the "non-integrated gap," between nations connected to the modern age of knowledge, wealth and progress and those disconnected from it.

Barnett's specific prescriptions on how to shrink the gap will be debated for years to come. His basic strategic assessment, however, is sound: "All we can offer is choice, the connectivity to escape isolation and the safety within which freedom finds practical expression."

In presenting this choice to the world — in Afghanistan, Iraq and scores of other nations — the United States and its allies in the functioning core are engaged in a desperate race against time. As 9-11 foreshadowed, the confluence of violent ideologies with modern technologies makes the destruction of one or more great cities far more likely than the Cold War did.

Recently Google, the company that revolutionized Internet searches, announced a historic development in the history of the Internet and mankind.

Google revealed its plan to index, scan and make available through its search engine what may eventually be tens of millions of books from five of the world's greatest libraries: Oxford University, Harvard University, Stanford University, the University of Michigan and the New York Public library.

A derivative benefit exists to decentralizing so much knowledge — including hundreds of thousands of rare editions to which the public has had little or no access — beyond simply sharing it. Should we lose the footrace with nuclear terrorism, our modern body of knowledge will not go the way of the ancient Library of Alexandria, the great repository of classical knowledge lost to history in the cataclysmic fires of some forgotten conflict.

The Internet and its philosophical propositions — conceived in response to the threat of a different cataclysm — are now among the chief weapons deployed against a disconnected enemy. It also serves as a digital storehouse for humanity should that enemy ever achieve its apocalyptic goal.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
jgurwitz@express-news.net

Posted by at 10:55 PM | Permalink

Slovene Commentary Says Success of US Troop Redeployment 'Difficult To Assess'

Originally published on 8/17/2004 by Delo (Internet Version-WWW) in Slovene .

[FBIS Translated Text] Germany, which used to be home to the biggest US military contingent in Europe, is at least slightly saddened. With the closure of military bases, from where the Americans would scare for decades the Soviet Union and also led a military attack on [former President Slobodan] Milosevic's Serbia, whilst both presidents Bush used to settle scores with Saddam Husayn from there, the Americans will finally bid farewell to nice little American towns and the Germans to quite big financial gains. But the punishment of the ally that condemned the war of the president son is merely a less important element in the biggest redeployment of the US army after the end of the Cold War. It's been months that [Defence Secretary] Donald Rumsfeld's Pentagon had been drawing up its new map of the world in which different threats call for different kinds of alliances.

Because the new terrorist threats are so extensive from the American perspective, the little treats, which certain Eastern European allies are going to get in the shape of new, more flexible bases, will not bring much Cold War nostalgia. It is not by chance that the defence secretary travelled to Russia and not to Poland just before the announcement of the new strategy. Washington needs Russia's quiet approval - or at least not loud opposition - of the anti-terrorist and energy front in Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, but also approval of the anti-ballistic and other missiles system in Alaska.

But above all, the Americans will try to bring closer to its targets in the Arabic-Persian Gulf the Russians - and Chinese and Japanese and the Europeans - both by trying to convince them of yet another "Islamic" nuclear bomb and by establishing peace in Iraq. The number of fallen US soldiers in this country is fast approaching the number thousand and the US army is already feeling the burden of long-lasting fighting. If it wants to avoid a general call-up, which with the inclusion of the boys from the neighbourhood would certainly spark off a new Vietnam syndrome, Washington cannot keep its servicemen and reservists in peaceful Germany.

It is as yet difficult to assess the final success of the announced changes, but the world can by all means only hope that the devisers of the new US strategy, which can no doubt win wars, have considered also the long-term consequences of military movements better than in the Iraq case. Because of terrorism, the American public agrees that the only remaining superpower must take care of stability of a large part of the world. But military analysts Thomas P. M. Barnett in the book The Pentagon's New Map also writes that the "USA had spent so much energy trying to prevent the horrors of a global war that it forgot to dream about a global peace".

Ljubljana Delo (Internet Version-WWW) in Slovene -- leading centrist daily

Posted by at 10:55 PM | Permalink

Just a quick notice. This was set up following my appearance on "Fox & Friends" this morning (0645 EST).

Sub host is same guy who interviewed me today on TV.

I guess when it rains, it snows!

Posted by at 11:34 AM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 27 December 2004

Got a lot of emails about this, overwhelmingly positive, so it must a pretty good interview. My impression of Steffen was that he was really prepared, and as I have learned time and again, that means everything in terms of the quality of the interview.

Go here for the full interview at the World Changing site.

Below is the full interview, without any further commentary from me.

December 21, 2004

Thomas P.M. Barnett: The Worldchanging Interview

WorldChanging Interviews

Prof. Thomas P.M. Barnett, Senior Strategic Researcher at the U.S. Naval War College, is maybe the hottest military thinker in the world right now. His work, which focuses on the connections between development and security, and in particular his book, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century, has become deeply influential with forward-thinking members of the military. Whether or not Worldchanging readers agree with what he has to say, Prof. Barnett's vision for the future of the U.S. military is worth knowing about.

Alex Steffen: What do you mean when you talk about "the Gap" and "the Core?"

Thomas P.M. Barnett: Let me back up and explain how I got here.

A few years ago, I was doing some simple mapping of where we sent US military forces since the end of the Cold War. We sent soldiers into conflicts almost 150 times, seemingly around the planet, but when you actually plot it out, you realize it's clustered, rather significantly, in a series of regions.

When I drew a line around those regions on the globe, I realized there were certain things about those regions that were similar, and in a burst of bold data-free research I realized there was a pattern: when you look at the area where we've committed our forces, you're seeing the parts of the world that are least connected to the global economy. And I realized the shape I was staring at I'd seen in many, many forms: biodiversity loss, poor soil quality, where the most fundamentalist versions of religions are, where there're no fiber optic cable, where there are no doctors.

And I wanted to describe this split without using a term -- like North and South, say -- which resurrects a whole bunch of old arguments. So I just tried to describe it plainly, calling the connected parts of the world the Functioning Core of Globalization (or the Core)

Across that Core I see integrating economies, the regular and peaceful rotation of leadership, and no real mass violence. All the countries that the Pentagon's been planning for a big war with are all in the Core, but oddly enough, these are all the countries that come to our aid after 9-11, and the countries that find commonality in a struggle against global terrorism.

Meanwhile, when I look at the other areas, what I call the Non-Integrating Gap (or the Gap), I see almost all the negative situations we've faced since the end of the Cold War. Virtually all of Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean Rim and Andean portion of South America, the Caucauses, Balkans, Central Asia and much of Southeast Asia: in that Gap I found virtually all the wars, civil wars, ethnic cleansings, genocide, use of mass rape as a tool of terror, children forced or lured into combat activities,virtually all the drug exports, all the UN peacekeeping missions and almost 100% of the terrorist groups we're fighting.

It's a simplistic map, of course, but the match-up is profound: show me where globalization and connectivity are thick and I'll show you people living in peace. Show me where globalization hasn't spread, and I'll show you violence and chaos.

(continued. . .)

Steffen: So, if you're right and globalization brings peace, why are we experiencing so much blow-back?

Barnett: Because globalization can be a wrenching process. When globalization rolls into traditional societies -- and those are the only societies left outside the Core -- it has certain profound effects. Globalization is Borg-like in its integration abilities: it remakes you more than you can ever remake it. When it comes into traditional societies, which are pretty much defined by male control over females, it suddenly alters the character of some of our most important relationships and decisions: marriage, sex, births, family economics, the whole shebang. And globalization has proven itself time and time again to empower women disproportionately over men. That is a direct threat to the nature of traditional societies.

***

Steffen: The top third of humanity has unquestionably gotten much richer in the last decade, but there's also a billion people on the bottom who seem to be going backwards. And those people -- the part of the developing world that's no longer developing -- seems to map pretty exactly to your Gap.

Barnett: The Gap is the bottom third. One of my main points is that the middle third has joined the Core. The lives of the middle third have improved. There's been a reduction of about 400 million in the number of people in absolute poverty over the last 20 years. The number of people living on a dollar a day went from 40% of the world's population to about 20%.

There is still, though, about a third at the bottom who are shut out of the benefits of globalization. About half of them are kind of getting by in a subsistence way, but the other half, about one billion, are not only not getting by, they're falling off the edge of the planet.

Now, I should note that it doesn't mean that terrorism comes from one or the other, because terrorism seems to be related less to poverty than to a sense of diminished expectations. It tends to be people who know there's a better life, know they could get a better life because they have the skills and drive, but are prevented from having that better life. Terrorists tend to be middle-class, fairly educated, fairly smart people. Just because people are poor doesn't mean that they'll become terrorists.

Steffen: Yet you do say that shrinking the Gap is a pretty strong priority for our own national security.

Barnett: There is absolutely a security imperitive involved. If you're serious about ending transnational terrorism you've got to end disconnectedness. You're got to grow the global economy in a fair and a just manner. And we've got to find ways of bringing in that one third of humanity who still have their noses pressed to the glass (some of whom are pissed off about it).

To grow connectedness, though, you are going to necessarily involve yourself in the tumult, the resistance, and the violence, frankly, that comes about as that global economy expands and overruns traditional societies.

Bin Laden is part of the resistance to the global economy. He's saying in effect, your system is corrupt, it changes our traditional way of life, it asks too much in terms of lost identity and cultural distinctiveness and we're going to fight it and do our best to keep a firewall between us and you.

We need to understand this and we haven't. There was this sense in the 90s when the global economy was growing so well and so fast, that you didn't need to care about the consequences of having a Gap, because -- and this was essentially the argument Tom Friedman made in the Lexus and the Olive Tree -- globalization itself would just sort of spread all over the planet, and erase poverty, and integrate everybody, and by doing so it'll handle any problem you can dream up.

When we got 9-11, we realized that wasn't the whole picture, that those who feel shut out of the global economy are going to be unhappy about it, and in their unhappiness, they're going to send us their pain, and that pain can take profound proportions. 9-11 proved that the global economy can't police itself.

Now we know that there's no way to ignore the fact that a good third of humanity feel shut out of the global economy. That doesn't make them all threats. What it does mean is that if you're going to be serious about this trans-national terrorism issue, you're going to have to confront the reality of that one third. If you want to attack terrorists by shrinking their area of operations, in a classic military way, to reduce their ability to move around and squeeze them out of existence, then you have to integrate the rest of the world that remains left out.

Steffen: Now, you're not arguing that globalization is perfect, though, that the specific rule set under which we're operating globalization now is the only rule set, but rather just that there must be a rule set that applies to everyone? You give the Group of 20+ and their criticisms some credibility, right?

Barnett: Absolutely. There is always going to more argument about what's fair and what works. The concept of globalization is under constant revision.

As India and China become such big players in the global economy, the old charge that globalization equals Americanization is disappearing. In ten years people are going to see an economy that is as dominated by China, India and Brazil as it is by the EU or US. There are a variety of different rule sets competing here, and the globalization we have today will not be what we have in a decade. But the conflict isn't fought by massed armies on the battlefield, it's fought in huge bureaucratic conferences like the World Trade Organization. That's a positive process.

When I talk about globalization growing, I'm not talking about the enforcement of US interests on the rest of the world. I'm talking about places with rules replacing chaotic places. Globalization comes with rules, not a ruler.

***

Steffen: One of the things I've heard you say is that in the global economy we have all sorts of institutions and organizations to handle countries with failed or bankrupt economies -- from the IMF on down -- but that we don't have any institutions which are set up to handle failed states.

Barnett: People would assume that the United Nations was set up to handle failed states, but the reality is different. The UN was created -- largely by the United States -- in the aftermath of World War Two, having seen the horrors of state-on-state war, invasions and occupations and the like, and so the rules they put in place at the UN said state sovereignty is everything. The UN is set up to help stop states from invading and conquering each other.

The UN rules, in retrospect, look odd. To pretend that a Sudan, for instance, which is doing what it's doing within its borders should have its sovereignty treated with the same respect as a France or Japan is ludicrous.

So while in the popular imagination, the UN is the forum for addressing international crises, the reality is that the UN is largely impotent, except for its internal technical rule-making, which functions quite nicely, frankly. The UN has become primarily a bitch-session, where the developing countries can complain about their lot and the direction of the advanced world. I think that's fine in many ways; it's good that the Gap has a venue and forum to complain in the direction of the Core. In fact, increasingly what you see is one position held by what I call the "old Core" -- the U.S., the E.U., Japan -- another position held by the Gap, and what I call the "new Core" -- the Brazil, India, China and South Africa -- acting as a sort of go-between. This is an arrangement which serves us well in terms of trade and economic and technical arguments.

But in terms of security, in the realm of violent situations, it's not realistic to pretend that 1) all countries are equal -- 'cause they're not: we have huge military capabilities and almost nobody else really does -- or 2) that every state has good intentions or treats its own people well. There are terrible things happening in certain parts of the world, and I think it's unrealistic to pretend that the U.N. is going to be able to stop these things.

So what I argue for in the book, and what I'm arguing for even more extensively in the next book, is that we need to come up with a transparent and fairly agreed-upon "A to Z" ruleset, as I call it, for dealing with politically bankrupt states. Again, as you said, we have a system for dealing with economically bankrupt states. Why? That's a fairly non-controversial subject compared to genocide or states trading in weapons of mass destruction. It's pretty basic to say, it would be nice if you paid back your creditors. But how do you deal with states that are either run by bad guys or in melt-down?

The traditional model has been imminent threat. You threaten me and I'll deal with you. But in a world of international norms and a stronger sense of community, haphazard responses just don't measure up.

Steffen: "He was reachin' for his gun" sounds pretty shabby in comparison to our economic and diplomatic decision-making processes?

Barnett: Well, what you want is not some sort of frontier justice, but a police force: something that represents the law, that points out when some guy transgresses the law, and takes him down when we catch him.

Steffen: Would that be an international institution?

Barnett: It'd be a series of institutions.

Steffen: What might those look like?

Barnett: The U.N. has a certain role. It would be the Grand Jury, aggregating information, organizing complaints, hearing grievances, and then when there's a preponderance of evidence against a particular actor in the system -- people are complaining about what the government of Sudan is doing in Darfur, and the evidence suggests a serious wrong is being committed, then it rises up to the U.N. Security Council which blesses the argument that someone has crossed the line by issuing resolutions and taking the limited punitive actions it can.

That's the first step. What would need to come afterwards is some sort of functioning executive, which would take the will expressed in the UN and make some decisions about when the collective international community's military firepower will be brought to bear against this bad actor.

That's a complex set of decisions, because that military power is, in essense, the US military, because we're the only ones who can project power anywhere on the planet, it is a struggle for the international community to come up with an agreed-upon system for saying, "Here's when we turn the Americans loose on you."

It's hard to turn the Americans loose on somebody without it seeming like it's the Americans, and only the Americans, engaging in an act of war. And because we're a democracy, in order for us to build the will to engage in these acts, we traditionally have to turn it into an argument about how this guy's not only evil, but he's a threat to us, and he's not only a threat to us, but he's a threat to us right now and we'd better do something about it this minute, when in reality we haven't fought a war against a truly imminent threat in over 50 years. We wage war on a nearly constant basis, but not because of true threats -- there have been bad people, doing bad things, typically far from our shores, but we've come to the conclusion that stopping those things is worth doing, and so we make these arguments about how we're under imminent threat in order to fight the people doing them.

That was the core of Containment in the Cold War. That's the core of the Global War on Terrorism. Various people, including myself, have trouble with that phrase, but it's an improvement, I suppose, over saying something like we're fighting a war against chaos and uncertainty.

But anyway, right now, any conflict we get involved in needs to be couched in terms of global terrorism: "I think this guy is aiding terrorists." That won't work. What we need, in the real world, is a clear rule set that says certain behavior is just unacceptable. Uprooting a million people from their lives and homes and then engaging in mass-rape and mass-murder against them: whether or not terrorism or narcotics or weapons of mass destruction are involved, we can't tolerate that and it must be stopped.

So we need some functioning executive to decide when we're going to step in and stop it. I think that's going to be a sort of Star Chamber that can say this is wrong, it's bad for business, and we're going to stop it now.

The neo-cons have a very small definition of the membership of that Star Chamber. It's called the United States. Our allies would like to think it's the United States plus our allies, something like the G8 framework. I think it needs to be something like the G20 [not to be confused with the G20+ -- ed], a coalition of the world's 20 or so biggest, richest and most powerful countries. I like that idea, because it basically gets you most of the functioning Core in one room. If you can get that group to agree on how to wield power together, then I think you've got the closest thing you can get to a global consensus.

And if you can get that consensus, then you can use the Leviathan force, the US military, to do, frankly, regime change, against bad guys who need to be taken out, in a way that won't make everyone angry and scared and uncertain. No one else can do these missions, but the US can't do them alone.

***

Steffen: But what do we do once we've toppled the bad guys? Are you saying we need to do nation-building?

Barnett: Well, we need to get better at it. As demonstrated by the failures in the Iraq occupation, we need a Core-wide, and a Core-wide-funded peacekeeping force. I think the US military has a key role to play in that force, in terms of command and control, organization and logistics, but the overwhelming the bodies for that force have to come from all around the Core, and, in certain key circumstances, the Gap countries themselves.

After the Leviathan force has done the hard stuff -- the killing and removing of the bad people -- this force comes in and engages in a very broadband, dedicated, capital- and labor-intensive effort like the US engaged in Germany and Japan following the end of the Second World War, with Japan being the more direct model: with Germany, we were just reconstructing industry -- you had property rights and a moden history of democracy there; with Japan, we had to build all sorts of social and political institutions.

We need to rethink the connections between security and developmental economics. We need to stop having an antagonistic relationship between military people and the development community, because the fact is, we're not succeeding at all in these failed states. Insecure places are desperately poor places. Desperate poverty breeds insecurity. We need a new approach, a more comprehensive and integrated approach that sees these problems as two sides of the same coin and thinks differently about how to solve them.

Steffen: What would that approach look like on the ground, do you think, compared to what we're able to do now?

Barnett: Well, it would be what I call the System Administrator Force. It would be a people-intensive, UN-peacekeeping-plus approach that could defend itself -- could do counter-insurgency, could fight and not be some ineffective, pussy UN force where you shoot at them and half of them run away. It would be a tough force. You shoot at these guys, or start committing atrocities in their presence, and they would stop you, and if necessary, kill you. It could not only keep the peace, but enforce it.

It would also have a highly-trained civilian component. You'd have international, inter-agency teams. It'd look like the Casbah bar scene in Star Wars -- you'd want to see loads of uniforms from all sorts of countries, and you'd want to see civilians from all sorts of NGOs and aid agencies: you'd want the whole package, acting in a Great Depression, FDR sort of mode, where the first order of business (after enforcing the peace) would be to get everybody busy. The government that would be there would be some sort of transitional organization, an international reconstruction fund, with the goal of getting things stabilized, an economy working and laws written.

The United States military is going to continue to be critical to the whole process, though, for a long time, Other countries won't show up for peacekeeping unless the Americans will be there, and be there in numbers. And the NGO crowd can't really show up unless there's a stabilizing military presence there. So if you don't have the Americans, you don't have big enough coalitions to make it work, and if you don't have those coalitions, you don't have the NGOs who can turn things around, except for the bravest, most foolhardy ones who will go into the most dangerous situations, people like Doctors Without Borders.

But it's not going to be the United States alone, policing the whole world. It can't be. The only way that you can shrink the Gap and deal with these failed states and the humanitarian crises you're seeing is to bring together the assets and the energies and ideas from the Core as a whole: not just what the Americans can dream up, not even just what the Europeans can dream up, but the best innovations from an India, a China.

The military component would be predominant at first, then, over time, ramp down. These would be trained, experienced peacekeepers, and at first they would be everywhere, because our experience with peacekeeping is, the more peacekeepers you have, the fewer of them die.

We need to design an overwhelming presence, like that we've had on the warfighting side, for the peacekeeping side. Our warfighting force can actually be a small, elite, small footprint, highly maneuverable, lethal, mostly raining death-and-terror-from-the-skies crowd--

Steffen: You're talking about a continued process of having the best Navy, the best Air Force, and really great special operations units, forming a small tight fighting force that can do pretty much whatever it wants, right, and --

Barnett: And then this other force, which will be much more ground-intensive. And it'll look different, too: it'll be an older crowd, it'll tend to be more gender-balanced, more educated. It'll seem to our current eyes more like a uniformed, muscular peace corps. The warfighting guys come in and get the killing done in five weeks, but these are the people who may stay for five years. That's the force that the Pentagon needs to start building now.

Steffen: So, if I understand you, the goal would be to bring to bear pretty massive resources and personnel, to build the country's capacities as rapidly as possible, to move it from being a failed state to a country where we can leave and be confident that we're handing off power and authority to a responsible government?

Barnett: Yes, but look, we need to rethink every step of that process.

The developmental model needs to be smaller, simpler, more rapidly-achievable. We've gone in with giant infrastructure projects, vastly expensive, so complex that they require imported expertise to run, and so large that they take years to unfold. I think those are terrible models for any developing community. I think they're an absolute disaster when you're talking about a failed state.

Failed states are situations where people have been brutalized. And when you've gone in and fought a war there, however much it was necessary, you've just brutalized the people there some more. What you have is a situation where people need some rapid recovery. People there are going to ask for help.

The answer can't be, "Well, the good news is, we got the bad guy. The bad news is, if you can just hang on for about six to eight years --"

Steffen: We'll get your water working again.

Barnett: [laughs] Exactly. What we need really looks like what FDR did for this country: get people working. I don't care what they do, get them involved in building something out of their lives again. We don't want to make them dependent on foreign aid, but we do want to get people doing something.

Steffen: But at the same time, the sense I get is that the gap between the best practices for development and the current methods is so large that we could potentially take those best practices and tools, customize them for the situation on the ground, and create some pretty worldchanging progress. I mean, what if we could say, here's nationbuilding-in-a-box; everyone get to work? What if we could quickly spread models for microcredit programs, literacy programs, better transitional housing, better medical care, small-scale industry, communications networks, solar energy and lighting, y'know, the whole works?

Barnett: Well, like as Tolstoy said at the beginning of Anna Karenina, all happy families are alike, but unhappy families are all unique.

Steffen: So all failed states are unique?

Barnett: Yes, they tend to be screwed up in incredibly unique ways. I mean, I agree with everything you say there. I think we can now do many things better than we could in the past. We could do it all a lot better. We can turn countries around. But every situation will be unique.

And we don't need to change every country. The Gap is about 100 countries, about two billion people. Historically, since the end of the Cold War, there's about three dozen at any one time having levels of mass violence. Usually, there are about seven or eight that rise to the level of an international moral issue, where we all start to say, Jeez we should do something about this.

Steffen: Those are also the countries which tend to destabilize their neighbors, spreading conflict, uprooting refugees, creating the conditions for famines and epidemics.

Barnett: Right, so fixing those countries is important, and so we're not talking about invading 100 countries at once. We're talking about stopping genocides and civil wars in seven or eight, and frankly, the US military's already been doing that for fifty years, but most people here don't realize it. I could point out several countries in Africa where we've gone in eight or nine times over the last dozen years. It's like we're doing ER medicine, when what they need is rehabilitation--

Steffen: Or at least some preventive care.

Barnett: Yeah, get 'em some health insurance or something.

Steffen: I wonder if one of the difficulties is that we don't really have a heroic image of a peacekeeper. We have plenty of heroic warriors, but how many heroic peacekeepers do we have?

Barnett: Of course we have a heroic image of a peacekeeper: it's called a cop.

Steffen: But we don't usually think of sending our cops to other countries.

Barnett: No, we don't. And that's where we have to dis-aggregate war and peace a little better, and we have to dial down some of our old military rhetoric a little. War now is not about state-on-state combat. It's about cop-like behavior. But because it involves, by necessity, the instrumentality of the US military, and because it involves at least the possibility of people getting killed in large clusters, we describe what we're doing in the language of war. That's a real problem. It leads to real errors.

For us to shrink the Gap, we need to find a new lexicon to describe what we're doing. We've tried terms like "police action," but we need new language that doesn't make the victims into enemies, and that lets us more easily divide the conflict side, the soldier mode, from the peacekeeping side, the cop mode.

Look at what's happening with the International Criminal Court. It blurs the line between military law and civilian law. The international community wants us to go in and engage in serious violence in these places, to engage in acts of war against bad actors, and then apply a police model with these civilian legal norms after the fact. Of course, the US military is concerned that they're going to do something legitimate by military standards that'll be called a war crime later under a different standard.

My argument is that you will never get the war-fighting portion of the US military under the purview of the International Criminal Court. But there is that other part of the mission, the peacekeeping force, which should be under international legal authority. In effect, we have to stop calling that second force "soldiers."

Steffen: At the same time, "peacekeeper" isn't quite the right word, because you're talking about something more vigorous. You're talking about "peacemakers," really, y'know?

Barnett: Well, and that's a really good word, actually. That's how they described that one handgun that settled the West.

Y'know, I get criticized for this on my blog. I say that shrinking the Gap is like settling the West, and the first response I get from people is "Barnett advocates genocide throughout the Gap."

That's the fear. That's a reasonable expression of the fear that when globalization comes in, it's like an invasive species. The fear that you're being invaded by a hostile army and it will mean your death, the death of your family and your culture. And in the New World, early globalization meant real genocide, both intentional and accidental.

That's not what I'm talking about when I talk about settling the West. I'm talking about the time when you had things settling down--

Steffen: When the sheriff and the schoolmarm showed up.

Barnett: Yeah, and what's the Coalition of the Willing? It's posse. We're looking, at the Pentagon, for metaphors like this, to explain what we're trying to do.

Steffen: Of course, these are precisely the kinds of images and metaphors which don't reassure the rest of the world. They may make sense to us, but I wonder if others aren't saying, wait a minute, if you're the cowboys, who're the Indians?

Barnett: Well, but we're also a nation with a frontier history, and we understand that rough, tough law men were part of how our country came to be a stable, integrated nation. This was how we set up rules and got people to respect them.

The Gap needs rules, needs laws, needs institutions that can enforce them. That's Hernando de Soto's point about how so much of the Gap's economic activity is informal, and therefore not recognized, not legalized.

Steffen: Which makes it really hard to do business, much less use that property as collateral for credit to expand your farm or --

Barnett: Basic structures for doing that don't exist through much of the Gap. I mean, look at the conflicts you have in the Sudan and Nigeria -- it's the farmer and the cowboy can't be friends. It's right out of our own past. And so often, when you look at these conflicts, they may break down along tribal or religious lines, but they start over who has rights to the land. Who gets to use the resources? The rule sets are weak. There's no way of adjudicating these disputes, other than picking up guns and getting medieval on each other.

Steffen: Well, and that example raises not only the points you make about the need for laws in the Gap, but also, another set of questions around environmental issues. In much of the Gap, all the problems we've talked about are being made worse by climate change, by water shortages, by erosion and the spread of deserts, even, increasingly, by massive pollution, as these nations scramble to catch up. Degrading environments create real instabilities--

Barnett: Right, environmental refugees, for instance.

Steffen: Exactly. If you go back to Rwanda, for instance, there have been studies that show that the strength of the pre-genocide local relationships between the groups had almost no impact on the outcome, but rather, that the places where the famine was the worst, were the places where the killing was the worst, period. What do examples like this teach the Core about how to think about security and sustainability?

Barnett: I think what it shows is that if you want a country to protect its environment, help it develop, and visa versa. The answer can't be to turn the Gap into a giant game preserve, and prevent development. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't care about their environments, but throughout the Gap, wherever I see failed states, bad governments, loose rule sets and lack of development, I see people cannibalize their environment out of sheer desperation. Until you create a certain critical mass of development, people won't protect their environments.

Steffen: My point is though that protecting the environment is also a way of creating the kind of stability it takes to shrink the Gap. Climate change, for instance, is hitting the developing world much harder than it's hitting us --

Barnett: Look. I put protecting the environment where I put democracy: everybody wants them, and it's clear that they are both goals we're ultimately aiming for here. But first you need development and stability and some basic rules. First things first.

***

Steffen: So, let's say you were asked to serve as Secretary of Defense. What are the first three differences we'd see in your Pentagon?

Barnett: One. I would advocate a massive redistribution of resources towards that System Administrator function. I'd accelerate that dramatically. In terms of acquisitions for my war-fighting force, I'd keep buying high technology, but I'd buy in much smaller numbers, and take the freed-up resources and plunge them into building the new force.

You would see, very quickly, a four-star military police general in my Pentagon. You would see position and authority accrue to people that had been considered lesser includeds: I would have four-star military medical generals and four-star military supply generals, not just the war-fighting guys running everything.

Two. I would redesign the unified command plan, which was really built for another era. Having European Command have its Area of Responsibility extend all the way down to Sub-Saharan Africa is really kind of a mis-match. I would create an African Command, and an East Asian Command and a West Asian Command. In East Asia, once we get rid of Kim Jung Il, I'm looking at a relatively peaceful region, and I'm building a NATO there. That's a place we can draw resources from.

I'd put those resources into Africa. I think Africa needs a lot of dedicated attention. To the extent that we drive that fight against terrorism out of the Middle East it's going to head south, especially to the Horn of Africa. People ask me "How do we know we've won in the Middle East?" And I say, "When all our troops are on peacekeeping missions in Central Africa."

Three. I'd abolish service identities once you reach flag rank, meaning once you became an admiral or a general (and I suppose you'd have to come up with a single term, which will really piss of the Navy, because I'm sure you'd end up with general), you'd serve the Pentagon as a whole. That'd solve one of the biggest problems, because now, once you become a one-star general, the way to become a two-star general is to protect you service's force structure in budgetary battles, to make sure that no matter what else happens, you've got twelve carriers or three armored divisions or whatever. These idiotic budgetary battles go one forever and ever and lead to all sorts of overlaps and inefficiencies and acquisition scandals.

If instead, the incentives for becoming a two- or three- or four-star would be how gloriously "purple" you were -- which is the color they associate with "jointness" -- how seamlessly you could cooperate. That would also, I think help people to be more interagency, more international, to adapt to unexpected situations.

I threw that out as sort of a lark in the book. You'd be amazed how many people take it seriously, inside the Pentagon.

Steffen: Are you finding a willing audience for your reforms?

Barnett: When they invite you in to address the entire class of a war college, that's a good sign. The other thing I do is I'm now coming in and briefing all the new one-star generals and admirals, and that's a big sign of acceptance.

Posted by Alex Steffen at December 21, 2004 10:36 PM

Posted by at 7:46 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 27 December 2004

Was going to take sick leave today to tend to ill wife and eldest daughter, but snow storm saved me the effort by closing the base to all but essential personnel (and we now know how unessential I truly am!).

The amazing and heart-rending story of the tsunamis in Asia has shifted my time on "Fox & Friends" tomorrow. Instead of appearing in the 7am EST hour, I'll appear at approximately 6:50 am EST. That means the car sent from Providence to drive me to Watertown MA and the satellite studio there will need to pick me up around 5am, so if I look a bit bleary eyed, you'll know that either my spouse's tough day dragged on or baby's two incisors coming through made for some late night HBO watching on my part.

I won't be using the "Fox & Friends" platform to announce my impending departure from the college. Upon advice of many friends and family, I will let that sleeping dog lie. There's simply no good way to spin that event without raising unsettling questions about the college's (or the Department of Navy's) fears and motivations regarding my future writings, and I'd rather not go down that road, even if some on the other side are more than happy to voice malicious accusations regarding my own. Taking that argument public is counterproductive to my goal of spreading the vision, which I know has widespread appeal even within the U.S. Navy, probably the service most likely to endure significant change as a result--after the Army, of course. So I won't be dignifying those sorts of threats, and I trust the college's leadership will be wise enough to do the same.

Again, the larger goals here are what matter. I saw an amazing segment last night on "60 Minutes" on the "echo boomers," sometimes called the "Y Generation" and the "Millenium Boom." It's the single largest age cohort America has ever seen, roughly 80 million souls born between the 1980 and the early 1990s, meaning my oldest Emily would fit in. This is the group that will run the world in 2025, as their age range will then extend from roughly 30 to 45.

Reaching this group regarding A Future Worth Creating is everything to me, for they are the generation of note for the next several decades.

To that end, there are no greater satisfactions had than to receive the sort of letter I just got from a high school teacher who's written me in the past.

Here it is in full:

Dear Tom,

I thoroughly enjoyed seeing your brief again and the question and answer session. You may recall that I was the Davison High School teacher that asked for a little advice before. After reading the book and being a constant visitor to your weblog, I was most excited to see that your brief was returning to C-SPAN. It will be an excellent addition to my current issues class next semester, which I am going to give a “world problems and conflict” spin.

I wanted as many of this semester’s students (Economics, Government, and American History) to see it as possible, but it’s too long to show in a 50-minute class with the end of the semester looming. So, I bribed the children with extra credit for watching it and writing up a summary and reaction paper. I figured that this semester’s kids would be fine guinea pigs.

I've created a monster. I have kids walking around talking about "system perturbations," "disconnectedness defines danger," and "Sys Admin." The assistant principal reports he has even heard them discussing this on their lunch period.

It gets better—I have a large world map on one wall of my classroom. The day after the brief, I had several students ask if we could draw the boundary of the Core and Gap on it. Another student raised his hand, presumably to lobby for it, and I called on him. He responded that it wouldn’t be wise to draw the line on the map permanently because the gap will be progressively shrunk, and that it would be better to put clear plastic over the map and draw the line with an overhead marker. Out of the mouths of babes…

As far as the brief is concerned, I liked the new version, but you cannot leave out the part about Canada and anthrax! It’s too crucial to demonstrating the “new rule sets” that emerge from 9/11.

May I humbly suggest the following “new rule set” for your weblog? India is now being forced to conform to the WTO’s new rule set on patents for prescription drugs. This will contribute to connectivity; now the outsourcing of jobs can include more high-tech drug researching jobs to India, since there will be less risk of patent infringement. Umm, is that a good thing? By your model, it is a definite good. Try telling that to new American medicine graduates. . ..

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=509&ncid=509&e=4&u=/ap/20041226/ap_on_bi_ge/india_patent_worries

Keep up the good work. I'm looking forward to reading “A Future Worth Creating.” And don't let caller #1 from the program (clearly of questionable sanity) stop you in your quest.

Sincerely yours,

Mike Baysdell

Weird thing is, I know Davison well. My first cousins on my Mom's side grew up there, and we visited their house several times across my childhood.

Small world, huh?

Indeed, getting smaller all the time in the minds of the Echo Boomers.

And I think that is a very good thing.

Posted by at 11:04 AM | Permalink

Monday, 27 December, 02:00 am (EST)

The Pentagon's New Map: Presentation & Call-In
C-SPAN
Thomas P. M. Barnett , U.S. Naval War College

Posted by Josette at 7:33 PM | Permalink

Critt here. . . Barnett's webmaster. . .

I'm in the process of editing an end of year review for this blog, to be published December 31st (my birthday). In the meantime, for those wanting to better understand Tom's message, I've put together an index of posts that I believe are illustrative of Tom's strategic thinking.

Peace to you,

Critt

Posted by at 1:50 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 26 December 2004

On the second day of Christmas, the Globalist gave to me . . . a #2 ranking as the second-most important book written on globalization this year.

Here's the announcement reposted from their site, which is for the most part restricted to subscribers:

Special Feature > 2004 in Review

The Globalist's Top Ten Books of 2004

By The Globalist | Thursday, December 23, 2004

In some ways, terrorism and the role of the United States in the world still shaped many a book on global issues in 2004. But beyond that, many of the most interesting books covered other ground, including the way the environment and regional futures shape our common destiny. Here are our top 10 books of 2004.

1. Stephen Glain: Mullahs, Merchants, and Militants [How have economic decay and political malaise created tragic consequences in the Arab world?]

2. Thomas P.M. Barnett: The Pentagon's New Map [Will the United States be able to improve the Middle East's position in the global economy?]

3. Emmanuel Todd: After the Empire [What accounts for America's deteriorating global authority?]

4. Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy: The Siberian Curse [How have Soviet planning and physical geography shaped Russia's economy?]

5. Elizabeth C. Economy: The River Runs Black [Can China's economic growth be reconciled with sound environmental policy?]

6. Martin Wolf: Why Globalization Works [Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf describes how globalization works — despite the efforts of the World Bank.]

7. L. Ronald Scheman: Greater America [What are the key factors in determining the future of geopolitics and power in Latin America?]

8. Sebastian Mallaby: The World's Banker [Have outside activists undermined World Bank development projects?]

9. Victoria Abbott Riccardi: Untangling My Chopsticks [Victoria Abbott Riccardi describes her year in Kyoto, engulfed by the tastes and customs of Japan.]

10. Howard Markel: When Germs Travel [Is eagerness to participate in the global economy a danger to countries' health — or an incentive to fight disease?]

COMMENTARY: I'm going to go out on a limb here and say that PNM is probably the only NYT best seller in the bunch, and when all is said and done it will outsell the other 9 books. And it will do all this without a review from either the Times or the Post.

Enjoy the rerun of the C-SPAN 20 December broadcast of my 6 December brief to the Highlands Forum and the subsequent live viewer call-in segment lasting an hour.

I will be too busy to watch: got a sick wife and eldest daughter, so I empty the buckets, keep the fire roaring, and assemble the toys.

Just kidding. I'll have it on in the background. It's a rare day when you get to watch 2.5 hours of yourself on TV!

Here's the catch of the day:

■ Americans care, some more than others

■ The year-end good, bad and ugly on China

■ The year-end good, bad and ugly on Russia

■ Islam: the opposition movement

■ In trade, bilats matter

■ Adjusting the rule set for Argentina

■ Zimbabwe: more bad signs on the horizon

■ Pakistan and bomb-selling: implicit villains in the Core, plenty of customers in the Gap

■ Postwar occupation planning in the Pentagon for Iraq: the magic cloud phenomenon

Posted by at 1:43 PM | Permalink

■"America, the Indifferent," editorial, New York Times, 23 December 2004, p. A26.

■"When the Right Is Right: For the left, this is no time to sulk," op-ed by Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times, 22 December 2004, p. A31.

The New York Times sees the U.S. essentially short-changing on aid while wasting money on foreign interventions, and by doing so, the editorial board there fundamentally misses the military-market nexus. To shrink the Gap is to engage in both building up security inside the Gap and increasing its market connectivity to the Core. Does the U.S. specialize in the former more than any other Core power? Yes. Can the U.S. be expected, therefore, to keep pace with the rest of the Core on foreign aid? No. Does that make America "indifferent"?

Ask someone in America who's lost a loved one in either Afghanistan or Iraq. Ask them if they can easily equate higher taxes to the death of a child, or spouse, or parent. America has sacrificed a significant number of their "only begotten sons" in this global war on terror, signaling that—in the truest sense—they love their enemies more than themselves.

Tell me Jesus wouldn't understand that one.

Tell me Jesus wouldn't also say, put your money where your mouth is. Does America pull its weight on foreign aid? Not in terms of official developmental aid. But frankly, that's a drop in the bucket anyway when compared to far more important and larger aid flows.

Take America's willingness to let in foreign workers and immigrants. What they send back in remittances is routinely 5-6 times what we spend in aid. Remember that when those immigration-hating Europeans lecture us on foreign aid.

Also remember that "crazy," "far too religious" America also gives a huge amount of private charity aid to the Gap. Foreign policy "experts" are constantly decrying the "indifferent, ignorant" American public that cares not for suffering throughout the Gap, and yet, where is all this charity coming from? Faith-based groups are the biggest providers. These red-state types are also the ones who agitate most regarding human rights abuses in places like Zimbabwe and North Korea. They're the ones who scream the most about the effective genocide going on in the Sudan.

Where are the liberal street protestors on any of this?

Here's Kristof's interesting take:

… a larger shift is also under way. Liberals traditionally were the bleeding hearts, while conservatives regarded foreign aid, in the words of Jesse Helms, as "money down a rat hole." That's changing. "One cannot understand international relations today without comprehending the new faith-based movement," Allen Hertzke writes in "Freeing God's Children," a book about evangelicals leaping into human rights causes.

Uh … I mean, except for Kristof, of course, who frankly is kicking Friedman's ass right now in terms of being the foreign affairs interpreter of note on the staff.

Posted by at 1:41 PM | Permalink

■"China Expands, Europe Rises. And the United States . . . As the dollar falls and debt grows, America no longer seems indispensable," by Fred Kaplan, New York Times, 26 December 2004, p. WK6.

■"Canada's Oil: China in Line As U.S. Rival," by Simon Romero, New York Times, 23 December 2004, p. A1.

■"A Corner of China in the Grip of a Lucrative Heroin Habit: Peasants find an escape from poverty in a new version of the opium industry," by Howard W. French, New York Times, 23 December 2004, p. A4.

China's emerging as a global counterweight to the U.S., as is the euro. Is this a sign of "chaos" and "uncertainty" and "frightening" multipolarity where the U.S. isn't in charge of everything?

Yeah, I guess it is. It always amazes me that the same analysts who decry U.S. "unilateralism" and "empire" also seem to wax pessimistic whenever any real balance begins to emerge in the system.

This balance in the economic realm is not only necessary, it's absolutely essential for the Core to win this war on terrorism. America needs to be economically healthy and well-connected to the global economy if its going to continue being the lead military player in this effort. We won't discipline ourselves all by ourselves, so a rising balance in both Europe and Asia on this score is exactly what the doctor ordered, just so long as we don't dissolve into the usual paranoia about being held "hostage" to the demands of others. The global rule set is always a "test," whether it's Russia failing the test on the Yukos auction, or Asia adjusting to pass the test on the avian flu, or America checking the necessary boxes whenever it deems it necessary to push for regime change inside the Gap. Global "tests" are good, essentially the Core as a whole saying "this is how we define playing by the rules." China is, through its rise, playing a huge role in this, and that's very good.

Of course, China will engage in seemingly "bad" activities as it emerges, like daring to compete with the U.S. in oil markets around the world, and perhaps even in our backyard! But viewing this as zero-sum is stupid in the extreme. China securing oil is China continuing to develop economically and move increasingly in the direction of our political and social model, while simultaneously helping us maintain our standard of living through a complex series of economic transactions. Expecting them to somehow "get theirs" always at no competitive cost to the U.S. is bizarrely myopic. Again, there is no "free riding" anywhere in the Core; it's all one big system of checks and balances. If we want to remain the world's sole military superpower, then we have to accept certain economic realities vis-à-vis China.

We have to accept those realities because there is still a huge, interior chunk of China that is stuck in the Gap—otherwise known as its largely rural, agrarian, poor, interior provinces, or where my daughter came from. There, we're going to see very Gap-like behavior, like growing poppies and exporting them to the rest of the Core to support our continuing heroin habit.

Facilitating China's explosive growth is how that Gap gets shrunk. So again, there's no free riding here. There's only seeing the world in all its complexity and understanding the trade-offs. The U.S. wants China to be in charge of "in-Coring" its own internal Gap regions, as well as "in-Coring" those Gap states in the rest of Asia that line its very long borders. If America is going to focus on transforming the Middle East, we need a China to continue that process in East Asia. Shrinking the Gap is a Core-wide effort. China isn't a free rider. It's pulling its weight just fine, if only we take the time and effort to see the full spectrum of its interactions with the world outside, as well as with its interior Gap regions.

Posted by at 1:41 PM | Permalink

■"Getting Personal, Putin Voices Defiance of Critics Abroad: Heated words about an oil giant's sale and post-Soviet elections," by C.J. Chivers, New York Times, 24 December 2004, p. A3.

■"Why 'Contain' Russia?" op-ed by Eugene B. Rumer, New York Times, 17 December 2004, p. A33.

■"State Company Buys Winner In Yukos Deal," by Erin E. Arvedlund and Simon Romero, New York Times, 23 December 2004, p. C1.

It's good for Putin to sound off on how hypocritically the West seems to be whenever it chooses to judge him or Russia's path in general. I mean, there's voter intimidation and there's voter intimidation, and when it occurs in either America or the Ukraine, it's wrong. When Europe tries to tell American voters who they should vote for, Americans tend to say, "shove it." And when the U.S. gets itself in the position of non-too-subtly seeking to influence election outcomes in Ukraine, just like Russia did, we can expect Putin to call this kettle "black."

What's just so good about this rather contentious end-of-year extended press conference is that Putin simply held it, seemed relaxed and in command of a wealth of details, and proved flexible throughout over a two-and-a-half-hour conference!

Is Russia still a meddling player throughout the former Soviet Union (how dare they?)? Sure. But the real point is how ineffective they've been most of the time (Rumer's point). So bad, yes, but not effectively so.

Of course, the Yukos auction was ugly. It's like the U.S. buying a distressed Microsoft after going after it with anti-trust legislation. It's ugly alright, but keep it in perspective. Russia is feeling shut out of the corridors of power in many places, and the government will do whatever it can to make itself seem important and a needed seat at the table, wherever it is set.

We want Russia at those tables, sitting in that seat. And we want that role to be defined economically, not militarily.

Posted by at 1:41 PM | Permalink

■"Europe's Muslims May Be Headed Where the Marxists Went Before: 'Ideology of Contestation,'" by Craig S. Smith, New York Times, 26 December 2004, p. WK7.

This is an interesting peak-ahead article of the sort I always clip, because it suggests how the scary thing (Islam in Europe) actually works out to become the positive force for change (I know, I know, yet another example of naïve optimism!).

Here is the key section:

When Assedine Belthoub was growing up in the shantytowns outside Nanterre, France, 40 years ago, the people who came to take the young North African kids to swim in the community pool, to register them for school and give them candy and comic books, were Marxists. The French Communist Party offered a political voice for the working classes, including the growing number of North African immigrants imported to fill labor shortages after the war.

Today, Islam plays that role, especially in France, where men like Mr. Belthoub, wearing long beards and short djellabas, reach out to the poor and disillusioned in the country's working-class neighborhoods. Young Arabs and Africans here have turned to Islam with the same fervor that the idealistic youth of the 1960's turned toward Marxism.

"Now religion has become our identity," Mr. Belthoub said last week, sitting in a friend's small apartment in a largely Muslim suburb north of Paris.

The question is whether Islam in Europe will follow the same path that Communism did here, shedding its revolutionary extremism, electing mayors and legislators and assimilating itself into normal democratic political life.

This is not convergence or the "mongrelization" of the rule set, but simply its logical expansion. Globalization is like the Borg from Star Trek in that manner: you will be assimilated, but of course, we will be changed by that process. As the Borg threatened more than once to humans: "The best of what is you will be assimilated into the larger whole."

Sound scary? Sure. Assimilation always is, but the larger process is hardly one of homogenizing the Gap, but rather one of diversifying the Core.

As the father of a "mongrel" family whose own very Irish-German Catholic rule set has been redefined by a small Chinese female who's remade our collective sense of who we are, I can tell you it ain't easy, but it sure is both rewarding and beautiful in the end.

Posted by at 1:40 PM | Permalink

■"U.S.-Bahrain Accord Stirs Persian Gulf Trade Partners," by Michelle Wallin, New York Times, 24 December 2004, p. W1.

America's freed trade accord with Bahrain is shaking things up in the Gulf, where Saudi Arabia has always acted like it was going to be the dominant economic player. But how can it possibly hope to play that role when all it offers is oil and nothing else? Trade is based on complimentarity and there is virtually none in the Gulf, because if there was, their intra-regional trade levels wouldn't be the lowest in the world.

So how to perturb that system? Give Jordan a free-trade agreement a few years back and watch it's exports to the U.S. soar many times over. Then do it again to Bahrain, and watch it redefine the Gulf Cooperation Council's flaccid customs union. And then watch the House of Saud get pissed.

Our long-term goal, a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013. Insane you say? Ask Jordan and Bahrain, or any of the other GCC states now looking to replicate that bilateral treaty with the U.S.

Terrorism will haunt the Middle East and—by extension—the Core as a whole so long as the region remains fundamentally disconnected from the global economy save for the narrow oil trade. The U.S. can either wait on regionalism to emerge, with the self-preserving House of Saud "leading" the way, or for some massive global trade deal to emerge, or it can bilat the situation forward all by itself.

Of course, as I said in PNM:

Outside of military alliances, the United States need to continue doing exactly what U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick has advocated and pursued over the past several years: bilateral free-trade agreements, regional free-trade agreements, and global free-trade agreements. None should be prioritized over another, and all should be pursued to their earliest common denominators. Bilateral agreements like the one the United States cut with Jordan more than half a decade ago can have huge demonstrative effects, even when the politics of the agreement far outpaces its economic logic.

I say, keep on "demonstrating" Bob, and when Bush asks you to be the new head of the World Bank, say "yes!"

Posted by at 1:40 PM | Permalink

■"Economic Rally For Argentines Defies Forecasts: After Record '01 Default; Ignoring Orthodox Advice Results in 8% Growth for 2 Years Running," by Larry Rohter, New York Times, 26 December 2004, p. A1.

People who hate PNM often like to describe the IMF and World Bank as agents of great evil, thus my praise for and reliance on them regarding the spread of rule sets within the global economy is described as a sort of economic "empire" by which the Core plots to keep the Gap poor and deny New Core powers a fair playing field.

This is what I wrote in PNM on page 131:

Of course, always trying to play by globalization's evolving rule set does not guarantee success, it just makes success more likely—on average. But when states do follow the rule sets adequately and their economies still end up being abused in the global marketplace, as in Argentina or Brazil in recent years, then it is incumbent upon those international organizations and the largest economic powers that dominate them to adjust the rule sets accordingly. That is simply the squeaky wheel asking for grease, and that has to be allowed.

Does this prove the IMF is bad and wrong? No, it simply proves it's not omniscient and learns like everybody else. The IMF is nothing more than an enforcer of conventional wisdom, which is nothing more than past experiences codified into coherent understanding. That understanding is subject to constant revision, and—not surprisingly—the main sources for that revision process will be New Core states, because in their successful transition from Gap to Core, they literally rewrite the book, adding new chapters of understanding.

So expect New Core states to "defy forecasts" and conventional wisdom regularly. This isn't a sign of the Core's stupidity or ignorance, but a mechanism by which the Core economic rule set improves systematically over time.

The entire Core benefits from Argentina's experience, and its willingness to forge new rules. America is hardly the only source of new rules, and over time, it will be only one of many such forces within the Core.

Posted by at 1:39 PM | Permalink

■"Zimbabwe Extends Crackdown On Dissent as Election Nears," by Michael Wines, New York Times, 24 December 2004, p. A1.

Mugabe is scared and it's showing. His ZANU-PF party was almost swept out of power in free elections in both 2000 and 2002, so he's taking no chances for 2005. According to this article, he's "taken a series measures designed to minimize the chances of another competitive ballot."

I know what you're thinking: just like the Republicans in 2004!

But seriously, in our political system both sides are free to push the envelope, and we've got the Congress and the courts to work out the rule sets. In Zimbabwe, there's no real restraints on the actions of the party in power, just a sort of distant "judgment of the international community."

Try some of these out: you can go to jail for practicing journalism without a license granted by the government. Compare that to the phenomenon of Matt Drudge and political bloggers in the U.S. and you begin to see why our system, slimy as it sometimes gets, is sparkling clean compared to your average Gap state.

Another: one measure gives the government direct control over churches, non-governmental groups and charities, to include the ability to investigate their finances, restrict their activities and ban them by fiat if desired. That ain't exactly like letting Michael Moore do his thing and sell $100m-plus in movie tickets in the process, now is it?

Zimbabwe is going downhill and fast. The president after Bush better be thinking of what that regime change will need to look like, because we will be sucked into that situation eventually, if we have a conscience.

Posted by at 1:39 PM | Permalink

■"As Nuclear Secrets Emerge, More Are Suspected," by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, New York Times, 26 December 2004, p. A1.

This article details—in a nutshell—why I think it's a waste of time trying to use arms control treaties to stop technology flows from the Core to the Gap.

Pakistan got the bomb a long time ago from the Chinese, who got it from the Sovs. Where they've sold it is entirely to countries inside the Gap: North Korea (okay, my outlier), Iran, Libya. Where else do we suspect atomic mastermind Khan to have possibly sold stuff? This is where he traveled in his duties: Tunisia, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, and Kazakhistan—all Gap states. Middlemen were from Dubai and UAE, classic connectors inside the Gap.

Who helped in this process? Who sold the connecting technology? Here's the list from the Core: Switzerland, Netherlands, Germany, South Africa, Britain, Spain, Italy. Then there's a crew of Seam States that were involved: Malaysia, Singapore, and Turkey.

All in all, seem like non-proliferation treaties are working?

Posted by at 1:39 PM | Permalink

■"Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan: Major Calls Effort in Iraq 'Mediocre,'" by Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post, 25 December 2004, p. A1.

In Pentagon briefings, when planners don't know how something is going to work out, they tend to put the "magic cloud" on the PowerPoint slide that signifies a sort of black-box experience where it all works out—we just can't describe it in advance. In economic planning, the equivalent is the "negative wedge," or the magical cost savings that will appear in the future. Why? Because we desperately need it, that's why!

There is a great bit that Mark Warren cut (yes, that evil man who is constantly strangling my "voice"!*) in the upcoming Esquire article where I talk about postwar occupation planning for another scenario and I describe it as "both PowerPoint slides!"

Of course, the reference is supposed to be a joke, but based on this Army major's official report, it seems it isn't. There basically was no written plan for "Phase IV," the Pentagon term for the second half, or the postconflict stabilization/occupation/rebuilding effort.

"There was no Phase IV plan" for occupying Iraq after the combat phase, writes Maj. Isaiah Wilson III, who served as an official historian of the campaign and later as a war planner in Iraq. While a variety of government offices had considered the possible situations that would follow a U.S. victory, Wilson writes, no one produced an actual document laying out a strategy to consolidate the victory after major combat operations ended.

"While there may have been 'plans' at the national level, and even within various agencies within the war zone, none of these 'plans' operationalized the problem beyond regime collapse"—that is, laid out how U.S. forces would be moved and structured, Wilson writes in an essay that has been delivered at several academic conferences but not published. "There was no adequate operational plan for stability operations and support operations."

This is stunning in the extreme. I have participated in several command post exercises in various military commands (particularly Pacific Command) and I find it amazingly hard to believe that the national leadership (Chairman of Joint Chiefs, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, President) let Central Command and Tommy Franks off the hook on that one. I am simply amazed. To me, that would have been the planning section that would have logically received the most attention and argument—especially from an Army that loathes nation-building and wants to ditch those situations as fast as possible.

As a result of the failure to produce a plan, Wilson asserts, the U.S. military lost the dominant position in Iraq in the summer of 2003 and has been scrambling to recover ever since. "In the two to three months of ambiguous transition, U.S. forces lost the momentum and the initiative . . . gained over an off-balanced enemy," he writes. The United States, its Army and its coalition of the willing have been playing catch-up ever since."

It was only in November 2003, seven months after the fall of Baghdad, that U.S. occupation authorities produced a formal "Phase IV" plan for stability operations, Wilson reports. Phase I covers preparation for combat, followed by initial operations, Phase II, and combat, Phase III. Post-combat operations are called Phase IV.

Many in the Army have blamed Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon civilians for the unexpectedly difficult occupation of Iraq, but Wilson reserves his toughest criticism for Army commanders who, he concludes, failed to grasp the strategic situation in Iraq and so did not plan properly for victory. He concludes that those who planned the war suffered from "stunted learning and a reluctance to adapt."

* Don't worry, I'm just kidding. This is my way of getting Mark Warren to give me a call. He'll read the bit above, trust me, and phone me immediately to complain. And no, he won't bother reading this far down . . .

Posted by at 1:38 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 25 December 2004

You know, I'm beginning to realize I'll need to build up this space a bit now that I won't have an office away from home.

And I'll need a laptop of my own (guidance welcomed!).

Anyway, if you had told me back on 26 April when PNM came out that on Christmas morn it would be #71 on B&N.com and #61 on Amazon, I would have been simply amazed.

And so I try to remember what a real privilege it is to have a book do so well for so long. When I looked yesterday, it was PNM and the 9/11 Commission report and that was basically it among the top 100 in terms of foreign affairs. Given the year it's been and all the books that have been published, that's pretty cool.

Final point: took the kids today to "A Series of Unfortunate Events" and it was fantastic. Really worth seeing, even to the point of watching the closing credits. I've heard most of the books on tape, and they did a great job of racing through the first three volumes. Best of all, the two kid leads were very impressive, and Carrey really pulls off Olaf in a neat way. It really sticks in the mind, and I'm betting my kids will want to see it again in theaters, it's that good.

And Sunny did remind me of our own little biter Vonne Mei!

Posted by at 12:30 AM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 24 December 2004

I know, I know. Yesterday's cryptically poetic sign-off was supposed to hold until Sunday. But you should know by now that I never keep those promises. If I'm near a PC and there's access, I will write. [Then there's the small pile of six articles I'm really dying to blog.]

I woke up this morning realizing I don't have a job anymore, I'm not exactly rolling in cash (understatement), I've got four kids and two car payments and a good-size mortgage, and it's Christmas Eve, which now means I get to watch everybody open presents tonight and tomorrow morning wondering how I'm going to pay for it all (okay, an overstatement there).

I guess I'm in a little bit of a shock. I mean, I knew, in a long-term sense looking ahead, that the path I was on would make it hard for me to stay at the college. I knew that.

But looking back in a long-term sense, as one is wont to do at the end of a year (it's all that "year-end" and "year in review" stuff), I guess I'm stunned to realize that PNM's success meant I had to leave the college. That just wasn't a decision point that I could accurately spot, even as the logic of its emergence was stunningly clear.

The choice is basically this: don't write the second book and stay, or write the second book and go. I understand the college's position, but let's be very clear here: if I had written a book that no one read and sold the usual academic total of about 500-1,000 volumes, then the question of the second book would have never been raised. And frankly, even if it had, the money involved would have been so small that it wouldn't have mattered. In that instance, the choice between a steady paycheck and the lack of one would have been easy. There would have been a barrel, and I would have been straddling it uncomfortably.

So, in reality, it's all about the money for both sides—at least when the choice is put to me in terms of write-book-versus-keep-your-job. Did it have to come down to that choice for the college? I understand the notion of better safe than sorry, and I watched Anonymous score on his book and he had to go, so I guess I understand than when I score decently on mine, I have to go too. It is a weird territory to be both a government analyst and a successful author. I know that. No matter how honest you are in that process, people are going to wonder about you, and some are going to think the worst simply because they can't imagine anything else.

I know I've done nothing wrong to date, and I've got a tall stack of legal documents (God, it's good sometimes to be so anal) reflecting a huge number of decision-points all along the way where superiors and lawyers signed to that effect (not to mention six and a half years of personnel reviews that make it sound like I walk on water). But no one is willing to sign to that effect regarding the future, and that's why this relationship no longer works. Again, I understand the reticence on the college's side: it's one thing when it's an academic book and it's another thing when it's a New York Times bestseller that everyone's talking about inside the Pentagon. It's simply a different standard. All of us can claim we had no idea about how big the first book would be, but none of us can claim that about the second. It doesn't matter how honest you've been up to now, the danger is simply the appearance from here on out, and I can't control nor prevent suspicions driven by personal enmity. I've changed some in this process, but how I'm treated by everyone has changed dramatically, and to deny that change is to pretend the success of the first book didn't happen. So even if I wanted to do research at the college in the way I've done in the past, how others would treat me in this process likely makes that goal an impossibility. I can't go back to what I was before PNM. I simply have to move on.

So as time passes and the sense of shock and anger over the decision point fades, there won't be any hard feelings on my part toward the institution. It did well for me and it certainly did well by me. But in the end, their definition and my definition of "did well by me" started to diverge dramatically. What I saw as demand from the rest of the Defense Department, military commands, the rest of the U.S. Government, media, the private-sector, the college began to see as a diversion of my talents. I assumed the college would welcome the PR, the stature, the reputation of being home to someone in such demand, and it did to a certain extent. But that demand creates fissures that eventually overcame that sense of shared pride, and that process was fundamentally driven by the success of the book.

It's the oldest story in the book, and it reflects a fundamental reality that I've preached about for years: failure is easy to handle (especially for a nice Irish Catholic boy like myself), success is hard. Failure you trust, because you just know you deserve it! Success, that's what creates doubt.

And that's what's inescapable here. The book changed everything. A modest book doesn't, but PNM does. It creates opportunities, exposure, demands, requests, and pressures, and eventually that culmination of events changes the conversation with your employer. They want certain things, you want certain things, and then you're told you have to choose.

Fair enough, I chose the second book.

I've got ten days to reconsider. The college, in the personage of one senior leader, is wise enough—and kind enough—to demand that interregnum. And I will think about it long and hard.

But I think all that thinking will lead me to the same conclusion: the second book is something I feel very strongly about, and the feeling I get from that beats the feeling I get from the college about my future there. And that's the real sign here. That's when you're supposed to leave one job situation and take up the challenge of another: you feel like the old place just doesn't do it for you anymore and that something else that's possible will do it for you much better.

So I try not to kid myself. The college forced the choice but I forced the college to enunciate that choice, through PNM's success and the sense that the second book could expand things even further. I'm certainly not some passive rider on this train of events. I set the whole damn thing in motion simply by wanting to reach the larger audience with a message I felt compelled to craft.

Why work through the emotions?

First, it pays to be as clear and honest with yourself as possible. Self-delusion is always dangerous, but especially so at big decision points like this.

Second, to walk away from any job situation always takes getting your blood up on some level: you have to hate the old in order to embrace the new. But being self-aware in the process means you should be able to get past that point as quickly as possible. I don't hate the college. I loved working there. It changed me dramatically from what I was when I came here to what I am now as I leave, and I'm very grateful for that. The circumstances of detachment could have been better, but the timing and the outcome is essentially good: it worked until it stopped working. You can't ask for anything more—except of course, no hard feelings and a sense of mutual respect. And I trust both are there, just waiting to be recognized.

Third, I need my head clear of this sort of turmoil to write the second book. Having my status in doubt at the college was stressful—for both sides. This break will be clean and simple—again, it worked until both sides found that it could no longer work. The college had things to protect, and so do I—something I will be thinking about as I watch my kids open presents over the next 24 hours.

Fourth, I do like a sense of drama in my life. Just before I wrote PNM I had throat surgery that was simply horrendous in terms of the recovery: unbelievable pain with swallowing and a very hard time with the pain killers (which tend to depress me emotionally the older I get). When I came out of the far side of that experience, I was scared, but I was also about as clear-headed as I could be. I had thought long and hard about mortality, in part because of the terrible two-weeks of recovery and in part because I knew my father was engaged in the long slow process of death at age 80. So when I came out of that emotional journey, I was more than ready to write the book. In many ways, I fundamentally sought out the surgery at that point in time to have that experience at that point in time. I was watching my Dad suffer horrifically from sleep apnea (it contributed mightily to his death spiral), and the surgery was designed to head off that possibility decades in advance. In my mind, having the surgery was detaching me from that scenario pathway, and in that sense allowed me to process my Dad's coming death so that my head would be clear to write the book. I just needed a break from all that dread and fear and sense of impending loss. I needed to fence off a creative space in which I both ignored those emotions and yet somehow tapped into them to say the things I knew I wanted and needed to say in the book. PNM was to be my book for the ages, the book that defined my sense of legacy, the statement that would allow me to face death knowing I had had my say. And in some ways, I wanted it to be my Father's statement as well—through me. I wanted him to feel that sense of accomplishment through me as he faced death, which I knew scared him terribly as it scares anyone—even when armed with tremendous faith in God.

JesusMaryJoseph!

You start a paragraph like that thinking you're writing one thing and then you realize something so much more profound by the time you manage to hit the return key.

But that, in a nutshell, is why I choose the second book over the college. Writing like that, where the mix of personal and professional is willingly blurred, not only pleases me, it grows me as a person.

I can't write any more impersonal government reports. I simply can't express myself anymore in the third person. I knew that on 9/11. As I sat down to my PC that afternoon, just before they closed the base, I stared into my screen at the draft final report of the third workshop of the New Rule Sets Project, held just weeks before on the 107th floor of the World Trade Center, and I could not type a single word. I tried time and time again over the subsequent weeks, and each time my fingers got on the keyboard they simply froze. I felt the report would be so meaningless. I felt I had so much more I needed to say and history needed to hear—spoken in the first person.

That's why I leapt at Mark Warren's suggestion in that Greek restaurant in NYC the week before I started writing PNM; he said, "you have to make this book an autobiography of your vision." After the process of the surgery and the mental journey of processing my Father's impending death, I was ready to hear that message—and act on it.

By both passively and actively setting in motion the various trajectories that led to yesterday's culminating meeting about my future at the college, I created not only a similar turning point in my life, I made a profound choice about who I am going to be and what I am going to say and how I am going to say it.

And as scared as I felt this morning when I woke up, I feel very much at peace now for having written this.

Posted by at 4:06 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 23 December 2004

The uncertainty is settled. A decision made clear. The way ahead made apparent.

And I've got 10 days of Christmas to reconsider!

But the die is cast, with no complaints.

The timing could not have been better, nor the outcome.

Schedules are altered. The Black Hole passes. The blog is uninterrupted!

And life is very, very good.

I wish you all a very happy holidays and a great new year. Mine will be, by decision, a voyage of great discovery. I look forward to it all, and I'll see you next on Sunday.

Til then, enjoy your loved ones, count your blessings, and dream of a future worth creating.

Posted by at 7:00 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 22 December 2004

No pretense at processing news today, and this is a precursor of the Black Hole to come. Much to be done in my spare hours between now and 2 January, when I start writing the sequel. My reach will grow smaller, my comments shorter, and my posts more cryptic.

And then I'll enter the Black Hole of non-stop writing, giving only impressions of passing news and a daily diary of what it's like to write the book.

No pretense at news today because I've experienced the weird joy that is answering several hundred emails in an XX hour period (thank God a quarter of them come to my college email so I can justify answering them at work--then again, I've got a lot of government readers, so that only seems both polite and legitimate).

Right now I just hurt, and I don't want to go on TV for quite some time.

So it was probably a bad idea to accept an invitation to go on "Fox & Friends" next Tuesday morning. I hate the drive all the way to Watertown MA to the satellite studio there, but Fox said they'd send a car for the round trip, so I said yes, even though I don't love remotes per se. I'll be on during either the 7am or 8am hour.

Went on a radio talk program today in Tampa, speaking from my office, at 8am for one hour. Host was Henry Raines on WDCF 1350 AM and WWPR 1490 AM. Show started nice but then got a bit testy with the callers. One guy said he hoped the next terrorist attack involved my home and family, which was nice since I opened the show with a very sweet question from Mr. Raines' spouse about our adoption of Vonne Mei. The show ended with another caller refering to the dangers of the Core's "mongrelization" if too many Gap people came here. Hmm, as the father of a mongrel family, I didn't care for that one either.

Raines was fine throughout, and both he and his in-studio compadre apologized on air for the comments from callers, which didn't bug me so much as I felt it marred the quality of the show, something Mr. Raines obviously values.

Suffice it to say, "globalization" tends to send many people into strong emotional territory.

Got this nice email from Mr. Raines following the taping:

Dr. Barnett,

Thank you for such a thought provoking edition of American AM this morning. I apologize for the over the top comments you suffered from the callers.

I must tell you on WDCF 1350 AM the show that followed us, another talk show, was fielding spillover calls about your appearance for the next hour. On WWPR 1490 AM the show that follows us, a music show, did not play a song for twenty minutes because the host and his callers were fired up over your interview.

I hope you will consider a return appearance in the future. Now that the audience is becoming familiar with your work we could open the discussion to how it plays out in real events that they see in the news. Is there any chance of this after the holidays in a few weeks? Maybe you could discuss the role of a publicly held asset like the Green Bay Packers in an increasingly privatized and globalized world.

May you and your family have a very Merry Christmas and prosperous New Year,

Henry Raines

Hah! You see the man trying to make peace with the Packer reference. Very slick. He's done his homework.

We'll see if he wants me back after the Black Hole passes and I emerge, blinking in the harsh sunlight that is whatever follows this expectedly life-altering experience (Why so? Why bother writing a book if not so?).

My dogs are barking, callers are incensed, emails are answered, night has fallen, and my best memory of this day is seeing my angelic four-year-old Jerome play "the boy" in his pre-school's holiday-show rendition of "The Polar Express."

And both Amazon (43) and B&N (53) have me in double digits.

Who could ask for anything more?

Posted by at 6:13 PM | Permalink

Dateline: Portsmouth RI, 22 December 2004

This site and post sent to me by my brother Andrew, the reference librarian in northern WI.

Very impressive. Original site found here

Via Seamus, this email is a thank you from a Marine Gunnery Sergeant in Iraq. It was sent two days ago:

Just wanted to write to you and tell you another story about an experience we had over here.

As you know, I asked for toys for the Iraqi children over here and several people (Americans that support us) sent them over by the box. On each patrol we take through the city, we take as many toys as will fit in our pockets and hand them out as we can. The kids take the toys and run to show them off as if they were worth a million bucks. We are as friendly as we can be to everyone we see, but especially so with the kids. Most of them don't have any idea what is going on and are completely innocent in all of this.

On one such patrol, our lead security vehicle stopped in the middle of the street. This is not normal and is very unsafe, so the following vehicles began to inquire over the radio. The lead vehicle reported a little girl sitting in the road and said she just would not budge. The command vehicle told the lead to simply go around her and to be kind as they did. The street was wide enough to allow this maneuver and so they waved to her as they drove around.

As the vehicles went around her, I soon saw her sitting there and in her arms she was clutching a little bear that we had handed her a few patrols back. Feeling an immediate connection to the girl, I radioed that we were going to stop. The rest of the convoy paused and I got out the make sure she was OK. The little girl looked scared and concerned, but there was a warmth in her eyes toward me. As I knelt down to talk to her, she moved over and pointed to a mine in the road.

Immediately a cordon was set as the Marine convoy assumed a defensive posture around the site. The mine was destroyed in place.

It was the heart of an American that sent that toy. It was the heart of an American that gave that toy to that little girl. It was the heart of an American that protected that convoy from that mine. Sure, she was a little Iraqi girl and she had no knowledge of purple mountain's majesty or fruited plains. It was a heart of acceptance, of tolerance, of peace and grace, even through the inconveniences of conflict that saved that convoy from hitting that mine. Those attributes are what keep Americans hearts beating. She may have no affiliation at all with the United States, but she knows what it is to be brave and if we can continue to support her and her new government, she will know what it is to be free. Isn't that what Americans are, the free and the brave?

If you sent over a toy or a Marine (US Service member) you took part in this.

You are a reason that Iraq has to believe in a better future. Thank you so much for supporting us and for supporting our cause over here.

Semper Fi,

Mark
GySgt / USMC

I am constantly amused by the all the predictions that America is going to hell in a hand basket, that we raise only idiot children and incompetent adults, and that we're the most wasteful, selfish people on the planet.

I am obviously biased, because I've spent the last 15 years of my life living in military communities, so I imagine that everyone's involved in this war because everyone I seem to know or interact with is either on their way, there, or just back. I also imagine that everyone wants not just what's best for America, but for others around the world, because that is what my faith tells me is right.

And so when I bump into something like this letter, it's very reinforcing. I know the plural of anecdote is data, and I know the strength of America is its optimism, which begets generosity because we believe there's plenty more where that came from.

Most of the world doesn't think like this, but that only underscores how important America is to world history.

We produce the greatest dreamers in the world, even among those toting guns today in Iraq--exporting security, exporting hope, exporting that quintessential American optimism.

Posted by at 1:48 PM | Permalink

Dateline: horrified, above the garage in Portsmouth, crack of dawn 22 December 2004

Locked out of site due to bandwidth issues. Got into Movable Type before leaving for work to pen this. Not sure how long it will take to post.

Site obviously overwhelmed by bandwidth pull (so many visitors, so many graphics [i.e., the slides], and way too many emails).

We have asked for more bandwidth and we've opened up the floodgates on the email server even more.

I assume the site will rise sometime today. I fear, based on a quick glance at Hotmail, where yesterday I had 500 emails in my unfiltered in-box and today I have 7, that a bunch of mail is either constipated in the server or has been lost. If the latter is the case, then I apologize profusely.

We will do our best to get to the flood of emails, and I will try my hardest to answer them all in some manner--eventually (that small event, called Xmas, looms however).

I want to thank everyone for the interest and the comments. And, just in case this is my last successful post for a while, wish everyone as happy a holidays as possible--wherever you are and whatever you're facing in life.

Tom I'm-losing-the-feeling-in-my-fingertips Barnett

Posted by at 10:42 AM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage, Portsmouth RI 2004

My four-year-old is tormenting me until I stop answering emails and play with him. Meanwhile, I post this quick email from Steve Scully, the guy who hosted me on the call-in show at C-SAPN last night:

Tom,

Thanks for taking the time to join us on C-SPAN. . .for your sharp, insightful
perspectives on the American military and this period in our history.

We will be re-airing the program on Sunday, Dec. 26th @ 4pm ET because of
the many calls and e-mails we've had in the last 12 hours.

I wish you, your wife and those four beautiful children a VERY Merry
Christmas. . .

and oh yeah, GO PACKERS !

All the best,
Steve Scully

TV people are so slick. This guy works in the kids, Xmas, and the Packers! He should give email lessons.

So let those who want to know that December 26 at 4pm is another showing of the package.

Posted by at 6:43 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 2005

I can always tell the left-handed compliment regarding PNM. It usually begins with, "Say Tom, let me congratulate you yet again on your latest brush with fame."

What the person really means is, "I can't believe you're still milking that! How come you get so much attention?"

The answer is, of course, you gotta feed the beast. That's why the articles matter. That's why all those profiles matter. That's why all the TV and radio appearances matter. That's why all the speeches matter. That's why the million and a half words in the blog matter. That's why always saying yes matters.

Scully asked me last night, "Has this become a career for you?" And the answer is, "Of course it has." But the career is determined by two factors: 1) the reproducibility of the strategic concepts (their essential utility); 2) the reach of the message. These are self-reinforcing in a network sense: the more I interact with the world at large, the better I tailor the concepts for their reproducibility (meaning the easier it is for a wide range of minds to instantly "get" what I'm talking about), and the better tailored the concepts, the wider the reach of the network. In short, I am constantly improving both reach and richness—the ultimate feat in marketing.

So I give talks to get more talks. I write to be offered more writing assignments. I travel to attract more travel. And so on and so on.

Here's a good example of why this networking is so important to me: almost every book I've read in preparation for writing the second book has been recommended to me by a blog reader, like TM Lutas telling me I need to read Wolfe's Why Globalization Works, an excellent book I finished today. How else would I know what to read without this network? I simply will not hear about these books in my day job, even as reading them is essential to me being who I am in my day job.

The lesser includeds have superseded the presumed greater inclusive.

That ultimate feat in marketing is essential for a horizontal thinker like myself, because sitting caged in the ivory tower working the most narrow of subjects is career death, which is why the recent offer by the college to have me focus all my work there on thinking about how the Navy must change in response to a SysAdmin role is . . . how shall I put this . . . not a great commitment of 40 of the best hours I have each week. Can that 40-hour block be structured in such a way as to make career sense for me? In many ways, only by creating such a broad team around me that calling me "director" of the project is a stretch, while simultaneously raising the question of whether or not the college would be better off simply outsourcing me as a function (i.e., moving me to a consultancy within the project rather that suffering the pretense that I will direct it effectively).

As for the immediate impact from yesterday, the Amazon rank is now 42, which is roughly the same territory I achieved in the first week of marketing after the book came out in April (I'm talking about 10 national media appearances in 3 days) and roughly the same height reached after Jaffe's WSJ front-page profile (still framed, still in my basement). So am I feeling good?

Yeah baby! YEAH!

And then I notice the roughly 600 emails in my various accounts, all beginning with "C-SPAN" . . .

So I pull the six-pack of Old Milwaukee out of the paper bag and get started, saving for Xmas the bottle of nice scotch whiskey (Glen somebody) my wife and Vonne Mei got me to celebrate the show.

Here's the catch of the day:

■ Intra-China dwarfs China-world

■ When everyone's gaining on you, you're not slipping

■ The tertiary effects of China's rise

■ The argument for patience remains with Putin

■ Rumsfeld deathwatch begins in earnest

Posted by at 3:57 PM | Permalink

■"Rural Exodus for Work Fractures Chinese Family: The Great Divide (A Missing Generation)," by Jim Yardley, New York Times, 21 December 2004, p. A1.

This is another point I tried to get across last night in response to a caller's question: I think most analysts tend to overestimate the nature and extent of China's internal political adjustment (i.e., the rule of the party) to its growing connectivity to the global economy in relation to the internal social and economic adjustment that continues to unfold in response to the far larger process of integration and growing connectivity within China. In short, China's internal integration process will dwarf that of its external integration process.

What this article highlights is the amazing amount of internal migration going on across China today, as fathers and sometimes even both parents leave behind families in search of better-paying jobs. The impact of all those absentee parents will be profound for an entire generation of Chinese kids. You simply won't have the same family-centric China in twenty years ago that you have today, and it's hard to exaggerate what a huge social change that will be for this culture.

This is yet another reason why I argue that America needs to mentor China in this grand historic emergence process as much as possible, but most clearly in terms of its security interactions with the outside world. In short, we need to make China our strategic security partner not to make ourselves feel safe, but to make China feel safe, and—in doing so—help this vast civilization traverse a vast amount of economic and social history in a very short time.

Remember, the question of who loses China today is really the question of who loses this era's version of globalization.

Posted by at 3:54 PM | Permalink

■"U.S. Slips in Status as Hub of Higher Education," by Sam Dillon, New York Times, 21 December 2004, p. A1.

On some level, the fear about America's higher education institutions no longer drawing the best and brightest from around the world is a natural reflection of the expansion of the global economy over the past generation. Yes, when we were roughly the only game in town, we cleaned up like crazy, but over time other English-speaking nations like ourselves (Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand) recognized a clean, cash-cow industry when they saw it, and progressively revamped their educational systems to reflect the American model.

But beyond Old Core states simply emulating our model, we now have New Core pillars like China and India deciding that creating such brain factories not only makes sense for their long-term economic emergence, frankly it's more important than old economy concepts of "independence" like food and energy. In short, some things you have to trade for, but others you can develop on your own.

Yes, we have hurt ourselves at a tipping point in this process for the Core as a whole by our crackdown and complication of the student visa process here in the States. But you know what, it's also true that, as one U.S. educational expert put it, "Many U.S. campuses have not yet geared up for the competition." Instead, they've simply jacked up tuition for years without any sense of how that kills their "export product," so when the System Perturbation called 9/11 hit, it was a whammy on top of a whammy.

The good news? This rising competition will hopefully be an eye-opener for U.S. higher education, forcing it to make stronger cases for federal policies to improve U.S. economic competitiveness through both education and training. That push, in turn, should hopefully mitigate our tendency to go overboard in firewalling America off from that scary outside world "full of terrorists!"

So, as always, competition is a good thing.

Posted by at 3:54 PM | Permalink

■"To Supply China, South African Mines Want More Trains," by Nicole Itano, New York Times, 21 December 2004, p. W1.

China's enormous demand for raw materials can not only revive or reshape such commodity markets around the world, it can also lead to significant growth in infrastructure for these suppliers.

For example, last year China pulled in 157 million tons or iron ore, and next year that number is expected to top 200. Meanwhile, South Africa, a global giant in iron ore, is losing market share. Why? They simply can't access enough rail infrastructure to keep pace. So Australia and Brazil capture larger market shares over time.

Obviously, when South Africa builds up its transportation infrastructure, the entire economy as a whole benefits, meaning China is not just creating trade connectivity, but infrastructural connectivity as well. So our demand for Chinese goods drives China's demand for iron ore drives South Africa's demand for rail infrastructure drives growing connectivity for Africa as a whole.

Tell me that doesn't beat foreign aid. Tell me that doesn't mean that China, as well as South Africa, are key components and thus allies in any American-led strategy to shrink the Gap and—by doing so—win a global war on terrorism.

War within the context of everything else. . ..

Posted by at 3:53 PM | Permalink

■"Yukos Auction Deepens Doubts Of Investors," by Erin E. Arvedlund and Jad Mouawad, New York Times, 21 December 2004, p. A1.

■"Bush Says He Wants to Keep Ties With Putin: Relationship Called 'Good' Despite Policy Concerns," by Peter Baker, Washington Post, 21 December 2004, p. A20.

I have long said, that so long as Putin only seeks to reinstitute vertical control over the political system and does not seem the same in the economic system, then I think he's still moving Russia in the right direction over time.

So what to make of the entire treatment of Yukos, stretching from the Khodorkovsky trial to the suspicious auction of the oil production unit to a firm that's obviously in the back pocket of the government?

Astute observer Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group overstates the case a bit when he says, "It should be clear to even the most Pollyannaish analyst that this is not a one-off example of political deviance. There's no question that Russia has moved closer to the Saudi model than to the American model."

Okay, there's no question about where to locate Russia on the issue of oil, but how much sense does it make to judge all of Russia on that slim margin? Frankly, do any of you get any news stories about Russia today that aren't about either Chechnya or Yukos? I was stunned to come across that piece I blogged a while back about Russian outsourcing in IT and services. Why? That kind of non-oil, non-terror stuff just doesn't appear in the mainline media on Russia, and yet Russia is a huge country whose economy is far from dominated by oil, like a Saudi Arabia.

Actually, Russia's far more important in gas, but even when you add oil and gas you don't capture more than a minority fraction of Russia's GDP, whereas in a Saudi Arabia, you're basically talking about the vast bulk of the economy.

Still, it makes sense to interpret Russia's behavior on this score in terms of an oil-producing country, something the U.S. left behind as a significant aspect of our economy a long, long time ago.

To me, here's the reasonable take:

"Russia is acting like any oil producer with a strong dependency to oil revenue," said Robert Mabro, chairman of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. "You've got to compare Russia to other oil producers like Iran or Saudi Arabia, not democracies like Denmark or Holland. After 80 years of communism, you don't turn into a liberal democracy overnight. That's a romantic notion that has no historic foundation."

As for the U.S., we need to be patient and think strategically, so Bush is right to hold his tongue in terms of criticism. Think of a strategic security future worth creating 20 years from now where Russia is not a political and economic ally of the United States. So keep your eye on that prize and don't obsess over whether or not we're seeing a multi-party democracy in Russia any time soon.

Russia's not just some "body" state like Saudi Arabia, that's endowed with natural resources but not a smart population. Russia's got plenty of "head" to go with that "body." What it doesn't have is a lot of cash producing exports right now, so as long as Russia uses its exporting of oil and gas to progressively connect the rest of the economy and populace to the global economy, that's a move in the right direction.

Does Russia have to be very proactive in the latter activity? No, that is largely a private-sector-driven process. But where Putin does err is in creating a sense of chill and uncertainty about business practices in Russia and what the ultimate role of the state will end up being.

So it's crucial for him to make public his case for a heavy state role in "commanding heights" sectors like oil and gas, while disavowing such an approach in more "head"-heavy sectors. Go back and look at early Canadian and Australian and South African economic history—all countries with vast natural resource endowments. You will see plenty of state intervention and domination of those industries at the outset. The question is what those economies became over time, not where they started.

So we need to pick our fights on economic and politics and security with Russia very carefully.

Posted by at 3:53 PM | Permalink

■"Scapegoat in Chief," op-ed by David Ignatius, Washington Post, 21 December 2004, p. A25.

I read USA Today today because you always get them free at hotels, and yes, I did notice that the top story was that a poll said a very slim majority of Americans said Rumsfeld should go (52% to 41% saying he was doing his job fine). But I didn't clip that one, because geez! You can't run your foreign policy or pick your team on that basis.

What the poll really said was that all those Republican senators are having an effect. And what all those senators are really signaling is that they're unhappy with the course of events in Iraq and want Bush to change policy. Since they can't say that much in such an up-front fashion (party unity and all), they instead attack the proxy, which logically is Rumsfeld.

Fine enough, but it's really the wrong target. As I said last night on C-SPAN, it wasn't the war that was bad, but the peace. We planned and executed the war brilliantly, and Rumsfeld's "transformed" force performed brilliantly.

Where the mistake was made was in the Interagency process, overseen by national security advisor Condi Rice, where Defense was allowed to take on too much of the postwar planning when in reality it should have been a multi-agency affair directed firmly by the National Security Council process.

In short, if the Republican senators want to direct their fire for maximum impact, it should be at both Rice in her capacity as nominee as Secretary of State (there, the Senate has real power to wield) and at Stephen Hadley, the Rice deputy who takes over at NSC. Rice needs to explain the lack of interagency balance in the postwar planning and execution, and Hadley needs to explain how he's going to run NSC differently than Rice and, if not differently, why not.

Going after Rumsfeld as Pentagon CEO in terms of the up-armoring issue is fine—going all the way back to the decision to invade Iraq. So the speed of the up-armoring process is a fair target. But the fact that the Army entered the year 2003 with only a tiny fraction of its Humvees and heavy trucks armored is completely the fault of the Army uniformed and civilian leadership going all the way back through the two Clinton administrations and into the first Bush one.

There is no doubt that plenty in the Army, especially the gray beards (meaning retired flags) hate Rumsfeld's transformation goals of making the Army more light, more MOOTWA (military-operations-other-than-war) and post-conflict stabilization focused, and more SysAdmin in nature. This is not the Army these old generals resurrected after Vietnam; this is the army they sough desperately to leave behind in Vietnam, and that's basically Ignatius' point in this op-ed. The Army v. Rumsfeld war is the higher-order version of the Fourth-Generation-Warfare v. Network-Centric Operations war, which is fundamentally a ground pounders' war with the fly boys, and that conflict is a huge step backwards, strategically speaking.

So, in my mind, the attacks on Rumsfeld are not only misdirected, they are a sign that the military, as it always does in defeat, is starting to turn on itself in both anger and fear.

Hmmmm, gotta remember that one the next time I lash out at my wife.

Posted by at 3:53 PM | Permalink

Dateline: Hilton, Crystal City, Arlington VA 20 December 2004

I wish I could say it was a magical day, but it was actually a fairly tight and small experience for me, and staying within that tight, small experience is how you keep appearing on TV from getting too big in your imagination. As far as you're concerned, it's not national cable TV, it's just you showing up in a room with a guy and taking some calls. To keep an even keel, you get nowhere near the excitement or tension that, in previous iterations (especially the first few) dominated your sense of the here and now, and I'm talking that lump-in-your-throat, dry-mouth-rasping, heartbeat-pounding-in-your-ears sensations. Of course, those are all fun sensations to experience the first few times, but it would be exhausting (not to mention mentally debilitating) to go through every single time.

So you make your peace with the process and you fit its bigness within your preferred smallness.

My day was this: I got up, took a shower, played with Vonne Mei in bed, and then took her downstairs and changed her and started her on breakfast. Then goodbye to Vonne and the drive to the airport. Process the Times, Globe and Journal on the plane and enter them into the blog template. Then do the Post on the bus to the rental center at BWI. Then the drive to DC, arranging for new life insurance (anticipating the loss of coverage from the government) via the cell during the drive.

Then a 3.5 hour version of the brief at the Office of Force Transformation for a select audience of staffers all in the colonel range.

Then to McDonalds for a salad while I finished the day blog.

Then to Best Buy to get some gifts for my spouse: CD of jazz from Ken Burns' PBS documentary series, two true-crime DVDs from A&E, and a collection of vintage Jimmy Stewart movies. Then to Barnes and Noble for a great Chinese cook book.

Then I look at my watch! Christ! It's 8:15 already!

Jump in my car and decide immediately to skip checking in at the hotel, so drive direct to Union Station, talking to both Vonne and Mark Warren en route, both reporting that the tape looks good (and Vonne reminding me of my thinning spot being so expertly lit).

Then park at Union and walk through the station, tempted to check out the B. Dalton's there (huge), but it's 8:45 and I figure I better find this 400 North Capital address. Get there about 8:55 and an exec is waiting for me, so I skip security. I'm wearing my business casual slacks and turtle neck, but carrying my garment suitcase on my shoulder, so the exec takes me to the green room, which I have all to myself. I set up in the head and get into my grey suit, then come out and watch about 10 minutes of myself getting near to the end of the brief.

Then make-up lady comes in and dusts me up and attaches the ear piece line for the calls. Then the host Steve Scully comes in and we chat for a couple of minutes. He tells me to wait another minute and leaves.

Then stylist lady is back and she walks me onto the set, which I like immediately. Nice low table, comfy chair, and a camera I can look into to address the caller, which is set up so I can see myself live as I appear (which is great for centering yourself and not distracting really at all, although by definition it's disembodying: "Who is that nice man and why does he talk every time I open my mouth?" you find yourself wondering vaguely).

Then Scully sits down, they count down the seconds and he asks the first question and you're off. The set disappears. The calls are like any call. You're very live and very now, and the whole thing is over in about 20 minutes, even though the elapsed time is actually 60 minutes.

Then back to the green room with Scully, nice chit chat. Then change back into regular clothes. They walk me out. Everyone seems very happy. And I'm back on the street walking back to Union. Nice message from Vonne before she goes to bed. Quick conversation with my Mom, who thought I did well. Then I talk with Mark for a good two hours—all the way through check-in, going up to room, running to McDonald's for more food, eating it all, and then noticing it's 12:30.

A fairly contained day. A pretty good feeling.

How did I perform?

What I saw of the brief seemed pretty standard. Scully joked about the FCC and my use of "jackass." Me, I was pretty impressed with C-SPAN getting the slides direct on the screen, which I thought really helped.

As for the call-in's, I felt relaxed and confident, and I think it showed. A word–for-word analysis probably wouldn't thrill me, but hey, it's TV!

I was happy to hear that C-SPAN reran the Book Notes with Brian Lamb this afternoon. The execs joked that it was Tom Barnett Day at C-SPAN. I countered that it was almost the shortest day of the year!

Back in my hotel room at the Hyatt, I couldn't watch the rerun because the hotel channel selection didn't include C-SPAN, so beyond that impressionistic capture, I can't comment on much, other than Vonne and Mark thought it was great, as did my Mom (which is unusual for her).

In fact, my Mom came up with the highlight of the day: some old family friend from Lancaster called her after the first broadcast. She didn't know the guy from Adam but he knew my Grandpa Barnett and my Dad from decades back. This fellow said I reminded him of my Dad, and that may me feel very good.

My Mom, in a nice grace note, said Dad would have been thrilled with the entire evening.

My Dad, as some of you might remember, died about a month before the book came out.

THE LAST BRIEF

Dateline: Hilton, Crystal City, Arlington VA 20 December 2004

NOTE: WRITTEN BEFORE THE C-SPAN BROADCAST, BUT POSTED AFTER THE FACT

Gave what I assume will be my last PNM brief for the government—at least as a government employee.

Because I was in town for the C-SPAN show tonight on the dime of the Office of Force Transformation, I stopped by OFT and gave an inside-the-brief sort of brief for staff there—in effect, telling all the behind-the-scenes stories about how each slide came about. So even though I used only 30 slides (the same 30 you'll see tonight), the brief went 3.5 hours, because there was a lot of interesting debate that saw me pulling out the arguments of both the upcoming Esquire and Wired articles, which in turn pushed me to enunciate more clearly (at least for myself) an argument that I plan to use to center an op-ed-like piece for the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, a journal I haven't written for in three years, but which recently asked me to try and pen something for an upcoming issue.

I had had some dreams of trying to start that article tonight, but the length of the OFT brief killed that idea, because I need to do some shopping for the spouse while I'm in town and fancy-free. Depending on how fast that goes, I may get to C-SPAN early enough to watch the brief myself from 8pm to 9:30, but I'm guessing I'll miss it and simply show up in time to do the call-in. I've given the brief enough times that I'm not exactly worried about my usual capacity for total recall!

Be kind if you call…

Here's the catch of the day:

■ Who helps the U.S. figure out the Shiites?

■ Nye sluchaino chto the Yukos auction …

■ In the long run, we'll all be energy independent

■ 4GW is what you end up with when you do SysAdmin badly

■ Arabs to Turkey: you are/are not the lead goose!

■ India: connectivity good, but not all content acceptable!

■ Bush is polarizing figure of the year according to Time

Posted by at 7:08 AM | Permalink

■"In Iraq: One Religion, Two Realities (Sunni, Shiite Sermons Leave No Room for Dialogue on Election or Insurgents)," by Anthony Shadid, Washington Post, 20 December 2004, p. A1.

■"Lebanese Wary of a Rising Hezbollah: Fears of Militia's Broader Ambitions Reignite Debate Over Its Populist Agenda," by Scott Wilson, Washington Post, 20 December 2004, p. A17.

The serious score-settling in post-Saddam Iraq between the previously dominant Sunnis and the long-repressed Shiites is just beginning. America is going to get stuck with the Sunnis and their Triangle of rebellion—count on it. But who can generate some sense of control over the demographic majority that is the Shiite population? Can we pretend we can crackdown on the Sunni-heavy insurgency and somehow be seen as keeping the two sides apart with an even hand?

So if we can't, then to whom are we going to turn locally for help?

Ditto on Lebanon, where the Shiite Hezbollah movement is looking rather restive in its ambitions. No secret there who are its main patrons: Shiite states Syria and Iran. As one local Christian leader put it, "As long as they receive money from Iran, as long as they believe they can turn Lebanon into an Islamic society, then we have a real problem with Hezbollah."

So again, to whom are we going to turn locally for help?

Posted by at 7:03 AM | Permalink

■"An All-but-Unknown Bidder Wins a Rich Russian Oil Stake: Auction of Seized Yukos Unit Raises Suspicions," by Erin E. Arvedlund and Steven Lee Myers, New York Times, 20 December 2004, p. A1.

■"Mystery Russian Company Wins Bid on Yukos Unit: Offer of $9.37 Billion Seals Fate of Beleaguered Firm, But Many Questions Linger," by Gregory L. White and Guy Chazan, Wall Street Journal, 20 December 2004, p. A1.

Nye sluchaino chto is a wonderful old Russian phrase that means, "It is not by accident that . . ..

The Yukos move to seek bankruptcy protection in U.S. courts spooked Gazprom's German financial bankers, and so, it would seem, Gazprom's financial bid must have fallen apart prior to the auction. So surprise! A mystery buyer emerges that no one's ever heard of before! What does that phrase mean? It means, that if this obscure small company really had $10b in cash to buy up Yukos, the international business community would have heard of it by now.

My guess is that this company will turn out not to have the financing ready, meaning the auction will be repeated in several weeks time, and by then, my guess is that Gazprom will have it's package in order.

That's the minority view from the articles, as I glean them.

The majority view is that this company, Baikal Finans Group, is nothing more than a front for Gazprom or some other "state-friendly company" (or some combo thereof).

I like the minority view myself, because I like the idea that a U.S. court somehow forced this outcome, proving yet again that connectivity requires code and sometimes code can ruin the best-laid plans of mice and men.

Posted by at 7:02 AM | Permalink

■"Declaration of Energy Independence: We can end our reliance on foreign oil by 2035," op-ed by Robert McFarlane, Wall Street Journal, 20 December 2004, p. A15.

So America should shoot really hard to be energy independent by 2035!

Fine and dandy, say I, but you know what? That date is so far into the future that it's essentially meaningless to describe that goal as a practical strategy to run the world between now and then. Frankly, there's no way we can temporize the current security situation in the Middle East for another three decades, so either we solve it dramatically by then (making energy independence irrelevant) or we screw it up so badly well before then that if that is truly our goal, we'd need to crash-course well before 2035.

All this talk of getting off oil to solve our security issues is a huge and rather useless diversion from the tasks at hand, not to mention the debates at hand. The violence in the Middle East is all about globalization, not energy dependency per se. It's a reaction to the encroachment of modernity into traditional societies in the region, not a function of the regional governments' reliance on oil exports for revenue. The latter truly delays the movement by those regimes toward reform, but that delay is being overwhelmed by globalization's advance, which is clearly not a process that's going to wait around until 2035 for America to engineer a military pull-out on the basis of being energy independent.

The U.S. will have moved onto the hydrogen economy well before 2035, and it won't be because of some godawful government plan to make it so. It will happen because the technology makes sense and the markets figure out how to employ that technology while making a lot of profit in the process.

People who talk incessantly about energy independence as the answer to the challenges/sacrifices/demands of a global war on terrorism are living in denial. It is a cop out argument, not a strategy whatsoever.

Posted by at 6:58 AM | Permalink

■"In Iraq, Less Can Be More: We should focus on better training for fewer troops," op-ed by Peter Khalil, New York Times, 20 December 2004, p. A29.

■"Local Heroes: A Vietnam strategy is working in Iraq," op-ed by Andrew Borene, New York Times, 20 December 2004, p. A29.

■"Disquiet in Iceland That Its Peacekeepers Dress for War," by Sarah Lyall, New York Times, 20 December 2004, p. A4.

There is an idiotic argument in the Fourth Generation Warfare literature (descriptive of the intifada-like guerrilla war we now face in Iraq) that says the snafu-ed occupation proves that the Network-Centric Operations that won the war ultimately proved illusory. Nothing is further from the truth. The NCO-driven warfighting phase of the takedown would have set up a positive occupation, save for the fact that we didn't pursue that follow-on phase in anything close to a truly comprehensive, SysAdmin fashion. That we now end up with a 4GW-like insurgency situation does not negate the takedown, it negates the poor follow-on effort that should have prevented that conflict's emergence.

Let me clue you in on this struggle: NCO is the language of the air guys, whereas 4GW is the lingo of the ground guys. The ground guys feared that Kosovo + Afghanistan + the Iraq takedown was making it look like we no longer needed a ground force, and so they argue against the utility and validity of NCO. Conversely, the air guys have used that experience to argue against 4GW, although few are making that case now except to say we should withdraw—in Powell Doctrine fashion—as soon as we run out of traditional targets to bomb.

The real answer, of course, is—in effect—to split the difference. Do NCO right and there's no rogue government we can't take down, but if we can't prevent the probable follow-on 4GW response, there's not much sense in toppling any regime. Plus, on some level, we need to fight transnational terrorism throughout the Gap in a 4GW fashion, although most of that will be done by Special Ops guys, not Marines and Army. So if we restrict ourselves to the regime-change argument, we can say the two functions are intimately linked: dominance in NCO means 4GW is all that's left for opponents to employ in their resistance to our state-by-state effort to shrink the Gap by targeting rogue regimes.

Is that a bad thing? Being so good in NCO that no one's really willing to fight us in that realm? Hardly. That just describes the dominance of our Leviathan force. But clearly, once we get into any occupation, even with the best of SysAdmin efforts, we need to maintain and field a small warfighting capacity that can come into the postconflict stabilization arena and kick ass as required.

We know how to do this: it's called fighting side-by-side with the locals and training them as we go along, building up their skills. This is not capital-intensive, but personnel-intensive. And it requires that sometimes our SysAdmin cops will have to act like soldiers, something that will be shocking for those coalition partners (like an Iceland) that believe such peacekeeping will only occur in truly peaceful areas.

Will this relegate the SysAdmin function and its embedded capacity for 4GW into some sort of "clean up" role, operating always in the wake of the Leviathan? Only in truly big cases, where the takedown of the regime is required. But by and large that SysAdmin function will be out there working the Gap on a daily basis, whereas the Leviathan spends the vast majority of its days back at base inside the Core.

In this way not only does our unparalleled capacity for NCO enable a new focus on 4GW, but a strong 4GW capacity enables the SysAdmin's successful functioning by making clear that we're just as tough in the second half as we are in the first half.

Posted by at 6:55 AM | Permalink

■"Turkey's EU Inroads Meet Arab Chill," by Hugh Pope and Dan Bilefsky, Wall Street Journal, 20 December 2004, p. A13.

Those Euros do everything they can to make the Turks feel welcome, don't they? Including making their accession to the EU talks "open ended," which is their polite way of saying the largely Christian club reserves the right to conduct the talks for years on end and then still say no!

But good, say I, that the EU is linking the talks to Turkey recognizing the Greek-run government of EU member Cyprus. That "olive tree" conflict is waaaaaay past its due date.

Here's the larger point: the Muslim Middle East can't seem to make up its mind as to whether or not Turkey's efforts represent anything larger as far as their relationship to Europe or the West is concerned.

And big surprise, what resentment the process creates in the Middle East is the sense that Turkey has to beg for entry—in effect promising not to be "too Muslim" (my quotes). As one Saudi newspaper editor said, "I cannot go into a club that doesn't want me."

Truer words were never spoken—except perhaps by Groucho Marx.

Others are more sanguine, especially in neighboring Syria, which until recently was a big critic of Turkey, which now seems to be arguing for a closer Europe—so to speak. As one economist in Damascus put it, "If Europe becomes our neighbor to the north, that will help stability."

I say, it cannot hurt to have Europe feeling more local ownership of security in the region.

As one Egyptian scholar states, "It sends a strong message that Islam in itself does not pose a threat to the Western civilization. This can defeat terrorism."

In my mind, Turkey's membership in the EU would create connectivity of the highest (symbolic) and simplest (geographic) order. In short, you cannot shrink the Gap unless members can graduate out, and they can't graduate out unless you leave the door open for membership.

It's a lesson the U.S. needs to learn vis-à-vis Latin America.

Posted by at 1:14 AM | Permalink

■"India Arrests Head Of eBay Division In Obscenity Case," by Mylen Mangalindan and Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal, 20 December 2004, p. A3.

The government of India arrests the local head (Indian born, but a U.S. citizen) of eBay (actually a local division called Baazee) for allowing a pornographic tape featuring Indian teenagers to be sold inside the country. Got him under the Information Technology Act, which forbids trafficking in porn through the Internet.

eBay removed the tape once it came to its attention, and sent the employee from Mumbai to New Delhi to assist police in their investigation, so they're more than a little bit pissed with the outcome (so far). The police already nabbed the seller and are working to locate the teens featured in the video, but weren't satisfied with that. In effect, they arrested the eBay employee as though he was a fence who knowingly trafficked in illegal goods.

Of course, eBay's response is going to be, "we pulled it off as soon as we found out and we can only be held responsible for so much," which is fair enough and I bet the charges will be dropped (if they ever get levied). Still, as the article states, "The incident demonstrates the risks that U.S. companies and executives face when they do business in other countries under different legal standards.

In my vernacular, this incident just proves that while everyone wants connectivity, not everyone wants all the content that ensues, so the differences in national law that matter most will be primarily those revolving around acceptable and unacceptable content flows.

… oh, and the question of liability that results from transgression!

Heads up for eBay: it's called Bollywood, not Hollywood. Remember the difference, cause it mostly comes down to how you portray sex.

Posted by at 1:13 AM | Permalink

■"Time again rates Bush as 'Person of the Year,'" by Sam Dolnick, Boston Globe, 20 December 2004, p. A6.

George W. Bush joins six other presidents who've been named "person of the year" two times (essentially every president since WWII who's been elected twice [Ike, Nixon, Reagan, Clinton), plus two presidents who assumed the presidency on the death of his predecessor and then won his own term [Truman, LBJ]). If Bush manages the trifecta, he'd join the only three-time awardee (and the only president to be elected more than twice): FDR.

Bush was clearly the polarizing figure of the year. Two others mentioned in the running were Michael Moore and Mel Gibson, and in many ways, both owe their stature to the polarizing political conditions raised by Bush. Moore, without Bush, is basically nothing, whereas Gibson's rise is very much tied to the same Christian/evangelical/red state base that Bush draws upon. So the trio is basically the polarizing Bush, and the blue state/red state combo of Moore and Gibson (so I guess Hollywood really does matter politically!).

Oh, and the fourth possibility Time entertained was Karl Rove, but he's even more derivative than either Moore or Gibson. I mean, why settle for the "brain" when you can have the whole guy?

But look over the last four years now and tell me 9/11 was a System Perturbation of the highest order: Guiliani is the pick in '01, then the FBI whistle-blower Colleen Rowley (Forgot her already? So has everyone else) in '02, then the U.S. soldier in '03, and then Bush reelected in '04 on the basis of standing up to terrorists and sharing our "social values." 9/11 doesn't just inform all this—it defines it.

Posted by at 1:10 AM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 19 December 2004

C-SPAN lists the brief and call-in program on their schedule for tomorrow, 20 December, at 8pm EST.

This is what C-SPAN says:

08:00 pm (Eastern Standard Time)

2:30 (estimated length of program is about 2 1/2 hours)

LIVE Call-In

The Pentagon's New Map: Presentation & Call-In

C-SPAN

Thomas P. M. Barnett , U.S. Naval War College

See you tomorrow night live on TV.

Posted by at 7:36 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 19 December 2004

When C-SPAN broadcasts the latest iteration of my brief tomorrow night at 8pm EST (followed by the live, call-in show), I and my team expect to see this site flooded with hits, just as it was last time the network put me on.

But it will be even more of a flood, I hope, than last time, because this time C-SPAN will be showing both my website URL and my email address. For each I gave them the thomaspmbarnett.com coordinates rather than my war college stuff. Why?

I killed all my web presence at the college a while back when I was subtly threatened with charges of conflict of interest by people there with potential to hurt me. I had had webmaster rights at the college for a very long time, going all the way back to Y2K. I was, in fact, the first professor granted such rights to post his material. The problem had become, of course, the success that was PNM. In a world where the usual first run of an academic book is in the high hundreds or low thousands, selling over 50k volumes puts you under a lot of scrutiny.

So rather than have my NWC online presence come under attack, I simply killed it, and started pushing all my PNM-related correspondence, no matter who was the source, in the direction of thomaspmbarnett.com, the site that bore the brunt of the scrutiny the last time C-SPAN broadcast the brief and this time will hopefully attract all the attention lest I be accused once again of abusing any standing I might have with the government.

This time, however, we have a different plan in place, and you'll see the outlines of that plan on the front page of this site starting tomorrow.

In short, I am diversifying. While the college is pushing me to make my work exclusively naval in nature, I want my interactions with the wider world - the everything else - to not suffer in this process (assuming I choose to remain at the college despite the narrowing of my work there), so I need to make thomaspmbarnett.com better at conducting that larger dialogue with that outside world.

How will this be achieved? Tomorrow you'll see the front page of my site divided into a series of clustered links that represent the various avenues I see myself and others pursuing in terms of a broadband dialogue with the world on the multitude of subjects presented in PNM. So besides the usual clusters on my writings, the book itself, and me the person, you'll see explicit links to three new avenues of activity for me: 1) my public speaking function, conducted through the Leigh Bureau; 2) a newsletter based on the blog and my writings in general, called the Rule Set Reset; and 3) a consultancy for non-governmental clients (non-federal, that is) where I come together with a quartet of colleagues, both old and new, in an LLC called The New Rule Sets Project.

Let me explain that last bit a bit more:

■ Who constitutes NRSP? Me and four of my hand-selected fellow change agents in a collaborative and strategic effort.

■ What will this company be about? It will provide structure, process and capacity to develop, refine, and share my message with more nodes than I can reach on my own (frankly, I need several more me's to keep up with things now!).

■ Where will this space be found? www.newrulesets.com [now defunct].

■ When will it appear? Sometime in the next 24 hours, by the grace of God and my webmaster Critt.

■ Why am I doing this? This is one of the many paths to my ultimate purpose that I am pursuing.

Where will all these new avenues take me? I have no idea. The everything else and the everyone else will decide that. My goal in all of this is the same goal I've always had - a future worth creating.

Here's today's catch:

■ The Middle East: a time for real imagination

■ 2004: the year of China

■ The Leviathan-SysAdmin divide: unclear rule sets

■ The multi-kulti debate in Europe

■ A glimpse inside my world

Posted by at 11:25 AM | Permalink

■"A Political Arabesque: The way to reform in the Middle East is not a straight line," op-ed by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 19 Dedember 2004, p. WK11.

■"A Modest Proposal: Israel Joining NATO," by Steven Erlanger, New York Times, 19 Dedember 2004, p. WK6.

■"Sizing Up The New Toned-Down Bin Laden: He is acting like an elder statesman from a borderless Muslim nation," by Don Van Natta, Jr., New York Times, 19 Deeember 2004, p. WK1.

Even Tom Friedman now sees hope on Middle Eastern peace, if only the U.S. is imaginative in how it approaches Arab states and Iran. Iran, of course, is not Arab but Persian, which is why Friedman says not to worry so much about Iran ruling over the Arab Shiites in Iraq. Sure, Iran can ruin the prospect of peace there, but it can't exactly determine the nature of peace there either. It needs help to make that work, just like we do.

Again, like me, Friedman is asking, Is this administration imaginative enough to see the potential here? I know Friedman will probably freak when he reads my Esquire piece in January, as he won't know what to make of it any more than he does of PNM, which, according to mutual acquaintances, he has read but declines to comment upon. Then again, he writes for the careful Times, whereas I write for Esquire and Putnam, so I can afford to take more risks.

But taking risks is the name of the game right now in the Middle East. Osama's taking risks right and left by trying to appear more statesman like, and even cracking jokes about not choosing to attack that bastion of personal freedom (and licentiousness?): Sweden! What does that tell us about Osama right now? He's not winning, and so he's adjusting to what he hopes will be negotiations with . . . somebody . . . please!

But who can Osama count on nowadays? Who is the big power that will stand up to the U.S. when all of those big powers seem to be coming together ever more intensely in a global economy?

So it's a time of desperate moves and imaginative proposals, like admitting Israel to NATO. Why?

I dunno. Maybe Israel will need some systematic backing once Iran has the bomb—Iran, the same country that's just signed huge energy deals with rising eastern powers India and China. Maybe some balancing will be in order.

Maybe even a grand bargain of sorts.

Again, it's all about imagination. Anyone can write policy pieces about what's feasible in this current climate. You know those pieces—boring as all hell get out.

But where to find the real strategy?

Hmmm, I'm betting on the Feb issue of Esquire!

Posted by at 11:24 AM | Permalink

■"Who's Afraid of China? How Dell Became the World's Most Efficient Computer Maker," by Gary Rivlin, New York Times, 19 December 2004, p. BU1.\

■"Whoops! It's 1985 All Over Again: Fat Deficits. Dollar Woes. Asia Rising. Calling James Baker?" by Eduardo Porter, New York Times, 19 December 2004, p. BU1.

■"The Dollar? China Gets A Big Vote," by Jonathan Fuerbringer, New York Times, 19 December 2004, p. BU9.

These three articles are all the usual stuff. My point in citing them is that, here it is, the second to last weekend of the year, and on the subject of globalization there is one clear dominating topic: China.

China is the big competitive threat. China holds many of the cards regarding the future flight of the dollar as the world's reserve currency. China needs to be at all the negotiating tables.

Oh yeah, and when the world really needs a serious fix-it man . . . call James Baker—our last good secretary of state.

Hmm, I gotta work that into an article sometime . . ..

Posted by at 11:24 AM | Permalink

■"Pentagon Seeks To Expand Role in Intelligence: Traditional C.I.A. Tasks; Proposal Is Taking Shape as Nation Overhauls Its Spy Operations," by Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 19 December 2004, p. A1.

■"Under Siege in Afghanistan, Aid Groups Say Their Effort Is Being Criticized Unfairly: Afghans say some aid workers appear to be living the high life," by Carlotta Gall and Amy Waldman, New York Times, 19 December 2004, p. A8.

The Pentagon is exploring the messy seam between war and peace, because that's where much of this Global War on Terrorism will be fought, and those serial assassinations will be conducted by the Leviathan's road team, Special Operations Command. These trigger pullers don't have an off-season, because they never leave the playing field. They're there when the Leviathan force pulls into town and they remain when the Leviathan force pulls up stakes.

And they need intelligence.

And if that need means the Pentagon starts acting more like the CIA in obtaining it, well, this is just another blurring of the line between war and peace, or between Leviathan and SysAdmin functions.

The SysAdmin forces will never engage in the sort of serial assassinations that the flies-on-the-eyeballs guys do, because that force can never be tainted by such activity. The SysAdmin's killers will be the Marines, who, with their worldwide reputation for both fierceness and discipline, are the perfect face to put forward in terms of that force's muscle.

Yes, I know, there are plenty of aid groups that don't want to be associated with the U.S. military, but if they're going to have any lasting positive impact in postconflict stabilization ops like Afghanistan, both we the military and they the private aid groups are going to have to forge a new set of understandings and relationships. We need to become the cop and the social worker who walk the same beats.

And another thing: the aid crowd has to start being more cognizant of how they come off to the locals, who often grow angry with the U.S. military but never accuse them of living "high on the hog" as aid workers are consistently accused.

As one aid group director admitted, "A lot of agencies are only here for the money."

The solution? Regularize and codify the process. Separate the good groups from the bad, and get clear lines of demarcation between groups and the military, even as the two sides need to work increasingly together. Systematize it, for crying out loud. Administer it in a comprehensive fashion.

Yeah, that's the ticket . . . system administration!

Posted by at 11:24 AM | Permalink

■"A Runaway Personifies Germany's 'Multi-Kulti' Debate: A teenager's plight reflects a deeper issue of a cultural divide," by Richard Bernstein, New York Times, 19 December 2004, p. A6.

The story tells you once again that this so-called "clash of civilizations" is really mostly a "clash of gender issues": the runaway in question is an 18-year-old daughter of Turkish immigrants in Germany, who ran off rather than be "sold" into marriage to a man she had never met ("I never even saw a picture."):

Women like Jasmin are prime evidence for people in Germany who argue that the influx of Muslims is a threat to the country's social cohesion, and that stronger measures are needed to stop practices like forced marriages.

They are part of a broader current of opinion in this country, jolted into action by the recent murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. This view repudiates "multi-kulti," as multiculturalism is called here, the notion that Germany needs to become culturally more diverse.

This antagonism formed the main theme of a recent congress of Germany's main conservative parties, which issued a platform called "In Germany's Interest: Encouraging Integration, Fighting Islamism." It called for unspecified sanctions against foreigners who refused to accept Germany's democratic values, and recommended new restrictions on immigration.

But there are many other people who argue that cases like Jasmin's are unusual, and, because they are sensational, can be used for political purposes, to darken the image of the Turkish community. In reality, they say, the Turks are changing and adapting to German ways more or less the way other immigrant groups have in other countries.

"Integration takes a long time," said Barbara Joh, the former commissioner for foreign affairs in Berlin, who once protected Muslim girls against what most Germans would regard as unfair practices. "The Muslims themselves are in a confrontation, and we have to help them," she said. "But we are not doing that if we are drawing the line between the Muslims and ourselves, rather than between the fanatics and the nonfanatics."

Why didn't she? She figured out the law and realized that her real prize was a German passport and residency. She realized she was being sold for that and she rebelled.

That's your "clash of civilizations." Not some grand military struggle between tectonic forces, but a melodrama played out in living rooms.

Posted by at 11:23 AM | Permalink

■"A Packerville Party: Green Bay, Frozen Capital of the N.F.L., Draws the Faithful," by Bruce Weber, New York Times, 19 December 2004, p. SP7.

Mark Warren likes to say that he always needs to be careful what he says around me for fear it will go into the blog. He's kidding . . . I think.

Then again, perhaps he shouldn't had said that to me if he didn't want it in the blog.

Anyway, when Mark and I were talking in anticipation of our Packer weekend for the Vikings game a while back, he said his old friend Paul Begala (they go way back to TX days) told him that the weekend with me in Green Bay was going to be important for our future collaborations together—in effect saying, to know Tom Barnett is to know the Green Bay Packers.

Begala was right, of course, and Mark came away from the weekend knowing me so much better (as I, him), because not only was I in my element, but so was small-town east Texas Warren.

Green Bay is the smallest town (100,000) in America with a professional sports team. The reason it still has that time it that it is the professional sporting world's only publicly-owned team—meaning there is no effective owner, just a committee on top that looks out for the public's interest. The man who drew up those articles of incorporation was my grandfather, Gerald Clifford, long-time Packer executive (always without pay). That's why he's in the Packer Hall of Fame, an institution whose attendance rates are rivaled only by the "other one" in Canton, OH.

This article is a fun one, right down to noting the news-worthy event (in Green Bay, that is) of the sale of the life-size Brett Favre bobble-head doll for $18,000 (my son Kevin had his eye on that one, I can tell you).

My favorite quote in the piece (on tailgating): "They say we're a drinking town with a football problem. There's some truth to that."

Posted by at 11:23 AM | Permalink

Dateline: down in the basement in Portsmouth RI, 18 December 2004

Took #1 daughter Emily and five of her friends on a birthday-celebrating jaunt today: lunch for them (while I read "Occidentalism" at a nearby table and had some clam chowder) at a great seafood place in Westport MA and then a wonderful local ballet presentation of the "Nutcracker" at this fab old theater in New Bedford MA.

Now watching "Return of the King" (the four-hour version—and yeah, it's even better!) on the widescreen in the basement with the other three kids (frankly, with the Mitsubishi picture and the Sony sound, I wonder why we ever go to theaters anymore, because it's just plain better at home). Pretty sure none of us will make it to the end, but that's okay, since we'll finish it in the van on the way to meet our new puppy, a black lab I think we're going to call Bailey after Jimmy Stewart's character in "It's a Wonderful Life." Pup will be only four weeks old, so this will be just a get-acquainted session. We're looking to take him in at the end of January.

Got an incredible present from my publisher Neil Nyren this week: a beautifully leather-bound edition of PNM, with gold embossed lettering on the spine and my initials on the front cover. It's got that funky inside-cover, quasi-psychedelic heavy paper, and the top of the pages have the gold stuff too. In short, it's done up like a Harvard Classic or some book from 19th-century England, but in the most expensive sort of way. It was a thrilling gift to receive. It must weigh about twice as much as the regular book, and it's almost too pretty to look at, like the King gave it to me personally or something. Neil sent it as an Xmas thank-you for the effort I put in on the book and promoting it. I'd bet no other Putnam author blogged a million-plus words in support of their book this year! Still, it was a stunningly nice gesture on Neil's part. His excitement for the Son of PNM is very important to Mark Warren and me. None of us are interested in just cranking something to cash in on PNM. What excites us all is where this journey may take us next in our quest to change the world for the better.

Big announcement coming tomorrow in the blog, part of the new directions and possibilities I see for myself, and those I choose to ally with, as a result of PNM. No secret on the timing. If I'm going to answer several thousand emails again, I might as well have something new to announce.

Today I offer the daily catch, plus the Preface to the Turkish edition of PNM, which I sent the publisher in Turkey yesterday. The latter seems very timely given the news on Turkey opening negotiations with the EU on membership—finally the formal invite to join the Core!

Here's what I pulled from the Times today while the girls lunched (okay, mostly talked):

■ When Hamas joins the discussion, you might just have a quorum

■ The hype on food security

■ Europe to Turks: Here begins the first of many discussions!

■ UN peacekeeping: not exactly the professionals needed for the Gap

■ China looking to codify its rule-set on Taiwan

Posted by at 10:07 PM | Permalink

I sent this to the Turkish publisher of PNM at their request yesterday. Their instructions to me were simply to pen something that related the book and Turkey's particular placement on the map to the Turkish reader. So I cranked out these almost 500 words "off the top of my head," a phrase that I now find quite deceptive given all the writing I do daily in the blog (i.e., nothing comes "off the top of my head" anymore, as I've just gotten all the pre-writing out of my system on so many topics that my "idle" is set so G.D. high that I'm ready to write at the drop of a hat—like asking someone who runs 10 miles a day to compete in a 5k!).

Here's what I wrote. My foreign-rights agent just loved it. I don’t know if it's that good or Esmond's opinion reflects how little effort other authors put into such things. Me, I consider it a real honor to be published in another language. Imagine the pride I will feel to hold this book in my hand!

Preface to the Turkish edition

It is with a sense of great privilege that I offer this book to the Turkish reader, and that is because there are few countries in the world destined to play a more pivotal role in the future unfolding of globalization than Turkey.

I am often asked, "Why is Turkey not included within your definition of globalization's Functioning Core?"

I included Turkey within my definition of globalization's Non-Integrating Gap, or those regions that are least connected to the global economy and therefore most at risk of mass violence and conflict, for three reasons. The first reason is sheer geography: Turkey is the literal land bridge between Europe and the regions of the Middle East and the Caucasus, and as such finds itself often buffeted by the latter pair's frequent bouts of instability since the end of the Cold War.

The second reason is that, while Turkey has long been a member of the NATO military alliance, it has been denied membership in the European Union (EU). Is that unfair? I believe it is, and yet this dichotomy reflects Turkey's status as what I describe as a Seam State, meaning a country located along the dividing line between globalization's Functioning Core and its Non-Integrating Gap. In effect, Europe is satisfied with keeping Turkey a military shield against the forces of instability inside the Gap, even as it has not yet seen fit to embrace Turkey as a fully-fledged member of its economic portion of the Core.

As a Seam State, Turkey is therefore easily described as belonging to both the Core and the Gap, so the third reason behind my ultimate choice to locate the country inside the Gap was this: I prefer to see the discussion about Turkey center on the question, "Why isn't Turkey in the Core?" rather than on the question, "How can Turkey be in the Core if it continues to be denied entry into the European Union?" I prefer the former question primarily because I believe that Europe's eventual decision to admit Turkey into the EU should serve as a precedent-setting example for much of the same self-interested logic that will inevitably drive the Core as a whole to seek the Islamic world's broad integration into the global economy. In short, I seek to highlight this historic process as much as possible, and I accomplish that best by highlighting Turkey's economic exclusion from the Core even after decades of belonging to its preeminent military alliance.

It is my sincere hope that Turkey will play the historic role I believe it must in showing how a modern, Islamic state can function as a stable pillar of globalization. If this book adds to such understanding within Turkish society and—by doing so—helps to motivate bold action and wise policies by its leaders in pursuit of this goal, then I will be most pleased by the honor of having my work published in the Turkish language.

Thomas P.M. Barnett
December 2004

Posted by at 10:05 PM | Permalink

■"Hamas May Give Peace a Chance: After Arafat's death, it's Gaza vs. the West Bank," op-ed by Scott Atran, New York Times, 18 December 2004, p. A35.

Now it seems that even Hamas is coming out for moderate candidate Mahmoud Abbas, overtly working to discredit his rivals. Indications are, according to this op-ed, that a split is emerging within Hamas regarding tactics, with the West Bank crowd seeing their chance while the Gaza fanatics want to fight on. As Sheikh Hassan Yusef, the top Hamas leader in the Bank recently stated, "We have to find an exit. We need a dialogue of civilizations, not a clash of civilizations."

The number of potential spoilers is dwindling by the day, leaving only the toughest nuts yet to crack. Is the Bush Administration ready for this historic opportunity? Is it ready to deal? Or are we going to see the same lack of imagination that got us the totally snafu-ed occupation in Iraq?

Posted by at 10:04 PM | Permalink

■"Think Globally, Eat Locally: How to protect food from bioterrorism," op-ed by Jennifer Wilkins, New York Times, 18 December 2004, p. A35.

My Mom can drive me nuts politically sometimes, but one thing she is always good for is spotting a "horse's ass" a mile away. Her take on Tommy Thompson as governor of Wisconsin was always just that: big blowhard who specialized in leaving messes for somebody else's watch.

Thompson's time at HHS was what you expect of him: lotsa press conferences full of sound and fury and signifying basically nothing, plus a record of achievements that will be debated if it's ever located. On his way out the door, he spouts some nonsense about how our food supply is super at risk for terrorist attack. Why? Because we don't check everything at every point in the process, so—shazam!—it must be totally at risk because . . . I dunno . . . look at the disastrous record we've had up to now in terms of bad food outbreaks, mass deaths from them, and . . .what the hell were we talking about again?

The food fear-mongering post-9/11 is one of the weirdest aspects yet of the reign of terror that is the army of self-appointed security experts that now besiege America on a daily basis regarding various sky-is-falling scenarios. I know, I know, it's all so much EASIER to pull off than anyone realizes!.

So here, in this op-ed, we finally get some answers about "how to protect food from bioterrorism." This lady's brilliant answer:

The solution to these insecurities is to establish community-based food systems that include many small farmers and a diversity of products.

My God, Willie Nelson and Farm-Aid would be proud. Let's return to 19th-century agricultural patterns across America just in case al Qaeda might strike. Sure, let's just reverse engineer our entire society on this one, because we just never know!

You know, when Mao planned his Great Leap Backward, his dream was to create a little iron smelting furnace in every peasant's back yard, lest poor China be held hostage to the industrialized West. Now, in response to the 7th-century types running global jihad against Westoxification, we should emulate Mao's dictum by returning to our agrarian roots. Victory gardens? Hell, entire Victory Farms!

This is beyond stupid. But somehow it's what the editors of the NYT op-ed page think we need to know.

We have officially reached the Idiotic Age in this Global War on Terrorism.

Thompson left too early. He was perfectly cast for this sort of role.

Posted by at 10:04 PM | Permalink

■"Europe Bloc Says Turks Can Apply; Long Road Seen," by Susan Sachs, New York Times, 18 December 2004, p. A1.

The EU is nothing if not blunt: "Turkey," it says, "you can start talking about joining us but don't expect it to happen in less than ten years." This from a civilization that routinely refers to all guest workers as "Turks."

Yes, we're talking a United States of Europe any minute now with that attitude!

The kicker is, most of the reluctance of ordinary Europeans is expressed by the fear that letting in a Muslim society would irreparably harm the "Christian" character of the EU. What a laugh that is, since Old Europe hasn't seen the inside of a church for many years now. Hell, the only Catholics who attend mass in big numbers all live in New Europe, so the hypocrisy on this one is profound. Yes, come and do all our dirty jobs in onesies and twosies, but don't expect us to let in an entire country of "you people"!

Here is where the U.S. outclasses the Europeans by a ways. Yes, we may bitch about our illegal Latinos, but we let them in (both legally and illegally) in droves. Most of our arguments are about—quite frankly—how much we should go out of our way to extend the illegals the same rights we grant our own citizens.

Europe has a way to go on figuring out its demographic destiny, but the clock is ticking on those Old Europeans far faster than it is on Turkey, even if the "good Christians" there haven't got a clue.

Relax Turkey, time isn't just on your side, it's a tsunami waiting to happen.

Posted by at 10:03 PM | Permalink

■"In Congo War, Even Peacekeepers Add to Horror: Soldiers Used Money and Treats as Lures, Rape Victims Say," by Marc Lacey, New York Times, 18 December 2004, p. A1.

The UN's record on the Congo has always been so bad, so pathetic, so irrelevant, such a complete waste of time, that I have long thought nothing could possibly come down the pike to make it seem worse.

That something has arrived in the form of the UN's own internal auditing process uncovering the systematic sexual abuse of women by peacekeepers operating there over the past several years. Apparently, the blue helmets came on the scene, noticed the usual tricks of the trade being conducted there, and then simply joined in the party.

How often? Unicef says it's treated 2,000 victims of sexual abuse in the Bunia region in recent months, and that many of them involve peacekeepers. The UN itself owns up to at least 150 incidences involving their troops—so far.

No, Kofi shouldn't resign just because his kid takes bribes, nor for this either. He's such an incompetent symbol of such an incompetent system that both he and his well-deserved Nobel should be on display for as long as possible—if nothing else than as a reminder for how low this organization has fallen in the realm of security, which, BTW, was the entire raison d'etre for its creation following WWII.

Posted by at 10:03 PM | Permalink

■"China's Army May Respond If Taiwan Fully Secedes: A legislative tactic hints again at military action by Beijing," by Joseph Kahn, New York Times, 18 December 2004, p. A7.

This is real news alright. China's legislature "indicates" that it is "preparing" a "law" that will "possibly mandate" a military action "if" Taiwan "were to declare independence."

Check out this bold reporting even in the title: may, if, fully, tactic, hints, again.

Hu Jintao is making clear that the mainland is prepared to go through with its threat to militarily threaten Taiwan if the latter goes out of its way to signal that it will never allow reunification with China. Note that that's not a threat to invade Taiwan if it does nothing to change the status quo.

So if Taiwan never pisses China off unduly, nothing happens—and now China is threatening to make that notion a "law" on its books. Wow. That is news, because it's such a vast change from the last three decades of hints, maybes, and indications.

Tell me which side America really needs to keep an eye on in this situation.

Ah, but if I don't hype this scenario as any analyst worth his salt does (a great naval phrase, if ever there was one), then how can I possibly continue working for the Department of Navy?

Posted by at 10:02 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 17 December 2004

Going back and forth with Putnam about the title of the second book, while back at the naval station they've officially kicked upstairs the decision about whether I can stay at the college and write PNM-II. So on the one hand I've got Neil Nyren at Putnam arguing the notion that PNM is becoming almost its own brand (sounds good, yes?) while the Department of Navy (actually, the Office of General Counsel) gets to decide whether or not it wants me on their label anymore (sounds bad, yes?).

Funny to feel so owned and disowned at the same time. I mean, how can the question of letting me write the second book be any different than the first one? If the success of PNM is the issue, then the real question for the college is whether or not it wants to own that success or distance itself from it. This is not a question the General Counsel will answer, no matter what the decision.

I'm not mad at the college, just sad that they don't know what to do with me. Then again, according to my own vernacular, when something can no longer be described using the usual terms, then clearly you're in the zone of a rule-set reset.

You know, I've always loved that phrase—rule set reset. It's sort of a social science version of rebooting your computer after installing so much new software that a new operating equilibrium needs to be established.

So that's apparently where I'm at right now, riding out the many horizontal scenarios emanating from the System Perturbation that was PNM's publication. Quelle surprise! Mark Warren and I both set out to make sure PNM had that sort of impact. We wanted to change the world! And so as much as I might want to pretend that I could set off this shock wave and not have it impact my personal path too much, I have been careless in gaining my wish.

Failures are so much easier. I actually enjoy abject failure because it's so liberating. Every time I've hit rock bottom, it's always caused to reinvent myself in some way that I later realize represented a far better scenario pathway. With success, however, there is simply the desire to pull back and say no.

But clearly, there in no alternative to writing the sequel. I just need to create the new rule set required to pull it off.

Being the optimist, I will have to hope that whatever that new rule set is, I will either part ways amicably or establish a different, more suitable relationship with the college. That's the expressed desire of my superiors as well, and I don't doubt them when they say that.

Medianalia:

I wrote an op-ed this morning for the Baltimore Sun. Just popped outta bed and cranked it before heading to work. Sweet little 700-word piece on the future of globalization, with the basic point being that in ten years, no one will be able to equate globalization with Americanization. They faxed me a contract upon receipt, so that, plus the fact that they asked me up front to write it (based on the Ignatius article) makes me feel they'll probably print it. I just love it when publications call me up knowing exactly what they'd like me to write. That's what Wired did. That's been my entire relationship with Esquire. I just love when people know exactly what to do with me.

Keep an eye out for it.

Also, if anyone reads Portuguese, the interview I gave Epoca is slated for the 1 January issue, a special annual edition that wraps up the year, I guess.

Likewise, if anyone reads Japanese, my interview with Mr. Akita ran on 15 December in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, the Japanese Wall Street Journal. If anyone has access to the English-language version Nikkei News, I be interested to hear if it ran there as well. As always, electronic copies of anything are greatly welcomed.

Heard back from CNN's Paula Zahn show. The "future of war" series will run in mid-January. Not sure how much I will appear in that, but it will definitely get me to tune in religiously while it runs, if for no other reason to see who else got interviewed.

Also, still waiting to hear from WorldChanging.com regarding the rather long interview I gave them over the phone. Not sure when that will be posted.

Finally, I am slated to do a Tampa-based radio show on 22 December at 8am EST for an hour to discuss the book with Howard Raines, host of American AM, heard M-F, 7-9am EST in Tampa Bay on WWPR 1490 AM and WDCF 1350 AM. Guess I can stand talking to Bucs' fans now that we're no longer in the same division!

That's all I can think of for now.

Here's today's catch:

■ Today's good, not so bad, and ugly on China

■ Everyone seems in the giving mood on Middle Eastern peace this holiday season

■ Iraq's "democracy": the compromise will always be on social values (re: women's rights)

■ Kremlin move to NOC up its energy sector receives rebuff from U.S. federal court!

■ National Guard: prognosis not good

■ The best sign of Core-ness: lotsa new mortgages!

Posted by at 6:05 PM | Permalink

■"Soy Underwear? China Targets Eco-Friendly Clothes Market," by Mei Fong, Wall Street Journal, 17 December 2004, p. B1.

■"Yuan-derful: Fixed or floating, up or down, the Chinese currency isn't a threat to anyone," op-ed by Jonathan Anderson, Wall Street Journal, 17 December 2004, p. A14.

■"A Hidden Cost Of China's Growth: Mercury Migration; Turning to Coal, Nation Sends Toxic Metal Around Globe," by Matt Pottinger, Steve Stecklow, and John J. Fialka, Wall Street Journal, 17 December 2004, p. A1.

The good is oh so good. China is moving into environmentally friendly fabrics, like those made of soybean fiber, and these products are infiltrating markets in Europe and the U.S., where people actually care about stuff like that.

Here's the fascinating impact of that move:

China's involvement in the organic textile trade is likely to push down prices for these premium-priced products globally and help take them mainstream, textile producers say. Price differentials could narrow to the point where it becomes less of a niche product, says Dodie Hung, spokesman for Chinese apparel company Esquel Group. Esquel's cost for organic cotton, which must be handpicked, is about half of what it costs to grow organic cotton in the U.S., currently one of the top exporters of the material in the world.

See, not all the environmental news out of China is bad. In certain instances, the "China price" will actually push the Core toward environmentalism where it would otherwise not move to the same degree.

In the second piece, Mis-ter An-der-son (I've always wanted to say that in a sort of drawn-out Agent Smith sort of way) makes a neat case that the pegged yuan ain't the bogey man we're making it out to be. His most salient point?

Chinese exports have been penetrating European, Japanese and U.S. markets at a headline growth rate of 35% per year—but total Asian exports have not. Overall Asian market share has in fact grown very slowly, which means that for each additional dollar industrialized consumers spend on Chinese imports, imports from the rest of Asia actually fall. This is not because China is "outcompeting" its Asian neighbors; rather, Asian countries have simply moved low-end processing and assembly functions to China, as a final stop on the production chain before shipping off to Wal-Mart or Tesco.

As for the ugly, that's easy. China's skyrocketing energy requirements means its burning everything it can get its hands on, and what it holds most abundantly is loads of the dirtiest coal known to man. So all that increased energy means more coal burned means not only plenty of CO2 (though China is taking great efforts to reduce that particular impact overall) but also a crucial amount of mercury is being tossed into the air and sent over to North America thanks to the conveyer belt of high-altitude winds.

Why doesn't China stop this bad stuff from blowing over to our neck of the woods? It lacks a strong enough rule set on that particular pollutant. In the U.S., companies are required to slap on very sophisticated and costly smokestack scrubbing equipment, but in China you can just pay the fine and avoid the whole damn mess—or more accurately put, just shove it to the next country over.

This is the rub of development: when you move from poor to rich, you do tend to decrease local pollution eventually, but you likewise tend to increase your contribution to global pollution. China's close to the tipping point on many forms of local pollution, because—frankly—it can only get so much worse before people rebel. But when it comes to global pollutants, the world needs to enmesh China in the same entangling global environmental deals that the U.S. signs up to.

What about Kyoto? Our main complaint on that global warming pact was that it excluded rising New Core powers like China and India.

And now you know why that's a big missing ingredient.

Posted by at 6:03 PM | Permalink

■"Sharon Says Breakthrough in Relations With Palestinians Is Possible in '05: 'This is the hour, this is the time,' the prime minister said. 'This is the national test,'" by Steven Erlanger, New York Times, 17 December 2004, p. A14.

■"Donors Consider Large Rise In Aid To Palestinians: Conditions Are Attached; U.S., Europe and Arabs Want Both Sides to Act to Reduce Conflict," by Steven R. Weisman, New York Times, 17 December 2004, p. A1.

Sharon is sending out as clear a signal as possible that he wants to deal, as is the moderate presidential candidate Mahmoud Abbas, as is Egyptian president Hosni Mubarek, and now the deep pocket donors are making all the right noises.

Now all that is left are the spoilers: Hamas and Hezbollah, and their backers Syria and Iran.

Of that quartet, which offers the most arm-twisting potential regarding the others? And which has the most to gain right now by backing a deal?

Hmmmm.

Posted by at 6:03 PM | Permalink

■"A Jeffersonian in Cleric's Garb: U.S. Pins Hope on Ally's View of Iraqi Democracy With Islamic Tint," by Yochi J. Dreazen, Wall Street Journal, 17 December 2004, p. A12.

This is the face of Jeffersonian democracy in Iraq: a cleric by the name of Farqad Qizwini, who talks the talk quite nicely on both economics and politics, but then basically balks at anything that smacks of equal rights for women. Is he a positive force? You bet. Should he be encouraged? Absolutely.

We just need to be real on where Qizwini will draw the line: basically anything having to do with women's rights. Qizwini recently opposed the appointment of a female judge and is working against U.S. attempts to ensure women hold a certain percentage of positions in the new government.

So he's not perfect, but he is willing to withstand the many death threats he's received for even working to make some form of democracy work in Iraq as quickly as possible. Remember, women got the vote here less than a century ago.

Ain't pretty, ain't perfect, and when the push comes to shove, we'll end up holding our noses on certain gender and sex issues again and again.

Don't tell me this is a war over ideologies. This remains the same struggle it's always been—one over sexual mores.

Posted by at 6:03 PM | Permalink

■"Kremlin Reasserts Hold on Russia's Oil and Gas: U.S. Court Moves to Halt Auction Plan for Energy Giant," by Erin E. Arvedlund and Simon Romero, New York Times, 17 December 2004, p. A1.

The Kremlin was all set to have one of those "auctions" where the preferred, government-backed buyer cleans up. This time it was to be government-owned Gazprom buying up the lucrative oil giant Yukos.

But the thing is, Yukos is a private company, and apparently this private company took the unusual step of seeking bankruptcy protection in a U.S. federal court, and apparently this judge agreed with the Yukos' request to block the auction and so issued an injunction. Yukos' CFO is an American, and this guy argued that American stockholders would be harmed by this unfair auction process. Other Euro banks involved in the process said it was unfair for the CFO to take this case to the U.S., since Yukos is a Russian company with no U.S. employees save the CFO.

Pretty tricky move by the CFO, huh?

But Putin is unlikely to be deterred. He wants Russia to parlay its oil, but especially its natural gas, into an economic superpower status:

"The Kremlin wants to set the strategic economic agenda, and that means not leaving the long-term strategies and decisions about how revenues should be spent to private companies," Ms. Hill said. "The state wants control of the commanding heights. This is how Russia positions itself as a superpower."

With a bulked-up Gazprom, Mr. Putin will take a leaf out of the book from China, Japan and South Korea, where governments worked hand-in-hand to champion certain industries and build successful corporate leaders. Mr. Putin was probably paying close attention when China's high-technology giant, the Lenovo Group, bought the personal computer business of I.B.M. this month.

The Kremlin hopes to create huge world-class corporations in important sectors - what Vladimir Konovalov, a member of the Petroleum Advisory Forum, a lobbying group, has called "ship of state" companies.

How bad is it that Putin is "re-Sovietizing" the oil and gas industry? It's not a good sign, but you have to expect Russia to take advantage of what it can under the circumstances. Oil and gas are what get Putin a seat at the table in both Europe and Asia, and it makes him someone the U.S. can't ignore on that basis either.

[Just to preclude the inquiring emails: NOC stands for National Oil Company. I know, energy is not a good business to make pun of.]

Posted by at 6:02 PM | Permalink

■"Guard Reports Serious Decline In New Recruits," by Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 17 December 2004, p. A1.

The Guard's recruiting totals are down 30% for the last two months, forcing them to push up the incentives to as high as $15k in enlistment bonuses. Then there's the $20b bill the Guard says it needs to pay for worn-out/destroyed/expended equipment and supplies thanks to all the deployments it's picked up in this Global War on Terrorism.

How much do these numbers matter? Guard and Reserves make up 40% of the force in Iraq, or roughly what they make up of the total force in being. Of course, the Reserve Component (as the Guard and Reserves are collectively known in DoD-speak) was never designed to be used this frequently. Gone are the days of the two weekends a month and two weeks in the summer, replaced by the reality of the rotational expeditionary force concept that basically promises you'll see a year overseas for every five that you serve.

That sense of certainty may solve the home issues, but it creates new and more difficult work issues. Essentially, you hire a Guard or Reservist and it's much like hiring a woman of child-bearing age: you the employer must expect that soldier will be gone one out of every five years of employment. So what are you, the employer, likely to do? Put that person on the military equivalent of the mommy track?

The rule set reset on the Reserve Component is just beginning, my friends. The SysAdmin function will be served, whether the Pentagon likes it or not.

Posted by at 6:02 PM | Permalink

■"Mexico's Working Poor Become Homeowners: Mortgages From a Government Program," by Elisabeth Malkin, New York Times, 17 December 2004, p. W1.

Give it up to Vincente Fox. He promised to double the number of mortgages granted each year in Mexico by the end of his administration, and he's on track. A Credit Suisse First Boston construction analyst said, "I have never seen a housing plan such as the one in Mexico. It's a unique model that has been extremely successful." So now we're talking roughly 750,000 new mortgages each year in Mexico, instead of the usual 350,000.

To me there is nothing better than home mortgages to signal membership in the Core, because they require both solid property rights and a reasonably sophisticated financial system to pull off. The key? The government housing agency, Infonavit and private lenders have managed to sell roughly $400 million in mortgage-backed securities, or collections of individual loans packaged up into a long-term bond. This is the basis of the sophisticated and very fluid mortgage market that the U.S. has long enjoyed, but such secondary market instruments only came to Mexico in 2003. And that was only 8 years after the peso collapsed.

See, the Core has an A-to-Z system for dealing with economically bankrupt states. Now we just need one for politically-bankrupt states in the Gap.

Meanwhile, Mexico's mortgaging "are laying the groundwork for a new middle class," says one homebuilding company CEO.

Good stuff!

Posted by at 6:02 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 16 December 2004

Nice email I chose to share:

From: The teacher in [city withheld] 'burbs. . .

As a behavioral specialist working with severely emotionally/behaviorally disordered kids, one of my classes is a 'pull-out' (non-mainstreamed) social science course where the curriculum delves into what I term as the four major catalysts that drive/have driven history: a) economics; b) politics (political philosophy); c) cultural development (sociology); and and our current semester project. . . d) religion.

Generally speaking, these kids hate school, they hate teachers, and hate the planet in general. They find no intrinsic value in education and would rather be "4:20'd" the better part of their day if they could.

The other day I was presenting a discussion on violence in world religions. For some odd reason, the kids perked up and started asking questions about the general threads of violence in Judaism, Christianity, and of course, Islam. When the question was asked: "Why does it seem that Islam is so violent and the other two aren't?", I responded with what I thought would be a mini-lesson on the Core and the Non-integrated Gap. . .phrased in HS vernacular of the traditional "HAVES", and "WANNA HAVES" v. the "HAVE NOTS", and the "PISSED OFF BECAUSE THEY DON"T HAVE"/DON'T WANTS".

It carried on for nearly 40', with brains actually thinking, with comments that didn't reflect how much school sucks or how BS my class was. I got questions like: "You mean if the countries that get along because they have too much to lose [the Core], work together to shrink the pissed off rogue countries and the ones that don't have squat, that terrorism and wars might eventually go away?", and "So is this why we're fighting in Iraq?", and "Will Afghanistan and Pakistan really buy into this stuff?".

They actually GOT IT!!!! They understood. The irony is that a group of screwed up, disconnected kids who hate rule sets in their own lives, clearly understood an advanced lesson on global geopolitics, and there are people you face everyday who remain complete skeptics and naysayers.

The joy is. . .indirectly, you helped me reach some really tough kids. . .and for at least one day in their lives, they chose to learn!!!

Thanks,

[name withheld]

Posted by at 11:08 PM | Permalink

Dateline: in bed in Portsmouth RI, 16 December 2004

What's weird for me since PNM came out is this desire of so many people I've never met—or, in many instance, would ever even think to meet—calling me up or sending me emails and asking my permission for them to come to Newport and simply talk to me about the book. I am consistently stunned that anyone would spend the money on airfare or drive several hours in a car for this "privilege." I mean, I can't wave my wand over anything really, and all these appearances simply highlights the weird fit I endure now at the college (or let's say, the lack of any fit).

Late yesterday while I was checking email remotely from home, a colleague of mine at the college reminded me that I had told him to come to a meeting with a bunch of reserve Army officers who had asked weeks earlier to sit down with me and talk about PNM. Damned if these guys didn't give me a single communication by email, instead using only the phone. So sitting at home in Portsmouth, I had no idea how to get a hold of them the night before our planned meeting to let them know I was down with the flu.

[Whew! Come to think of it: good thing I'm not trying to do a TV call-in show tonight in DC on CSPAN. Man, what a stinker that effort would have been.]

Then, true to form, baby kept me up to 4am with a combination of ear infection and two upper teeth coming in (good news being I got to watch both "Boogie Nights" and "Wonderland" right in a row on HBO, which allowed me to observe that the main character in "Boogie Nights" was obviously completely based on John Holmes—okay, not important to you, but that was my evening), so I got up at 9am feeling pretty wobbly. But, I couldn't have a two-star general, three other officers plus a sergeant major all go to the effort of driving all the way to the island from up New England and then get turned away with the news that I was home in bed. I mean, we're talking units that have done plenty of time in Iraq. It's simply a matter of respect for the uniform and those who wear it.

So I sat down with these guys for almost three hours and we talked the realities of what the Army reserve is facing in this Global War on Terrorism. It was a frank exchange and a very good one for me, giving me loads of ideas for future writing as well as a better idea of the challenges that lie ahead in arguing for a SysAdmin function—something they all seemed very charged about in a positive way.

In all, they were an impressive bunch, and I felt deeply privileged that they wanted to take an entire day out of their busy schedules to discuss all these issues with me. Happier still to sign all their books at the end.

Will I get to spend more time with them? Maybe give their rank and file the brief? Hard to say. Not much in it for the Navy, you know. . .

. . . but plenty for the man with a plan.

The Army officers also left me with this nugget, which I pass onto you:

I told them about how I saw PNM as the big idealistic statement of what was possible, based on a rather realistic and ruthlessly pragmatic diagnosis of the current strategic security environment, and that the sequel would project that idealism a good two decades ahead, and then describe—in that same realistic and rather ruthlessly pragmatic way of mine—exactly what I thought it would take to get there. I also told them that the Feb. article in Esquire, which I put to bed last night by phone with Mark Warren (okay, he, as the editor, actually "put it to bed" whereas I merely acquiesced to his latest round of brutal cuts! All so this guy named Jeffrey Sachs can get in his two cents worth in the same issue!), would be a first great expression of this combination, aimed very specifically at the next four years—or the second Bush administration.

The Army officers' response was very interesting: they said a mix of long-term idealism with brutal short-term realism is the essential mental model the military likes to inculcate in its personnel, and I'm not simply referring to some simplistic the-ends-justify-the-means bullshit, but rather a balance of yin and yang, as the Chinese like to describe it to me.

In describing this model, the two-star general cited the "Stockdale paradox" as laid out in Jim Collin's bestselling business book, Good to Great (I have already located a copy and Xeroxed all the relevant pages). The basic story comes from Adm. Jim Stockdale (yes, that same guy who ran quite badly as Ross Perot's VP candidate in '92). Stockdale was not only a former president of the Naval War College, he was the highest-ranking U.S. military officer in the "Hanoi Hilton" POW camp, spending eight years there and suffering numerous incidents of serious torture at the hands of his captors.

Stockdale tells the story of the optimists who never survived their time in Hanoi, simply because they clung far too much to their dreams of release and—in doing so—couldn't handle the brutal realities of what it took to survive the day to day. So instead of dealing with the here and now realistically, they tended to cling to the hope that they'd be home by whatever the next holiday was, and when that day came and went, their spirit would be diminished by that measure. Over time, they died because their spirit was extinguished by reality.

Stockdale's paradox is thus expressed by himself in this manner:

This is a very important lesson. You must never confuse faith that you will prevail in the end—which you can never afford to lose—with the discipline to confront the most brutal facts of your current reality, whatever they might be.

Of course, the opposite is equally true: you don’t want to get so wound around the axle about today's harsh realities that you lose the capacity to dream the happy endings, because that spirit is necessary, if not sufficient, to survive bad times and remain whole. Otherwise the short-term sacrifice loses all meaning, and your sense of a guiding rule set—typically your religious faith—tends to get jettisoned in favor of not just survival-at-all-costs but survival-with-no-sense-of-costs.

Good lessons all around, making me glad I got my sick ass out of bed this morning.

Here's the catch of the day:

■ On the question of who serves, I say let 'em all in!

■ No U.S. SysAdmin, no Core SysAdmin

■ Is Iran ready to deal?

■ To shrink the Gap, let it grow the food

■ When security gets solved, economic connectivity can begin

■ The Hard Right is wrong on military strategy—as usual

■ Saving more lives, but still losing too many souls

■ Rising China = rising hype on threat

■ Insourcing = incoring for Russia

Posted by at 10:21 PM | Permalink

■"At Ivy League Schools, ROTC, Long Banned, Plots a Comeback: Push Stirs Up Old Passions On Some Campuses; A Beachhead at Harvard," by John Hechinger, Wall Street Journal, 16 December 2004, p. A1.

■"Ready, Willing, Disqualified: Before sending vets into battle, let gay troops serve," op-ed by Nathaniel Frank, New York Times, 16 December 2004, p. A35.

In light of the email I received yesterday from a Columbia ROTC advocate, it certainly seemed timely to see the front-page piece in the WSJ this morning (right down to the nice mention on Columbia: "Attitudes may be shifting. At Columbia, a university task force is now considering a return of ROTC. Students in Army ROTC now travel by subway from Manhattan to the Bronx to drill at Fordham University.").

The Ivy Leaguers resistance over the issue of gays in the military seems a bit disingenuous, to say the least. You get the feeling that if that issue didn't survive, opponents would simply come up with some other excuse, and that's too bad, because what I remember of the great chapel at Harvard was the very impressive and solemn memorial hall dedicated to those who served in World Wars I and II. The Ivy League seemed to take real pride in that service back then, so you have to wonder about the profound distance this current standoffishness represents.

And no, don't tell me it's all about gays in the military.

My solution for this issue is a simple one: no gays in the Leviathan but any gay who wants to join the SysAdmin force, either as a civilian or in uniform, would automatically be welcomed no differently than anybody else. I understand the unit cohesion arguments of the old-style military, and frankly, I don't want to disturb that reality with either gays or women.

But my SysAdmin would accommodate both women and gays with ease, along with whatever warfighters would be cool with that complexity on both scores. Since the SysAdmin force would be the face of America 95% of the time, it would present the diversity and tolerance we both preach and usually practice.

Posted by at 10:19 PM | Permalink

■"Darfur: Where Is Europe?," by Christian W.D. Bock and Leland R. Miller, Washington Post, 9 December 2004, p. A33.

■"Pentagon To Seek $80 Billion More: Request to Help Finance Iraq, Afghanistan Presence Is Bigger Than Expected," by Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal, 14 December 2004, p. A1.

Great op-ed castigating the Europeans for taking a total pass on the Sudan. What are they so scared about, the authors wonder?

Simply stated: if the American military doesn't show up, there is no multinational party. And the American military ain't showing up so long as it remains bogged down in both Iraq and Afghanistan. And it will remain bogged down there until the situation either settles on its own, settles because the U.S. creates some local ownership of the issues, or settles because the U.S. gets some major new help from outside powers. Of those three choices, I'd say local ownership is the most realistic.

So if you want help for Sudan, help this administration figure out how to generate some local ownership on Iraq and soon. Because until that situation settles, there'll be no U.S. military effort in Sudan, and that means no European effort.

Bitching at the Euros in the meantime is good sport, but a complete waste of time.

Posted by at 10:18 PM | Permalink

■"Iran and Europeans Open a New Round of Negotiations," by Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, 14 December 2004, p. A14.

■"Will Iran Win the Iraq War?," by Reuel Marc Gerecht, Wall Street Journal, 14 December 2004, p. A14.

■"25 Years Later, a Different Type of Revolution: Western Culture Is Seeping Into Iranian Society, Despite Lingering Restrictions," by Robin Wright, Washington Post, 12 December 2004, p. A20.

■"Minister Says Iran Is Open To U.S. Talks," by Nazila Fathi, New York Times, 15 December 2004, p. A8.

■"Palestinian Urges Arabs to End Violence: Prominent Candidate for President Says Intifada Is a Mistake," by Greg Myre, New York Times, 15 December 2004, p. A10.

Iran and Europe prepare for another round of gamesmanship regarding nukes in Gulf. Meanwhile, strategists fret that Iran may be the big winner in the Iraq takedown.

Duh! You can't take down the Taliban and Saddam and not elevate the mullahs by default. Nor can you commit yourself to not allowing the Sunnis to rule over Iraq anymore and not expect the Shiites there to dominate.

I mean, really! How can any of this be a surprise?

Whether we wanted to or not, we just made a huge friend in Tehran by removing two great pains in its side(s): the Taliban (who played Trotsky to the mullah's Stalin) and Saddam (the Hitler role). Now, in what should be a surprise to no one, the mullahs are both more scared and emboldened (very Stalin-like, yes?).

Meanwhile, Iran's revolution is looking awfully sloppy in Tehran, even if the mullahs ride herd far more effectively in the countryside. I lived in the Soviet Union in the period just after Gorbachev took over, and I recognize a society that's totally gone cynical.

So let's deal with the dead elephant in the living room, I say.

Iran's getting the bomb America. What do you want to get in return?

Iran's says it's ready to deal directly with the U.S. So what cards do we have in our hand, and what are willing to put in the pot?

The Palestinians seem ready to strike deals. Sharon says he's committed to the pull-out. Egypt wants to help on Gaza. Syria's looking ready to pull out of Lebanon.

Tell me, who's missing in this equation?

And no, I'm not talking about the Marie Antoinette crowd in Riyadh.

Posted by at 10:17 PM | Permalink

■"Why Not to Cut Farm Aid: Many Poor Nations Fight Europe's Bid to Lower Barriers," by Scott Miller, Wall Street Journal, 16 December 2004, p. A14.

■"South America Seeks to Fill the World's Table," by Larry Rohter, New York Times, 12 December 2004, p. A1.

The EU is getting ready to slash farm subsidies to its own farmers, but here's the rub: they've given former colonies in Latin America and Africa preferred access over the years via quotas, and so if a truly level playing field in created, rising agricultural powers like nascent ag superpower Brazil will likely quickly overwhelm the competition.

This problem is much like the one the US generates 1 January when it agrees to end quotas on who sells America textiles. Ending that system was designed to let competition flourish in the developing world, but when the decision was made, it wasn't anticipated that New Core power China would rise up so formidably that virtually every Gap nation now quakes in its dominating market presence that's only likely to grow further once the quotas are off.

Brazil is playing the same behemoth role in agriculture, as part of a surging South American profile in the global trade.

What do these conundrums mean? They mean you can't lump in New Core states like India, Brazil, Russia and China with "emerging markets" or "developing countries" anymore, because it's just not fair. When the Old Core sets a new rule set for the "emerging markets as a whole" and lumps New Core powers in with them, the New Core players clean up rather unfairly.

Conversely, when the Old Core is tasked by the Gap to clean up its pollution like CO2, and the world comes up with a Kyoto Treaty that places all the onus on the Old Core (plus Russia) but ignores surging New Core powers like India and China, that's patently unfair.

Posted by at 10:17 PM | Permalink

■"W.T.O. To Consider Iraq And Afghanistan," by Fiona Fleck, New York Times, 14 December 2004, p. W8.

■"Melting Icy Egypt-Israel Relations Through a Trade Pact: The inseparability of politics and economics leads pragmatists to join forces," by Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times, 16 December 2004, p. A3.

The WTO agrees to start membership talks with both Afghanistan and Iraq. This is the beginning of economic and political connectivity for both countries after decades of isolation resulting from security issues. Did it take a U.S.-led coalition war to topple both regimes before these states could even begin the conversation of joining the Core economically? Sure. For some Gap states, that will be the first required step.

But does that mean it’s the required first step for all in the Gap? Hardly. Even an Axis of Evil state like Iran, which is close to gaining acceptance by enough WTO members to start similar negotiations, could begin this integration process simply by acceding to the Core's major security rule sets regarding WMD.

Notice I don't say "major security rule set," because there's more than one. For some states, the rule must be, "the Core can't trust you with WMD under any conditions," but for others, it's "you need to see nukes are for having in a mutually-assured destruction balance, not for using." When you're talking a North Korea, there is no balance and there is great suspicion that Kim Jong Il doesn't get the whole "having, not using" argument. But is the same true for Iran? Is there no balance in the region that could be usefully manipulated to increase regional security? And has Iran exhibited the gamesmanship on its pursuit of nukes that suggests it buys into the logic that nukes are for having, not using?

Until we reach the security rule set for the Middle East that allows Iran to become a major diplomatic and economic player there, it's hard to see how we can be successful in transforming the region for the better. Egypt and Israel began a security dialogue over two decades ago that now allows for something like this very interesting trade pact just signed between the two and the United States. In this agreement, the U.S. offers duty-free imports from Egypt of certain goods so long as those goods contain Israeli inputs.

Yes, there were a host of recent events and calculations by all parties involved that allowed this specific agreement to happen right now, but if there's no Begin-Sadat effort way back when, this doesn't happen.

So guess what? If there isn't some U.S.-Iran-Israel effort today on security, there's virtually no chance that we'll see any real movement in the region toward similar confidence-enhancing trade pacts that involve a wide array of players, and without such agreements, it's hard to imagine how a Mideast will be transformed in coming years.

Posted by at 10:17 PM | Permalink

■"Grumbling Swells on Rumsfeld's Right Flank," by Todd S. Purdum, New York Times, 16 December 2004, p. A20.

■"Defense Missile for U.S. System Fails to Launch: Setback for Interceptor," by David Stout and John H. Cushman, Jr., New York Times, 16 December 2004, p. A1.

I give the neocons credit in pushing the U.S. toward accepting the reality that a Global War on Terrorism is meaningless unless it involves transforming the Middle East, but when it comes to military strategy questions, the hard Right is hardly ever right.

Yes, everyone should bitch about the lack of armor for our troops in Iraq, and we should hold the Pentagon's feet to the fire on this issue. But let's remember where this problem began, with the hard Right's refusal to deal with the world as they found it across the 1990s. The Powell Doctrine is a Republican creation, and its essence was the desire to avoid nation-building and peacekeeping at all costs. That bias created the armor problems we have today in the Army in Iraq, because you don't buy for what you're unwilling to do.

So when the hard Right goes after Rumsfeld on the issue today, as though it sprang out of his office one afternoon, they're kidding themselves—and essentially getting the debate all wrong.

Listen to Bill Kristol, who's really one helluva jackass whenever he opens his mouth on military matters (specifically here, Rumsfeld's poor reply to the soldier about "up-armoring"):

"For me, it's the combination of the arrogance and the buck-passing manifested in that statement, with the fundamental error he's made for a year and a half now," Mr. Kristol said. "That error, from my point of view, is that his theory about the military is at odds with the president's geopolitical strategy. He wants this light, transformed military, but we've got to win a real war, which involves using a lot of troops and building a nation, and that's at the core of the president's strategy for rebuilding the Middle East."

First, the error isn't about attitude, and it sure as hell goes back a lot longer than a year and a half. It's about a vision of the future of war, which is what determines what the Pentagon buys year after year, which is what gets you the force we have today.

Second, it ain't a theory of war, it's a proven capability. We have a transformed force and it just took down both the Taliban in rugged Afghanistan and Saddam in Iraq using its agile speed and overwhelming maneuver—not "lightness" you pinhead! That force won a "real war."

Third, what we face today is exactly nation-building and peacekeeping, but guess what? That's not a "real war" but the reality of generating a real peace. That force does need to be big in size, but guess what? You can only get that sized peacekeeping force when you transform the warfighting one. So again, it ain't a theory, it's a practical reality. Rumsfeld's transformed military is what makes possible Bush's grand strategy of trying to transform the region, first by ably dismantling the biggest military threat there, and then by freeing up the resources within the Defense Department for reallocation to a major nation-building effort. But guess what? That switchover goes badly after 15 years of the Powell Doctrine's dismissal of all those kinds of activities as military-operations-other-than-war crap that "real militaries" that fight "real wars" don't do! And guess who pushed that dogma like crazy across the 1990s? Well, that was hard Right neocons like Kristol, who's either just the stupidest pundit on record regarding military matters or a man with no long-term memory.

Meanwhile, another dreamchild of the hard Right is looking more stupid—both militarily and economically—by the minute. Yes, I'm talking about another complete failure of the missile defense system. There's close to $100b spent by the neocons over several administrations (going back to Reagan when they collectively hatched this asinine dream—thus cementing their historical legacy as pinheads on military strategy).

The shame about the neocons is that they—by and large—know best when, and for what reasons, to wage war, but when you give them any sort of operational control over the Pentagon, they tend to buy the wrong stuff and employ it badly. The funny thing is, these are the guys who always go on and on about letting the military leadership do its own thing when needed—a rule they themselves routinely break on both acquisitions and operations.

Posted by at 10:16 PM | Permalink

■"Iraq Combat Fatality Rates Lowest Ever: Technology and Surgical Care at the Front Lines Is Credited With Saving Lives," by Ceci Connolly, Washington Post, 9 December 2004, p. A24.

■"A Flood of Troubled Soldiers Is in the Offing, Experts Predict," by Scott Shane, New York Times, 16 December 2004, p. A1.

The good news on Iraq is: if your serve, you're less likely to die than in any U.S. war previous. The bad news is: that means more soldiers survive to come home with a certain amount of psychological baggage from combat.

In both Vietnam and Desert Storm, 24% of those wounded ended up dying. In Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Afghanistan operation, that percentage drops to 10%. That is not just impressive, that's amazing.

The U.S. military features the best battlefield medicine the world has ever seen, and we spend plenty for it. But when you wage wars of choice in a global struggle against terrorism, that expenditure not only makes sense, it's the right thing to do.

The downside to that saving of lives is that we now have to plus up extensively our commitment to dealing with the psychological late effects that emerge from combat duty. The Army says it's seeing a traumatization rate of roughly one out of every six soldiers, and experts say the ultimate rate may be one in three, or roughly what we saw in Vietnam.

This is the reality of modern warfare (much like modern police work): you are more likely to be psychologically damaged than killed or maimed, but the responsibility of the government remains the same.

Posted by at 10:16 PM | Permalink

■"China's Splurge on Resources May Not Be a Sign of Strength," by Howard W. French, New York Times, 12 December 2004, p. WK5.

■"China Tries Its Wings as a Global Investor," op-ed by George Melloan, Wall Street Journal, 14 December 2004, p. A15.

■"Beijing, Moscow Plan Joint Military Exercise," by Times Wire Reports, Los Angeles Times, 14 December 2004, pulled from DoD Early Bird.

China is scouring the word for oil, and that's a national security threat to us, right?

The reality is, the U.S./West dominate all the easily accessible sources, pushing China to overpay for access to the more remote/less stable/politically isolated sources like Sudan and Iran.

Here's some brilliant analysis:

"China can be competitive in markets where they face the junior varsity, but not with the varsity," said Andrew Thompson, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "Paranoia is one way to describe their behavior. I would call it an acute awareness of their vulnerability. The new kids on the block who lack faith in the rule of law because they don't have it themselves, they don't see the international system as being in their favor, and engage in a constant quest for vertical integration in their business dealings, wanting to control every aspect of whatever it is they need."

"Wanting to go out and buy equity in natural resources is not inherently wrongheaded, but you have to travel pretty far down the road, in terms of conspiratorial views of the world, in order to justify the way they are going about it," Mr. [Jason] Kindopp [a China analyst at the Eurasia Group, a New York-based political-risk consulting firm] said. "China's economy is grossly imbalanced at this point, with an overwhelming dependence on investment versus consumption—possibly the most imbalanced country in human history," he said, adding that "China is paying peak prices for commodities today, and if their economy stumbles in any significant way, we are going to see really significant declines in the prices and some very serious pain as a result."

And guess who's gonna feel that pain along with China? How about anyone who shops at Walmart?

This is why America needs to realize that China having safe access to reasonably priced Middle Eastern energy is in our economic interest. When China runs around the world seeking oil from rogues and an "axis of evil" state like Iran, it's not thumbing its nose at our national security policy, but rather demonstrating how dependent it's become on that national security policy—for good or ill.

The same is true for U.S. monetary policy, upon which China has also become significantly dependent—albeit by choice by refusing to let the yuan float. So all those insourced dollars get recycled back to America, first just to buy our public debt and then to buy our private debt (secondary mortgage markets) and—increasingly—to buy our economic assets, like the recent sale by IBM to a Chinese electronics company, Lenovo, of a majority stake in its PC business. Will China end up "owning" America someday?

Did Japan? Or have you forgotten all that talk in the late 1980s?

Again, is this strength or a sign of growing dependency?

I see Russia and China planning their first joint military exercise and I see two countries nervous about America's apparent domination of the Middle East, a region in which both countries have significant economic interests. Again, strength or the perception of weakness and an attempt to do something about it.

Posted by at 10:15 PM | Permalink

■"Modest Now, Russian Outsourcing Has Big Hopes," by Erin E. Arvedlund, New York Times, 15 December 2004, p. W1.

When did Russia get its first outsourcing deal from American IT companies? It was in 1991, and the U.S. company involved was Hewlett Packard

Listen to this bit of globalization analysis from the guy who pulled off that deal 13 years ago, and has been pulling them off ever since, Alexis Sukharev:

I had a meeting recently with the U.S. deputy secretary of comer, and he said offshoring is good for the United States. I think it's bad for small groups of people who suffer a lot, particularly outsourcing of white-collar jobs. But the Democrats made it a major campaign pillar, which was simply populist. The world is too simply about globalization now. Outsourcing is unstoppable.

Russia is gunning, not unlike China, to become the next India in IT services outsourcing. The government is backing giant software programming centers much like they did "science cities" during the Soviet phase. Russia's take for now is small compared to India's, or only $500m to India's $11b, but Russia hopes to be up to $2b in two years time.

To insource high-end jobs from the Old Core is to "incore" Russia; it's to make Russia indispensable in something besides natural gas. Cybernetics is another venue where Russia could become a key Core-wide player, given its large talent pool on that subject, but it needs to connect that labor with companies and money that can do something with it.

Education is not the hold-up for Russia on outsourcing: lack of infrastructure and English speakers is. To solve both is to see Russia connect up to the Old Core in a bigger way.

And this will happen.

Posted by at 10:15 PM | Permalink

http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/news/worldtonight/ram/worldtonight_20041214_2.ram

Tom here: thankful that my webmaster Critt thought ahead on this one and got the permanent URL posted. I have listened to the interview twice now, and it always amazes me how much smarter I sound when the interviewer has a British accent! Especially this one, who almost has an Emma Thompson thing going on there.

Posted by Josette at 2:08 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage, slumped in my chair, Portsmouth RI, 15 December 2004

I am deeply impressed with this year's version of the flu. I haven't been able to stand up straight all day.

Here's a nice email that got me through the afternoon (along with the Amazon ranking being back in the low hundreds!):

Dear Mr. Barnett

I would like to thank you from the bottom of my heart for the virtual
revolutionary paradigm you've discovered. I'm currently a Junior in college in
the Intelligence Studies major, and I have to say you probably saved me from a
really nasty burnout 30 years from now. The casual lack of concern for the
proverbial other has seemingly been a cornerstone of "realistic" foreign policy
and strategy. I thank you for bringing enlightened self interest and a sense of
morality back into the picture in a rational and viable strategy. Believe me
your not just influencing young officers, but young intelligence profesionals
(usually an oxymoron I know) as well. Im trying to start a small campaign to
get your book in as required reading anywhere I can force someone to cram it in.

Thanks again and keep up the good work! [D.F.]

I'd give his full name but I don't like to do that with people without asking--especially future intell people!

Of course, Mr. D.F. could just be some Chinese spy trying to get me to keep writing nice things about China . . ..

Hmmm.

Time for more Alka Seltzer Plus.

Posted by at 2:01 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 14 December 2004

Go here to listen to the interview: http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/news/worldtonight/.

Not sure if this URL will work for the long haul, but it's good for right now.

Posted by at 11:42 PM | Permalink

Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 14 December 2004

Busy day. Taped interview with BBC radio's "The World Tonight" over lunch. That was set to run in the 1700 hour EST (listening to it now as I type late at night via web). I was, oddly enough, in very rare form considering I haven't done a phone interview in a while. Sometimes I can start incredibly choppy and disjointedly, but this time I was rapid fire from stem to stern.

Then I got a call from Aaron Brown's show on CNN, from a producer perusing the book in rapid order (clearly a result of the Ignatius piece). I was supposed to do a quick phone interview with her around dinner time to scope out the possibility of appearing on Brown's show in the near term, but we did not link up.

The afternoon was lost to a workshop I facilitated at the war college, an "innovation forum" where we brought in a lot of private-sector heavies to discuss future pathways for the world. That seemed to go well.

After the workshop, I rushed home for daughter Emily's 13th birthday celebration. We now have a teenager in the house. Enough said on that one.

Then back to the college and the Officers' Club to give a short presentation to a local group of retired military officers and college profs. I got home around 10:30 p.m., feeling like I was falling victim to the flu that's already hit three of the kids and now seems to have its claws in me.

Rewinding to the start, the day really began for me when I read David Ignatius' most excellent op-ed around 7am this morning. Here's the piece in full, and you can click here for the original

Washington Post

December 14, 2004

Pg. 27

Winning A War For The Disconnected

By David Ignatius

It hasn't been reviewed by the New York Times or The Post, and it's little known outside the military. But the red-hot book among the nation's admirals and generals this holiday season is a work of strategy by Thomas P.M. Barnett called "The Pentagon's New Map."
Imagine a combination of Tom Friedman on globalization and Karl von Clausewitz on war and you begin to get an idea of where Barnett is coming from. His book tries to rethink strategy for a post-Cold War, post-Sept. 11 world caught between order and anarchy, self-satisfaction and rage, prosperity and ruin.

Barnett's central thesis is that today's world is divided into two categories: the "Functioning Core" of nations connected to the global economy and prospering as never before, and the "Non-Integrating Gap" of nations disconnected from the matrix of wealth and progress and therefore spinning toward chaos. Most of America's military interventions in recent years have been in the Gap, notes Barnett, but we have failed to understand that we face a common enemy there.

The enemy "is neither a religion (Islam) nor a place (the Middle East), but a condition -- disconnectedness," writes Barnett. "If disconnectedness is the real enemy, then the combatants we target in this war are those who promote it, enforce it and terrorize those who seek to overcome it by reaching out to the larger world." It's hard to think of a better definition of the cleavages that underlie the war in Iraq or the battle against al Qaeda.

Barnett doesn't see America's role as a neo-imperialist global centurion. Instead, he argues, the U.S. goal must be to promote "rule sets" that are shared by Core and Gap alike. "All we can offer is choice, the connectivity to escape isolation, and the safety within which freedom finds practical expression," he writes. "None of this can be imposed, only offered. Globalization does not come with a ruler, but with rules."

Barnett has been tinkering with these ideas since the late 1990s, but they came into focus, not surprisingly, after Sept. 11, 2001. Three months later, he was giving the first versions of a briefing that has now been heard by hundreds of senior military officers. His concepts have spread so fast among the military brass that when I was in Bahrain two weeks ago, I heard a Barnett-style briefing from the commander of U.S. naval forces in the Persian Gulf, Vice Adm. David Nichols. He outlined a strategy of encouraging countries in the Middle East to move toward "connected" economies, orderly "rule sets" and democratic political reform.

Barnett's ideas have been taken up by other military commands that must reckon with disorder in the Gap, including those responsible for the Pacific and Latin America. The Air Force has asked him to brief every new roster of one-star generals, and the Navy has him lecture each year at the Naval War College. And Barnett was the featured speaker last week at a meeting of the Pentagon's high-level technology group, the Highlands Forum. With so many officers buying books, "The Pentagon's New Map" has managed to sell more than 50,000 copies.

So what does Barnett's strategy imply for the vexing problems of today, such as Iraq and Iran? Barnett argued in his book that linking Iraq to the Core is job No. 1. "Show me an Iraq that is as globally connected as an Israel in 10 years and I will show you a Middle East that can never go back to what it has been these past two decades -- overwhelmingly disconnected, populated with dispirited youth, and enraged beyond our capacity for understanding." Barnett would still like to see such an Iraq emerge as a stabilizing local pillar, but he told me this week that the U.S. occupation there has been so "totally snafu-ed" that Iraq may not be able to play that role.

Barnett sees Iran as the potential bridge between Core and Gap in the Middle East. He will argue in an article in the next issue of Esquire that the United States should try to make Iran its local security partner in the region, accepting its hegemony over a future Shiite-led Iraq and the Persian Gulf. The alternative is a new Yalta-style fault line between East and West -- one that could divide the West from emerging Core countries such as India and China.

Visiting Iraq, as I did this month, you can see that the United States has gotten itself into a heck of a mess in that part of the world. Reading Barnett's book gave me a rare moment of hope that perhaps we can still think ourselves out of these problems, rather than just shoot our way out.

COMMENTARY: I don't think a more perfect 783-word description of the book and its impact is possible—right down to his retelling of the story he told at the Highlands Forum about the Central Command briefing by Adm. Nichols to the combatant commander Gen. John Abizaid. What's more impressive to me are the quotes Ignatius uses. Frankly, they are my favorite lines in the book, including the one I used with the BBC today: "None of this can be imposed, only offered. Globalization does not come with a ruler, but with rules." His mentioning of there being no reviews in either the Post or Times is very gratifying, because it labels PNM as a cult hit inside the Pentagon that needs to be read more widely. In all, Ignatius did me one helluva turn here, and I couldn't be more pleased. Especially since I never asked anything from him, despite his comments at the Highlands Forum (in fact, we never spoke one-on-one at the event). So this was his decision, based on his experiences at CENTCOM and his reading of the book. The fact that he ends with a sentence highlighting the "hope" he found in PNM . . . well, that is just icing on this fabulous cake. With a piece like this, it gets harder for people around here to argue that I don't do good things for the military with my writings—even as so many disagree with my vision.

Here's today's catch:

■ The need to create local security partners on Iraq

■ In the ship of Gap, it's women and children last

Posted by at 11:18 PM | Permalink

■"Iraq, Jordan See Threat To Elections From Iran: Leaders Warn Against Forming Religious State," by Robin Wright and Peter Baker, Washington Post, 8 December 2004, p. A1.

■"Rebels Aided By Sources in Syria, U.S. Says: Baathists Reportedly Relay Money, Support," by Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post, 8 December 2004, p. A1.

■"U.S. Wants to Block Iran's Nuclear Ambition, but Diplomacy Seems to Be the Only Path," by Thom Shanker, Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, New York Times, 12 December 2004, p. A10.

■"U.S. and Europe Are at Odds Again, This Time Over Iran," by Steven R. Wiseman, New York Times, 12 December 2004, p. A10.

■"Iran and Europeans Open A New Round Of Negotiations," by Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, 14 December 2004, p. A14.

■"Will Iran Win the Iraq War? A hawkish stance on Tehran would help us in Baghdad," op-ed by Reuel Marc Gerecht, Wall Street Journal, 14 December 2004, p. A14.

The United States cannot make Iraq work all by itself in the region. It cannot make Iraq stable in defiance of every other state in the region. Yes, we can get small weak states like Jordan to go along (what choice do they have sitting right next door to 150,000 U.S. troops?), but the big, more powerful ones aren't simply going to go along.

That's why we need to create a serious security partner in the region—someone who's big and who can bring along others. Iran is that someone. With Tehran, you've got a chance for stability in Iraq, but without them, tell me how it works.

Instead of fixating on Iran's quest for the bomb, which only alienates our European allies all over again (our credibility on this subject is—let's say—a bit weak following Iraq), the U.S. needs to think long and hard about what it would take to turn Iran from our inveterate enemy to someone whose strategic interests essentially overlap with ours in terms of security.

When the Taliban went away, who was most happy in the region?

Ditto for Saddam?

The tipping point on our relationship with Iraq is coming. It can go very well or very bad. But it's coming.

So's my piece for Esquire, which I'm sure will generate more hate mail than I can possible read and probably get me some heat from the Navy for what I say about China.

But hey, it's a career!

Posted by at 11:16 PM | Permalink

■"Beggar, Serf, Soldier, Child: Watching as a continent crushes millions of its young," by Somini Sengupta, New York Times, 12 December 2004, p. WK1.

■"For Africa's Poor, Pregnancy Is Often Life Threatening," by Marc Lacey, New York Times, 12 December 2004, p. A14.

■"A Harsh Price to Pay in Pursuit of a Dream: For Central American Women, Sexual Coercion Is Hazard on Route to U.S.," by Mary Jordan, Washington Post, 6 December 2004, p. A1.

Across the Gap, child beggars are the norm. It's just one big Charles Dickens' scene with brutal overlords who beat the kids who don't return with their daily quota.

Sengupta, a veteran reporter on Africa, paints a sad story:

I have met fathers who have sent away their boys to break stones in another country—something they couldn't imagine their own fathers doing. I have met girls who will never go to school because their mothers rely on them to fetch water and firewood, one reason girls' education rate in sub-Saharan Africa remain the lowest in the world. Only 56 percent of girls were attending school between 1996 and 2003, according to Unicef.

In fact, in the roughly 40 years since these countries have freed themselves from Europe's colonial rule, the plight of children in Africa has only grown worse.

Worse means these kids are poorer, more diseased, less educated, and living shorter lives full of more suffering and degradation. Shrinking the Gap is fundamentally about saving these children—pure and simple. Yes, you will kill men along the way, and we—the Core as a whole—will lose loved ones in the process. But tell me a better reason why than the killing and genocide and the wars and the children forced into combat units and the mass rapes, etc—give me a better reason to stop all these than to save these kids from this horrible existence.

And if the Core as a whole has to lower its standard of living a bit to make this inclusion happen, tell me what's so wrong about that? Is America's survival based on how much stuff we can buy while kids live in misery throughout much of the Gap?

But it's not just the kids who are terribly marginalized by all this instability and violence that we routinely turn a blind eye to. Just as much it's the women, who seem destined to suffer all sorts of indignities and threats primarily due to their biology. Pregnancy and childbirth "are among the top killers of women" inside the Gap, more so because of all the horrific situations that too many women find themselves in just trying to survive conditions there, or, more ambitiously, to escape those conditions and make their way to the Core.

Where do the mass rapes as a tool of terror occur? Inside the Gap.

How do many women escape this plight? They are forced into becoming sex slaves by "smugglers, border officials, street gang members and others who control the underground route to the United States," and this means "many female migrants are paying an especially harsh price for a chance to land a job in the north, according to government and church officials."

Society is judged by how it treats its most vulnerable elements—such as mothers and children. If we're going to have a global society, don't we have to start judging the Core as a whole on what it lets occur to women and children inside the Gap?

Posted by at 11:15 PM | Permalink

Critt here. . . Barnett's webmaster. . .

Tom was interviewed today by BBC radio for this main evening news program "The World Tonight." It will be aired this evening in the 5pm EST hour. Catch it if you can.

The interview was prompted by David Ignatius' op-ed this morning in the Washington Post, click here to see the original. Tom will blog the piece tonight--without fail.

Posted by Josette at 9:56 AM | Permalink

Dateline: Portsmouth RI, 13 December 2004

The prophet is never welcome in his birthplace, and you can never go home again.

Then again, Washington, which we abandoned almost 7 years ago (itch, itch), seems to like me more and more the longer I stay away.

This morning I got a call from David Ignatius. After what he saw in Central Command during his trip last week, he's convinced PNM is the little book that roared. He was amazed to find out that neither the Post or Times had reviewed it!

So he's devoting his entire op-ed column tomorrow in the Post to correcting that oversight.

Then later in the day I hear from C-SPAN: the decision has been made to broadcast the brief taped at the Highlands Forum on Monday night, 20 December, at 8pm EST, with my live, call-in segment to follow from 9:30 to 10:30pm. Then the whole thing gets run again once or twice, with probably one of them coming immediately after the first showing in order to catch the West Coast crowd (the 11pm to 2am EST slot).

Am I holding my breath? No. But I will be working out plenty between now and then to tighten my gut as much as possible.

Got the first serious edit of the Wired piece I wrote for the February issue on the question of how to fight this Global War on Terrorism using the out-of-date rule set called the Geneva Convention of 1949. They rewrote the first paragraph quite a bit, as editors often do, but it was just a juicier restatement of my original opening (I suck at openings, I will admit, and as Mark Warren constantly reminds me {he rewrote the opening of the upcoming Feb article in Esquire too}). The rest of the piece reads fundamentally the same. All in all, I would have to say that my first writing assignment with Wired was really quite easy, meaning I'd love to do it again.

Of course, having pieces in the Feb issues of both Esquire and Wired should lower my standing at the college to new depths.

Really, what was I thinking writing for such magazines with wide circulation?

Here's today's catch:

■ How the Core can be destroyed . . . or enlarged

■ You have to wonder about all those poppies in Afghanistan

■ Taiwan thinks twice about Chen's push for independence

Posted by at 10:25 PM | Permalink

■"Unhelpful China," op-ed by Dan Blumenthal, Washington Post, 6 December 2004, p. A21.

■"Russia's Unchecked Ambitions: The White House is treating the Ukrainian crisis as an isolated affair, and not linking it to Putin's actions in other former Soviet states," op-ed by Jackson Diehl, Washington Post, 6 December 2004, p. A21.

■"Beyond the Rim: China is bent upon and will achieve gross military and economic parity with the U.S.," op-ed by Mark Helprin, Wall Street Journal, 13 December 2004, p. A16.

■"Japan's New Military Focus: China and North Korea Threats," by James Brooke, New York Times, 11 December 2004, p. A3.

■"Embraceable E.U.," by Robert Kagan, Washington Post, 5 December 2004, p. B7.

■"Afghans' Gains Face Big Threat in Drug Traffic," by Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 11 December 2004, p. A1.

Dan Blumenthal sees China as a dangerous threat because when we engage it in an "engagement policy," China doesn't give us everything we want in every situation that we consider important.

America wants to isolate Iran, whereas China, facing a rough doubling of its energy in the next two decades, oddly enough wants to have warm relations with Iran, third biggest source of oil and second biggest source of gas in the world. Funny how that works, isn't it? America decides it's all about WMD, and China decides it's all about oil and gas. Therefore the United States is good, and China is obstructionist.

I mean the United States just conquered the world's second largest reserves of oil. Nothing provocative in that. What's a military occupation compared to a $100b oil and gas deal?

Ditto on the Sudan, where the U.S. has done so much on its own to stop the killing, that surely China holding up the all-powerful UN Security Council's economic sanctions is the reason why the killing goes on. Bad China, bad. This is all your fault!

Ditto on North Korea, where the U.S. offers China what in return for its possible help? How about a missile shield for East Asia with Beijing on the wrong side. Sound friendly enough to you? I mean, who can turn down an offer like that?

And of course, there is Taiwan, to whom we sell loads of weapons. Nothing provocative in that, mind you, so it does seem strange that China grows its military as its economy explodes in size. Really odd.

China is indeed very unhelpful. That's why the world refers to it as a hyperpower out of control, bent on conquering the world for oil!

Hmmm, that sounds vaguely familiar . . .

Well, we should definitely do to China what the Brits did to us when we arose in the first half of the 20th century as their eventual equal: we should target them as a long-term threat and do whatever it takes to make them our enemy! I mean, screw this nonsensical Global War on Terrorism! Don't change our military into peacekeepers or counter-terrorist elements! Better to wall off America and wait for the Chinese to eventually come after us! Yes, Mark Helprin is a strategic genius. China is on the verge of matching our expeditionary forces. It will happen any day now—the differences between elbows and assholes notwithstanding. Hell, I'd trade the U.S. military for China's right now, to answer Cap Weinberger's old question about the Sovs. We are such fools not to see this coming.

Russia is also clearly very bad. Can you imagine the U.S. badgering small defenseless countries in its "near abroad"? I mean, just invading them and removing leaders from power? I dunno, like in Haiti or Panama or Haiti or Haiti?

Geez, do you think it's time to invade Haiti again? It seems like such a long time since we did it last?

Of course, when we do it, it's all for the good, something I truly believe. But whenever anyone else in the Core does it, you know it's gotta be bad—all bad.

Too bad the Europeans aren't more like us, invading countries more often. Instead, those pussies insist on offering smaller, poorer nations the chance to join their union.

Gosh, I seem to remember America doing the same a long time ago.

Maybe we should just make Haiti the 51st state. Gotta be cheaper than invading every five years for . . . I dunno . . . about the last 100 years.

Maybe the U.S. should try the EU route, offering, as Robert Cooper says, "the lure of membership." Maybe if we weren't so uptight about our borders, we'd be a bit more trusted whenever we acted abroad militarily, or when we lecture the Europeans about letting more Muslims in as immigrants.

But at least Japan is becoming more like us: more fixated on North Korea and China as threats, building up its defense, erecting (with our help) an east Asia missile shield. It might be cheaper just to topple Kim Jong Il and make friends with China, the country whose imports of Japanese goods accounted for something like 90% of Japan's economic growth in that category last year. But why take the easy route? Better Japan build up its defenses over time. That's how you really grow the Core, not the way those pansy Europeans insist on doing it—by invitation, mind you!

Posted by at 10:25 PM | Permalink

■"Afghans' Gains Face Big Threat in Drug Traffic," by Eric Schmitt, New York Times, 11 December 2004, p. A1.

■"Where Democracy's Greatest Enemy Is a Flower," op-ed by Ashraf Ghani, New York Times, 11 December 2004, p. A31.

Maybe I'm just stupid, but how much money do you think it would cost the U.S. simply to buy up Afghanistan's entire heroin crop every year?

Actually, less than $3 billion dollars.

Posted by at 10:24 PM | Permalink